Alright, alright. I've now read this book three times. Here is a very comprehensive (and I think quite valuable!) summary:
This is an essay on the general economy, a term Bataille uses to designate how human societies are continuous with and similar to organic matter. Like the sun, which dispenses energy without return and thus gives earth an excess energy that is destroyed, the general economy abides by the same drive towards destruction of excess. Rather than narrowly studying, as economists do, the economy of a country or the price of wheat, Bataille examines how human societies and organic matter produce more wealth (energy) than can be usefully expended. Provocatively, Bataille regards his study as “holding the key to all the problems concerned with the movement of energy on earth—from geophysics to political economy, by way of sociology, history and biology” (10) Otherwise put, Bataille contends that human societies are significantly, if not principally, characterized by how they non-productively expend excess energy. Indeed, as Bataille provocatively states, “the choice [for systems] is limited to how the wealth is to be squandered” (23).
Bataille’s notion that societies non-productively expend energy is thus the focus of his subsequent studies on sex, religion, and war. Concerned with the non-(re)productive aspects of sex, Bataille claims animal sexual reproduction is “the occasion of a sudden and frantic squan¬dering of energy resources” that “goes far beyond what would be sufficient for the growth of the species” (35). That is, the drive to grow and reproduce the species is inevitably, inescapably, and necessarily undermined by a drive that non-productively expends excess energy and resources.
Such is the drive that Bataille designates as the inscrutable “accursed share.” This curse, for Bataille, in another Hegelian move, “cannot be lifted if the movement from which it emanates does not appear clearly in consciousness… what it aims at is consciousness, what it looks to from the outset is the self-consciousness that man would finally achieve in the lucid vision of its linked historical forms” (40-41). This self-consciousness Bataille later defines as “the return of being to full and irreducible sovereignty,” it is the full possession of intimacy (189). In yet another Hegelian move, Bataille states that is movement is far from being equal to itself (45). However, in a manner that is directly opposite of Hegel, “the man who is relatively idle or at least unconcerned about his achieve¬ments… helps us to gauge that which we lack” (46). Rather than the assertive man who actively leaves (yet in so doing constitutes) the family, enters civil society, undergoes his own Bildung, and thus gains consciousness of himself and age, it is the idle and passive man who illuminates this general movement of history. Moreover, we experience death, according to Bataille, first as a negation of ourselves and then, in a sudden reversal, as the profound moment of which life is the manifestation (35). Further yet, like Hegel’s idea of the absolute’s movement that retains that which it cancels, Bataille notes that “History ceaselessly records the cessation, then the resumption of growth” (106). Marx flipped Hegel on his head, now it’s Bataille’s turn.
Crucially, the squandering of excess energy can either be glorious or catastrophic. For Bataille, death is the most wasteful and catastrophic of all expenditures. While warmongers may insist that their ends are rational and conducive to a set of desirable political outcomes, Bataille notes that the killing of people, of would-be useful laborers, is the climax of non-productive expenditure. War, states Bataille, “consigns men and their works to catastrophic destructions. For if we do not have the force to destroy the surplus energy ourselves, it cannot be used, and, like an unbroken animal that cannot be trained, it is this energy that destroys us; it is we who pay the price of the inevitable explosion” (24). Indeed, Bataille has in mind how booming industry in the early 20th century lead to an excess that was non-productively expended in war. In lieu of directing non-productive expenditure in such a way that is glorious, such as gift-giving, luxury (as seen in eating, death, and sex) leisure, or squandering, war uses the excess energy of human societies to partake in the costliest of expenditures. In gift giving, for example, the article of exchange was seen to not belong to the order of things (65). These exchanges, per Bataille, were far from present day commercial practices (67). Regarding the potlatch, Bataille’s point is that a good amount of our behaviors are reducible to its laws.
Importantly, the general economy is a ‘general movement of life’ with a logic of its own (34). In Bataille’s remarks on the Aztecs, he recalls his definition of religion from Theory of Religion as the search for lost intimacy and notes that the executioners of the victims in Aztec culture experienced momentary intimacy. This intimacy of the sacrifice, of death, is the unconscious and destructive experience of the sacred (51-52). Why is this the case? Because “Sacrifice restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, rendered profane. Servile use has made a thing (an object) of that which, in a deep sense, is of the same nature as the subject, is in a relation of intimate participation with the subject” (55). Whereas the world of things had been introduced by labor, sacrifice and non-productive expenditure represent a search for lost intimacy (57).
Bataille argues that the one who expends energy non-productively and/or consumes energy uselessly is sovereign. In the case of war, the general is sovereign. However, in the case of ethical life, the one who expends their energy non-productively is sovereign in such a way that productive expenditure of energy is not. The sovereign, for Bataille, choses how energy is squandered. Indeed, Bataille’s fascination with sacrifice and the sacred are demonstrative of his idea of sovereignty. Expending energy non-productively is at once Bataille’s idea of the sacred and the means (which have no ends) through which sovereignty is practiced. Running against the profane grain of work and production, non-productive expenditure, epitomized in the act of sacrificing excess wealth and energy, demarcates a sacred sphere of experience. As Bataille notes, “sacrifice restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, rendered profane” (55). Useless consumption and the squandering of excess energy are how societies and individuals can and do experience the sacred world outside of the profane world of production.
As a scholar of religion, I found his theorizing on Tibetan Buddhism (in which the excess wealth of society was non-productively directed towards and preserved by a large class of monks), the Reformation, and Islam to be fascinating and troubling. Bataille thoughtfully shows how Calvin was a spokesperson for the upper-middle class bourgeois of Geneva. In advocating for the virtue of business (i.e., the charging of interest and profit-seeking) and the saintliness of all labor, Calvin, for Bataille, ironically profanes all of life. As Bataille states of Calvin: “The decisions to rescue divine glory from the compromises in which the Church had placed it could not have had a more radical consequence than the relegation of mankind to gloryless activity” (124). In one move, Calvin condemned luxury and idleness and praised enterprise. Similarly, capitalism and Protestantism alike prefer the increase of wealth to its immediate use (119). Indeed, according to Bataille, the Reformation’s critique of Rome is epitomized in the Reformers’ (especially Calvin’s) reduction of morality to commerce. Though I’m not sure if Bataille is correct in his estimation that Middle Age economic practices were not mirrored in Papal ordinances, I do agree with Bataille that Calvinism symbolically profaned the world and divinely sanctioned a burgeoning capitalism. The originality in Bataille’s understanding of capitalism and Calvinism is that both are not strictly involved in thrift and rational expenditure, but inevitably tends towards non-productive expenditure of excess energy—and the danger of both capitalism and Calvinism (insofar as we can always distinguish between the two) is that the agents of both camps are unaware of such non-productive expenditure.
Notably, Bataille sees similarities between Calvinism and Marxism. Namely, Bataille holds that those who presume that action, that is, work, will liberate themselves from the world subordinate themselves to the realm of things. The proletariat, for Bataille, “readily accepts being finally reduced, by the work of liberation, to the condition of a thing” (141).
Bataille sees the shift from pre-Islamic Arabic tribal societies of non-productive expenditure to a religious-military machine of conquest that oriented all excess expenditure towards the enemy as a shift from tribal sovereignty of oneself to calculative reasoning and expenditure. Reading Charles Bells’ book on the 13th Dalai Lama alongside the longer of Tibet, Bataille sees Tibetan practices that orient excess not towards preparation for impending war, but a dumping of all excess into the contemplative life (109). For the Tibetans, “life was its own end” (109).
In the truest sense of the phrase, this a good book. Though mistakes, oversights, and confusions occur in the text, such as a latent Orientalism in Bataille’s analysis of Islam, the thesis of the book is at each turn substantiated and proven. Moreover, Bataille is one of the few who has shown how his study of ‘political economy’ is different than a study of ‘economics.’ Many Marxists insist that they study ‘political economy,’ but fail to distinguish how this is any different than what Smith and Ricardo were studying ‘economics.’ However, Bataille breaks with the economists and demonstrates what it means to think broadly about the general economy.