“Imagine a stealthy electric flying car that lands like a helicopter, flies in near silence, and can autonomously navigate behind enemy lines to drop off, pick up, or resupply U.S. forces. Or tiny AI-powered quadcopters that can map the inside of a building and recognize faces of terrorists before Navy SEALs break down the door. Or a constellation of microsatellites that can see through clouds, enabling intelligence agencies to keep a constant eye on ISIS troop movements and North Korean missiles. Or a fleet of seagoing drones that can scan for threats for a fraction of the price of a single navy destroyer, for years at a time. All these advanced technologies – and many more like them – were being developed…They were designed not by brand-name defense companies but by plucky startups in Silicon Valley. And guess what? The U.S. military barely knew anything about them…”
- Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchoff, Unit X: How the Pentagon and Silicon Valley are Transforming the Future of War
The budget for the United States military is enormous. Last year, it came in at a staggering $820 billion. Unfortunately, it has become exceedingly clear in the past several years that despite spending all this money, the American armed forces have begun to lag with regard to its peer competitors, such as China and Russia. Indeed, in crucial areas such as hypersonic weapons and unmanned vehicles, the United States has fallen woefully behind.
Some of this is the result of America’s Middle Eastern Wars, a twenty-year period in which the military establishment focused intently on a very specific form of counterinsurgent warfare that will have little bearing in a superpower conflict. Some of this is the result of outmoded thinking and reliance on super-pricey legacy systems – such as aircraft carriers – that look really neat but have become increasingly vulnerable to advanced weaponry.
Much of this has to do with the so-called military-industrial complex, which has shriveled down to five major contractors known as “the Primes:” Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Boeing, and Northrup Grummond.
Reliance on these companies has created an inbred system in which failed projects, cost overruns, excruciatingly slow pipelines, and technology outmoded before operationality is not a bug, but a feature. The Primes feast on delicious tax dollars while providing marginal returns on investment. Boeing, for example, cannot keep its commercial jetliners in the air during times of peace, yet America is trusting it to remain on the cutting edge in war. It is a terrifying prospect for anyone living under the United States’s military umbrella, and an infuriating prospect for taxpayers, who have the right to expect that their dollars will be utilized effectively, if not always efficiently.
In Unit X, Raj M. Shah and Christopher Kirchoff tell the story of a group of men and women who saw a looming disaster, and sought to change the trajectory of the military procurement process, focused on finding high-tech projects suited for the twenty-first century, and streamlining the process of bringing them online. Given that they were the founders of Unit X, Shah and Kirchoff are in a unique position to present this tale, and provide a rather positive look at the potential advantages of more diverse military-private sector relationships.
Whether or not it’s already too late remains to be seen.
***
Unit X is a book that starts slow, ends slow, and does its best work in the middle. It grabs you with a sharply etched anecdote – with Shah flying an F-16 with outdated mapping technology on the border of Iraq and Iran, unsure of exactly where he was located – and then delves into the creation of Unit X.
The Defense Innovation Unit X – the “X” for experimental – was the brainchild of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. He tapped the authors – Shah was a fighter pilot who went to the Wharton School of Business; Kirchoff served in President Obama’s National Security Council – with finding ways to adapt commercial technology for military applications.
Obviously, it’s important to know how this unit formed, but it’s not necessarily exciting. It is, in fact, the opposite of exciting – or more precisely, the second cousin of boring – a stultifying tour of a wasteful and arbitrary budgetary process, filled with faceless staffers wielding power incommensurate with their unelected statuses. Suffice to say, the creation of Unit X, and it’s survival, comes as something of a minor miracle.
***
The book becomes much better when it gets the setup out of the way, and starts giving examples of what it did. Some of those are given in the excerpt at the top of the page.
For instance, Unit X went to the massive airbase in Qatar, where airmen were scheduling in-air refueling flights – requiring intense, complex coordination – with tools little better than an abacus. This was part of an issue that Northrup had been tasked with solving. Unfortunately – but not shockingly – Northrup was $300 million over budget, three years late, and still hadn’t done anything. Unit X arrived, developed an app for the price of $1.3 million, and solved the problem. Because of the high costs for refueling, the efficiencies created by the app meant that it paid for itself in a week.
This is bracing stuff, and constituted the best parts of Unit X. These pages flew by, and left me wanting more.
The success of Unit X drew immediate pushback, of course. Not because they did poor work, but the opposite. The Primes did not like the idea of an entity cutting into their profit margins, potentially forcing them – gasp – to do quality work on time and on budget.
Unit X also faced difficulties with regard to Silicon Valley’s reluctance to partner with the military. Google employees, for example, signed a petition when they learned that the company was working on facial recognition software that could be used in drone strikes. Ultimately, though, money – and the promise of more money – ignited the fires of patriotism in a number of tech firms.
***
If I have to choose between a book written by a participant, or one written by a third party, I will always choose the latter. To be sure, the first-person perspective is valuable. Yet it also comes with a certain lack of objectivity. Shah and Kirchoff are extremely smart, capable, and successful, and they let you know about it repeatedly. It can get old, seeing them pat themselves on the back so often it had to have left bruises. They also narrate Unit X with a semi-obnoxious amount of corporate-speak.
The other problem that comes from Shah and Kirchoff’s limited perspective is that they end up leaving Unit X long before Unit X concludes. Thus, the end of the book is an aimless meander. Instead of learning more about gadgetry – the cheap synthetic aperture radar satellites meant to see through clouds were especially interesting – we are treated to bland filler, which drifts far afield from the core focus.
To take one example, Shah and Kirchoff deliver some recommendations for the future. This includes a national military service requirement for all Americans. While wonderful in theory, it’s a notion that doesn’t make much sense in practice. Shah and Kirchoff do not describe where the extra billions of dollars are coming from to train, clothe, feed, arm, and house millions of new and unwilling soldiers, much less provide them benefits and healthcare; they don’t give any idea of what these soldiers are going to be doing; and they don’t explain why they spent two-thirds of a book extolling autonomous planes and ships, but then suddenly decide the United States needs the largest standing army in its history. In short, it’s the kind of thing you put down on paper when you’ve run out of things to say.
***
As we’ve seen in the Russo-Ukrainian War, some aspects of warfare will always remain the same. It will always be a source of misery, suffering, and violent death. But that war has also vividly illustrated the prevalence of new technologies – such as drones – and the way those technologies have reshaped the battlefield. Even though the United States pioneered the use of lethal drones – such as the expensive Predator, which is remotely piloted like a plane – it lags in the development of cheap machines that can be used to swarm and overwhelm far costlier systems, such as tanks or ships. In pointing this out, in amplifying the call for real change to the standard way of doing business, Unit X has real value, even if that value is more substantive than literary.