Judging Statutes

by Robert A. Katzmann

In an ideal world, the laws of Congress-known as federal statutes- would always be clearly worded and easily understood by the judges tasked with interpreting them. But many laws feature ambiguous or even contradictory wording. How, then, should judges divine their meaning? Should they stick only to the text? To what degree, if any, should they consult aids beyond the statutes themselves? Are the purposes of lawmakers in writing law relevant? Some judges, such as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, believe courts should look to the language of the statute and virtually nothing else. Chief Judge Robert A. Katzmann of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectfully disagrees. In Judging Statutes, Katzmann, who is a trained political scientist as well as a judge, argues that our constitutional system charges Congress with enacting laws; therefore, how Congress makes its purposes known through both the laws themselves and reliable accompanying materials should be respected. He looks at how the American government works, including how laws come to be and how various agencies construe legislation. He then explains the judicial process of interpreting and applying these laws through the demonstration of two interpretative approaches, purposivism (focusing on the purpose of a law) and textualism (focusing solely on the text of the written law). Katzmann draws from his experience to show how this process plays out in the real world, and concludes with some suggestions to promote understanding between the courts and Congress. When courts interpret the laws of Congress, they should be mindful of how Congress actually functions, how lawmakers signal the meaning of statutes, and what those legislators expect of courts construing their laws. The legislative record behind a law is in truth part of its foundation, and therefore merits consideration.

Genres: Law, Nonfiction, Legal

184 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2014

Reviews

[Vincent Li · Rating 3 out of 5]

A short treatise that defends that somewhat clunky named "purposivism" school of thought that was dominant from the New Deal until (maybe?) the 1980s. It's a book that tries to defend the main claims of purposivism against the new textualism of Scalia and others. In particular, the book defends the use of legislative history (committee reports, conference reports), and judicial construction of statutory purpose in judicial interpretation of statutes.

The book does a pretty good job explaining the competing claims between textualism and purposivism. In particular, that textualism opposes the use of legislative history in understanding statutes because the legislative history does not go through the law making process, is prone to manipulation by special interest groups, and allows a judge too much discretion in interpreting the statute. The book argues that judges should increase their understanding of actual statutory creation, in order to more properly understand how to interpret the statutes, and that the courts could inform Congress when it thinks a drafting error has occurred. The author argues that since Congressmen are increasingly more busy, they defer more and more to committee reports to understand the statutes (the book even proposes that Congressmen more directly incorporate legislative history by signing their names to it). The book argues that the staffers and proponents of legislative history have an incentive to accurately represent the statute in order to retain trust and their jobs. I think this is a bit of a simplification, since it seems to disregard the possibility of horse trading (look the other way, and I'll look the other way later), salience (how much people are paying attention to the issue), or other various agency costs. The book cites extensively, the Gluck/Bressman study that show that staffers generally expect legislative history to be used in interpretation, do not use dictionaries in drafting, and do not know/use all the canons of interpretation (though they use some without realizing the latin names, but seem to disregard certain "clear statement rules"). The book also discusses how legislative history is often used by agencies in their dialogues with Congress. One of the stronger arguments I think the book makes is that a strong emphasis on text (textualism) does not necessarily incentivize better drafting, if the ambiguity comes from a necessary compromise or limitations of cognition.

Overall, I think the book does a fair job of presenting textualism, and its rival purposivism. It's a short readable introduction into the subject, and incorporates some interesting studies and work on the area, and gives a few example of cases where purposivism was put into use. For those more interested in this field, I would recommend Scalia's Matter of Interpretation, which does the same but from the new textualist perspective.

[Salparadise7 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Given this through law school. It's more of an essay than a book but Katzmann has a fair point in stressing the usefulness of leg intent. If the courts put their utmost respect in the actions of an agency and the agency interprets their role through legislative measures and committees, then why would fed courts ignore the legislative history of a statute that compels the agency to act. His illustration of the complexities and many moving parts of law making further illustrate that if the language of a statute is ambiguous, credence should be paid to what led the bill to pass.

[N · Rating 5 out of 5]

This gave me a newfound appreciation for the very finicky process of both drafting and interpreting statutes. Judge Katzmann is an authoritative voice on the subject, and he does an excellent job capturing the debates surrounding textualism, the use of legislative history, and purposivism. The three cases he highlights serve a useful didactic role.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Judging Statutes" is a useful companion and counterargument to Scalia's "A Matter of Interpretation." I wouldn't recommend one without the other, though I am still partial to the latter. That said, Katzmann did convince me there is no need to swear off legislative history completely.

[milo · Rating 2 out of 5]

this book was, again, for pbpl5. what a class. it was almost disgustingly boring but the author was really passionate so i was like... ok man i'll listen.

[Bella · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was a law book. It was ok.

[yasmine_reads · Rating 3 out of 5]

Educational? Read for a class earlier this year and just now remembered to record it here... I mean it's a book about judging statutes what do you expect

[Sanaya · Rating 4 out of 5]

idk if law school is gonna be for me

[Clare · Rating 1 out of 5]

Katzmann's my biggest op right now.

[Al Menaster · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good. More of a long essay, this judge refutes Scalia's position on legislative intent.