The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941-1942

FDR at War #1

by Nigel Hamilton

Based on years of archival research and interviews with the last surviving aides and Roosevelt family members, Nigel Hamilton offers a definitive account of FDR's masterful--and underappreciated--command of the Allied war effort. Hamilton takes readers inside FDR's White House Oval Study--his personal command center--and into the meetings where he battled with Churchill about strategy and tactics and overrode the near mutinies of his own generals and secretary of war.

Time and again, FDR was proven right and his allies and generals were wrong. When the generals wanted to attack the Nazi-fortified coast of France, FDR knew the Allied forces weren't ready. When Churchill insisted his Far East colonies were loyal and would resist the Japanese, Roosevelt knew it was a fantasy. As Hamilton's account reaches its climax with the Torch landings in North Africa in late 1942, the tide of war turns in the Allies' favor and FDR's genius for psychology and military affairs is clear. This intimate, sweeping look at a great president in history's greatest conflict is must reading.

Genres: History, Biography, World War II, Nonfiction, American History, Presidents, Politics

544 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2014

About the author

Nigel Hamilton is an award-winning British-born biographer, academic and broadcaster, whose works have been translated into sixteen languages.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“From Berlin, and Tokyo, and Rome, we have been described as a Nation of weaklings – ‘playboys’ – who would hire British soldiers, or Russian soldiers, or Chinese soldiers to do our fighting for us. Let them repeat that now! Let them tell that to General MacArthur and his men. Let them tell that to the sailors who today are hitting hard in the far waters of the Pacific. Let them tell that to the boys in the Flying Fortresses. Let them tell that to the Marines!”
- President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942

“Some day, the story of our activities will be written and it will be interesting.”
- Admiral Chester Nimitz, letter to his wife, May 31, 1942

Judging Franklin D. Roosevelt’s performance as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces in World War II is a difficult task. After all, who or what do we compare him against? During this portentous moment in history, with great chunks of earth fallen under the dominion of nations driven to mastery and annihilation, of nations that seemed to have sprung as supervillains from a comic book, Franklin Roosevelt stood (with leg braces) quite literally – and for perhaps the only time in the vast annals of time – as leader of the free world.

Of course, the utter uniqueness of Roosevelt’s role never stopped anyone from criticizing him. He stayed in power long enough that just about everyone along the length of the political spectrum could find something they disliked about him. Herbert Hoover even wrote a book devoted to FDR’s many alleged mistakes in the lead-up and prosecution of the Second World War.

Nigel Hamilton is not here to criticize.

In The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941-42, he sings his praises to high heavens. He is so laudatory that it is, at times, a bit embarrassing, even if you believe that Roosevelt did a commendable job during one of the great trials in the sad catalogue of catastrophes we call human history. He uses adjectives such as “amazing” to describe Roosevelt, which makes you wonder if you’re reading a wartime biography or a dating profile.

Hamilton employs an interesting structure for The Mantle of Command. He divides his narrative – which stretches from the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting in Placentia Bay in 1941, to the Allied landings in North Africa in late 1942 – into fourteen different “episodes.” Thus, instead of straight-line storytelling, Hamilton focuses on discrete events (such as Churchill’s 1941 Christmas visit, the Fall of Singapore, the battle of Midway, and the planning of the Torch landings), and he hops from one incident to the next like a frog that can't decide on a lily pad.

This is a very entertaining and fast-paced book. The structure, however, has some inherent deficiencies which Hamilton makes no effort to rectify. Specifically, the focus remains tourniquet-tight on Franklin Roosevelt. Consequently, Hamilton makes hardly any effort to flesh out details of the (admittedly vast) context in which events occurred. If you don’t already know how the big pieces of World War II fit together, this volume is not going to clue you in. This is not helped by skipping from one event to the next, rather than utilizing a more methodical, chronological approach.

More troubling is Hamilton’s tendency to declaim, rather than explain. The white whale that Hamilton chases across these pages is the notion that a cross-Channel invasion (i.e., the invasion that actually took place on D-Day, June 6, 1944) could have been attempted as early as 1942 or 1943. Hamilton hates this idea with admirable intensity (we all need our passions), and repeats it endlessly. Instead of laying out exactly why such an attempt would have failed, though, he just sort of cites it as an irrefutable truth.

Hamilton is also incredibly hyperbolic, to the point of hysteria. He devotes an entire chapter to what he terms a near “mutiny,” which is how he describes the opposition of Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to the decision – which Hamilton calls FDR’s “baby” – to invade North Africa. I wouldn’t deign to match wits with Hamilton, who is a noted historian and archive rat, but where he sees implied treason, I saw only principled opposition. (It is beyond ridiculous to even hint that George Catlett Marshall, whose picture is featured next to the dictionary entry for “moral rectitude,” would ever consider anything remotely resembling a “mutiny”).

It should be noted that these critiques go hand-in-glove with what works so well here. To wit: Hamilton’s infectious enthusiasm for his subject. This is not your staid and unbiased history. Instead, Hamilton paints his biases in broad strokes, cutting and slashing. Churchill, for example, becomes the man who “could boast only of having produced in two years the longest series of military disasters in British history.” (For a book by a guy named Nigel, this is very anti-British in tone. Churchill is positioned as the avatar of 19th century colonialism, while FDR becomes an enlightened man of post-colonial vision). Hamilton also takes potshots at Douglas MacArthur (citing his “bribe” from Philippine President Quezon), most of the British general staff, and pretty much everyone else who isn’t Franklin Roosevelt.

Roosevelt was not a perfect president, and I don’t think Hamilton does him any favors by glossing over some of his hugest mistakes. He essentially ignores the decision to intern Japanese-Americans, and comes close to endorsing or rationalizing them by linking their imprisonment with Japanese atrocities in the Pacific.

Despite this, I can appreciate his fervor. Roosevelt was faced with a task that no one else has ever faced before. He did lead the free peoples of earth in a time of extreme danger. There is no exaggerating the lethality of the German and Japanese regimes in this period. They murdered millions and millions and millions of people, leaving mass graves in Europe, in Russia, and in China. For a time, they appeared unstoppable. Many of the countries that stood up to them had fallen. Many other countries did not appear ready to lift a finger. Roosevelt did not panic when faced with his task, but went about it with optimism and good cheer and a far-reaching conception of the future. If Hamilton goes a bit too far, that’s okay, because plenty of historians have gone quite too far the other way, either rejecting FDR’s leadership or ladling all the accolades on his able subordinates.

This is the first in a trilogy of FDR at war. The second book is already out. The third has been completed and is set for publication (no William Manchester situations here). I fully intend to finish the series, even with its flaws. Whatever else that can be said, Hamilton’s tendency to dramatically reframe things gives even serious students of the war something to ponder. It provides a bold counterpoint to a lot of World War II’s conventional wisdom.

[Aaron Million · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is the first book in a trilogy concerning the military management of World War II by Franklin Roosevelt. It starts in the summer of 1941, several months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack by Japan, and finishes up in the aftermath of the successful operation torch in November 1942 in French Northwest Africa.

Nigel Hamilton clearly has a command of the era and the conflict, and this is not a surprise given that he has written extensively about this in the past, especially with his multivolume biography of British General Bernard Montgomery. Here, Hamilton switches to focusing on Roosevelt himself and how he managed to steer the U.S., an isolationist country, through the perilous times following the attack on Pearl Harbor. He begins with Roosevelt going to meet British Prime Minister Winston Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland in the North Atlantic Ocean. The meeting was kept secret, deliberately by Roosevelt, as prior to Pearl Harbor. He simply did not have the support of the American public to engage either Germany or Japan in actual war.

Hamilton, then writes about the attack on Pearl Harbor, and goes into what Roosevelt did and did not know. This is important as there has been speculation ever since then that FDR knew about the attack and did nothing. Frankly, I’ve never believed such a thing, and Hamilton doesn’t either and manages to prove that – while Roosevelt did know that an attack was going to come somewhere – he really did not think it was going to be at Pearl Harbor and he did not know the specific date in advance. Roosevelt, a Navy man to the core, was shocked – not at the attack itself – but at where it happened and how the US Navy was caught basically with its pants down. The battleships were all lined up in a row, the fighter planes were all lined up in a row, and they were all just sitting ducks for the Japanese. This enraged Roosevelt, who was a prior Assistant Secretary of the Navy in World War I. Still, Hamilton does a nice lead up here and does talk about many of the mistakes that were made at the military level. There were breakdowns in the chain of command, there were interest service, squabbles, and rivalry between the army and the Navy, and there was a general lack of direction out in the Pacific and basically a sense of complacency That Pearl Harbor was simply too far away for Japan to actually attack.

One of the things that I really liked about this book is that, while FDR is front and center, Hamilton also occasionally goes into the minds of the Germans, what they were doing, and then also there is a lot of time spent on the decline and dissolution of the British Empire. There are chapters about Hitler, there are chapters about Burma and India and Churchill’s racism and fierce reluctance to admit that the British Empire was crumbling. Some of these topics do not get a lot of attention in World War II history books.

Hamilton makes copious use of many diaries, such as that of German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and others. There is an interesting chapter about Hitler’s decision to declare war on the United States, with Hamilton, pointing out that, even after the Pearl Harbor attack, Roosevelt was very deliberate and careful not to declare war on Germany – only Japan. Even at that point, he did not think that he would be able to sell a war with Germany to the American people, because Germany had not actually attacked the United States. Only Japan had. However, Hitler made a fatal miscalculation in deciding to declare war on the United States, which then opened up FDR to ask Congress for a declaration of war in return on Germany. Had Hitler not done that, there would not have been a US war declaration on Germany - At least not right then. Why did Hitler do this? Well, he simply didn’t think that Roosevelt and United States would dare to tangle with Germany. He thought that they would be consumed out in the Pacific with their war with Japan, which would let an increasingly depleted Britain continue to try to fight against Germany in the West. Hitler apparently did not pay attention to one of Roosevelt’s fireside chats, where he specifically pointed out that the main danger to the world was Germany, not Japan.

Hamilton has a very good review of the India theater of the war, and how Churchhill over riding obsession with maintaining the status of the British Empire, coupled with a dose of his racism, Made him essentially blind to the fact that the Indians themselves were reluctant to fight with the British against the Japanese, solely to remain in subjugation to the British themselves. Churchill was still thinking in terms of the late 19th century, and the Victorian era, and he just could not accept that Britain was no longer going to be the world power that it once was. Roosevelt meanwhile, kept trying to steer Churchill away from some of his imperialism, but it was like hitting his head against a brick wall, as Churchill was unmoving. Only as Britain’s material kept getting depleted, and the British kept losing battles, did Churchill finally come to the realization that – like it or not – he was going to have to give in eventually on India and Try to just maintain what he still could of the British Empire.

There is an interesting chapter, and actually Hamilton spends quite a bit of time on this, talking about Roosevelt‘s relationship with General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur was out in the Philippines, and much like he would be later with Harry Truman, he was a real thorn in Roosevelt side. MacArthur had a propaganda machine that was always ramped up to high, and he had sequestered himself in headquarters that were far away from battle, rarely coming out to see them in under his command. He danced around the edges of insubordination, and only reluctantly would go along with what Roosevelt wanted him to do. MacArthur would frequently suffer from Proximity bias, thinking that things were always worse off, and his area was the most critical in need, not ever really thinking about what kind of needs there were in Europe.

Hamilton also writes quite a bit about General George Marshall, and also Secretary of War Stimson, their relationship with FDR, and how FDR basically had to save them from themselves and take over management of the overall war strategy as they could not manage to do it. Much of the latter half of the book talks about their obstinacy against Roosevelt’s wishes to plan operation torch. Marshall and Stimson instead wanted to try to launch a cross channel invasion, way before the US was ready to do so. Eventually, that would happen in 1944, but those two wanted to do it in late 1942. Roosevelt knew that the US military was simply not ready for that type of an operation against an entrenched and well defended German foe.

There were a few things that I wish Hamilton had went into more. Aside from Stimson, Roosevelt’s cabinet is pretty much nonexistent in this book. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes is mentioned once, for example. I wonder if they were any more involved than what Hamilton makes them out to be. Also Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox is not mentioned nearly as much as Stimson is. And since Stimson was so unhappy with Roosevelt’s directions in the war, did he ever seriously consider resigning? Given how unhappy he was it makes you wonder if that was a possibility.

Another thing that I would’ve liked to have seen is a robust discussion of the unfortunate decision by FDR and senior leadership to inter Japanese Americans in camps. Hamilton does mention this, but doesn’t spend very much time on it. He has a footnote in the back of the book which talks more about it than he does in the regular part of the narrative. I think this needed to be focused on much more than what Hamilton did. Also, he has a brief chapter on a long inspection trip that FDR took in September 1942. I would’ve liked to have seen much more written about this trip, and also how a little bit of it was political, given that the 1942 congressional elections were just around the corner.

Despite that, this was a very, very good book and a really interesting read. Also, Hamilton kept most of the chapters short, which made reading even easier. This really gets into FDR‘s military management, and how he was a brilliant strategic thinker, to the point of driving his associates, mad, But also knowing what the country was and was not capable of. An excellent look at wartime leadership by FDR.

Grade: A-

[Jim · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fascinating, and full of stuff I didn't know. This book covers the 11 months between Pearl Harbor and the beginning of Torch through the eyes of FDR, showing how he slowly and surely became Commander in Chief, not just of US forces (as prescribed by the Constitution, though even that wasn't guaranteed at the beginning of 1942), but also Commander in Chief of the entire world's combined efforts to beat Germany and Japan.

The story of how FDR rises to supreme control over those 11 months is fascinating, at least partly because his (and the US's) rise to power meant the fall of the British Empire would happen at the same time. The story of Churchill vs. India was something I'd never heard before.

Great book.

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

FDR – C in C

The Mantle of Command is an interesting and engaging, albeit at times a somewhat heavy handed snapshot of the Allied War effort from mid 1941 to late 1942, i.e. the Atlantic Conference to Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa. As the title suggests FDR is the focus, yet the author provides an excellent overall description of both the times and personalities involved, giving the reader the proper context as the US ramped up for and became actively involved in WWII. All the while being personally led by President Roosevelt.

The last bit – FDR’s political/military wisdom and foresight - a “new” perspective – at least according to this author. And the otherworldly FDR intuition presented here much to the detriment of Churchill, Stimson and even George Marshall – is the heavy handed part - who all needed to catch up with FDR when it came to military strategy.

I am being a tad facetious for the author does makes an excellent case that FDR’s leadership and ultimately, control of the Allies’ military strategy is at the very least underappreciated. And in hindsight it’s difficult not to label his foresight and intuition – his sheer optimism - “otherworldly” – for instance the “united nations”, America’s soon to be realized potential for war materiel production, and prioritization of the invasion of North Africa prior to opening a second front in Europe.

Historians question when military control of the war shifted from Great Britain to the US, i.e. from Churchill to FDR. Here the author makes the not so subtle point that the shift never occurred. Simply because once the US entered the war after Pearl Harbor FDR immediately assumed control, i.e. the Mantle of Command, expertly herding his military advisors and Great Britain – including a kicking and if not screaming, a very vocal Churchill – onto his path to victory.

All and all a very good addition to the FDR/World War II library

[Joe L · Rating 5 out of 5]

There’s a lot I could say about this one, but I’ll keep it brief.
Prior to Pearl Harbor, America was a backwater and Britain controlled half the Earth. By June 1942 the British Empire was in tatters and people began to look to Washington DC, and not London for answers.
This book dives into how that happened, with FDR deserving most of the credit. Lots of people involved, lots of egos, and he was able to bring everyone together and keep them in line.
The book concludes with the allies invasion of North Africa in November 1942, an event that caught Hitler totally offguard. Afterwards, Hitler would remain on the defensive until the last moments of the war.
I’ll read the second and third volumes in the series at a later date.
Five out of five stars.

[Jim · Rating 5 out of 5]

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt is the subject of innumerable biographies, in fact I would venture to guess no President save Abraham Lincoln has been the subject of more. Yet with so many available there seem to be precious few that take a truly in depth look at his role as Commander in Chief. Happily, renowned historian and biographer Nigel Hamilton has rectified that situation with the publication in 2014 of The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941 – 1942. A practically flawless work, I was disappointed it only covered part of FDR’s time as Commander in Chief. I truly wish he would take on the rest of FDR’s tenure, but fear that task will have to be left for another.

The Mantle of Command takes us from FDR’s initial meetings with Winston Churchill in 1941 that resulted in the Atlantic Charter, through to the landings of American and British troops in French northwest Africa (Morocco and Tunisia) as part of operation Torch in November of 1942. Hamilton quotes copiously from letters, diaries and other primary sources to give us a very thorough, chronological look at this period of FDR’s tenure as Commander in Chief. Though detailed, the prose is never boring.

A number of things struck me as I read this; far to many to go through in a short review, though four stood out. First, the overall take away is that this period represented the ascendancy of the United States as the dominant world power, while at the same time it heralded the end of Great Britain as an empire. Both FDR and Winston Churchill recognized this (though Churchill took a bit longer), and played their roles accordingly. Second, Hamilton is clearly impressed with FDR’s abilities as Commander in Chief. Time after time, whether he was dealing with prima donnas such as George Patton and Douglas MacArthur over command responsibilities, or with opposition from his military chiefs and Secretary of War over Operation Torch, FDR, in Hamilton’s view, knew exactly how much pressure to apply and when to apply it. Third, in contrast to his positive view of FDR’s military leadership, Hamilton (a British subject himself), is surprisingly hard on Churchill’s judgement, faulting him for serious British setbacks early in the war, and for his hard headed attitude towards Indian Independence. And lastly, I was particularly pleased with the extensive use of German and Japanese primary sources, including diaries and letters. It really provided a great juxtaposition to accounts of Allied opinion during this period.

Prior to its entry into WWII the United States was essentially isolationist. After World War I it had drawn down its armed forces to the point where it’s army was approximately the size of Portugal’s. The United States Congress was in many ways dominated by an isolationist sentiment, and men as prominent as Charles Lindbergh were promoting a xenophobic isolationism even as it became obvious United States entry into the growing conflict was going to be required. FDR, who understood earlier than most that the United States would be drawn into war, recognized and adapted to this reality. As Hamilton portrays it Roosevelt’s political instincts were so spot on he knew exactly how far the country would be willing to go and when. He also knew how to present increased U.S. involvement in a way the public could understand and support. One example of this of course, was the Lend Lease program the U.S. initiated in March 1941 (prior to the events recounted in this book). Roosevelt, recognizing Britain, Free France, and China could not hope to hold out against Germany and Japan without aid, but cognizant of the country’s isolationist mood, devised a way to deliver that aid without it appearing as though it was entering the war. He was able to present it as a defensive measure; by loaning military equipment to those who were fighting our enemies the U.S. could stay out of the fighting. Once the crisis passed, intact equipment would be returned, and the U.S. would be reimbursed for equipment that had been destroyed. He sold this plan in a way every person could understand, by relating it to their own lives. In a December 1940 press conference Roosevelt used the following illustration to demonstrate why the country and Congress should support Lend Lease:

Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire. Now, what do I do? I don’t say to him before that operation, “Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.” What is the transaction that goes on? I don’t want $15–I want my garden hose back after the fire is over. All right. If it goes through the fire all right, intact, without any damage to it, he gives it back to me and thanks me very much for the use of it. But suppose it gets smashed up–holes in it–during the fire; we don’t have to have too much formality about it, but I say to him, “I was glad to lend you that hose; I see I can’t use it any more, it’s all smashed up.” He says, “How many feet of it were there?” I tell him, “There were 150 feet of it.” He says, “All right, I will replace it.” Now, if I get a nice garden hose back, I am in pretty good shape.

A February 1941 Gallup poll showed Roosevelt’s campaign for passage had worked, with a Lend Lease proposal receiving the support of 54% of Americans, and it was passed by Congress a month later. Ten months later Lend Lease would would take its place as part of a larger American effort when the empire of Japan declared war on the United States.

On August 7, 1941, four months before American entry into WWII, a U.S. naval ship, the Northampton class heavy cruiser U.S.S. Augusta slipped into Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Aboard was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt there to meet in secret with the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill. Though they had met earlier during WWI, this was the first face to face meeting of the two. On August 9th, the H.M.S. Prince of Wales arrived with Churchill aboard. Each had different goals for this first meeting. Great Britain, having been the target of an intense and destructive air campaign by the German Luftwaffe, was eager for the United States to enter the war as soon as possible. Roosevelt, recognizing the U.S. was not yet ready for this, nevertheless wanted to signal to the country that the United States sympathized with Britain’s plight and opposed Nazi Germany. Given these parameters, Roosevelt suggested development of a set of principles that would guide allied nations after the war. The “Atlantic Charter” agreed to by FDR and Churchill included pledges not to seek territorial gains, to seek lowering of international trade barriers, to work for establishment of global economic cooperation and advancement of social welfare, for freedom of the seas, for the right of all nations to self determination, and to work toward a world free from want and fear. This agreement became the basis for many subsequent agreements including establishment of the United Nations. Like Lend Lease, it was FDR’s way of moving the United States ever closer to a formal wartime alliance with Great Britain without actually crossing that line and incurring the wrath of politically powerful isolationists. For Great Britain it represented a step toward bringing the United States into the war as a full combatant, and for the Axis powers it signaled an escalation of the war; one they would regret encouraging.

On December 7th, 1941 airplanes of the empire of Japan attacked the U.S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Killing or wounding 5,381 Americans, this attack, and the declaration of war four days later by Germany on the United States, signaled the end of America’s role as a mere bit player on the world stage. From this time forward the U.S. would assume it’s position as the dominant economic and military power in the world, a position it has yet to relinquish. Britain on the other hand, would take its place as the junior partner in this alliance.

Due to poor leadership at all levels British forces were defeated in Malaya and Singapore, the latter surrendering without showing much resistance. Japanese Naval sorties into the Indian Ocean panicked the British, forcing them to move their fleet from Ceylon to Kenya, and although they had shown courage and grit during the Battle of Britain, they had not been able to mount any kind of effective counter to German expansion. Meanwhile after the devastation of Pearl Harbor and the loss of the Philippines, the United States achieved a strategic victory over the Japanese Navy at Coral Sea, and completed a decisive one at Midway Island, sinking four Japanese aircraft carriers. Domestically, it’s full productive capacity brought to bear, the U.S. was producing war materiel at an astounding rate, and the military services were rapidly adding manpower. Since it was providing the bulk of the men and materiel for the allied war effort (with the exception of the U.S.S.R.), it was understood the U.S. would be the dominant partner in this relationship. And to his credit, Winston Churchill understood and adapted to this reality, eventually. However, as Nigel Hamilton shows, Churchill’s leadership abilities were rightly called into question during this period.

Winston Churchill was an enigmatic man; courageous, stalwart and indefatigable. At the same time he could be stubborn, myopic, and a control freak. As Hamilton describes it, his admirable qualities kept Britain strong and defiant during the Battle of Britain. He was the rock around which the Allied effort eventually grew. But it was his less admirable qualities that were largely responsible for early British setbacks. His stubbornness in not recognizing the futility of trying to restore the British empire, and his poor choice of subordinates resulting in unnecessary tensions between British and American staff officers being two of the most important examples. As British defeats mounted in southeast Asia and North Africa and as the Japanese fleet moved into the Indian ocean fostering fears of an attack on India, Churchill appeared stubbornly determined to preserve the prewar structure of the British Empire. As Japan moved into the Indian Ocean FDR encouraged Churchill to begin independence negotiations with Indian leaders. Aside from his belief that India deserved independence as a matter of right consistent with the Atlantic Charter, it would also secure a Indian commitment to fighting off the Japanese. A delegation headed by Sir Stafford Cripps was dispatched to India to negotiate a devolution of power to Indian authorities in exchange for Indian Army support in the war. Churchill subordinates, probably acting with his tacit approval, purposely undermined the negotiations. Fortunately Japanese defeats at Coral Sea and Midway diverted their attention away from the Indian peninsula. Later, after the decision was made to mount the first joint offensive in North Africa rather than attempt a cross channel invasion of France, Churchill, acting on the advice of subordinates, including Lord Louis Mountbatten, mounted an ill conceived raid at Dieppe on the French coast. It was a disaster, with nearly half of British troops engaged being killed, wounded or captured. With these setbacks, lapses in judgement, stubbornness, and reliance on poorly chosen subordinates, it was only Churchill’s willingness to accede to U.S. leadership, and his position as the face of resistance to Nazi Germany that allowed him to stave off attempts to bring down his government.

Hamilton devotes a significant portion of the book to the decision by Britain and America to make northwest Africa the site of its first offensive. As he presents it, the success of Operation Torch is most attributable to FDR’s political and strategic genius. Pressure on the United States and Britain to mount a cross channel offensive as soon as possible grew as 1941 ended. The U.S. Joint Chiefs including Chief of Staff George Marshall along with Secretary of War Henry Stimson, were pressing for just such an attack. Winston Churchill realized early on this would be a monumental mistake. U.S. troops had yet to experience combat and would be unlikely to stand up to seasoned German troops, the allies had yet to mobilize the men and materiel they would need for such an attack, and the Germans had heavily fortified the most obvious points of attack at Caen and Cherbourg. FDR, after initially appearing to favor such an invasion, came around to Churchill’s view and advocated for French northwest Africa as the site of the first offensive. Convincing his own staff to go along despite their convictions it would only divert needed materiel from an eventual cross channel attack, and would probably fail on its own merits, was a stellar example of FDR’s ability to know where and when to press an advantage. Allowing his subordinates to make their case freely, he held firm. Eventually, in frustration they advocated moving the primary theater of operations from Europe to the Pacific. Calling their bluff, FDR asked them to provide him the detailed plans they must have been relying on to make such a bold suggestion. Unable to do so since they had impetuously made the suggestion out of frustration, they eventually fell in line with the President. The invasion proceeded and Operation Torch was a success.

Finally, I was very impressed by Hamilton’s use of primary sources from Axis leaders. Most significant of these was the diary of Nazi Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels. While many of his entries can be termed whistling past the graveyard, some were very incisive as to the mindset of Allied leaders, the potential success of an Allied invasion of the French coast, and as regards Operation Torch. It provided a very interesting counterpoint to the views of Allied leaders.

Overall I think this is one of the best FDR biographies I have every read. The detail was incredible, the arguments he makes regarding FDR’s skill as a political leader are detailed and very persuasive. The prose is well formed and extremely easy to follow despite the enormous amount of information being thrown at you, Other than my disappointment that it ends with 1942 and that it does not appear Hamilton will be producing another volume, I have nothing but praise for this book.

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 4 out of 5]

Twasn't the British forcing Operation Torch down our throats, twas FDR forcing it down the throats of a vociferously opposed chiefs of staff. That's the main takeaway from this very good book.

How vociferously opposed? Roosevelt finally had to give the C-in-C's equivalent of a direct order, or nearly so, to get George Marshall and Ernie King to stop talking about cross-Channel plans, to focus on what became Torch, and to actually develop operational plans. This is also when and why he brought Admiral Leahy into his orbit as his military aide.

The almost-outright insubordination of Marshall, and even more of his direct military head, Secretary of War Stimson, as well as their post-Torch refusal to admit they were wrong and FDR right, is stunning.

Much else on the military side is not new, such as the vanity and idiocy of Dugout Doug MacArthur.

The second big takeaway is how strenuously FDR worked to get Churchill to open his mind on India and how tenaciously he refused.

Related to that, the other main takeaway is how Roosevelt was using the Atlantic Charter as the first salvo in announcing that part of US war goals, even before being in the war itself, was for a post-colonial post-war world.

A lesser takeaway, to be found in more depth elsewhere, is just how badly performing, militarily, the British were during this period.

The biggest negative takeaway is that Hamilton seems a fairly blatant FDR booster, enough that it arguably affects his "framing" on some issues, such as how close to quasi-mutinous (his words) Stimson and Marshall may have been.

That and a few nitpicks of factual error keep this book from a fifth star. Chief of those errors is Hamilton calling the Lusitania of WWI an American ship. This is yet another reflection on the sad cheapness of modern book publishing, too. (And, Hamilton is British, which makes the error more egregious!)

==

Update: Upon finishing the second volume of the trilogy, the last of the three I read, there's an even bigger reason to ding this. This is not the opening volume in a biographical trilogy of FDR as commander in chief, but as half commander in chief, as Hamilton nowhere in these volumes discusses the Pacific war, and there's plenty to critique FDR on.

[Urey Patrick · Rating 3 out of 5]

Hamilton certainly has an enthusiastic and unbridled admiration for Franklin Roosevelt. He imparts an analysis of documents, diaries and events that invariably promotes Roosevelt as the indispensable man – always right, frequently resisted by lesser men, and the one whose vision, strategy and constant wisdom saved the Allies from totalitarian domination.

Now I agree that Roosevelt was a superb war leader, but recognizing that does not diminish the critical roles played by others such as Churchill, Marshall, King, Eisenhower, et al., nor the larger places in history of the British, the French and the other nation members of the allied war effort. Hamilton views Churchill as meddlesome (which he was) and a minor figure in war leadership, more of a nuisance and a hindrance to the steady brilliance of Roosevelt – I think an overreach of great proportions. Marshall is presented as not only always wrong, but an obstacle to the realization of Roosevelt’s war plans to the point of mutinous obstinacy. The British are routinely depicted as incompetent in battle and leadership (due largely to Churchill), cowardly in the face of the enemy and more interested in preserving the Empire than in winning the war.

Hamilton sees the flaws in all the other actors but little else in their characters or contributions to the prosecution of the war. The reverse regarding Roosevelt – he sees and embellishes Roosevelt’s strengths, and ignores his mistakes and flaws. He looks upon Roosevelt’s character traits (his secretiveness, his reliance on charm and impulse, his consistent practice of keeping everybody around him in the dark) as str4engths and as well and explanatory reasons for his misunderstood brilliance and the consistent obstruction and opposition among his staff and advisors, civilian and military. That none of them were fired, reassigned or removed is considered a testament to Roosevelt’s patience and tolerance.

Roosevelt was a flawed, contradictory and enigmatic leader whose secretive ways severely tried and vexed those tasked with implementing his policies. He was a superb war President, a mediocre domestic President. Despite Hamilton’s assertion, Roosevelt did not save the country from the Depression – he prolonged it. The rest of the world had emerged from the Great Depression years prior to the war… it was the war that returned the United States to prosperity despite Roosevelt’s policies. Domestically, he created policies based on whimsy and how he felt on any given day. He did the same as the war leader, but he also put good people in positions of responsibility and let them do their jobs under his political and strategic guidance. His penchant for whimsical decision making led him to keep MacArthur in play. Hamilton clearly lays out MacArthur’s many flaws and missteps including his extortion of the Philippine government for half a million dollars, but glosses over Roosevelt’s tolerance of it all for the purely political consideration of keeping him out of domestic politics. It can be argued that the consequences included extending the war against Japan and fighting numerous unnecessary battles. Hamilton considers the MacArthur issue another testament to Roosevelt’s tolerance and foresight.

With regard to the Vichy French in Africa, he fails to point out that the reason Roosevelt ignored De Gaulle was personal – he could not abide the man, detested him, and his refusal to treat with De Gaulle had unfavorable and unnecessary consequences during the remainder of the war. The attempt to incorporate Vichy military officials (Geraud, Darlan) into the Allied plans and policies for Africa was shameful – but again, glossed over by Hamilton. He imputes motivations and emotions to Hitler and Goebbels that are speculative, at best, but serve to promote his depiction of FDR in the alternative as the master of strategy and tactics and war management, befuddling them with his moves.

So on balance an interesting read, but an unbalanced one. Roosevelt’s positives are extolled and embellished at great length, his negatives ignored or dismissed. The reverse is so of everybody else in Roosevelt’s orbit – all of their negatives and few if any of their positives, except for Stalin, curiously. There are insights into the characters and events of the high level tiers of command and strategy, the interplay between the various involved historical figures – but the assessments and analyses are lop-sided and skewed to present FDR as the one indispensable and flawless leader of them all, without whom the US would have lost the war. That is another altogether different quibble, because Germany and Japan had no chance of defeating the US and/or Russia… they might have extended the war some, but the vast disparity in production, materiel and resources was so extreme that the US was not going to lose the war, with or without FDR.

[Everydayreader1 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nigel Hamilton has written a masterpiece chronicling the first year of US involvement in World War II, from events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, as well as US aid to Great Britain and FDR's relationship with Winston Churchill.

I learned so much from reading this book. Mr. Hamilton has written this account from diary entries of those involved, as well as letters and documents. I will definitely read the next installment in the trilogy. Anyone, a student of history or not, will find this book fascinating, if WWII is of interest to you.

[Matt Carmichael · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great read! This is book 1 of a trilogy, focusing on Roosevelt's role as "commander in chief" during WW2. I am struck how careful the author is on his research because his narratives are somewhat different than most histories i have read. He mentions in the acknowledgments he researched using primary sources like diaries, memos, etc. and interviewed FDR's surviving war staff. The author asserts Roosevelt, not Churchill was the mastermind of the Allied efforts. Gens. McArthur and Marshall are described as borderline mutinuous. I was especially curious about Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels' sober thoughts on America & Roosevelt (drawn from his diaries)...*as opposed to the fanatical hysteria of Hitler. This is an essential read to the student of History. Look forward to book #2..

[Mac McCormick III · Rating 2 out of 5]

I picked up Mantle of Command at the Little White House gift shop while visiting the Historic Site on vacation this year. It looked like it would be an interesting read and it would be nice to have a book on FDR that came from his Little White House at Warm Springs. Mantle of Command essentially takes a look at President Franklin D. Roosevelt's leadership as Commander in Chief during the early stages of World War II, essentially from the Argentia Conference in 1941 to the Torch Landings in North Africa in 1942. Hamilton's intent was to show that Roosevelt was not being led by the nose by Churchill, as some would have you believe, but was the true leader and decision maker in the direction and strategy of the early days of World War II after the United States' entry into the war. In my opinion, however, Hamilton goes beyond biography and History into hagiography. It seems that from Hamilton's perspective everything that Churchill, Stimson, Knox, Hull, Marshall, King, and others do wrong and everything that Roosevelt does is right. Furthermore, he is downright hostile toward Churchill and Stimson in particular. He goes too far and the book lacks objectivity; it feels like he started out with a premise and instead of exploring that premise only attempted to prove it. I have to admit that I was profoundly disappointed with this book after having good expectations of it. I don't like giving bad reviews, but this is a History book that I just can't recommend.

[Daniel Zadravec · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very good read, one I would highly recommend for people interested in FDR and his role as Commander in Chief during WW2. Shows once again how special of a man he was at his time in history, and how his actions defined the modern world. Also included some focus on Mackenzie King, which as a Canadian I quite like. A highly informative book, and one I would very much recommend.

[John · Rating 2 out of 5]

Two stars for interesting history, -3 for presentation and balance. This account spanning The Atlantic Charter (Aug. 1941) to just after Operation Torch (nov. 1942) is a look at the period from the viewpoint of FDR, specifically in his role as C-in-C of first the US, and rapidly as the entire Allied war effort. As such, it is unique in my experience of reading hundreds of WW2 books. My main beef is with Hamilton's tone. He very gleefully (as opposed to objectively) trashes Churchill, the British military, and most of FDR's own circle, both military and political. He labels one of Churchill's biographers as "slavish" at one point, but his own language is just so for FDR, who could apparently do no wrong. Another couple of things that grated were his saying Newfoundland was in Canada (it didn't join Canada until 1949) and placing FDR's Campobello Island vacation place off Newfoundland, when it is off New Brunswick, near the Maine border. This is like placing a South Carolina island off Long Island. I have started the second of Hamilton's FDR trilogy, and he seems to have toned down the adulation (at least in the first 50 pages), which is welcome.

[Elizabeth S · Rating 4 out of 5]

An extremely interested perspective on the given war years (1941-1942). I've read other books that cover those years, but this one tells the story from a different perspective. I enjoyed following the play-by-play between the military leaders and President Roosevelt. There was a lot of balancing of politics, individual personalities, military needs, and logistical realities. I am looking forward to the author's installment covering the rest of WWII.

I received this book for free through the Goodreads FirstReads program. Thank you!

[Julian Douglass · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a wonderful portrait of how FDR took command of the grand alliance between western nations and was able to turn the war in favor of the US and the Allies. Mr. Hamilton has done his research in that schools will make it seem (and I am guilty of doing this too) that Pearl Harbor was a minor blip in an otherwise well oiled war machine for the US and UK. In reality, there was plenty of infighting and fears that the United State might not mount a serious counter-offensive to the Japanese and German troops. Mr. Hamilton also paints the isolationist forces in America in a negative light, plus he does do a good job shooting down the erroneous myth that FDR knew about Pearl Harbor and did nothing about it.

However, despite the book being rich in detail and insights, the chapters are wildly inconsistent. With the first 9 chapters being about 40% of the book, then the rest being the other 45% (15% of it is notes and the index). If you aren't hooked by the first couple of chapters, you will put this book away. Also, while Churchill wasn't a fantastic war time leader, he did manage to keep Britain relatively safe from the German invasion and was able to hold them off for the duration of the war. Mr. Hamilton seems too ignore that fact and instead blame the fact that he had horrible field generals all on him. This book is very pro-FDR and very anti-Churchill, which usually covers up some gaping flaws in the lead character that the author conveniently overlooks. Good book overall though. Looking forward to part 2 and 3.

[Don Siegrist · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well written book that makes a strong argument that FDR, not Churchill, was the guiding force behind the Allied victory. Since FDR never lived to provide his own account we have mostly been left with Churchill's telling. As Winston himself said "History will be kind to me as I intend to write it".
This is not meant as a dig at Churchill (I am a fan) just that FDR deserves as much, if not more credit. Thankfully this book goes a long way towards that goal.

[Gerry Connolly · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nigel Hamilton's Mantle of Command is a masterpiece. He revisits FDR's critical decision to invade N Africa instead of France in '42 overruling his generals and changing the tide of war.

[M Tucker · Rating 4 out of 5]

In The Mantle of Command Nigel Hamilton focuses squarely on President Franklin Roosevelt as not only Commander and Chief of US military but also how he dominated the direction of the war effort of the Allied coalition he dubbed the United Nations to include Great Britain and the Commonwealth nations. This is a much needed, although not unique, work that investigates the relationship between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, Roosevelt’s direction of the US high command and Roosevelt’s influence in development of Allied grand strategy. There are other works that have recently been published that cover these topics but they do not emphasize President Roosevelt’s paramount importance to the direction of the war and clearly explain how he manipulated Churchill, that is exactly what Hamilton’s exciting book does. Some authors only focus on the war against Hitler and that is exactly what Hamilton does not do although his analysis of what happened in the first year of America’s war with Japan is a bit lacking.

Hamilton’s book is written from President Roosevelt’s perspective and he laments the fact that Roosevelt did not have an opportunity to write his own memoir. He emphasizes the often underappreciated yet profound contribution of President Roosevelt’s involvement in directing the war effort. This work is the first of two parts beginning with the Atlantic Conference (RIVIERA) that took place in August of 1941 and ends with the US landings in North Africa (Operation TORCH) in November, 1942.

The author has done a fantastic job of highlighting how in August, 1941 Roosevelt immediately took command of planning Allied war aims even before the US entered the conflict and did so in his subtle, friendly yet relentless manner. At that meeting Roosevelt would dictate what would be discussed and what agreements would be decided and this without having any direct military involvement in the war as yet.

Hamilton develops his story primarily focusing on key events of America’s first year of the war and how President Roosevelt played a commanding role. It is interesting to note that even though Hitler began rearming Germany in 1935 and so had five years to prepare, he was totally unprepared and unable to mount an amphibious invasion of Great Britain while the US pulled off a major amphibious invasion in its first year, having only two years to prepare. That was the result of President Roosevelt’s vision and leadership and a demonstration of America’s industrial might.

A key event that Hamilton spends some time on is describing President Roosevelt’s attempt to pressure Churchill to grant India Dominion status after the war with the possibility of complete independence. Roosevelt felt this was very necessary. As the Japanese Army moved through Burma threatening India it was feared that Indian troops might refuse to fight or opt to fight for the Japanese. I had no idea so much time and effort was put into this and how much pressure was put on Churchill; who was ready to resign over it. Hamilton emphasizes the weakness of the British Army in defending its colonies against the Japanese, and in battling Rommel in the African desert, making the point that it was a major reason Roosevelt decided from the beginning that the US would be the senior partner in the alliance.

Another key event, what the author describes as the centerpiece of the book, was the intense disagreement that rose up between Roosevelt and his military chiefs over the invasion of Northwest Africa. Hamilton calls it a mutiny or a quasi-mutiny. Some might think this is too strong a description but Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold did initially refuse to consider an African invasion and insisted on a cross channel invasion either in 1942 or 1943. If that would not be planned for then they insisted that America should put its major effort into the Pacific and only carry out strategic bombing of Germany making the claim that defeat of Japan would hasten the defeat of Germany. I had always thought that when Roosevelt shot down their argument that was the end of it but both Marshall and Stimson persisted. Stimson persisted the longest and even bet President Roosevelt that the African invasion would fail. I find that to be a truly extreme reaction bordering on the grotesque. Stimson could certainly disagree and worry about the outcome but to actually bet against success, to feel vindicated only when great numbers of American soldiers and sailors floated dead in the water, is to my thinking unconscionable.

While discussing the “mutiny” the author quotes part of the instructions written by the President that Marshall and King would follow during their visit to London. The quote is, “It is of utmost importance that we appreciate that the defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany…” Then Roosevelt says, “Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.” (pp 349-350) Roosevelt again mentions that same opinion on page 360: “…helping Russia and Britain to contain Germany this Autumn and undertake an offensive in 1943 has a good chance of forcing Germany out of the war, in which case Japan could not conduct war in the Pacific alone for more than a few months.”

To me these represent an even more ludicrous notion. It demonstrates President Roosevelt was just as capable of making asinine arguments as Marshall, King and Stimson and that, in 1942, he had a very naïve understanding of the resolve of both Germany and Japan. “Japan could not conduct war in the Pacific alone for more than a few months.”?!? I find it unbelievable that Roosevelt could even come up with that thought. Did he really think Germany was somehow aiding Japan in the Pacific?

While Hamilton does not ignore the war with Japan I was disappointed with his coverage after the Battle of Midway. The author says on page 360: “The threat of further expansion of Japanese conquest in the Pacific was now almost nil…thanks to the Battle of Midway.” In August of 1942 the Guadalcanal Campaign began and that conflict lasted for about five months. It was a titanic struggle and America’s victory definitely marked the turning point of the war with Japan; not Midway.

Of the five carrier duals recognized by most historians that took place during the war, four took place in 1942. Two of those were during the Guadalcanal campaign, after the Battle of Midway, while also featuring something like seven surface engagements, mostly at night. The IJN still posed a tremendous threat to the US Navy during the Guadalcanal campaign and the horrendous losses the US Navy suffered during that campaign were kept secret from the American public for years. It would have been very interesting to know how much President Roosevelt knew of this battle considering the author spent a reasonable amount of space describing the creation of his map room in the White House and how he kept track of every ship movement to include the known location of enemy submarines. President Roosevelt considered himself a Navy man and I feel sure he would have paid close attention to the Navy’s struggle at Guadalcanal. Yes, Midway was a stupendous victory for the US, four of the six IJN carriers that attacked Pearl Harbor were sunk, but the Japanese began the war with more carriers and still had superiority. Of the six US carriers that operated in the Pacific during 1942 only two survived to see action in 1943. Actually those two, Saratoga and Enterprise, survived the war. In 1942 the US Navy fought tooth and nail with the IJN and barely achieved victory. Two US carriers were sunk during the Guadalcanal Campaign and both Saratoga and Enterprise suffered damage. The results of this enormous clash were startling. The IJN would limit operations against US shipping to submarines and would not oppose any US landings or engage the US Navy again until the Marianas operations in 1944. That is nothing less than astounding and all the loss of life and shipping did have a very positive result. 1942 was the pivotal year of the naval war with Japan and it was not until the Guadalcanal Campaign ended could modern historians mark a turning point in the war. Of course those responsible for conducting the war could not consider the IJN defeated or even reluctant to take offensive action after Guadalcanal. The IJN still posed a very real threat. It would not have required much more than a few extra pages for Hamilton to have covered this better and it is not true, as he says, that “the situation at Guadalcanal [was] “much better” at the time of the North Africa invasions. The “much better” quote comes from Admiral King’s diary written on 6 November, 1942 and does not reflect the actual situation in the Solomon Islands. What was his diary entry on say November 15 or 16? The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was fought between November 12 and November 15, 1942. While it was a US victory the cost was very high. The US Navy lost fewer ships but two Navy Admirals gave their lives along with their men. No comment from President Roosevelt for Mr Hamilton to mention? Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan had been President Roosevelt’s Naval Aid from July 1938 until May 1941. He and Rear Admiral Norman Scott received posthumous Medals of Honor for their actions. So King was being optimistic and I’m sure the news of this battle deflated Roosevelt’s ebullience following the successful North African landings.

Nigel Hamilton has written an excellent and engaging piece of history that many think, and the author too, corrects a misconception that President Roosevelt was primarily engaged in encouraging America’s moral during the terribly trying times of the Second World War. While I agree that of the several books that have been written on the subject of: the Roosevelt-Churchill relationship, Roosevelt and his military chiefs and Allied grand strategy, this is largely true, I do know of one book by Joseph Persico that seems to cover this as well. That will be my next read while I wait for Hamilton’s continuation of this story.

This is an excellent and very entertaining read, I would definitely recommend it with an important mention that Guadalcanal was a much more significant and desperate battle that the author lets on. He does do a wonderful and a very important job of illustrating President Roosevelt’s indispensable leadership that began even before the US declaration of war and continued throughout. To be fair to the author he does end this book with the Armistice Day commemoration of 1942 so he may cover the rest of the Guadalcanal slug fest in his next volume. I can only give the book four stars because of Hamilton’s neglect of what happened after Midway and his characterization that Guadalcanal was a settled victory for the US at the time of Operation TORCH.

[Robert Sparrenberger · Rating 3 out of 5]

Way too much detail focused on two years of the war leads to boredom in this one. It has its moments for interesting little snippets but only read if you are a serious WWII buff.

[Christopher · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the great myths of World War II is that, while a great moral and coalition leader, Pres. Roosevelt deferred many of the war's military decisions to Churchill, the British, and his own military chiefs (Marshall, King, etc.). In this book, Mr. Hamilton seeks to dispel that myth and, but for a few odd choices and some serious overstatement, does so very well. The book covers the U.S.'s first year taking part in the war starting with FDR and Churchill's first meeting in August 1941, which produced the Atlantic Charter, through to the landing of American troops in French Northwest Africa during Operation Torch in 1942. Through it all Mr. Hamilton's points to FDR's incredible grasp of the greater political and strategic picture. He makes the argument that even before America's entry into the war, Roosevelt held to the idea that an American invasion of French Northwest Africa would be the first and best place to start the liberation of Europe. The book also builds up to a climax with FDR being at loggerheads with his military chiefs, Gen. Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson in particular. Mr. Hamilton is very quick to show how their calls for opening a second front in France in 1942 was doomed to failure and how their threat to FDR and the British to switch to the Pacific should they not support a cross-channel invasion was a bluff that they couldn't back up once the President called them on it. One other great theme of this book that few Americans may realize or remember is how the British Empire was crumbling in 1942 with a series of defeats between December 1941 and Gen. Montgomery's victory at El Alamein. There was a strong belief that the British couldn't fight and that India was under imminent threat by the Japanese. Thus, with the British unable to hold on and rumors that Churchill wasn't competent enough to run a global war, FDR and the Americans had to assume ultimate control, the "mantle of command," of the United Nations effort to defeat the Axis forces. Still, there are two problems I had with this book. The first was the structure of the book. Mr Hamilton, for some reason, wrote some monolithically long chapters in the beginning of the book, front loading the reader with a lot of information before his themes could develop. The chapters become shorter and more manageable in the second half and theme is better able to develop there, but the editor and author should have tried to break up the first chapters some. Also, the choice to break up the book into fourteen parts with some parts being very short, one chapter affairs is rather odd. Also, the authors choice to use some rather rare words, like jejune and majeure (the last one I couldn't even find in my dictionary app), is slightly annoying. Couldn't he have used the synonym juvenile rather than jejune instead? But, perhaps the books biggest fault is to overstate the case that Operation Torch was a masterstroke of strategic vision. Mr. Hamilton makes a compelling case and, true, Nazi forces did have to be diverted to take control of all of France and send reinforcements to Gen. Rommel's Afrika Korps after the Torch landings, but was it really such an ingenious move that Mr. Hamilton makes it to be? Personally, I'm skeptical. However, throughout this book Roosevelt's fine character, leadership, and political skills shine through. This book makes strong case for thinking of FDR as one of our country's greatest presidents both in peace and war.

[Kathleen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hamilton is a British-born award-winning biographer and academic. Roosevelt, unlike Churchill, died before he could write his own account of the war effort. Churchill, on the other hand, was able to play down or obscure his 'often suspect' military leadership in his Nobel Prize winning six-volume memoir, The Second World War.​ Hamilton contends that Roosevelt's deft but opaque role as commander in chief has been overshadowed or overlooked in many military histories. In this highly readable account, Hamilton attempts to correct the historical record.
​Churchill wanted the United States to declare war against the Nazis in August 1941 when they met on a battleship off the coast of Newfoundland for a secret rendezvous. Instead, he was induced to sign a declaration of principles that would end the British Empire by emphasizing national self-determination. Churchill was not in a strong position. Its armies were led by "toffs" and "blimps", and its men performed poorly against fanatical German and Japanese soldiers. Churchill was embarrassed by the failure of British troops to put up more than a token defense of Singapore against outmanned Japanese soldiers in February 1942.

Roosevelt was also not well served by his military in the beginning. The Navy was surprised at Pearl Harbor and the Army's great hero, General Douglas MacArthur was a narcissist and charlatan--taking a large bribe from the Filipino government. To professional soldiers, Roosevelt could seem like a lightweight. But he was crafty too. He required that "outgoing presidential messages be deciphered and sent by the Navy Department, while incoming messages be enciphered and sent over by the Arm​y Department." He wanted to be only one who knew everything. He could also be secretive and manipulative.

His Army chief of staff, Gen. George Marshall, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson wanted to establish a second front and relieve the pressure on Russia with an Allied invasion of Europe as early as the fall of 1942. Roosevelt foresaw disaster. He insisted on invading North Africa and forming a pincer with Britain's Eighth Army to trap General Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps. By invading northern Africa, then southern Italy, the Allies learned from battlefield experience, slowly and painfully, so that they were ready to storm Normandy's beaches on D-Day in June of 1944.

Recommend.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

World War II seems to hold an endless fascination for me and I've read a lot of history and biography associated with this truly global event. The Mantle of Command is simply superb, certainly in the top five of all the (several dozen) WWII non-fiction books I've read.

Hamilton writes in the Acknowledgements, "My fascination with FDR goes back to 'American Caesars' .... a biography of the last twelve US presidents, which I published in 2010. Researching the opening chapter on President Roosevelt, I found it hard to believe that no military biographer or military historian had tackled his military leadership in World War II as commander in chief in a full scale work."

A decent review would take me hours to compose - which I decline - so you'll just need to take my word that if you're interested in WWII history and/or FDR, this is a must read book. The reader does need to understand that Hamilton used selective (from my perspective, critically important) decisions in FDR’s career as Commander in Chief – a comprehensive approach would require many, many volumes. But the author brilliantly illuminates the critical assumption of command by the president, not just of his own generals and politicians, but command over the entire Allied United Nations war management in 1942. It must pain an English historian to document the broken reed that was the British Empire and the British military in 1942, following, one upon another, British defeats on land and sea. Unlike any volume ever published, Mantle of Command shows how and why FDR took complete control of the war in 1942, overruling his Secretary of War and Joints Chiefs who were set to make an attempt to invade northwest Europe in 1942. Hamilton explodes prevailing myths about many key figures including McArthur, Marshall, Stimson and King.

I suggest, before you begin the book, turn to the back and read the first several pages of the Acknowledgements (to the point where he starts thanking people).

Hamilton's second volume in the ‘FDR at War’ series covers the year 1943 - I intend to start it immediately.

[Naomi · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent, thought-provoking book. Well written and superb research. Thoroughly enjoyed it - could not put it down once I started reading it.

[Steven Kaminski · Rating 5 out of 5]

The more I read history the more I discover that my History class in high school didn't teach me anything & really sucked. This book is a broad look at FDR's leadership during WW II but there was tons of stuff in this book that I didn't know and was shocked about...

- When Churchill first met FDR...they were supposed to meet secretly but Churchill brought members of the press pissing FDR off...Churchill had drafted plans for America to jump into the war and to fight alongside Britain. But FDR instead negotiated a statement of shared principles for the Atlantic Charter and didn't declare war. Why? Because of politics & reality. The isolationist movement in America is was huge and FDR knew that any antagonizing of that movement would hurt other political programs he needed support for. But even greater in the background was something I didn't think through: America wasn't ready to go to war. They didn't have the military hardware in place, they didn't have a big enough military to get involved in the European conflict. FDR disagreed with his generals as well ordering one fleet to the Pacific and one into the Atlantic to project that America was much stronger than it was.

- FDR liked Churchill because of his fight and his desire to fight. But in reality he saw Churchill based on his results as absolutely incompetent. Every single battle the British fought before America got in the war they lost. They were getting their asses kicked everywhere. But in the statements that eventually brought America into the side of the Allies he made clear to Churchill that they would only come in IF the British gave up control over almost all of their colonies. Churchill was furious but he really didn't have a choice either.

- Before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor (and MacArthur in the Philippines) the military had placed those sites on heightened alert so they should have not been as unprepared for the attack but it was devastating. All of FDR's advisors wanting him to give Congress a speech for over an hour educating America on the threat. FDR overruled his advisors & made a speech of just over 300 words. It was powerful, concise & got people inspired. When he asked Congress to declare war he was very careful to just declare war on Japan because of the isolationists in Congress. It was only after Germany declared war on the US that America went into a full partnership with the British.

- FDR in his leadership style listened. He would deliberately picked people he trusted to go to areas where he needed more information & they would report back. When the Admiral in charge of Pearl Harbor was summoned to Washington he expected to be demoted, But instead FDR listened to him as the admiral was very candid. So honest in fact the President sent him on a nationwide tour to educate the public and the military allowing him to keep his rank.

- MacArthur had a HUGE ego. In WW I he had been given 7 Silver Stars for bravery. But in the Philippines he was a political disaster. He often would send out public cables that would make himself look good. He over promised to his own troops and when they were overrun blamed Washington. He blamed Washington for his Air Force being destroyed even though he had been warned of an attack NINE days earlier. It eventually got to a point where the War Department openly questioned his sanity. His own troops nicknamed him 'Dugout Doug'. He was disgraced in Washington when during the war he accepted a payment of almost $5 million dollars for 'services rendered' to the Philippines. He also participated in (and I didn't know this) an attack on veterans after WW I who were marching peacefully in Washington for bonuses they were owed. He ordered bayonets fixed killing many of them.

- The Doolittle Raid (where the first bombing runs were made upon Tokyo) humiliated and surprised the Japanese. So much so they turned around a navy engaged in active battles to retreat back to the mainland.

- For over a year FDR fought a battle with his generals over where to land forces in the European theater. FDR wanted to land where German troops were overextended (in North Africa). His generals were all opposed. So opposed they went all on the record on paper, they actively worked to undermine the battle planning, demanding that the President focus on Japan (even though the generals had no plan in place) & they even leaked plans to the public. What became known as Operation Torch was a public success but even more greater a success that the military should have civilian control over its decisions. I had no idea how bad it had gotten it was almost to the point of mutiny. The Secretary of War (Stimson) asked General Marshall if he was ready to take over the military if they took away FDR's authority and he was shocked into silence...he knew the opposition had gone too far.

Really great book...

[Elda Mengisto]

"How accurately President Roosevelt read the demented mind of the Nazi fuhrer; how, after ensuring U.S. naval victory in the Pacific, he turned his attention back towards Europe; how he overruled the generals and insisted upon American landings in French Northwest Africa in 1942....these marked a remarkable reversal of fortune for the Allies, and testify to Roosevelt's extraordinary military leadership..."

The successes Nigel Hamilton paints in the prologue form his thesis in the first of his three-book trilogy about FDR's role in WWII; compared to popular logic, he did more significant things in his second major challenge in his administration. In this first book, The Mantle of Command, it focuses on the period between July 1941 (when Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met out on the Atlantic to discuss possible American involvement) and November 1942 (featuring the invasion on French Northwest Africa, which shifts the war towards the allies). All in between, it features Roosevelt in his debates with different figures and changes throughout the war.

I was looking forward to this for a while, especially with the premise that it would be the memoir that Roosevelt never got a chance to tell. While Hamilton clearly does his research, featuring multiple interviews of Roosevelt's inner circle and detailed documents, I didn't fully get into this at first. Maybe it was because of the writing style, or how some of the earlier chapters dragged on while the latter ones came on faster, with several pages to detail multiple scenes from the second world war. I got to note the arc which led onto the invasion of French Northwest Africa, though--that was well-written.

However, there were little details which I really didn't notice from the outset which enlightened the view of the war in the United States, and added a bit of character to what would otherwise be a dry book. A notable one was Roosevelt's declaration of war against Japan; the 390-word declaration initially began with "Yesterday December 7, 1941, a day which will live in world history..." (67) rather than the more serious "infamy". This kind of makes you think about how a certain set of words could add to the gravity of a situation, especially as the United States teeters between continued isolationism and actual involvement in the war. On a more lighthearted note, Hamilton discusses how "Maps were a different matter. The president loved maps, just as he loved stamps--a hobby that had become the more passionate the less he himself could travel, owing to his disability. It was no surprise, then, when the President ordered that something similar to Churchill's portable map-and-filing system be installed in the White House" (149). It also draws a bridge between him and Churchill, which Hamilton delves into as well.

One thing he notes is how Churchill has a charm about him which overwhelms people, albeit with some flaws. He notes how "after being voted out of office in 1945, Churchill was doubly anxious to paint himself, in his six-volume memoirs, The Second World War, as a successful wartime prime minister" (105) This further expanded onto how it falsely implies that Churchill encouraged the invasions in Algeria and Morocco, while Roosevelt had the idea as early as summer of 1941. Another thing which stood out was how Roosevelt and Churchill saw India (which also laced on to if either wanted to save the British empire). The latter's policy about keeping India on close corners may have cost an ally, as the Indians didn't want to fight for an empire which didn't want to give them rights. This adds another layer to Churchill--a hero in the UK, he had an imperial bent which bordered on racism.

The Mantle of Command has a good arc--it points to one of the great battles of WWII, and depicts how Roosevelt, with a manipulative yet passionate bent, guided the way. It also paints a nice portrait amongst the commotion of the peak of the Japanese empire, and the pull between the two fronts. It's also a good character analysis--though it may be hard to get into at first. Take some time with this one; it's not necessarily rewarding at first, but it comes together well. (7/10)

[Steven Meyers · Rating 5 out of 5]

“CALLING THE SHOTS”

Mr. Hamilton’s attempt in his three-volume work about President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) is to explain his presidency from the vantage point as Commander in Chief. The first volume covers the years 1941-42. He also highlights FDR setting and maintaining the moral agenda of the Allied Powers and the collapse of the British Empire in the weeks and months following Pearl Harbor. The book was published in 2014.

The book begins in 1941. President Roosevelt who turned 59 in January is at the beginning of his third term. Hitler will break the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact that was not even two years old yet and invade the Soviet Union. Germany has conquered vast portions of Europe. Isolationism in the United States was still very strong with polling showing 75%-80% of U.S. citizens against intervening to help Britain. The U.S. military is completely unprepared to engage in a war. The service is small and ill-equipped. Britain is two years into their war with Germany and in very dire straits. Germany at this point looks unstoppable. As usual, older American generations and foreign leaders believed U.S. citizens were too soft to go to war. Boy oh boy, our industrial might and courage showed otherwise. The same “too soft” attitude in underestimating youth remains today.

The book skims over battle scenes, not giving detailed descriptions. The focus of the trilogy is how power players maneuvered during the creation of the important Atlantic Charter; the responses towards Japan’s surprise attack on Pearl Harbor; Hitler’s major military blunder of declaring war on the U.S. after the attack on Pearl Harbor; FDR’s strained relationship with General Douglas MacArthur; the reasons we first engaged with Germany instead of Japan and invaded Northwest Africa instead of Europe; FDR’s and Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s (age 66) different management styles; and the reasons and results in the Battle of Midway. It also covers Churchill’s duplicity in refusing to accept that British colonialism was crumbling and his insistence of not allowing India to self-govern. It sure was big talk from a country that was repeatedly getting its ass whipped in practically every military engagement. Many times, the British simply surrendered without much of a fight.

I was shocked at the near mutiny of FDR’s many top generals over his decision to begin engagements against Germany by assaulting Northwest Africa instead of launching an attack from Britain towards German-occupied France. Such esteemed leaders as brilliant 4-star General George Marshall really laid an egg on his stubborn insistence that green American recruits were more than capable of beating Germany’s seasoned troops on Nazi’s well-fortified turf. We most certainly were not. It was too soon. The troops needed actual battleground experience before attempting what would be known as the Normandy Invasion in June of 1944. General Marshall and his cohorts took the truculent attitude that if their opinion was not accepted, the United States should pick up all its toys, go home, and let Britain alone deal with Germany. How FDR was able to resolve the very serious temper tantrum by his generals was impressive. Secretary of War Henry Stimson is portrayed in an especially negative light on his persistence in sabotaging FDR’s plans, even to the point of trying to recruit other military leaders to attempt a coup if Stimson didn’t get his way.

‘The Mantle of Command’ does a good job of explaining the political infighting and President Roosevelt’s supporters as well as detractors. Many political calculations were involved during the war. There were oodles of strong personalities and immense egos at play, often at cross-purposes. Decisions had true life-and-death results. The book shows how psychological warfare was important. Like all great history books, it gives the full measure of a man, his weaknesses and strengths. They were all men. World War II caused a seismic shift in power from its results. The United States, like it or not, became the Big Kahuna with responsibilities to promote and protect democracies. The book concludes with American soldiers engaging Germany in Northwest Africa. ‘The Mantle of Command’ is an excellent first volume in the trilogy.

[Larry · Rating 4 out of 5]

A worthy historical account, but also the most openly opinionated history text I have ever read. Admittedly, other historians may still offer their opinion by what they include or not include in their narratives, but they would have done it much more subtlety by letting the reader "jump" to the conclusion that the author may have made clear. In this case, the author quite often offers a conclusion, albeit with considerable prior evidence to back that conclusion up. I'm just not so used to the author being so blatant about it. However, all of this gets off the main point and advantage of this historical account on FDR that gives the book weight and value, this first in a trilogy is specifically about a president, namely Roosevelt, as the Commander-in-Chief of the United States, leading up to and throughout World War II. This book takes us into Pearl Harbor and to the landing of U.S. troops in North Africa in late 1942. I have already read a few individual accounts of World War II, but more comprehensively about the European and Pacific theaters of war via the first two volumes of Ian W. Toll's excellent Pacific War trilogy, which covered the eastern Pacific half of the the Pacific Theater, namely the naval half, as well as the first volume of Rick Atkinson's equally excellent Liberation Trilogy, which covers the European Theater of the war. With that two-sided background of the 1941-1942 war period from a military history perspective, it was easy for me to follow and assess for myself the White House-based, Commander-in-Chief part of the war. Frankly, I was impressed by this narrative of the first part of the war. The author gives great credence to FDR's skills at this point in time. The average reader will likely be more, not less, impressed by him as a president. Douglas MacArthur, unfortunately will not be. I had already read two other historical accounts of MacArthur, both from World War II and the Korean War that were far from flattering. This book introduced new material to me that makes me wonder why he was ever a general. (Think Donald Trump but without bone spurs.) On a different note, this author had what I would call a strange summary of the American landing in North Africa. To believe this author, the landing was all but child's play, while Rick Atkinson's account made it clear that was not the case. Perhaps, the degree to which this was a "walk in the park" is a product of how many American deaths is considered acceptable for a park walk. Regardless, I look forward to reading the other two volumes of this trilogy, but will be ready for critical assessment of the author's further accounts.

[Alan Vanneman · Rating 5 out of 5]

This the first of a projected trilogy on Franklin Roosevelt's role as commander in chief during World War II by the noted British historian Nigel Hamilton. Unless you are a WWII or an FDR buff this is probably more than you want to know, but if you are either of the two, you will find this an excellent read. Hamilton, who began his career as a military historian with a three-volume biography of Field Marshall Montgomery back in the eighties, has been a student of World War II for decades. The greatest "defect"--perhaps the only one--is Hamilton's almost invariable conviction that FDR was always right, on every issue, rejecting the American military's over-ambitious plans for an invasion of France in 1942, and rejecting Churchill's "plan" of, basically, "never".

Hamilton amasses a great deal of detail to back his arguments, and I generally agree: Roosevelt was right, over and over again. Particularly helpful are "real time" quotations from letters and diaries that let us know what Roosevelt and the other major players were thinking when they made their decisions. Roosevelt understood, as his generals did not, that in 1942, and in 1943, that neither they nor their soldiers ready to face the German army. He also understood, as Churchill was not willing to admit, that Germany could only be defeated through a series of great land battles, culminating in the invasion of Germany itself.

Churchill never wanted to invade Europe: He believed, probably correctly, that Britain simply could not endure casualties on the scale of World War I (750,000 dead, plus almost a million wounded) and would probably have been willing to sacrifice most of Europe to Stalin in the utterly vain hope of holding onto the British Empire of his youth, which was already falling apart.

Roosevelt, on the other hand, had been against the "armistice" that ended World War I (he was assistant secretary of the navy at the time) and always believed that the Allies had made a huge mistake by not invading Germany and conclusively defeating their armies in battle. This was a (relatively) easy decision for Roosevelt to make both because the U.S. had vastly superior manpower and because U.S. casualties in World War I had been (almost) negligible.

Volume II of Hamilton's work, Commander in Chief, which I'll also review, is similarly impressive.

[Elgin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Perhaps the best book I have read this year. Nigel Hamilton's well researched book gives a behind-the-scenes look at FDR's thoughts and plans in the years prior and just after America's entry into WWII. This is the amazing story of the clear thinking, thoughtful, and brilliant man that led us from the Depression to eminence on the international stage. There are many books about the Generals and troops who fought in WWII...but the true genius behind our entry to the war and the development and maturing of our fighting men and strategy was FDR. This is an inspiring story of leadership and the luck of having the right man in office at the right time. He thought clearly about our capabilities, need for development, Allied politics and seemed to lead the country on the only path to victory, in spite of pressure from his aids and generals to embark on a path that would well have been disastrous.

I read this book immediately after reading a biography of Churchill and Orwell (also excellent.) However the two authors' takes on the Prime Minister and the President were somewhat different. Thomas Ricks portrays Churchill as "playing Roosevelt masterfully" in convincing him to ally with Britain. Hamilton portrays Roosevelt as the master diplomat and manipulator who knew what he wanted and made sure he got it. Perhaps both are true. It is interesting how different authors or historians put different spins on people and events. Of course thats what makes history interesting...there is rarely one impetus for events or one path to resolution.

Final note - thank God that Donald Trump was not President during WWII. If he had we would all be goose-stepping in jackboots and saluting the rising sun!!!

[Steven Thomma · Rating 4 out of 5]

If history is written by the victors, then it’s also greatly influenced – dominated even – by those who actually write it.
Of the two great western leaders against fascism in World War II, Winston Churchill lived to write his account. Franklin Roosevelt did not. For decades, many saw Churchill as the dominant allied leader of World War II, with a partner in FDR.
Now in this richly detailed account, the first of a trilogy, Nigel Hamilton shows how it was FDR, not Churchill, who quickly emerged as the dominant wartime leader who sets the allies on the path to victory.
FDR is a shrewd, informed, and decisive leader not only in his work with Churchill, but with his own often rebellious top advisers including Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Gen. George Marshall.
Roosevelt had a great curiosity, an enormous appetite to know more.
First. He was a voracious reader. I know firsthand, having taken a private tour of his personal stacks in his presidential library. Each book with his handwritten notation in the front cover of when and where he acquired it.
Second, he regularly went beyond his own staff and advisers, eager for other sources and views and asking people to send him reports directly from around the world.
As a leader, he used that to question and challenge generals and advisers who others might defer to. (See JFK and the Bay of Pigs debacle.)
As early as October 1941 – before Pearl Harbor – FDR was thinking about how to send US troops to Africa. Stimson and Marshall thought he was “going off the deep end.” They work repeatedly to change his mind, if not to covertly undermine his wishes.
Yet he prevails. The invasion of North Africa was a great success. And the path to victory was set.