In this groundbreaking new work, based on a thorough re-reading of primary sources and new research in the Austrian State Archives, Franz A.J. Szabo presents a scholarly but eminently readable and stimulating reassessment of the continental war - the first in nearly a century.
Professor Szabo challenges the well-established myth that the Seven Years War was won through the military skill and tenacity of the King of Prussia, often styled Frederick 'the Great.' Instead he argues that Prussia did not win, but merely survived the Seven Years War and did so despite and not because of the actions and decisions of its king. The Seven Years War was not the 'cabinet war' that history has written it to be but a war that drove all participants to near collapse and, in doing so, changed the face of Europe.
With balanced attention to all the major participants and to all conflict zones on the European continent, the book describes the strategies and tactics of the military leaders on all sides, analyzes the major battles of the war and illuminates the diplomatic, political and financial aspects of the conflict. By providing a clear analysis of English, French and Prussian, as well as Austrian, Russian, and Swedish policies and actions, the book offers a new perspective on the war as a whole.
Franz A.J. Szabo is Professor Emeritus of Austrian and Habsburg History at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada, where he was also Director of the Wirth Institute for Austrian and Central European Studies from 1998 to 2011.
From Heinz Reinhardt's knowledgable GR opinion to the peer reviews* we can agree on Szabo's anti-Frederick's bias, possibly entwined with his Austrian roots. Personally, I rather enjoy the effect. A default study of Frederick the Great ** inevitably leans from the positive into the mildly hagiographic. By consequence, the genius from Prussia outwits fearful odds to survive the Seven Years' War with his Kingdom intact. He did, but as Szabo tells it, he barely survived an Enkreisung pummeling because the alliances against him couldn't properly coordinate their attacks.
There's an unreal sense of schizophrenia in the Franco-Austrian camp. Fretting over the unprecedented financial cost, compared to the War of the Austrian Succession a generation earlier whose scores they tried to settle now, while simultaneously shipwrecking all peace feelers because the territorial gains sketched out in a settlement never satisfied anybody.
Frederick in particular insisted on hanging onto Saxony, also his main theater against Austria, while Russia unenthusiastically operated in Silesia. From Kolberg [ see the 1943 movie] to Königsberg, the second half of the 18th century already rumbles with the Germany vs Russia names famililar from the first half of the 20th century. It's not a complete coincidence: if Szabo can identify 1 long-term effect of the war, its the eastwards power shift in Europe. France reached across the Rhine while losing a substantial part of its colonial empire to Britain, past its zenith on the slope towards the Revolution. the Habsburg Empire.. stayed where it was? While Russia's ascendance, in spite of its meagre performance (a steamroller with less than 100.000 effectives?) was confirmed. Just look at has-been Sweden, sort of sitting on the sideline like it's nurturing the blisters of Pavlova.
500 pages with a LOT of politics and, true to the day and age, a LOT of chessboard marching of armies, but FEW battles. Szabo's not exactly a battle bard, anyway. Regiments attack positions, casualties are counted, outcomes are discussed. It's a good thing we have Christopher Duffy to provide maps and to be referred to if you wish to know how, for example, the Austrian artillery was trained and equipped***. Those guns read like the main Verdun-esque spoiler of the Prussian infantry, no matter how hard it could march, pushed on by the bayonets of its own officers.
It was a war started both by an opportunistic King, seeking to land a knockout blow on a coalition that he viewed as strangling his nation's survival, and by a trio of strong willed, women who despised said King, and built a coalition of three Great Powers. A coalition that, in hindsight, wether it truly was aimed at strangling Prussia or not, couldn't help but be perceived as such in Berlin. The Seven Years War is one that is somewhat well known here in the States. It is the story of Rodgers Rangers, The Last of the Mohicans, Fort Carillon, and the Plains of Abraham. And yet, the real bloodshed was not in America, but in central Europe. Frederick, King of Prussia, having already agrandized his Kingdom by way of Austria with seizing Silesia in the War of Austrian Succession a decade and change earlier, saw the coalition formed against him and realized he had no choice but to gamble on a first strike. The coalition built to forestall such a move was largely the brainchild of three of the most remarkable women in Western history. Madame de Pompadour, consort of the French King and a brilliant strategic and analytical mind. Empress Maria Theresia of Austria, a strong willed, brilliant woman who yearned for revenge against Prussia, and Czarina Catherine I of Russia, a fierce opponent of all things Prussian and a woman who saw in this alliance the possibility of Russia cementing it's status as a Great Power. Added to the three major powers of France, the Hapsburg Empire and the Russian Empire, were the provinces of the Holy Roman Empire, and Sweden. Seeing this array of strong states seeking to contain him, Frederick lashed out first and gambling upon the tactical proficiency of the best drilled and equipped Army in Europe, he invaded Saxony and rapidly overwhelmed it before turning and lancing into Bohemia. Franz Szabo has written the only English language work of any length and depth on the Seven Years War in Europe in the modern era. And while it is a worthwhile addition to any library of European, German or military history, it does have one very glaring flaw: the author is entirely incapable of hiding his disgust with the Prussian King at any level. This is not at all an unbiased work, and the near constant snide quips and dark interpretations of every move made by Frederick gets in the way of genuine criticism of his strategic handling of the war, his ruination of the Prussian state by it, and his lack of battlefield successes. Despite this glaring flaw, it is still a very useful, and interesting read. In Bohemia, however, Frederick learned that the Austrian Army had not been idle in between the wars. The Austrians had feverishly reformed their logistics, cavalry, artillery and overall tactical doctrine, even if operationally and strategically, Austrian commanders tended to play their cards close to their chest. Then again, why bother being flashy when your artillery could literally blow apart any assaulting formation you encountered? Which is precisely how the Austrians fought the war tactically. Interestingly, the Seven Years War in Europe would be tactically similar to battles in the US Civil War, with the Austrians foreshadowing the Federal reliance on firepower, and the Prussians foreshadowing the Rebel reliance upon elan and maneuver. However, the Prussians would have far less tactical success than the Confederates would in that later conflict a continent away. Even if Frederick won a battle, which was honestly rather rare, his losses were enormous thanks to the overwhelming Austrian firepower, and more often than not, Austrian commanders merely took position to block Frederick and allowed him to impale his fine army on their Cannon and musket volleys. The Russians too proved to be far tougher than Frederick had initially hoped. At Zorndorf in particular, where Frederick managed to double envelope the Russian Army, he could not destroy it as the Russians proved themselves by simply refusing to lose. Though many thousands, on both sides, would die in that particular bloodbath. Frederick was, however, well served by his subordinates who were predominantly quite skilled. His brother, Prince Henry, and Ferdinand the Duke of Brunswick (commanding the joint Anglo-Hanoverian Army against the French and Holy Roman Empire forces) had a far better battlefield record than did Frederick. And Sweden was there too... though they accomplished next to nothing besides reminding Europe that they were no longer the Army of Charles XII. In the end, the war ended in mutual financial and political exhaustion. Prussia was bled dry and were it not for raiding the central German States for their treasuries, utterly broke. Austria was near bankruptcy, France had lost her colonial possessions and her will to fight on, and Catherine I had died of illness, was briefly replaced by Czar Paul, a Prussophile, who in his turn was soon ousted in a coupe by Catherine II, who for reasons of internal dissent, had to agree to peace. Part of the reason the war is less studied is that it was a war largely of attrition, absent he brilliant maneuvers of the Napoleonic Wars, the US Civil War, or the preceding War of Spanish Succession. And yet the war paved the way for the modern world. It established Britain as a global Empire, facilitating English as the global lingua Franca, it saw the rise of Russia as a Great Power, and a great leveler of European affairs, it created the dual power contention in Germany between Prussia and Austria which set the world on the course to both World Wars, and it set the stage for the French Revolution and the coming of Napoleon. Despite the blatant bias of the author (himself an Austrian, so I do suppose it is forgiveable), this is an excellent work on the political, strategic and military history of a very forgotten conflict. Highly recommended.
Thorough, solidly well-documented and perhaps accordingly somewhat heavy going. But this volumen provides a reader with an in-depth understanding of the politcal, diplomatic and military history of the war, that resulted in Prussia's breakthrough as a great power. It also demolishes any romantic notions of a tidy 'cabinet war' with elegant manoeuvres and limited societal impact. As an example this war meant the demise of Saxony and laid the foundation for subsequent erasure of Poland. Finally it provides a convincing case that the 'Great' in Frederick the Great most certainly was a spin created by the man himself and sustained opportunistically by both Prussian and British authors subsequently.
Recommended for the dedicated, who want a solid foundation for further studies.
Dr Franz A.J. Szabo, Professor of Austrian and Habsburg History at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Canada, provides an outstanding study focused on the Seven Years War in Europe, leaving aside the Anglo-French naval and colonial aspects of the conflict. Professor Szabo is known for his Kaunitz and Enlightened Absolutism, 1753-1780 (1994). In the study under review, the author explores Seven Years War from Frederick II of Prussia’s invasion of Saxony in August 1756 to the Peace of Hubertusburg in February 1763.
Historians say that the Seven Years War was a continuation of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). In 1756, the Diplomatic Revolution resulted in an Anglo-Prussian alliance against an Austro-Franco-Russian alliance. Shortly thereafter, Frederick II launched a preemptive strike against Saxony, an ally of Austria, to defend Prussia against the possible threat of Maria Theresa of Austria and Elizabeth I of Russia. This action began a protracted European war. While Britain and France fought for global power, Prussia fought to defend territorial conquests and maintain its recently gained status as a Great Power. Overseas conflict split the French war effort. France could only muster limited military moves against Prussia while the Austro-Franco-Russian alliance suffered from the lack of coordinated efforts, different objectives, tactical mistakes, and logistical problems during several years of conflict. These problems, along with the supposed military talent of Frederick II, allowed Prussia to survive a close conflict. “Frederick’s survival,” according to Szabo, “depended on his ability to take unexpected initiatives and to keep his enemies off balance” (p.425). He adds that, “the benefit of interior lines also made it easier for him to react quickly to specific threats, gave him shorter supply lines and allowed him to operate at cheaper cost than his enemies” (p.425). Even so, Prussia was a defeated power by 1761. And, then the “miracle” happened. Empress Elizabeth I of Russia died, and her heir, the pro-Prussian Peter III, dropped the Austrian alliance and established a Russo-Prussian alliance, saving Frederick II from a complete disaster. Prussia would keep Silesia and the illusion of Great Power status. “But it did so,” according to the author, “despite, rather than because of, the actions of its king” (p.426).
Szabo’s The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756-1763 is a valuable survey of the conflict, examining the politics, diplomacy, and warfare of the period. The author puts the accomplishments of Frederick the Great in a realistic light. Szabo is no hero worshipper of the Prussian monarch. He stresses a negative view of Frederick the Great, writing: “there was very little ‘honourable’ about Frederick in this war. Vengeful and ungracious in victory and self-pitying in defeat, he happily took credit for victories for which he was not primarily responsible, but invariably blamed defeats for which he was responsible on others” (p.427). The study joins other valuable military studies on the Seven Years War in Central Europe, including Christopher Duffy’s The Army of Frederick the Great (1974), The Army of Maria Theresa (1977), and Frederick the Great: A Military Life (1985), as well as Dennis Showalter’s The Wars of Frederick the Great (1995). The study is highly recommended for students and scholars interested in eighteenth-century warfare in Europe.
When Napoleon entered Potsdam on 24 October 1806 after his forces smashed the Prussians at the battle of Jena-Auerstedt, he made it a point to visit the tomb of Frederick the Great. While there he famously told his men to doff their hats, saying, "if he were here now, we wouldn't be."
After reading Franz Szabo's history of the European campaigns of the Seven Years' War, it's hard to understand why the Prussian monarch rated such respect. Szabo's detailed account of the bloody and devastating conflict serves as a powerful corrective to the Prussian king's standing as one of the great military leaders of history. In it he meticulously relates the various battles, showing time and again his flawed judgments, his undeservedly ruthless treatment of his subordinates and men, his bigoted assessments of his opponents and the errors that they spawned. Szabo also argues for a different interpretation of Frederick's opponents, especially (as befits an historian of the Austrian empire) Austria and her military, with only the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth in 1761 and the succession of her unabashedly Prussophile nephew Peter III that saved Frederick from a defeat that would have changed the course of European history. With this book, Szabo gives English-language readers the account it has long needed, and one anybody interested in the conflict should read.
Bottom line: Other reviews were correct about the obsession with a Fredrick. The reader would best read other books on the English / French conflicts and Fredrick the Great by Dennis Showalter:
A recommendation for readers who are in interested in the period Is to read multiple books and not attempt to reach that goal with only one book especially this one which is so tainted as far as the Fredrick issue is concerned.
This books spends so much effort in attempting to guide the readers impressions of Fredrick the Great that this effort can distract from the narrative. A person who has already read about the events or plans to read further may notice that the writers style is slanted: the information is based on actual resources however the author picks and chooses certain statements to fit his compulsion to degrade Fredrick. Not to mention some of the facts. For example: Szabo uses quotes from Catt however sparingly. Catt was Fredricks companion so to speak and wrote of his almost daily conversations and observations. The author states that Frederick did not accomplish his objectives at times. This is not true. Sure: If he could completely obliterate the Russian army that would be the ultimate goal. After the two main battles with Russia the Russians went back East thus allowing the Prussians to attempt again to tackle the Austrians. This the basic goal. Szabo spends pages attempting to create any other impression as to why the Russians had no wish to fight further other than the fact that the conflict was very costly in a number of ways. Tactical verse Strategic. Szabo does not seem as an historian to appreciate the Strategic gains. A competent History author would understand the difference. Szabo continually attempts to convince the reader that the only victories by the Prussians and Fredrick occurred because the other guy slipped on a bar of soap.
Overall material does not stick to books premise:
During the 30 some page introduction Szabo explains to the reader there was the French / English conflict and the Prussian everyone else conflict. The reader may have ( as did I ) the impression that this book would stick to the Prussian events. He does not and repeats material covered by the other book by the same publisher. If the reader has read The Global Seven Years War 1754-1763: Britain and France in a Great Power Contest (Modern Wars In Perspective) by Daniel A. Baugh (a well written in depth look at the French / English conflicts through out the world). Then some of the same material is presented with no further advantage. One approach the reader may wish to take to this subject ( as works with many Eruo topics ) is multiple literary sources.
The books published by Helion I have read are excellent presentations ( too bad Helion does not include indexes. Very good authors lousy publisher who thinks they need to sell expensive easy to damage books instead affordable books with indexes. ). Olmutz to Torgau is an excellent narrative of the Fredrick Prussian endeavors. Neil Cogswell presents different perspectives and makes an attempt to provide a varied view of the numbers. As opposed to Szabo who presents one number after the battle of Kunersdorf Cogswell presents the reader with the opportunity to view multiple views and numbers throughout his compilation of sources.
Guerra Fantastica by Antonio Barrento is an interesting look at the Portuguese / English – French / Spanish conflict. Zweybrücken in Command: The Reichsarmee in the Campaign of 1758 is only about one year, however provides the reader with a further look at other area ( also put together by Cogswell ).
The military life of Frederick the Great by Dupuy is a good overall view. A reader may wish to start with the Osprey books on the era. Always a good overview.
If this book was re-edited and all of Szabo’s Fredrick obsessions were removed and the repeat of material from the Baugh book. Then this book may have been a good read to fill in the gaps of events left out of most narratives, such as what did Sweden do.
The reader will spend a lot of time in what could be spent reading other books more to the point.
Szabo opens this book with his first salvo, and in doing so he is attacking several premises and people. First, he shoots against a well established premise: the "Frederician myth", and Frederick II "The Great" of Prussia's might, cleverness, et al. And his acolytes.
To sum it up, and I fully agree, Prussia didn't want the 7 Years War, but merely survived it, and by pure luck. Had the czarina of Russia's lived a couple of years extra, Prussia might have never got to be the power that it was, or even existed at all after this war. What is also always downplayed, was the fiscal effects, and its long term costs: -It crippled France economy, whatever savings, and changes for the better the Duke of Orléans did, this war destroyed them. Not to mention France didn't get anything out of it, plus a marriage to an Austrian archduchess no one wanted in the first place. What followed next is well known... -Austria changed its international views from superpower to a self-contained power, capable of managing itself, and started the Prussian-Austrian dualism, which the latter would eventually lost its protagonism thus ceding Prussia the leading role, and again, the rest is history. -Spain and the Dutch Republic became fully second powers, or worse. -Russia was confirmed as an important player, and was to increase its importance. -Poland's own downfall.
In due course, it changed the ballance of power completely, and the new boardchess remained thus until WW1. New Europeans ward would be fought but never to such escale, enters the "cabinet war".
As for the book itself, it was quite dreary at times, Szabo describes every single battle as detailed as each cabinet meeting which made the narration quite slow, hence the time that it took me to finish it. It was so easy to drop this book for more interesting ones, until the point I chose to avoid certain descriptions for the sake of narrations and continuity.
Wartościowa, ale męcząca książka. Napisana w stylu superdokładnym, wręcz na poziomie że wieczorem armia przegrupowała się na południe od wioski X, a rano wstał generał o 5:32 rano i podjął decyzję, że przegrupowanie było bez sensu, więc zarządza powrót. Więc w nawale szczegółów ciężko się brnie przez tę pozycję, ale warto. Autor skupił się na europejskim teatrze wojny, udowadniając jak kluczowa dla historii świata i lekko zapomniana była to wojna. Nie jest apologetą Fryderyka Wielkiego, wręcz skupia się na jego złych stronach, zmienności charakteru, okrucieństwa, tchórzostwa oraz zwykłego złodziejstwa. Swietnie wykazane "cuda domu brandenburskiego", rzeczywiście wręcz niewiarygodne jak niewiele brakowało aby historia świata poszła w inną stronę. Znakomite podsumowanie książki, na 10 stronach autor zarysował wszystkie konsekwencje konfliktu, jak kiedyś zapomnę o tych porannych manewrach armii o 5:32, to wystarczy jak otworzę podsumowanie i będę wszystko wiedział. Niesamowita historia, cieszę się, że uporządkowałem wiedzę - do kompletu jeszcze potrzebuję poczytać o wojnie w koloniach, bo tam się działo znacznie więcej. Czytałem z dwa miesiące, ale daję wysoką ocenę.
This is only the second book that I've read on Frederick the Great. I was very impressed with the author's research. He certainly portrays the king in a less than flattering light, which is in stark contrast to his popular portrayal in most historic literature. My only criticism is that his writing style is not the easiest to read with several very long paragraphs and dearth of chapters. I believe the same material could have been more adequately covered in 5-6 additional chapters. The paragraphs and overly long chapters became tedious to read at times.
This is an important work on what some people call World War Zero, only focused on the European battlefield. I did get a lot out of this book although you have to read it carefully because every paragraph is filled with information. The psychology of Frederick the Great is fascinating and his creation of a mighty military machine was impressive. Good read if you are interested in this time and learning about something you may never have studied.
I was not very familiar with the 7 years war in Europe when I picked up this book. I found this to be an excellent overivew and introduction of the period and especially like the political details. Giving the read an understanding of eachg participants war aims, international/domestic politics, and economic issues is a real strenght of this book. Another strenght is its descriptions of the strategice manouvers. The maps are decent, consisting of some maps in the front of the book that show the key rivers and cities etc. There are maps of some, but not all of the major battles and these are inadequate, imho, giving only an overview.
The weaknesses of the book are two-fold: (1) I think the battle descriptions are too short and give only a partial idea of what combat was like in the period. Two pages at most are given to the battles. (2) Szabo thinks Frederick is a fraud and is not afriad to let the reader know. While I tend to be pretty tolerant of author's bias (it is better they are out in the open), he could have given more background on Frederick as a ruler and general before the war started. Specifically, he talks a lot about the militirization of the Prussian state (mostly in the context of Austrian discussions about raising manpower and funds) without describing it. Similarly, a little background on Fredericks past success and methods would have been useful. That said, Frederick fought his battles with arrogance, always passed the blame, and pillaged horribly...
I would recommend this as a good starting point on the campaign. It is a well written, quick read.
A book that I wanted to like, given that it covers the European theater of the Seven Years War. Most books either concentrate on the struggle between France and England or focuses on Frederick the Great and his famous battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. The author here covers the European war in great detail and comprehensively from the diplomacy prior to the actual outbreak of war through to Frederick's desperate last moments and miraculous salvation. However, the book is flawed by overly convoluted writing and a clear emotional hatred of Frederick. This last in particular destroys the even tenor of the book. However much sympathy I have toward a revisionist view toward the hero-worship around Frederick the Great, I can only give this three stars.
A solid history of the whole of the war. While the author is now Canadian he self-identifies as Austrian and the work was funded in part by a grant from the Austrian government. So if you are looking for a hagiography of Frederic The Great look elsewhere.
This book can cause apoplexy among fans of the Kind of Prussia; for that reason if for no other a must read for an amateur with a serious interest in the period.
I remember being more confused last time I read this. Good overall narrative with a reasonable focus on the logistics and finances that drove much of the war. Frederick comes across as much more of an ass than I remember. Could use better maps - it can be hard to orient yourself towards the campaign progress with the set provided.