It was a war started both by an opportunistic King, seeking to land a knockout blow on a coalition that he viewed as strangling his nation's survival, and by a trio of strong willed, women who despised said King, and built a coalition of three Great Powers. A coalition that, in hindsight, wether it truly was aimed at strangling Prussia or not, couldn't help but be perceived as such in Berlin.
The Seven Years War is one that is somewhat well known here in the States. It is the story of Rodgers Rangers, The Last of the Mohicans, Fort Carillon, and the Plains of Abraham. And yet, the real bloodshed was not in America, but in central Europe.
Frederick, King of Prussia, having already agrandized his Kingdom by way of Austria with seizing Silesia in the War of Austrian Succession a decade and change earlier, saw the coalition formed against him and realized he had no choice but to gamble on a first strike.
The coalition built to forestall such a move was largely the brainchild of three of the most remarkable women in Western history. Madame de Pompadour, consort of the French King and a brilliant strategic and analytical mind. Empress Maria Theresia of Austria, a strong willed, brilliant woman who yearned for revenge against Prussia, and Czarina Catherine I of Russia, a fierce opponent of all things Prussian and a woman who saw in this alliance the possibility of Russia cementing it's status as a Great Power.
Added to the three major powers of France, the Hapsburg Empire and the Russian Empire, were the provinces of the Holy Roman Empire, and Sweden.
Seeing this array of strong states seeking to contain him, Frederick lashed out first and gambling upon the tactical proficiency of the best drilled and equipped Army in Europe, he invaded Saxony and rapidly overwhelmed it before turning and lancing into Bohemia.
Franz Szabo has written the only English language work of any length and depth on the Seven Years War in Europe in the modern era. And while it is a worthwhile addition to any library of European, German or military history, it does have one very glaring flaw: the author is entirely incapable of hiding his disgust with the Prussian King at any level. This is not at all an unbiased work, and the near constant snide quips and dark interpretations of every move made by Frederick gets in the way of genuine criticism of his strategic handling of the war, his ruination of the Prussian state by it, and his lack of battlefield successes.
Despite this glaring flaw, it is still a very useful, and interesting read.
In Bohemia, however, Frederick learned that the Austrian Army had not been idle in between the wars. The Austrians had feverishly reformed their logistics, cavalry, artillery and overall tactical doctrine, even if operationally and strategically, Austrian commanders tended to play their cards close to their chest.
Then again, why bother being flashy when your artillery could literally blow apart any assaulting formation you encountered? Which is precisely how the Austrians fought the war tactically.
Interestingly, the Seven Years War in Europe would be tactically similar to battles in the US Civil War, with the Austrians foreshadowing the Federal reliance on firepower, and the Prussians foreshadowing the Rebel reliance upon elan and maneuver. However, the Prussians would have far less tactical success than the Confederates would in that later conflict a continent away.
Even if Frederick won a battle, which was honestly rather rare, his losses were enormous thanks to the overwhelming Austrian firepower, and more often than not, Austrian commanders merely took position to block Frederick and allowed him to impale his fine army on their Cannon and musket volleys.
The Russians too proved to be far tougher than Frederick had initially hoped. At Zorndorf in particular, where Frederick managed to double envelope the Russian Army, he could not destroy it as the Russians proved themselves by simply refusing to lose. Though many thousands, on both sides, would die in that particular bloodbath.
Frederick was, however, well served by his subordinates who were predominantly quite skilled. His brother, Prince Henry, and Ferdinand the Duke of Brunswick (commanding the joint Anglo-Hanoverian Army against the French and Holy Roman Empire forces) had a far better battlefield record than did Frederick. And Sweden was there too... though they accomplished next to nothing besides reminding Europe that they were no longer the Army of Charles XII.
In the end, the war ended in mutual financial and political exhaustion. Prussia was bled dry and were it not for raiding the central German States for their treasuries, utterly broke.
Austria was near bankruptcy, France had lost her colonial possessions and her will to fight on, and Catherine I had died of illness, was briefly replaced by Czar Paul, a Prussophile, who in his turn was soon ousted in a coupe by Catherine II, who for reasons of internal dissent, had to agree to peace.
Part of the reason the war is less studied is that it was a war largely of attrition, absent he brilliant maneuvers of the Napoleonic Wars, the US Civil War, or the preceding War of Spanish Succession.
And yet the war paved the way for the modern world.
It established Britain as a global Empire, facilitating English as the global lingua Franca, it saw the rise of Russia as a Great Power, and a great leveler of European affairs, it created the dual power contention in Germany between Prussia and Austria which set the world on the course to both World Wars, and it set the stage for the French Revolution and the coming of Napoleon.
Despite the blatant bias of the author (himself an Austrian, so I do suppose it is forgiveable), this is an excellent work on the political, strategic and military history of a very forgotten conflict.
Highly recommended.