RUSSELL CONSIDERS THE EFFECT OF SCIENCE ON HUMAN LIFE
Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) was an influential British philosopher, logician, mathematician, and political activist. In 1950, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, in recognition of his many books.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1931 book, “In considering the effect of science upon human life we have therefore three more or less separate matters to examine. The first is the nature and scope of scientific knowledge, the second the increased power or manipulation derived from scientific technique, and the third the changes in social life and in traditional institutions which must result from the new forms of organization that scientific technique demands… In the following pages we will be concerned with science rather than with wisdom. It is well to remember, however, that this preoccupation is one-sided and needs to be corrected if a balanced view of human life is to be achieved.”
He suggests, “the theory of evolution might have been admitted by some people without too great a struggle, but in the popular mind Darwinism became identified with the hypothesis that men are descended from monkeys. This was painful to our human conceit… As it is, people have always been able to defend their self-esteem, under the impression that they were defending religion. Moreover, we know that men have souls, whereas monkeys have none. If men developed gradually out of monkeys, at what moment did they acquire a soul? The problem is really not any worse than the problem as to the particular stage at which the fetus develops a soul, but new difficulties always seem worse than old ones…” (Pg. 43)
He states, “The limitations of scientific method may be collected under three heads: (1) doubts as to the validity of induction; (2) the difficulty of drawing inferences from what is experienced to what is not experienced; and (3) even allowing that there can be inference to what is not experienced, the fact that such inference must be of an extremely abstract character, and gives, therefore, less information than it appears to do when ordinary language is employed.” (Pg. 74)
He asserts, “It is easy to invent a metaphysic which will have as a consequence that induction is valid, and many men have done so; but they have not shown any reason to believe in their metaphysic except that it was pleasant. The metaphysic of Bergson, for example, is undoubtedly peasant: like cocktails, it enables us to see the world as a unity without sharp distinctions, and all of it vaguely agreeable, but it has no better claim than cocktails have to be included in the technique for the pursuit of knowledge.” (Pg. 76)
He explains, “I metaphysics my creed is short and simple. I think that the external world may be an illusion, but if it exists, it consists of events, short, small and haphazard. Order, unity, and continuity are human inventions just as truly as are catalogues and encyclopedias. But human inventions can, within limits, be made to prevail in our human world, and in the conduct of our daily life we may with advantage forget the realm of chaos and old night by which we are perhaps surrounded.” (Pg. 98)
He comments, “[Sir James] Jeans argues [in The Mysterious Universe] that the world must have been created by a mathematician for the pleasure of seeing these laws in operation… if God were as pure a pure mathematician as His knightly champion supposes, He would have no wish to give a gross external existence in His thoughts… The world, {Jeans] tells us, consists of thoughts; of these there are three grades: the thoughts of God, the thoughts of men when they are awake, and the thoughts of men when they are asleep and have bad dreams. One does not quite see what the two latter kinds of thought add to the perfection of the universe, since clearly God’s thoughts are the best, and one does not quite see what can have been gained by creating so much muddle-headedness.” (Pg. 112-113)
He argues, ‘I think we ought provisionally to accept the hypothesis that the world had a beginning at some definite, though unknown, date. Are we to infer from this that the world was made by a Creator? Certainly not, if we are to adhere to the canons of valid scientific inference. There is no reason whatever why the universe should not have begun spontaneously, , except that it seems odd that is should do so; but there is no law of nature to the effect that things which seem odd to us must not happen. To infer a Creator is to infer a cause, and causal inferences are only admissible in science when they proceed from observed causal laws. Creation out of nothing is an occurrence which has not been observed. There is, therefore, no better reason to suppose that the world was caused by a Creator than to suppose that it was uncaused; either equally contradicts the causal laws that we can observe.” (Pg. 118)
He continues, “The purely intellectual argument on this point may be put in a nutshell: Is the Creator amenable to the laws of physics or is He not? If He is not, He cannot be inferred from physical phenomena, since no physical causal law can lead to Him; if He is, we shall have to apply the second law of thermodynamics to Him and suppose that He also had to be created at some remote period. But in that case he has lost his raison d’être.” (Pg. 119)
He contends, “At present, within wide limits, any man who has money to invest may invest it as he chooses. This freedom was defended during the heyday of laissez faire on the ground that the business which paid best was almost the most socially useful. Few men nowadays would dare to maintain such a doctrine… consider the immense sums of money that are spent on advertising. It cannot possibly be maintained that these bring any but the most meagre return to the community. The principle of permitting each capitalist to invest his money as he chooses is not, therefore, socially defensible.” (Pg. 218-219)
Although Russell often comments on scientific matters in his many books, it is delightful to see an entire book of his learned and witty commentary.