My latest choice in taking advantage of the Kindle Unlimited feature, for which I have a temporary trial.
This book consists of the text of a number of talks that AJP Taylor made for the BBC in 1977. I remember watching the ones about WW1 and WW2. Taylor stood in front of a camera and gave a lecture, with a plain black background behind him. There were no visual aids and no other contributors. It’s hard to imagine a history documentary like this being made for today’s TV.
The book has only about 130 pages of text. Taylor has a lively style of delivery and the book is very easy to read. That said, he makes lots of assertions about why things happened, and I imagine pretty much everyone will disagree with at least some of his arguments. Fwiw I disagreed with lots of them. It was still an interesting read. Getting your own views challenged at least forces you into thinking about why you don’t accept an alternative interpretation. When you are reading this book, it’s as well to imagine the author delivering the text as lectures, as indeed they were originally.
The book looks at a variety of European conflicts, including the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, “Bismarck’s three wars”, the two world wars and, perhaps oddly, the Cold War. One of the above is not like the others.
Taylor argues that most wars come about through misjudgements, and more often from apprehension about what a rival intends, rather than a lust for conquest. Wars start even though no-one actually wants war. He thinks that the First World War falls squarely into that category. He sets out in here his famous “war by timetable” theory about the start of WW1, that the railway timetables drawn up for the mobilisation of the German Army, once set in motion, made war inevitable (because German mobilisation was specifically designed to allow the country to avoid a war on two fronts). Personally I find this one of his more persuasive arguments.
There are exceptions to the above of course. For example, Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 was a clear case of a planned, premeditated attempt at conquest. Generally he is more sympathetic to Russia/the USSR than many western historians. He argues that the western European powers invaded Russia 5 times between 1812 and 1941, but that this never happened in reverse. The only times Russian or Soviet troops appeared in western Europe, in 1813-14 and 1944-45, it was to roll back the armies of their would-be conquerors.
Aside from considering “how wars begin”, Taylor also discusses how they end, with the peace conferences and treaties that follow, and what the long-term effects were.
A provocative book, in some ways, but also an entertaining one for history readers.