Islam, Autoritarianisme, dan Kemunduran Bangsa: Suatu Perbandingan Global dan Pensejarahan

by Ahmet T. Kuru, Hasyir Mursyidi Husam (Penterjemah)

Perbahasan tentang kemunduran dalam dunia Islam telahpun semarak sejak dari 200 tahun yang lampau dengan kedatangan kuasa-kuasa kolonialisme ke dunia Islam. Namun begitu, ia kekal sebagai perbahasan yang agak dangkal antara kedua-dua ekstrim – mereka yang menyerang Islam dan mengatakan yang ia sebagai punca kemunduran; dan mereka yang senantiasa menyalahkan kuasa kolonialisme bagi sebarang masalah di dalam dunia Islam.
Tetapi buku ini melakarkan sesuatu yang berlainan, yang disokong oleh statistik dan manuskrip- manuskrip silam, bahawasanya kemunduran itu adalah daripada kesan struktur yang lahir kemudiannya dalam sejarah umat Islam seperti penginstitusian kuasa aparat agama yang tiada mempunyai sebarang kebebasan untuk bersuara melainkan apa yang telah ditentukan oleh kuasa negara. Dan juga satu lagi penghadang besar adalah akibat dari peminggiran golongan intelektual dan pakar pakar ekonomi daripada kalangan usahawan dengan mengguna-pakai undang-undang yang bersifat mencengkam demi untuk mengawal- selia mereka ini.
Perkara yang sedemikian ini adalah sesuatu yang baru di dalam Islam kerana ia tidak pernah wujud dalam abad-abad awal Islam berkembang yang dengan kerananya itu, kaum Muslimin telah dapat mencipta tamadun yang gilang gemilang yang bertahan selama beberapa kurun. Apa yang jelas, penulis buku ini tidak ingin untuk memaksakan pendapatnya malahan mempersembahkan kesemua pendapat termasuk pendapatnya sendiri serta memberikan ruang kepada para pembacanya untuk membuat kesimpulan mereka sendiri. Kita mungkin bersetuju atau tidak dengan pendapat dan saranan yang ada di dalam buku ini, tapi apa yang pasti, selepas membaca buku ini, kita mungkin akan melihat isu kemunduran umat Islam ini dengan kacamata yang berbeza.

Genres: History, Religion, Islam, Nonfiction, Politics, Middle East, Faith

381 pages, Paperback

First published September 2, 2019

About the author

Ahmet T. Kuru is the director of Center for Islamic and Arabic Studies and Professor of Political Science at San Diego State University. His recent book, Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment: A Global and Historical Comparison (Cambridge University Press, 2019) co-won the American Political Science Association's International History and Politics Section Award, received honorable mention of SSSR’s Award, and was included in Times Literary Supplement’s Books of the Year. He is also the author of Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey (Cambridge University Press, 2009), which received Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR)’s Book Award. He is the co-editor (with Alfred Stepan) of Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey (Columbia University Press, 2012). Kuru’s works have been translated into Arabic, Bosnian, Chinese, French, Indonesian, Malay, Persian, and Turkish.

Reviews

[Murtaza · Rating 4 out of 5]

Why are contemporary Muslim countries backwards? Why do they lag behind on almost every measure of economic and political development, while collapsing into violence at similarly disproportionate rates? This is a question that looms over every thinking person concerned with the fate of these countries. The usual explanations tend to fall back on some familiar cliche: blaming either Western colonialism as the sole cause worth mentioning, or attributing the problems to the inherent nature of the religion of Islam itself.

Having tired of these cliched and self-serving explanations I found this book by Ahmet Kuru to be a refreshing attempt at offering a substantively new thesis. For several centuries the Islamic world was the most culturally, intellectually and economically developed civilization extant. The driver of this dynamism was the existence of independent intellectuals, supported by an independent mercantile bourgeois. Several centuries after Islam was created, an alliance began to form between the establishment clergy (ulema) and governing military elites. This alliance worked to shut down the mercantile bourgeois and snuff out the space for independent intellectuals. This fostered a stultifying atmosphere in which the authority to create legitimate knowledge was monopolized by a small elite, in league with the military state.

The interest of this alliance has been maintaining their prerogatives and defending tradition, as well as preventing any potentially disruptive independent power structures (like independent merchants and intellectuals) from arising in society. As the saying goes, “no bourgeois, no democracy.” Democracy in this case can also refer to development, free civil society and political stability — all of which Muslims lack. It is worth reflecting that a disproportionate number of the greatest Islamic philosophers, like Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd and al-Farabi, arose before the ulema-military elite alliance coalesced.

This argument could be thoroughly summed up in a few dozen pages. In a sense, then, a lot of the book was filler to give added context to what decline and rise really meant for Muslim countries, as well as the European societies they are often contrasted with. I was interested to see the rather harsh appraisal of the role of Mohammad al-Ghazali, who is often blamed for helping solidify the “Sunni orthodoxy” that became the governing ideology of the ulema-military elite alliance. Kuru emphasizes that a lot of what we consider Islam today is really highly-contingent and could easily have not been part of the religion. Many of the rules and practices that people consider sacred today (particularly vis a vis political theory) are in fact the accreted decision-making of people trying to govern a society in their interest at a certain period in history. Much of Islamic political theory is in fact adapted from Sassanid Persia, which exerted a strong influence over its Arab conquerors. The famous hadith about religion and the state being twins — supposedly emphasizing Islam’s inherently political character — was in fact a Sassanid maxim that was later laundered into Muslim political discourse by those who found it useful at the time. Even the notorious edict about executing apostates derives from Zoroastrianism. It is too bad that critical knowledge of Islam and Islamic history is so sparse, both among laypeople and so-called extremists.

Nothing as complex of civilizational decline can ever be monocausal. Having said that I found Kuru's explanation to be a plausible explanation for the decline and continued stagnation of Muslim countries. Even in the 20th century when many Muslim countries putatively secularized, the same authoritarian practices continued, with secular bureaucrats replacing the ulema of the past. The secularists have been just as hostile to independent intellectual life and the independent bourgeois as the clerics. With the powers of the modern state they have created an unbearably repressive atmosphere that has led to the compounding tragedy of wasted generations. I am often deeply impressed by the highly-intelligent and autodidactic people I meet in Muslim countries and wonder how different things could be were they operating under a governing structure that valued their abilities. No one who lives in a country which allows freedom of speech and intellectual pursuit, especially as it relates to Islamic issues, should take this for granted.

If there is a solution, it is to lift the heavy hand of the state enough to allow a powerful independent merchant class to form, which will then begin patronizing independent intellectuals as it did during the heydey of the Islamicate. Independent Muslim intellectuals still arise today, though they often find themselves hounded by repressive states and clerical establishments. Allowing a free intellectual environment and greater contestation over the legitimate goals and purposes of Islam can also help clarify that much of what we consider “Islamic” today (particularly in political theory) is in fact highly-contingent and not vital. In other words, Muslims need meritocracy and independence in order to rediscover their past dynamism. This explanation makes intuitive sense to me and I hope that the book is read carefully in Muslim countries.

[عبدالرحمن عقاب · Rating 5 out of 5]

في بلاد المسلمين على امتدادها عنفٌ واضح؛ داخلي بين طوائفها وخارجي ضد الآخرين. و يحكم في تلك البلاد استبداد عنيف وقح ظاهر؛ لا يهلك مستبد حتى يخلفه غيره، ولا ينقشع ظلم حتى يحلّ ظلام ظلم لاحق. وتعيش تلك البلاد تخلّفًا فكريًا وحضاريًا لا يحتاج إلى برهان.
يسأل هذا الكتاب سؤال "لماذا" عن السبب الكامن وراء هذا العنف والسلطوية والتخلّف، ويزيد إلحاح سؤاله بعقد المقارنة مع الغرب الذي سطع نجمه في حين أفول نجم الكيان الإسلامي الغابر.
يرفض الكاتب النظرية التي تنسب هذا الخلل إلى الإسلام كدين. ويرفض أيضًا نسبة الخلل إلى الأثر الاستعماري المباشر وغير المباشر. وهو في رفضه غير منحاز ولا جازم. وإنما يرفض النسبة المطلقة والاختزال المخلّ بسبب أو اثنين.
ومع ذلك، فهو يطرح سببًا يدير عليه تلك الظواهر كلها، ألا وهو تقارب علماء الدين مع السلطة، وما نتج عن ذلك من تغييب وإقصاء متعمّد للطبقة المفكرة الباحثة، من فلاسفة ومجددين وتنويريين. كما أنّ النهج الاقتصادي للسلطة الحاكمة أقصى الطبقة البرجوازية الفاعلة في الشأن الاقتصادي والاجتماعي والعلمي.
يبدأ ذلك كله، حسب الكاتب، في زمن الحكم السلجوقي الذي عزّز الإقطاع من جهة، و قرّب واستعمل علماء الدين من جهة أخرى. واستمر الحال على ذلك حتى في ظلّ الانقلابات "العلمانية" في العالم الإسلامي في عالم ما بعد انتهاء الاستعمار.
ويجعل الكاتب من السيرة الحضارية للغرب مقارنةً توضح مقصده، وتدعم طرحه.
يطرح الكاتب أفكاره من خلال استعراض تاريخي موجز جميل وشامل، كما يطرح فكرته بعد طرح التفسيرات الأخرى ونقاشها وذكر وجوه اتفاقه معها واعتراضه عليها. وهذا طرح فكري عادل ومثمر.
هل تغاضى الكاتب عن الأثر الكبير للتدخّل الإستعماري غير المباشر في عالمنا الإسلامي في عالمنا اليوم؟ أظنه فعل ذلك، إغضاءً لا إغفالاً ولا تجاهلاً تامًا!
وإن كان يمكن التسامح مع هذا التغاضي من حيث إصرار الكاتب –المبرر والصحيح- على الابتعاد عن اتهام الغير قبل اتهام النفس، إلا أنّ إغفال أثر مثل هذا الاستعمار الجاثم في الشأن المحلي للدول الإسلامية يخفي جزءًا غير يسير من الحقيقة؛ حقيقة ما نحن فيه، وسبب عدم قدرة الشعوب على إحداث التغيير.
ختامًا، فالكتاب غني بالمراجع والهوامش، ولغته سلسة، وأفكاره واضحة مباشرة. يستحقّ القراءة والنقاش الجماعي.

[Happy Dwi Wardhana · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mengapa negara-negara Islam otoriter dan tertinggal? Salah agama, ulama, atau pemerintahnya?

Islam, Otoritarianisme, dan Ketertinggalan (IOK) melacak sebab musabab pertanyaan di atas dari abad ke-7 saat Islam dalam masa gemilang hingga keruntuhannya di abad ke-11. Buku ini terdiri atas 2 bagian. Bagian 1 membeberkan data keadan negara-negara Islam di masa kini, dan bab 2 menulusuri sejarah kemunduran negara-negara tersebut.

Fokus pembahasan IOK adalah negara Timur Tengah yang jelas-jelas adalah negara Islam, bukan negara-negara berpenduduk mayoritas Islam seperti Indonesia. Meski tidak menelaah negara kita, buku ini tetap penting dibaca oleh orang Indonesia. Seperti yang penulis sampaikan di bagian Prakata, Indonesia menjadi kasus penting sebagai penguji argumen buku ini.

Ada 3 faktor utama penyebab kemunduran negara-negara Islam: persekutuan ulama-negara, pemerintahan otoriter, dan rente minyak. Dalam konteks Indonesia, ketiga faktor itu nihil. Alhasil, Indonesia adalah salah satu dari beberapa negara mayoritas muslim yang pembangunan sosial-ekonominya lebih maju dibanding banyak negara lain di dunia muslim. Hal ini dapat dilihat yang pertama dari MUI yang bukan lembaga negara, sehingga tidak ada keharusan bagi umat Islam Indonesia untuk menuruti fatwanya. Kedua, Indonesia merupakan negara yang demokratis di mana rakyat dapat berpartisipasi aktif dalam kebijakan negara. Ketiga, tidak adanya rente minyak. Negara yang berpendapatan dari rente minyak cenderung menolak partisipasi masyarakat dalam pemerintahan. Hal ini dikarenakan rakyat tidak perlu membayar pajak, sehingga sikap kritis terhadap pemerintah tidak ada.

Masalah yang dihadapi umat muslim bukanlah bersumber dari Islam, melainkan teori tertentu yang dianggap islami. Dalam buku ini, Kuru berpendapat bahwa Muslim memerlukan kaum intelektual dan borjuasi independen, yang dapat mengimbangi kekuasaan otoritas ulama dan negara. Dalam konteks Indonesia, saya rasa iklim untuk berpikir kritis dan berpendapat sudah ada, tinggal sumber daya manusianya yang perlu memanfaatkan keadaan sebaik-baiknya.

Setelah membaca buku ini, saya menjadi sadar bahwa menjadi Muslim di Indonesia merupakan privilege tersendiri.

[Motahareh Nabavi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fantastic work of research, I read the history chapters more than once to fully soak it in. Really informative in understanding the downward trajectory of Muslim societies after their initial flourishing in the early Islamic period, and how the fruits of these problems can be seen in the Muslim world's current sociopolitical context.

[Ali · Rating 5 out of 5]

Islam Authoritarianism and Underdevelopment focuses on the state of the Muslim world and the cause of its remarkable civilizational decline. There exists a plethora of books on this topic but author Ahmet Kuru hits the mark through focus on objective underlying conditions rather than drowning in all-encompassing theory. In doing so Kuru elucidates an illuminating truth: during the period Islamic society was most successful, the majority of its scholars were independently funded, with a mercantile class being eminent. Later that inverted, the majority of scholars being funded by the state, and the mercantile class becoming weak and marginalized.

— Summary

Islamic society today, to borrow a biblical term, is in a ‘Fallen State’. Yet there indeed is something to redeem, as between the eighth and twelfth centuries (encompassing the “Golden age”), Islam was a civilization that was objectively successful by several metrics of freedom, economic output, and productivity. A definitive characteristic of this society was a thriving mercantile class that backed an independent intelligentsia - a bourgeois, in short. As evidence of this, Kuru presents research that shows 72.5% of scholars were privately funded during this period, either through their own businesses, or via a patron.

Later Islamic society post Golden-age shifted. Kuru presents research (such as trade manifests) that argues the vast majority of scholars in this period were publicly funded. He argues that due to a drought, new wars (the Mongols and Crusades), and a change in structure around private property and wealth, the merchant class was actively marginalized and an 'Ulema-State alliance' arose in its place (between an establishment ulema and the military elite). Control and the avoidance of disruption was in the self-interest of this Ulema-State alliance, who gradually dominated the merchant class and instituted a suffocating sort of conservatism that ended the independent intelligentsia. Some of the fundamental philosophical justifications for that alliance (which Kuru argues were influential) did not originate from Islam at all, but were pre-Islamic Sassanian axioms, namely, the saying the religion and state are like twins.

This slowly led to the decline of Islamic society up until colonialism. The remnants of that alliance and its far reaching implications into our faith are responsible for Islamic decline into the modern era, in addition to the negative impacts of colonialism. The solution, then, is not through authoritarian means, nor possible only through on-paper democracy. Instead a mercantile class must re-emerge and become dominant, which will restore an independent intelligentsia, and allow the Muslim world to rise up from its depths.

— My thoughts

This is an interesting and novel thesis, and much value can be extracted from Kuru’s work by diving deeper into these separate points. What explains the underdevelopment, authoritarianism, and regressive aspects of the Muslim world today? Is Islam responsible, or are only socio-economic conditions the cause? And is there even something to redeem, or was there never truly anything to begin with? I learned a lot in attempting to answer these questions, and came away with meaningful changes in my understanding.

The heart of this book rests on the inversion of the relationship of scholars to the state, and the erasure of the mercantile class that this requires. To me, Kuru is able to make a convincing case for the problem of intellectualization, a conclusion that is somewhat different from Kuru’s own, and is a lesser claim to that of the Ulema-State Alliance.

In the Libertarian economist Thomas Sowell’s book, ‘Intellectuals and Society’ (disclosure: I have not currently completed this book), he defines intellectuals as individuals who conceive ideas but do not need to test them against reality. For him it is an invective category.
Take an engineer, for example. Engineers are forced to build real things - if their theories are incorrect you will know quickly as the bridge falls from out under you. Similarly a doctor who kills all his patients will surely find his clientele dry up, and perhaps a few lawsuits heading his way. An intellectual is free to theorize away, without suffering the loss for the failure of their ideas.
Nassim Taleb, in his book ‘Skin in the Game’, makes the same argument through a less partisan case. He touches on the removal of risk from intellectuals, the flawed incentive structure intellectualization promotes, and documents the harm of intellectualization on modern society, and societies throughout history.

As Kuru details, the Ottoman clergy refused to allow the Quran to be translated into Turkish by pain of death all the way into the 19th century. It was only after the Ottomans had fallen that the the Turkish-language Quran was published. Yet as I later looked up, Quranic translations had been published into other languages as far back as the 10th century, and even further. This pattern can be seen again and again, with an intellectualized elite banning things out of a theoretically justified fear of disruption and desire for control in later Islamic society (such as the printing press) that was embraced in earlier Muslim society (like when it commoditized the then innovation of paper). Kuru makes objective assessments of the Islamic golden age, and the later period using metrics for scientific output, intellectual freedom, and other modes of production. He is able to make clear that with intellectualization these outputs all suffered profoundly. Causality is a funny thing, but operating through revealed preferences, it's clear that intellectualization was an important force behind our fallen state. For Muslim believers it demonstrates also that Islam is not a corollary of decline, without discounting the objective fact that religion can also play a negative role.

Some may ask what difference does it make - why would it not be better for a civilization to be led by scholars and academics, rather than self-serving business men? Yet in doing so, they misunderstand the nature of commerce. Commerce has a functional necessity - profit, via customers. While indeed it is true rent-seeking exists, commerce remains an attempt to solve problems. Merchants know they have solved a problem when someone is willing to pay for them to do so, and they then begin to pursue other problems to solve, to further grow profits. This is highly productive, and does not suffer the problems of intellectualism - regardless of how good a business idea sounds on paper, it must work in the real world to be profitable.

Finally I wanted to note how attitudes towards the working for the state changed with the process of intellectualization, or the rise of the Ulema-State alliance as Kuru would put it. Originally, Muslim scholars saw working for the state as more negative, along with a popular discontent with the state itself (the Ummayads being responsible for the massacre of Karbala is one reason Kuru gives for this). He quotes Abu Hanifa’s (who was himself a silk merchant) prominent student Shaybani in the following “the profession of the honest merchant, or indeed any trade, pleases God more than Government service”. Later, this notion changed, wherein the majority of the Muslim ulema became patronized by the state. Where once a handshake was used to give Bay’a or fealty between the Prophet (pbuh) and his followers, a transactional act, Muslim rulers would later require their subjects to prostrate before them.

— Critiques

This book remains exceptional amongst many academic works for its focus, as mentioned before, on objective underlying conditions. Theory has always been uninteresting to me because seldom is it falsifiable (so what’s the point?), and never can it truly overcome narrative and correlation fallacies. In addition, I believe the problem of induction is proven to be a relevant one to analysis (ignore any paradoxes there). As such we can never completely understand cause per se, and pursuit of theory is to some degree futile, and in many cases harmful. Instead, by evaluating objective conditions instead of root causes, we can operate through revealed preferences and reach actionable conclusions to improve society, if never achieving utopia. As an academic, and somebody who does take theory seriously in this book, I doubt Kuru will side with me in this regard. But again, through focus on conditions, the book findings are such that it does not matter.

All that being said, there are shortcomings. Kuru’s research is meaningful but often fails to measure up. This is frustrating as Kuru clearly demonstrates a grasp of rigour, and a recognition that much historical research is questionable, as he unpacks why different theses that contradict his argument are incorrect. However, this is often not extended to research he himself cites. I will take one example that I found particularly vexing: his use of research from the 80’s that 72.5% of Islamic scholars in the Golden Age were privately funded. This to me was a critical piece of information that made the argument objective. However, this analysis did not look at the later Islamic period, making its comparative powers questionable. And there are obvious questions to be asked about methodology as well as quality of information. Ibn Sina, for example, was at one point privately funded, and at another funded by the state. Where does he fit in?

In addition, there are some areas where there is again a failure to be sufficiently comparative or objective, and argument that may suffer clearly from narrative or correlation fallacies. This is most obvious in the sections on Europe, and when diving deeper into the Ulema-State alliance theory. All this is not to say to attack Kuru, or to delegitimize this work, but to point out that it is only the beginning - the case has not yet been made, but has instead been made plausible.

— Challenges

Kuru tracks the evolution of Islam across different schools of thought, and how they arose often in response to one another. He then argues that Islam took a more anti-intellectual philosophical turn around the time and ideals of Ghazali, removing aql and other tools from use and beginning to call for those who disagreed to be put to death (though he does not sufficiently prove that this was novel, which is obviously extremely important to know). Islam is then codified into an orthodoxy through the Nizamiyyas, and the Ulema-state alliance continued to support this strangulation of intellectual dynamism. The Ulema-State alliance would also coopt convenient non-Islamic traditions into the fold of Islam, such as the Sassanian axiom the religion and state are like twins, which he argues was very influential and may continue to inform the religion’s views today as well.

The point Kuru is able to make here is that an authentic version of Islam, true to its roots, could exist in the modern world, and indeed did existed at one time. Where some argue that Islam acts as a regressive force, Kuru is able to make a convincing argument that such aspects are the contingent consequences of the Ulema-State alliance (or as I would see it, the lesser claim of intellectualization), rather than inherent aspects of the faith itself.

—

Kuru’s book is a massive undertaking and I am extremely grateful for him to have written it. In addition to these important findings, Kuru also helped me clear up topics I was unsure on, such as the objectivity of the Islamic Golden age. Yet as Kuru tracks, across metrics of scientific output, economic productivity, intellectual freedom, and tolerance Islam performed exceptionally. Comparing across time and geography, Islamic civilization was one that could progress towards modernity as we understand it today.

Near the end and beginning of the book Kuru examines the modern Muslim world, its faults, and the implication for its positive change. Kuru argues that the status of many Muslim nations as rentier states has harmed their incentive structure towards reform, similar in the ways in which land reforms around the 12th century hurt the merchant class and led to the domination of the Ulema-State alliance. In addition, he mentions how the authoritarianism of the Muslim states so often worked against them, the authoritarianism of secularists later being used against those same secularists.

According to Kuru the major change that needs to take place is the re-emergence of a mercantile class. This independent class then, without authoritarianism, can begin to move the Muslim world again towards a place in the modern world through sponsorship of intelligentsia, as it once did prior. I would argue this sponsorship of intellgentsia should not be the goal, but a movement away from intellectualization which will allow free thought and entrepreneurship to rise.

[Kahfi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Buku ini untuk sementara menjawab pertanyaan saya perihal mengapa dunia Islam pada saat ini tertinggal dalam hampir seluruh aspek sosio ekonomi dengan dunia Barat. Tesis besar yang dibawa oleh penulis seakan menjadi alarm bagi pemimpin dunia Muslim saat ini untuk mereformasi terutama sistem pemerintahan yang berkaitan dengan aspek sosio ekonomi.

Ketertinggalan tersebut ternyata apabila ditelusuri terdapat suatu akar historis yang telah dilakukan berabad-abad oleh para pemimpin Muslim yang tadinya pernah menjadi kiblat ilmu pengetahuan kemudian memutar hampir 180 derajat menjadi dunia yang sangat berbeda.

Titik balik peradaban tersebut dipengaruhi oleh beragam banyak faktor, namun penulis menggarisbawahi satu faktor yang paling berpengaruh yaitu terpeliharanya relasi antara ulama-negara yang sampai saat ini kerap dijumpai di beberapa negara Muslim seperti Indonesia.

[Ismail Tutar · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book effectively addresses questions about the gap of economic, social and scientific development between the West and the Muslim world. For many of us who have grown up in a Muslim-majority country but later emigrated to the West, answers to those important questions are elusive. Our first-hand experiences, such as being able to successfully adapt to the Western culture and institutions while remaining loyal to our faith, give us the intuition that Islam cannot be singled out as the culprit, yet we cannot explain to ourselves why Muslim-majority countries lag behind the Western world.

Dr. Kuru’s book on Islam and development offers a comprehensive explanation to this conundrum. As one can tell from the title, he has been profoundly influenced by the classical liberal thought which emphasizes the relationship between limited central power, individual liberty, and development. Dr. Kuru asserts his major points based on exhaustive historical research but eschews didacticism: he refrains from imposing a mono-causal argument and continually reminds the reader of the broad geographical, political, and socioeconomic factors, offers exceptional cases, and provides the reader with alternative explanations. In this regard, Dr. Kuru successfully performs two challenging acts: he gives credit to grain of truth even in most orientalist arguments while refuting them in their entirety, but without falling into the trap of reactionary apologetics.

Beyond its political arguments, Dr. Kuru’s book is also notable for presenting a rich set of complex events in the history of Islam. While reading it, I could not help drawing parallels between The Western Tradition, Eugene Weber’s instructional visual series on Western Civilization, which I have watched in the 1990s as a teenager. Notwithstanding the differences in their length and format, Dr. Kuru’s book offers a good primer on the development of Muslim thought, culture, and politics, the way Eugene Weber reviews Western history. I highly recommend this book to all readers who are interested in the ever-changing legacy of Islam throughout history.

[Baris Taze · Rating 5 out of 5]

It was impressive to see how Kuru thoroughly scans over a millennial-length history (from 600s to 1920s) and provides a fairly complete picture of any noteworthy phenomenon or process while seeking an answer to a famous question: Why muslim states fell behind of Western Europe?

In his book, he studies many major works previously done and criticizes them bravely. His confidence in elaborating in which ways his work is different than previous ones is well supported by comparative data and well-knit argumentation.

He suggests that the alliance between ulema (orthodox religious scholars) and state, “ulema-state alliance” as he puts, played a key role in marginalizing merchants and intellectuals. Such a suppression on bourgeoisie class eventually weakened the scientific and socioeconomic dynamism in Muslim world in a vicious circle fashion and held them back. He demonstrates that in absence of such an alliance, the bourgeoisie class could generate flourishing dynamism and prosperity in the golden age of Muslim world (from seventh to eleventh century) and in Western Europe after twelfth century.

His class-relations-based approach seems pretty convincing when compared to other approaches he studies: essentialist approach, anti-colonial approach and new institutionalist ones.

I found his book very profound and convincing; and I felt similarly provoked and inspired in comparison to Harari’s Sapiens or Acemoglu’s Why Nations Fall.

[Matthias · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kuru's book was a joy to read and gave me a lot to think about (or just look up.) But I'm not sure that the main argument works - much still seems mysterious.

The least interesting and most successful argument of the book is its purely negative one: the Muslim world isn't underdeveloped just because of Islam (one could extend the same argument to geography, "deep culture," supposed racial differences, etc) because the first several centuries of the Muslim world were quite intellectually and economically productive. It's also not just colonialism because stagnation set in well before Europe started flexing its muscles in the region. So something interesting and bad must have happened between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, something more contingent on politics and history.

Kuru says he has a materialist answer based on class alliances, but this materialist account is actually pretty idealistic on examination. Moreover, both the material and ideational developments he identifies arguably run more together than he frames it.

The class alliances Kuru identifies are a liberal or proto-liberal alliance of philosophers + bourgeois (in early Islam and early modern Europe) as against a conservative "ulema-state alliance" (in medieval Europe and is the Muslim world from the Seljuks on.) The first, conceptual problem is that it's not clear there's a meaningful class difference between the ulema and philosophers - they're both just intellectuals, and moreover intellectuals categorized into either group based on their ideas rather than their sources of income. (Kuru does emphasize the fact that many early such intellectuals pursued it as an avocation - many starting with the Prophet himself were small-scale merchants and professionals themselves, just as Spinoza was a glassgrinder - and that later on many were employed in waqfs and state-financed madrassas. He fits this into a public vs private dichotomy that sits uneasily with the role of waqfs, but doesn't at any rate adequately show a clear relationship between hobbyist vs. waqf vs state madrassa funding of intellectuals and their ideas.) The overpowerful centralized state, and the ideas promoted by these conservative intellectuals - literalist interpretation of scripture, the Ash'ari theological rejection of Aristotelian ideas of natural law and causality in favor of brute ocassionalism - strangled science and economic development.

Kuru gives the standard story about early modern Europe's fostering more propitious ideas and institutions over this time: property rights, the Enlightenment, you know the deal. But the more I think about it in light of the factors emphasized by Kuru's history of Islam, the more it looks similar, not different:
- the medieval European state was weak, and the clergy-aristocratic alliance depended on highly decentralized political power; European states became much *more* centralized during the early modern period
- Protestantism, the sect most closely associated here as elsewhere with the rise of individualism, capitalism, the bourgeois work ethic, etc, *in particular* represented a centralization of religious intellectuals and doctrine under the heading of local secular rulers
- Protestantism also represented an increasing rejection of what al-Gazali (one of the villains of the book) also rejected as "falasifa," the injection of classical philosophy into religious doctrine and a turn towards scriptural literalism
- in particular, theories of causality and natural law were rejected by the Ash'ari school and European anti-Aristotelians (most radically David Hume)

Plausibly both these changes were inevitable (with gunpowder leading to centralization, and - perhaps - sola scriptural and rejection of Aristotle arising from increasing access to printed copies of both. But they seem to have opposite effects.

On the margin, this increases my confidence that the correct explanation is something on the order of "something really freaky happened in early modern England," some combination of wage labor (EMW) and/or fossil fuels (Smil) and/or who-knows-what, and that maybe this could have happened in any of the high population density regions that existed across Eurasia - but it was a low probability one that just happened to happen there, and so if the Safavid or Ottoman empires look a lot like the Qing, well, that's just the null expectation.

Four stars for being a good book to think with.

[Lyz · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mengapa negara muslim atau negara mayoritas muslim seringkali dikaitkan dengan otoritarianisme dan ketertinggalan?

buku ini membahas sebab-sebabnya secara komprehensif dan mendalam, memberikan gambaran dunia muslim yang dari abad ke-9 sampai abad ke-11 menjadi tempat dengan kemajuan tertinggi dunia, jauh sebelum kemajuan Eropa barat yang terjadi beberapa abad setelahnya.

Lalu, apa yang membuat Islam sangat dikaitkan dengan ketertinggalan?
buku ini akan menjawab pertanyaan tersebut, anda tidak dibuat menjadi pembaca muslim yang kolot dalam buku ini, namun anda akan menjadi pembacs netral dengan rasa ingin tahu yang semakin besar semakin anda melwati halaman-per-halaman buku ini.

Indonesia tidak dikaji di buku ini, namun disebutkan beberapa kali. Dan, tentu saja buku ini penting bagi pembaca Indonesia, karena kita negara mayoritas muslim yang perlu dipahamkan betapa pentingnya literasi dan buku dalam kemajuan peradaban.

[— Prbw · Rating 4 out of 5]

Buku ini dibuka dengan satu pertanyaan besar yang akan dijawab pada 400 halaman berikutnya: kenapa intelektualisme di dunia Muslim jongkok berabad-abad, namun di saat yang bersamaan otoritarianisme merebak di negara-negara Muslim?

Data yang dikutip Kuru pada 2018 silam: proporsi negara Muslim berpemerintahan otoriter kelewat tinggi. Ada keterkaitan sistematis antara status konstitusional syariah Islam dengan otoritarianisme yang diterapkan.

Untuk menjawabnya, Kuru membawa kita pada abad 7 hingga 11 saat masih banyak filsuf anti-negara yang hidup dari pedagang-borjuasi independen seperti Farabi, Ibnu Sina hingga Khawarizmi—sang bapak dari cabang ilmu matematika yang digunakan sebagai dasar logika TikTok: algoritma. Bahkan, saat itu Khawarizmi sudah mewanti-wanti bahwa seorang Muslim yang ingin salat mengarah ke Makkah serta waktu yang tepat butuh pengetahuan geografi, kartografi, astronomi dan matematika.

Tesis kemunduran dunia Muslim-nya Kuru berangkat dari abad 11: banyak negara Muslim hancur—termasuk perpustakaannya—akibat invasi Tentara Salib dan Mongol sepanjang abad 12 hingga 14. Dunia Muslim berubah menjadi negara militer-tuan-tanah-penarik-pajak yang bersekutu dengan para ulama konservatif. Mereka adalah para ulama melestarikan teks-teks hukum Islam yang isinya kaku—termasuk hukuman fisik, kediktatoran, patriarkis, pelanggaran privasi hingga diskriminasi non-Muslim. Otoritarianisme mulai muncul dari simbiosis-mutualisme antara negara dan ulama. Walhasil, filsuf dan para pedagang independen mulai terpinggirkan.

Sebenarnya sebelum invasi itu, sudah ada para filsuf yang pemikiran kelak jadi batu pijakan anti-intelektualisme dan otoritarianisme. Salah satunya, tentu, Ghazali yang sangat menentang salah satu cabang filsafat: metafisika. Beberapa bagian pemikiran Ghazali juga cenderung mengkafirkan yang liyan. Seorang pemikir kontemporer asal Maroko bahkan pernah bilang: "Ghazali telah meninggalkan luka yang dalam di nalar Arab, yang masih berlumuran darah hingga kini."

Ada juga Ibnu Taimiyah, filsuf dengan gagasan negarasentris-nya (halo, Hegel?), yang punya kalimat galak betul: "60 tahun dengan seorang penguasa lalim lebih baik daripada satu malam tanpa seorang penguasa."

Sisanya hanya sejarah. Eropa Barat mulai terdepan secara intelektual dan ekonomi—lewat Renaisans, revolusi cetak, Reformasi Protestan, penemuan geografis (efek buruknya: kolonialisme) dan revolusi sains, namun dunia Muslim mandek dan hanya fokus ke penguatan militer.

Keadaannya makin memburuk pada abad 20 ketika dunia Muslim hanya berputar pada—yang oleh Kuru disebut "lingkaran setan dunia Muslim": kekerasan, otoritarianisme, ketertinggalan (intelektual dan ekonomi). Semua terjadi saat gagasan alternatif sosialisme tak lagi bergairah dan politik agama adalah kunci utama sejak 1980an.

[Erdem Dikici · Rating 5 out of 5]

Islam, Authoritarianism, and Underdevelopment is an ambitious study of contemporary problems of political violence, authoritarianism and socio-economic underdevelopment in Islamic societies. The monograph starts with the question, ‘Why are Muslim-majority countries less peaceful, less democratic, and less developed?’ To address this question, the book is divided into two parts: the first discusses the respective problems of 49 Muslim-majority countries and elaborates on prevailing theoretical explanations, and the second examines historical patterns of Muslim development and progress with a particular focus on the roots of ‘intellectual and economic stagnation, which constituted the historical origin of their current vicious circle of authoritarianism and socioeconomic underdevelopment’ (66). The book skilfully indicates that Muslims’ contemporary problems cannot be explained by singling out a particular factor such as Islam or colonial invasions. Instead, the author contends, class relations have played a critical role in the rise and decline of Muslim intellectual and economic progress. The book suggests that the ulema– state alliance substantially undermined intellectual and merchant classes, leading to stagnation. For a full review, see: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/1...

[liz · Rating 4 out of 5]

the amount of research done for this book must've been very immaculate

[Mehmet Kalaycı · Rating 5 out of 5]

I love reading books that bring a different perspective to current issues. I think the author did a great job of comparing the West and the Muslim world to bring an unusual view of the facts. Also, the book is very understandable and extremely easy to read even if you don't have a deep knowledge of the Muslim world.

[Baher Soliman · Rating 2 out of 5]

يُعد كتاب " الإسلام والسلطوية والتأخّر" [ تأليف أحمد ت .كورو، ترجمة حبيبة حسن، عدد الصفحات خمسمائة واثني عشر صفحة، الشبكة العربية للأبحاث والنشر]، كتابًا في العلوم السياسية وليس في التاريخ كما يقول مؤلفه، وإن كان يستعمل التاريخ في بناء حججه حول مشكلة تخلّف العالم الإسلامي والسجال حوله. يُساهم كورو في هذا السجال عبر تقديم مقاربات تفسيرية لتخلّف العالم الإسلامي. تتمحور مقاربة كورو حول نقد أطروحتين: أولهما: الأطروحة الجوهرانية التي تُشير إلى الإسلام بوصفه مصدراً رئيساً لمشكلة التخلّف. ثانيهما: هي مقاربة ما بعد الاستعمار، حيث تُظهِر الاستعمار الغربي للعالم الإسلامي بوصفه من عوامل تخلّفه.

ينقد كورو تلك الأطروحتين، فينقد الجوهرانية عبر دراسة الحقبة بين القرنين الثامن والثاني وعشر، حيث " أظهرت المجتمعات المسلمة منجزات اقتصادية وفلسفية عظيمة، مما يؤشر على توافق الإسلام مع التطور. كما ينقد المقاربة الاستعمارية بتأكيده أنّه بحلول القرن التاسع عشر حين بدأ استعمار القوى الغربية في القرن التاسع عشر كان العالم الإسلامي في حالة اضمحلال بالفعل.

يُمكن أن نضع أمام تشككات كورو حول هاتين المقاربتين تشككاً آخر حول مدى تماسك نقد كورو نفسه : الأول: هل إثبات التوافق بين المنجزات الحضارية في القرن الثامن و الثاني عشر كافٍ لنفي الجوهرانية؟ لاسيما وأنّ الجوهرانية تشكك بشكل مباشر في توافق الإسلام مع الحداثة؟ وبلاشك الحداثة منتج غربي أيديولوجياً ولاهوتياً، وبالتالي فهي منتج غربي جديد تماماً عن طبيعة منجزات القرن الثامن والثاني عشر. الثاني: عدّ كورو لحظة قدوم الاستعمار هو بداية التخلّف، وبما أنّ التخلّف كان موجودًا بالفعل قبل قدومه، فالجهة منفكة بينهما كما يُفهم من طرح كورو. لكن لحظة قدوم الاستعمار ليست هي بداية دوره التخريبي، بل قد يكون هو الحلقة الثانية أو الثالثة من دوره الذي قد يكون قد بدأ بالفعل، كما حدث في استعمار البريطانيين لمصر في القرن التاسع عشر، حيث سبق لحظة الاستعمار الفعلي، تمهيد كبير عبر تخريب مصر اقتصادياً ووقوعها في الدّين بداية من سعيد باشا ثم الخديوي إسماعيل .

البديل التفسيري الذي يطرحه كورو هو دراسة العلاقات بين الطبقات الدينية والسياسية والفكرية والاقتصادية، وبناءً على هذه العلاقات يتحدّد مدى نجاح المجتمع أو إخفاقه، ووفق كورو منذ القرن الحادي عشر تغيّرت العلاقات بين هذه الطبقات في العالم الإسلامي ، وظهر التحالف بين العلماء والدولة الذي أبعد المفكرين والطبقة البرجوازية، وهذه العلاقات هي المحرك الرئيس وراء التغيرات في مستويات التنمية وانقلابها في العالم الإسلامي وفق تصوره .

في واقع الأمر فإنّ كورو وهو يحاول دحض فكرة جوهرية الإسلام كسبب للتخلّف، بمعنى أنّ هناك عيوب ذاتية داخلي�� في الإسلام ذاته تحول دون التقدّم، قام بتحميل العلماء مسؤولية التخلًف، وفق كورو لقد احتكر العلماء العملية التفسيرية والتأويلية للإسلام؛ مما آل بالنهاية إلى إنتاج تفسيرات متشددة، وظهور الجماعات الجهادية، التي انبثقت من السلفية الوهابية السعودية كما يقول كورو، لكن عند التأمل، نجد أنّ كورو يقوم بعملية تأويلية حداثية للإسلام شأنه شأن الحداثيين العرب، فإذا كانت تفسيرات علماء الإسلام احتكارية ومتشدّدة، فما الذي يجعل تفسيرات غيرهم مقبولة أو هي الأصح؟ إنّ كورو يرفض دون أن يقدّم لك منهجاً للحكم على الأقوال أو التفسيرات سوى الاستشناع القائم على التشبّع بالأفكار الحداثية ومعايير النظام الدولي، وهذه في الحقيقة ليست أدوات تفسيرية لنصوص الإسلام. [ ستجد رفض كورو لحد الردة، ولأية السيف، بل وأدان العمليات الاستشهادية ضد المحتل الصهيوني ففي رأيه هذه الأفكار هي التي أنتجت العنف] .

كورو لم يقدّم في واقع الأمر منهجًا للحكم على النص أو فهمه، لقد قال لنا أنّ العلماء احتكروا التفسير أو تواطأوا عليه، وكأن العلماء هم حزب واحد أو فئة واحدة اجتمعوا في غرفة فتواطأوا على تفسير معين، لكن في الحقيقة العملية التفسيرية هي عملية ممتدة عبر قرون عديدة عبرملايين العلماء في كل العصور، والخيط الناظم الذي يتحرك عبره كل هؤلاء هو المنهج العلمي، فإذا نظرنا للدين كعلم، كان من السهل أن نرى العملية التفسيرية للعلماء بوصفها عملية أكاديمية، والأكاديمية تفرض الاحتكار العلمي دون من هم خارج الإطار الأكاديمي .

الجزء الثاني من مقاربة كورو للتخلّف هو السلطوية، حيث تحالف العلماء مع الحكّام السلطويين، وبالتالي فإنّ أحد التفسيرات الجوهرانية للتخلّف هو أنّ الإسلام ضد الديمقراطية، وهو ما يرفضه كورو؛ إذ هناك بلدان إسلامية مختلفة ترزح تحت نير الحكّام الديكتاتوريين العلمانيين، كما يُثبت من خلال الإحصاء أنّ لدى نصف البلدان الإسلامية دساتير علمانية، ومع ذلك هي تحت الحكم السلطوي، كما يرى كورو أنّ الدولة الريعية التي لا تعتمد على ضرائب مواطنيها، مثل الدول النفطية، هي دول سلطوية، حيث لا تحتاج إلى ضرائب مواطنيها، وبالتالي لا تخشاهم .

تفتقر مقاربات كورو إلى العمومية، بمعنى هو لا يُقدّم نموذجاً تفسيراً شاملاً، وإلا لماذا ظهرت السلطوية في الدول غير الريعية في الوطن العربي وأمريكا اللاتينية؟ كما أنّ كورو في معالجته للظاهرة في سياقها المعاصر إنما يتكلم عن عوارض التخلف والتراجع لا أصله، أنه بشكل واضح يؤصّل للعلمانية، يريد تفريغ الإسلام من بُعده العقدي التفسيري الكلاسيكي ظناً أنه بذلك ينفي الجوهرانية عن الإسلام، ولذلك سيحاول بعد ذلك إثبات الفصل التاريخي بين الدين والسياسة في الإسلام، وبذلك لا تختلف سرديات كورو عن غيره من العلمانيين والحداثيين سوى في وضع ذلك في إطار تاريخي لقراءة سردية التأخر يتّهم بشكل مباشر العلماء والسلطة بالتلاعب بالإسلام نفسه ، دون أن يرجع كورو إلى مصادر فاصلة وحاكمة تبيّن لنا ما هو الإسلام المعياري نفسه.

في القسم الثاني من الكتاب يلجأ كورو إلى التحليل التاريخي عبر الولوج في الماضي الإسلامي من القرن السابع إلى القرن الحادي عشر؛ للوقوف على الجذور التاريخية للمشكلات الحالية للسلطوية والتأخر في العالم الإسلامي، العصب الأساس لهذا القسم هو التأكيد على دور العلماء والدولة العسكرية والتحالف بينهما كسبب تاريخي جذري لهذه المشكلات. يُعمِل كورو أدواته التحليلية التاريخية للوصول إلى مبتغاه، فعبر ثنائية " العلماء" و " التجار" ينظر كورو إلى الواقع التاريخي في الفترة من القرن السابع إلى القرن الحادي عشر، حيث يرصد الإنجازات العسكرية والتجارية والفكرية للمسلمين في تلك الفترة، فقد كانت التجارة هي مصدر تمويل معظم العلماء المسلمين، في حين أنّ القليل منهم خدم في الدولة، ثم يحلل بداية الركود الفكري والاقتصادي في تلك الفترة بتحول العلماء تدريجياً إلى طبقة تخدم الدولة. وكما قلنا سابقاً فإنّ كورو يخلط بين التحالف بين العلماء والسلطة، الذي يُرجِعه كورو إلى الفترة السلجوقية، وبين كون الدين جزء لا يتجزأ من الحياة وبطبيعة الحال من السياسة، وهذا مأزق بحثي خطير عند كورو.

يبدو أنّ كورو يسير على خطى " لابيدوس" في دراساته عن العلاقة بين الدين والدولة في الإسلام . [ راجع لابيدوس في كتابه الفصل بين الدين والدولة، دار مدارات 2023 ]. إذن ما وجه التشابه بين أطروحة كورو وأطروحة لابيدوس؟ . تعقّب لابيدوس كما فعل كورو التحولات الجذرية التي طرأت على العلاقة بين الدين والدولة منذ فجر التاريخ الإسلامي إلى التاريخ الحديث، وانتهى إلى القول بأنّ أكثر المجتمعات الإسلامية لم تمتثِل للنموذج المثالي الذي يتكامل فيه الديني والسياسي أو تجمعهما مؤسسة واحدة، ولكنها كانت تركزّ في الغالب على مؤسسات منفصلة للدين والدولة، الأمر الذي أثمر مفهوماً سُلطانياً ذا طابع علماني.

لتدعيم نفس فكرة لابيدوس لجأ كورو إلى أحد العناصر الرئيسة في تحالف العلماء والدولة وهو علماء المذهب السني، وعندما يتكلم كورو عن المذهب السني فهو يعني المذهب الأشعري، وهنا يقف مع اللحظة السلجوقية الأشعرية السنية، حيث نظام الملك الذي أصبح وزيراً أعظم ( 1064- 92) وقام بتأسيس المدارس النظامية، ووفقاً لرؤية كورو " من خلال المدارس النظامية ، تجاوزت سلطات الدولة السلجوقية دعم العلماء وبدؤوا يؤثرون بشكل منهجي في تكوين العلماء" . [ نقلاً عن كورو في كتابه " الإسلام والسلطوية" 2021 ، ص 201 ] .

وبطبيعة الحال يُلقي الضوء على علاقة " الغزالي" بالسلطات السلجوقية التي يراها بوصفها علاقة معقّدة، وليست على نسق واحد. ففي أواخر عام 1095 استقال الغزالي من منصبه في المدرسة النظامية، وتبنّى أسلوب حياة صوفية، وصرح بندمه على خدمة سلطات الدولة، لكن قرب نهاية حياته، أنهى عزلته الصوفية، وعاد للتدريس في المدرسة النظامية في نيسابور. ينسب البعض مثل ضياء الدين سردار أسباب التدهور إلى الغزالي بسبب مهاجمته للفلاسفة، لكن كورو يرفض هذه السردية؛ لأنّ كورو يرى أنّ الدور الرئيس السلبي الذي لعبه الغزالي لا يتعلّق بتفاصيل آراءه الخاصة، بل في مساهماته في توطيد التحالف بين الدين والدولة. ومن هنا قرأ كورو كلمة الغزالي " الدين والسلطان توأمان" بوصفها مقولة ساسانية دخلت إلى الفكر الإسلامي.

لاشك أنّ مقولة الغزالي ليست من أقوال النبي – صلى الله عليه وسلم- ولم ينسبها الغزالي إليه، ومهما كانت مصدرية هذه المقولة سواء ساسانية أو غيرها، إلا أنها ليست هي الدليل الذي يُساق للتدليل على عدم الفصل بين الدين والدولة، وهذا هو أبو بكر الصديق رضي الله عنه أقسم أنه سيحارب من يفرق بين الصلاة والزكاة. في الواقع الدولة في الإسلام نشأت من رحم الدين، بل كان الهدف الأساس للدولة هو نشر الدين، وباالتالي يكون من العبث الكلام عن فصل الدين عن الدولة ونحن نتكلم عن دين هو بالأساس نشرته الدولة في فارس والعراق ومصر وبلاد المغرب العربي والأندلس إلى قلب أفريقيا، إنّ ممارسات النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم، وممارسات الصحابة رضي الله عنهم، كلها تنفي ذلك الأصل الساساني لفكرة عدم الفصل بين الدين والدولة .

وكما قلنا تحليلات كورو مجتزأة بشكل كبير حتى فيما يخص السردية الاستعمارية، وتحركها دوافع أيديولوجية من جانب آخر، صحيح تعافت الدولة العثمانية من غزوات تيمور، وتعافت الدولة المملوكية من الصليبيين، لكن هذا لا يمنع من حدوث استنزاف رهيب كان له أثر فعّال وإن لم يكن كل شيء، ومع ذلك ليس صحيحاً أنّه عقب هذا التعافي دخل العالم الإسلامي في حالة إنحدار، فعصر الموسوعات الثقافية هو عصر الدولة المملوكية، وعصر التوسع والقوة العسكرية القوية هو عصر الدولة العثمانية حتى منتصف أوائل القرن السابع عشر، حيث كان يملك العثمانيين أقوى مدفعية، وأقوى جيش بري، وبحرية قوية جداً

عندما قرأ كورو تاريخ أوروبا اعتمد على قراءة معينة لصعود أوروبا، والتي تعطي الأولوية للدور الذي تلعبه البرجوازية التجارية والفلاسفة والعلماء، إنّ هذه القراءة تبالغ في تبسيط صعود أوروبا، وتستبعد تماماً مجموعة من العوامل شديدة الفاعلية، مثل الثورة الصناعية واكتشاف الألة البخارية، وتدفق الذهب بكميات كبيرة من الأمريكتين بعد إبادة الهنود الحمر، حتى أنّ هوبسون في كتابه " الجذور الشرقية للحضارة الغربية" يتكلم عن نشأة النظام المصرفي الأوروبي بعد نهب الأمريكتين، وهذا ما يُضعِف من تقليل كورو لحجة الاستعمار.

[Nicholas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kuru’s sweeping study of decline, underdevelopment, and authoritarianism in the Muslim world cannot be said to be sweeping at all, as the reader revels not just in his argument but also his detailed and grasping footnotes. Like all studies claiming to make sense of a large swathe of history, I am sure a lot of nitpicking is to be expected of Kuru’s illustration of Muslim world history. But also like many definitive accounts of historical sociology (e.g. Diamond, Marx, Moore, Skocpol), one can’t help but notice the persuasive nature of the argument; rough at the edges maybe, but convincing in its deft combination of the historical, institutional, and ideological, and serious commitment towards cross-disciplinary referencing. This is an exemplary account of mono-causal theorisation, wherein an acute awareness of context and counterfactuals help propel the argument instead of forcing it into a caricature.

The book’s strength is that its highlighting of a case of intellectual decline is always matched with a strong dose of empiricism. To make his case, Kuru counts and compares books, libraries and students, showing that a decline in intellectualism is not simply the case of not having thinkers, but rather the ecosystem to produce one. Unlike many apologists, Kuru counters argument of Muslim exceptionalism by insisting on its comparability. But his analysis recenters the Muslim protagonists themselves, as seen in the footnoting that incorporates a great deal of primary sources. Only lazy reactionaries/apologists can accuse this book of being derivative, i.e, repeating Orientalist tropes, or worse, lazy.

My assessment of this book is favourable because I think the author is basically doing a thankless job of engaging with a few circles, i.e. the Islamic dogmatists, the Islamophobes, and the postcolonialists that seem too entrenched in their thinking to consider alternative opinions, let alone do the hard work of research to make an informative case instead of emotive ones (one who lives in Malaysia can surely appreciate this sentiment). At almost each turn, Kuru contends, unpacks, and reframe theories of Muslim decline, from Quranic essentialism to geographical determinism, and to absolutist colonial blaming. Not only that, he actively shows that dogmas, geography, and colonialism matters a lot, but they matter only if one considers how they reinforced the ulama-state alliance, or vice versa. Like any good historical institutionalist, Kuru cares about sequence, context, and the relative weight of individual factors. The intellectual labour undertaken is immense and deserves credit for being so.

As I said, nitpicking on this book will be easy, and I have no intention to make it easy for myself in front of a masterpiece. So I will just advance one question here. If the making of the Sunni orthodoxy (and to some extent Shia orthodoxy) under the ulema-state alliance is the reason behind the Muslim world’s underdevelopment and decline, why not just label the cause as the lack of secularisation, i.e. the differentiation of the spheres of power and religion?

I understand the author’s reluctance to pin the decline entirely on theocratic regimes in the Muslim world (which is far and fewer in between, as secular autocratic regimes still outnumber them), but secularisation does not necessarily mean the outcome will be a liberal democratic regime. But what it does offer is a break of the ulema-state alliance, which isn’t cleanly so even in the case of nominally secular regimes such as in Egypt, pre-Arab Spring Tunisia, pre-and post-military rule Turkey, and definitely in semi-democratic Malaysia.

To stress, to make the case that secularisation is imperative is not about promising a bright future. It is, however, to illustrate the absolute need to break a political as well as intellectual bondage that is institutionalised and normalised by the ulama-state alliance; one that also plagues the social sphere, as seen in the regressive tendencies of many non-state Islamist/Muslim movements, so that the Muslim world (including the non-Muslims residing in them) can be a productive and competent contributor to efforts to redefine the ‘secular’- something that brought us countless calamities as well.

[Javier · Rating 5 out of 5]

Full review here: https://www.thecommoner.org.uk/islam-...

This is an excellent study on the historical trajectory of the Muslim world, vis-à-vis Western Europe. Kuru shows how the ulema-State alliance adopted by the Seljuk Turks in the 11th century (and inherited by the Mamluk, Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires) persists to this day, especially in autocracies like Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This is despite the past secularizing efforts of Kemalism in the latter case (with which the author may sympathize). Kuru further demonstrates that this reactionary alliance (which mimics the backward, feudal societies of Europe between the Dark Ages and modernity) is not inherent to Islam, considering the much freer intellectual, political, and commercial atmosphere of Islam's Golden Age (ca. 700-1300 CE), which produced thinkers like al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun, and Ibn Rushd, among others. The author rightfully compares this period to the European Renaissance.

He finds that this progressive historical alternative to the ulema-State alliance depended on an independent merchant class (or bourgeoisie), which would finance independent scholars, scientists, and artists through its profits. (By contrast, the ulema-State alliance creates a stifling and stagnating bureaucratic atmosphere, opposed to progress of all kinds.) Accordingly, Kuru proposes political and economic liberalization as a remedy to the problem of authoritarianism and underdevelopment in the Muslim world.

I would be curious to consider what an anarchist alternative to this strategy might be: Kuru argues, and I don't disagree, that the Muslim masses are generally conservative, and attached to the ulema and State. It is a conundrum, admittedly.

[عبد الحكيم · Rating 3 out of 5]

سؤال الكتاب الرئيسي: لماذا الدول ذات الأغلبية المسلمة أقل سلاماً وأقل ديمقراطية وأقل تطوراً؟؟
هناك مقاربتان نظريتان كتبت حول مشكلات العنف والسلطويةوالتأخر في البلدان الإسلامية:
1، المقاربة الجوهرانية؛ التي تشير للإسلام بصفته مصدراً رئيسياً لمشكلات المسلمين الحالية.
2، مقاربة مابعد الاستعمار؛ التي تبرز الاستعمار الغربي واستغلاله لموارد البلدان الإسلامية كسببين رئيسيين لمشكلاته.
الكتاب ينتقد المقاربتين ويتبنى مقاربة ثالثة تركز على
1، العلاقات بين طبقات المجتمع (دينية، فكرية، سياسية، اقتصادية...) هي التي تحدد سبب نجاح أو إخفاق هذه المجتمعات
2، الارتباط بين الأفكار والظروف المادية.

مقولة الكتاب الأساسية والتي ظل يجادل عنها المؤلف على طول صفحات الكتاب (432 صفحة بدون المراجع والمصادر) هي ان تحالف العلماء والدولة بداية من القرن 11م الذي بدء مع السلاجقة وتم استنساخه لدى كل من أتى بعدهم أيوبيين، مماليك، عثمانيين، صفويين، مغول هو سبب التخلف والسلطوية في العالم الإسلامي.
هذا التحالف الذي قوض طبقة التجار والبرجوازية وبالتالي المفكرين والفلاسفة والعلماء المستقلين الذين كانوا يتلقون الدعم من هذه الطبقة.....
الأمر الذي ساعد على نشوء هذا التحالف هي التحديات التي واجهها العالم الإسلامي من غزو مغولي وصليبي وتهديد شيعي....

===================
هذه لمحة سريعة جدا عن الكتاب وأنوي لاحقا كتابة مراجعة طويلة (وقد تكون قراءة نقدية) فالكتاب يحوي على العديد من النقاط والمقولات والدعاوى التي تحتاج لنقاش ونقد.

[Fons Mariën · Rating 4 out of 5]

De auteur van dit boek is Ahmet T. Kuru, hoogleraar politieke wetenschappen en directeur van het Centrum voor Islamitische en Arabische Studies aan de San Diego State University. Hij is dus niet de eerste de beste en zijn boek is eigenlijk een diepgaande studie.
Hij stelt, met anderen, vast dat er een crisis is in de hedendaagse moslimwereld en onderzoekt wat de oorzaken en de achtergrond hiervan zijn. De crisis in de moslimwereld is vast te stellen door het feit dat er veel autoritaire regimes zijn, dat het vaak economisch slecht gaat, alhoewel bepaalde landen profiteren van hun bronnen, zoals olie. Hij noemt dit uitwinningseconomieën omdat ze eigenlijk niets produceren. Ook intellectueel en op wetenschappelijk gebied raken moslimlanden achterop. Er is bovendien het feit dat bepaalde islamitische groepen sterk betrokken zijn bij geweld en terrorisme.
De auteur bestudeert dit allemaal nauwgezet.

Hij zet zich wel af tegen veel voorkomende verklaringen : het zou de fout zijn van de islam zelf volgens sommigen, het komt door het kolonialisme door westerse landen volgens anderen. Hij verwerpt beide hypothesen. De auteur gaat daarvoor diep op onderzoek in de geschiedenis van de islam en hij wijst op de bloeiperiode van de islam (8ste-11de eeuw). Hij beschrijft uitgebreid welke intellectuelen er toen waren en waar ze mee bezig waren, waardoor de moslimwereld op een hoger plan stond dan Europa, dat na de val van het Romeinse rijk in de duistere middeleeuwen beland was. Er kwam evenwel verandering in na de 11de eeuw. Enerzijds was er de belangrijke bijdrage van Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) die de "filosofen" in de moslimwereld aanviel. Zijn belangrijkste werk is "De verwarring van de filosofen", een waar keerpunt in de islam. Al-Ghazali wees vooral op het belang van het geloof en wees rationeel onderzoek (naar causaliteit bijvoorbeeld) van de hand. Dit standpunt zou een grote invloed uitoefenen in de moslimwereld. Tegelijk is er een verschuiving naar het samengaan van de oelama (geestelijken) en de (militaire) staat. Voordien waren intellectuelen veel onafhankelijker. Ook de klasse van de kooplieden werd achtergesteld ten voordele van geestelijken en dienaren van de staat. Volgen Kuru ligt hier de ware oorzaak van de achteruitgang van de moslimwereld. Die was evenwel niet plotseling, Kuru bespreekt nog talrijke intellectuelen na Al-Ghazali, zoals de belangrijke filosoof Averroes of in het Arabisch Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). Hij leefde in het Moorse Spanje (Al-Andalus) en staat vooral bekend om zijn commentaren op Aristoteles. Zijn werken werden in het Latijn vertaald en droegen bij aan de renaissance in Europa.

Ahmet T. Kuru situeert hier echter de geleidelijke neergang van de moslimwereld. De onafhankelijke filosofie verdween stap voor stap. De oelama hadden het monopolie op het geestesleven, onder meer omdat zij aan het hoofd stonden van de madrassas (moslimscholen). Tekenend is bijvoorbeeld het verschil in de omgang met de boekdrukkunst: die ontstond in Europa in 1455, maar het duurde nog tot midden de 18de eeuw voor in het Ottomaanse rijk een boek werd gedrukt. De geestelijken verzetten zich nog heel lang tegen de vertaling van de koran en de verspreiding ervan als boek omdat ze hierin een bedreiging van hun monopolie zagen. In het Westen droeg de boekdrukkunst bij aan een bloeiend intellectueel leven, terwijl er op dat vlak een stagnatie was in de moslimlanden. Ook militair gezien overvleugelde het Westen de moslimwereld. De verovering van Egypte door Napoleon (1798-1801) was het eerste wapenfeit waaruit duidelijk bleek dat de moslimwereld ook militair achterop geraakt was. Nadien zijn er (o.m. in het Ottomaanse rijk) pogingen geweest om deze achterstand teniet te doen, door Europese verworvenheden te bestuderen en te introduceren maar helemaal lukte dat niet. De kolonisering van moslimlanden door Europese landen als Frankrijk en het VK hielp natuurlijk niet, maar de basis van de achterstand was al lang tevoren gelegd.

Het boek van Ahmet T. Kuru is een ernstige studie, met tal van namen en begrippen uit de moslimwereld die bij ons niet zo bekend zijn. Dat maakt de lectuur niet altijd gemakkelijk. Er is bovendien een uitgebreid voetnotenapparaat en een heel uitgebreide bibliografie. De auteur is niet over één nacht ijs gegaan. Het is duidelijk dat dit boek een gezaghebbende studie is, die niet over het hoofd kan worden gezien. Ik raad dit boek aan maar de lectuur ervan is dikwijls taai en moeilijk. Een gewaarschuwd lezer is er twee waard.

[David Andreas · Rating 2 out of 5]

Das Werk als solches ist allen der englischen Sprache mächtigen in seiner Originalfassung zu empfehlen. Es handelt sich bei der deutschen Übersetzung um ein ganz minderwertiges Erzeugnis. Der Springer-Verlag will eine menschliche Überarbeitung der maschinell Übersetzung durchgeführt haben. Welche Menschen können das wohl gewesen sein? Jedenfalls verschlägt es einem angesichts des Preises die Sprache. Doch wer wollte denn behaupten, daß der Zweck von Übersetzungen in der Erschließung fremdsprachiger Literatur bestehe?

Kurus in weiten Zügen chronologischer Abhandlung ist die Vermeidung aller geografischen und kulturell-essenzialistischen Lehren hoch anzurechnen. Geografische und kutlturelle Gegebenheiten werden bei ihm vielmehr in eine komplexe Analyse einleuchtend einbezogen. Es handelt sich bei seinem Buch um eine historisch-materialistisch zu nennende Analyse der Institutionen verschiedener Gesellschaften des sogenannten Islam über einen beträchtlichen Zeitraum. Kuru versteht sich auf die Verknüpfung vielfältiger kultureller Gegebenheiten zu einem synthetischen Bild. Wirtschaftliche Institutionen erfahren eine erhellende Kontextualisierung und werden somit als Teil einer gesamten gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit aufgefaßt. Geschichte wird da als Geschichte von Klassenkämpfen verstanden.

Im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit steht für Kuru das Bündnis auf ganz bestimmte Deutungen festgelegter Geistlicher mit Funktionären der Staatsapparate. Diese seit dem elften Jahrhundert auftretende Allianz hat sich seither hinsichtlich der Herrschaftskonsolidierung bewährt. Kulturelle Innovationen waren davon allerdings nie zu erwarten.

Kurus Einsichten stützen sich auf primäre wie sekundäre Quellen. Aufgrund seines politikwissenschaftlichen Forschungsinteresses spielen letztere selbstverständlich eine größere Rolle. Unter den primären Quellen wird der interessierte Leser zweifellos einige gemeinhin unbekannte finden. Allein aus diesem Grund lohnt sich ein genauerer Blick auf die Literaturverweise.

Der evoutionistische Ansatz des Verfassers verleiht seiner Darstellung nicht bloß historische Tiefe. Man erkennt die Entwicklung autoritärer Institutionen der Gegenwart aus historischen Voraussetzungen. Dabei wird die Instabilität institutioneller Anpassungen und ihre ideologische Rechtfertigung seitens der Geistlichkeit –der «ulema» – erkennbar. Der geschichtliche Vorgang erscheint dennoch als offen und durch keine vergangenen Gegebenheiten als unabänderlich vorherbestimmt. Somit ist die Darstellung eine dynamische und eben dies verleiht dem ganzen eine wirkliche Spannung.

Ideologiekritik kommt dabei nicht zu kurz und auch die unvermeidliche Vielfalt diverser religiöser Verbrämungen wird nachvollziehbar dargestellt. So ist die Bezeichnung gänzlich verschiedener Überzeugungen mit dem Namen eines selben Glaubens – als «Islam» – durchaus plausibel. Ihnen allen sind gewisse Referenzen gemein und diese Gemeinsamkeiten erklären ihre Bezüge auf und zu einander. Dabei wird die Unvereinbarkeit «othodoxer» Lehren mit gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt durch Kuru plausibel als Folge einer nahezu monopolistischen Stellung geistlicher Funktionäre im Bereich der Ideologie herausgearbeitet.

Wenig überzeugend ist hingegen der Gebrauch des Ausdrucks der «Marktwirtschaft» für Verhältnisse vor über tausend Jahren. Ebensowenig wird der Nutzen so bezeichneter Konzepte für gegenwärtige Lösungsansätze angesichts von «Autoritarismus» und «Unterentwicklung» deutlich. Es wurde die gerade in ideologischer Hinsicht sehr wirksame Bezugnahme auf die Vokabel «Marktwirtschaft» kaum berücksichtigt. Die Rolle dieses Ausdrucks als Feigenblatt für politische Zwecke und zur Rechtfertigung krassester Vorteilsnahme durch gegenwärtige Oberklassen ließe größere Vorsicht im Umgang damit als ratsam erscheinen.

Eben in diesem Zusammenhang darf man die Empfehlungen Kurus mit Zurückhaltung aufnehmen. In der Entstehung unabhängiger intellektueller und unternehmerischer Klassen sieht er eine Notwendigkeit der Zukunft. Eben da läßt sich eine eher dem neunzehnten Jahrhundert entsprechende Zuversicht erkennen. Von dieser aber sollte uns das zwanzigste Jahrhundert eigentlich gründlich kuriert haben.

Die Beschäftigung mit Ahmet Kurus Einsichten sei allen ganz ungeachtet solcher Einwände wärmstens empfohlen.

[Kemal Akkaya · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this timely book, A. Kuru investigates one of the widely asked questions on the roots of backwardness in Muslim majority countries. He focuses on scientific, economic and political aspects of the problem and presents a stunningly comprehensive survey of the Islamic history to get to the bottom of the problem by considering all the Muslim empires/dynasties starting from the time of Umayyads. The book discusses major transformations that happened in a chronological order by putting them in context. This is indeed very useful in order to understand the inter-dependencies of the events that are often presented in isolation in the typical history books. It is amazing to see all of the controversial issues being discussed in a compact manner from Al Ghazali’s ideas to revivalist endeavors in the late 19th century Ottomans, from Ashari Theology to Salafism and from the story of the book printing in Ottomans to failures of assertive secularist governments in modern times. While Kuru’s main argument for the underdevelopment of Muslim countries is shaped around the alliance of state and ulema (Islamic scholars), he does not shy away from discussing and crediting other arguments from essentialism to colonialism. This unbiased approach gives the reader a broader perspective in understanding the pros and cons of the other arguments with their details along with footnotes and related citations. Although at times Kuru overemphasizes his ulema-state alliance argument, this argument is a novel one that helps linking the dots. He clearly demonstrates that such an alliance not only hindered the flourishing of intellectuals but also undermined the economic development and hence the merchants. Consequently, for Kuru, Muslim countries failed to develop a bourgeoisie and intellectual class, which are indispensable for a functioning democracy. The book is very easy to follow and gave me a similar sense to watching a TV series where you cannot wait to see what would happen in the next episode when reading it. It is definitely a must read for every young Muslim, especially in the East, to be able to get out of their comfort zone and realize what had happened. For the western readers, it is an invaluable summary of history of Islam although it is not a history book. Kuru’s recommendations at the end of the book have also a lot of potential to pave the way for interesting contemplation and discussion.

[Ramdhani · Rating 5 out of 5]

Salah satu buku yang cukup memberikan pencerahan kepada pembacanya mengenai sejarah Islam khususnya dalam konteks sejarah mundurnya peradaban Islam secara keseluruhan yang masih terasa hingga kini. Buku ini mencoba merekam peristiwa atau proses sejarah yang berpengaruh, lalu membandingkannya dengan peristiwa bersejarah pada periode yang sama namun di tempat berbeda, kemudian menjelaskan bagaimana peristiwa atau proses sejarah tersebut berpengaruh terhadap pembentukan kondisi selanjutnya/setelahnya. Meskipun sekilas terlihat seperti buku sejarah, penulis buku ini sendiri mengklaim bahwa buku ini merupakan buku politik.

Jika kita membicarakan mengenai kemunduran peradaban Islam, maka kita akan menunjuk kepada
peristiwa penyerangan Baghdad oleh tentara Mongol sebagai penyebab utama dari mundurnya
peradaban Islam, tetapi penulis dalam buku ini mencoba memberikan teori lain dari penyebab
mundurnya peradaban Islam untuk para pembaca dengan bukti dan penafsiran yang cukup komprehensif, yang berfokus kepada relasi kelas-kelas yang ada pada masa itu (religius, politik, intelektual, dan ekonomi). Selain itu, penulis dalam buku ini juga tidak mau terjebak dalam dikotomi diskursus mengenai ketertinggalan Islam yang berkutat pada pendekatan esensialis/internal (pendekatan yang menganggap bahwa yang menjadi masalah masyarakat Muslim hingga kini adalah tafsir atas ajaran Islam itu sendiri) dan pendekatan pascakolonial/eksternal (yang menganggap bahwa kolonisasi dan eksploitasi Barat lah yang menjadi sumber masalah-masalah masyarakat Muslim hingga kini). Hal inilah yang membuat buku ini menjadi layak direkomendasikan untuk dibaca, karena penulis mencoba untuk menawarkan alternatif gagasan baru dalam wacana mengenai ketertinggalan peradaban Islam/masyarakat Muslim. Buku ini dapat menjadi otokritik kepada umat Muslim secara umumnya untuk tidak mengulangi kesalahan dimasa lalu agar dapat mempersiapkan masa depan yang lebih baik. Terimakasih kepada penerbit yang telah menerbitkan buku ini dengan penerjemahan yang bagus.

[Azwad Adnan · Rating 5 out of 5]

The book provides great insights for the history enthusiasts who are particularly interested about the Islamic history and culture. I would not be exaggerating much if I say it projects a holistic discussion of the political and economic structures and their actors of the Islamic world starting from the Umayyad Empire to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The geopolitical clashes these empires faced and the role of different actors involved at that period are the points of focus of this book. The author claims that the decline of these great Muslim empires is largely due to the Ulema-state alliance and the unfavorable atmosphere that existed particularly for the intellectuals and bourgeois class. The comparative analyses among Umayyad, Abbasid, Safavid, Mughal and Ottoman themselves and with their contemporary western counterparts support the author’s claim quite convincingly. The author meticulously dissected the thesis and anti thesis of other scholars on these topics through a very thorough, logical and data driven analysis. While going through the book one should find some ideas that indeed can be much thought provoking and perhaps lead modern Muslims to rediscover their history in retrospect from a new perspective. The author explores the great scholars and the personalities throughout the Muslim history, what difficulties they faced and why they were hardly found afterwards; how the once great Muslim empires came to ruins, gave in to the fast emerging western world and became colonized later also covered in this book. How philosophy was perceived in the Muslim world and the inevitable clashes between them- I find this particular part very fascinating. Overall the author of Turkish origin put up a great effort to draw a holistic picture of the political and cultural history of the Islamic empires, their downfall as well as explored the causes behind it and the effects it produced.

[MSB · Rating 5 out of 5]

Although this subject/problem is well-studied subject in the history and there are significant amount of thesis on why the Muslim countries failed, I personally was sure that "When the rulers and people live so called 'real Islam', the country becomes powerful" as how ordinary Muslim religious guys think. But after failure of "Turkish dream" by realizing how the Islamist's real faces are so ugly, and realizing lies of religious sect groups about brutal coup attempt in Turkey, this question again come into my mind.

According to writer, the historical reason of failure of Muslim countries is "ulema-state alliance". All beyond the book, "ulema-state alliance", which means the ruler (sultan, king..etc) uses ulema (the religious leader, spokesman,..etc) as his own benefit and not to share power with scientist, businessman or another part of the folk, is mentioned as big devil !

The writer explains the current failure of the Muslim countries by "rantier economy" which means the economic system based on renting oil reserves instead of collecting taxes and give the folk opportunities to ask question to the ruler where the collecting taxes are spent. The writer explains the exceptions by regional diffusion which makes sense. And also he described current Turkey as semi or quasi-rantier which means instead of renting oil, gas reserve, renting high valued land especially in bigger cities.

The book is definitely well-written and densely academic. Although I prefer a little bit easy reading book instead of fully academic research, because of the subject is so important for me, I could read it in 3 days.

[Samir Firdovsioglu · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book is a well-researched book with a lot of references, its arguments are convincing and the author tries to support his claims with explanations backed with historical examples. His language is not difficult, easy to understand, but as enjoyable as one would wish.
I have one main reservation with his conclusion regarding the authoritarianism; he is indeed right in pointing out the authoritarianism and centralisation of the power as the most significant factor that killed the spirit of science, entrepreneurship and merchantry which led to the decline of one of the greatest civilizations of the history. But I do not agree with him in defining ulema-state alliance as its cause, I would rather say that it was a result of the authoritarianism. Centralized states forced the ulema into submission and gave them a role in the state structure in order to legitimize the state through the religion. There are other reasons for authoritarianism in the islamic lands and it goes back to the end of rashidun khalifas and beginning of first kings/sultans.

The book is a powerfull work and I definately recommend it.

[Rudi · Rating 4 out of 5]

Het boek beschrijft de geschiedenis, economie, bestuursvormen, verschillende strekkingen van de Islamitische regio , een regio waar ik persoonlijk niet veel vanaf wist ,
Het boek beschrijft geen religieuze gebruiken en gaat niet in op de religie ,
Het boek leest vlot en is gemakkelijk te volgen ( ik heb veel zaken bijgeleerd over deze regio , geschiedenis, economische enz )
Met de conclusies weet ik niet of ik het eens ben , ik vind het moeilijk om in te schatten welke impact Bv de boekdrukkunst heeft gehad , … als men mij moest vragen welke impact de uitrol van het internet heeft ( gehad ) op de samenleving, ik weet niet welk antwoord ik zou geven en ik heb het nochtans zelf meegemaakt en aan het meemaken , positief en negatief , moeilijk om in te schatten en te beschrijven , Mss eens een boek lezen. De impact van het internet
Het boek beschrijft op vlotte wijze de geschiedenis van de islamitische regio ,( 4 sterren want ik kan het nog met geen andere boeken vergelijken het is het eerste dat ik lees over deze regio ) , leerrijk en vlot geschreven

[Vincent Blocker · Rating 5 out of 5]

Prior to reading Professor Kuru's well-written book, I had the very limited knowledge and understanding of Muslim history typical of the educated western layperson I am. His complex, panoramic view of Muslim societies over the centuries introduced me to the details of issues and happenings placed in a very clear analytical framework. Moreover, throughout the work he addresses the western and Muslim-world scholarly debate about multiple aspects of this history. I am well versed in European history and so appreciated his lengthy comparison of the emergence of western Europe with analogous developments in the Muslim world. Finally, he critically relates his findings directly to the situation of Middle Eastern nations today.

[Dimas Caesaria · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kenapa dulu peradaban Islam banyak ilmuwan keren & punya ekonomi yg kuat, tapi sekarang banyak negara Muslim terkesan biasa-biasa saja. Buku ini mengeksplorasi bahwa kejayaan Islam abad 8-11 muncul karena para ilmuwan dan pedagang mandiri (ga dikontrol negara), tapi mulai merosot ketika ulama dan penguasa militer "nikahan" buat jaga kekuasaan. Alhasil, kebebasan berpikir sulit dan beberapa tokoh bahkan dianggap kafir/murtad karena pemikirannya, ekonomi mandek, sementara Eropa malah ngebut lewat Renaisans. Kerennya, Buku ini ga nyalahin Islam sebagai agama, tapi struktur politik-ekonomi yang bikin negara Muslim sekarang banyak yang korup dan otoriter. Bacaan wajib buat yang penasaran sama akar masalah sekaligus pengen belajar dari sejarah

[Petra Gilang Ramadan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Awalnya saya berprasangka bahwa Ahmet Kuru akan habis-habisan membahas tokoh muslim yang menjadi aktor kemunduran. Ternyata tidak! Ahmet Kuru dalam buku ini berprilaku sangan objektif, mambongkar kebiasaan pejabat di negara muslim yg menyebabkan kemunduran sekaligus membongkar prilaku-prilaku dunia barat dalam menyebabkan kemunduran negara muslim. Kuru juga mematahkan teori-teori tentang kemunduran Islam yang menekankan pada aspek spiritual Islam itu sendiri, sehingga menurut Kuru ajaran Islam bukan penyebab kemunduran Islam seperti yang dilabelkan oleh pemikir di dunia barat.

[Dea Evani A · Rating 4 out of 5]

Akhirnya bisa menyelesaikan this (kinda) big book! Butuh waktu lumayan lama karena selain harus fokus, juga kedistract oleh keseharian hehe.

Oke, buku ini menarik banget. Sebagai orang yang agak suka sejarah, analisis di buku ini top tier. Seperti yang Kuru-san bilang di awal buku, beliau pakai metode analisis untuk tiap kejadian-kejadian kecil, jadi lebih mendalam pembahasannya. Kita jadi tahu akar permasalahan & alur kenapa umat Islam di dunia bisa jadi "kayak gini". Tulisannya lugas dan tegas. Bisa jadi bahan diskusi panjang ini. Probably gonna make it to my top 5 book this year.