For decades we have known about the dangers of global warming. Nevertheless, greenhouse gas emissions continue to increase. How can we explain our failure to take the necessary measures to stop climate change? Why are societies, despite the mounting threat to ourselves and our children, so reluctant to take action?
In this important new book, Jens Beckert provides an answer to these questions. Our apparent inability to implement basic measures to combat climate change is due to the nature of power and incentive structures affecting companies, politicians, voters, and consumers. Drawing on social science research, he argues that climate change is an inevitable product of the structures of capitalist modernity which have been developing for the past 500 years. Our institutional and cultural arrangements are operating at the cost of destroying the natural environment and attempts to address global warming are almost inevitably bound to fail. Temperatures will continue to rise and social and political conflicts will intensify. The tragic truth we are selling our future for the next quarterly figures, the upcoming election results, and today’s pleasure. Any realistic climate policy needs to focus on preparing societies for the consequences of escalating climate change and aim at strengthening social resilience to cope with the increasingly unstable natural world. Civil society is the only source of pressure that could build the necessary strength and support for climate protection.
How We Sold Our Future is a crucial intervention into the most pressing issue of our time.
I came across this book from an Institute for Policy Research webinar with Jens Beckert (and received a discount to purchase the title). I loved that it was less than 200 pages, like a more succinct version of Overshoot: How the World Surrendered to Climate Breakdown. It offers some insightful notions of how to be more engaged individuals in the face of the climate crisis but is riddled with overgeneralization of global trends and political paradigms. The blatant oversimplification of ideas, however, was not owing to the book's length; if Overshoot (and its sequel?) is any indication, a longer piece could muddy up articulation further.
Unsure if it's my algorithm picking this up as an interest since I have purchased similar titles, but I need to stop and think about where and how these kinds of books are being advertised to me. From the relatively small sample size of titles I have read from presses such as Verso, Polity, and the like, I get the feeling that these largely European-based professors are only interested in promoting specific political opinions rather than an objective analysis of the current state of our climate crisis battle. Like many others in this genre, Beckert's drawn-out essay tends to oversimplify interlinkages and correlations, relying on readers not to scrutinize unsubstantiated claims. I feel that I can no longer view publications from these publishers as objective, which is unfortunate because the questions posed in each of these texts are intriguing and worth asking.
I believe Beckert and authors like him suffer from monocausotaxophilia — the love of single ideas that explain everything (thank you for the term, KSR) — while simultaneously venturing too many or too complex ideas that compete for attention and too many themes pulling them in different directions. In other words, the underlying ideas being advocated are not inherently problematic, but rather the execution is lazy and the purpose unclear. Is this book meant to be persuasive, informative, or performative? It comes across as all three.
I strive to avoid being seen as someone who "reacts allergically" to criticisms of capitalism or 'neoliberal' paradigms. I never want my opinions or actions to be dismissed as a symptom of an embedded and path-dependent 'capitalist' biases. Yet many of the texts I come across that address the systemic 'lock-in' of extractive processes and environmentally-damaging economic activities often single out "capitalism", as if our current socioeconomic and climate woes are being deliberately perpetuated by a secret cabal of free market pundits. To some extent, there are evident power imbalances and an identifiable (Western, hegemonic) minority who not only have the audacity but also, more importantly, the capacity to take advantage of the inequality. And though Beckert articulates these views well, he offers weak and minimal evidence to support the development of extractive-dependent growth, even though plenty exist.
Moreover, while this narrative is indeed convincing, it is somehow often presented without accounting for many other relevant variables and factors, assuming our economies operate on theory-based order or logic (i.e., economic incentives) rather than the chaotic and complex reality that we experience. Although Beckert acknowledges the complexity of the climate crisis in the end, other systems are not seen in the same light. As Sammy Roth writes, "In an ideal universe, I'd support only climate solutions that don't cause other problems. But we don't live in an ideal universe."
That is only one weakness of Beckert's writing. Some audiences are content to suspend disbelief or read not too closely, absorbing only the key ideas — certainly, a much more enjoyable way to read. When it comes to climate-related literature, unfortunately, I have been conditioned to be more critical than usual. As a result, there were too many instances in this book that prompted questions of credibility. Many of the arguments Beckert makes are unsupported. I recognize that Beckert includes extensive empirical research and, in some sections, he does use it sufficiently to back up his claims (though more in the latter half than the former). But in most of the book, Beckert makes largely unsupported, definitive statements. Even when there isn't a peer-reviewed citation attached, the defense of the claim is weak. Beckert opts to tell (i.e., lecture) rather than show. I initially prepared examples of this but felt that such nitpickiness would come across as pretentious rather than an earnest desire for better communication (but I can provide on request). I'll admit that more of these kinds of paragraphs are featured in the broader chapters that attempt to make sense of the systems we operate in (namely "Capitalist modernity", "Big Oil", and "The hesitant state"). Later chapters provide more specific examples and arguments and make for a much more compelling discussion but still harbor many uncorroborated arguments.
Normalizing such generalizations implies an assumption that the intended audience shares the same, if not similar, perspectives. It begs the question of whether these kinds of theories only exist and thrive in echo chambers and, thus, whether the associated essays/think pieces are intended to persuade/convince readers of their truth or peddle a specific ideology. Beckert employs causation language (A is the de facto result of B) over correlation assumptions (B suggests A is likely), which leaves no room for counter-arguments or discourse — not physical space on the page but discussion space. We exist in uncertainty, so why present these arguments as fact? The reason may be to bolster the credibility of such statements through a confidence signal, but presenting with such infallibility makes these arguments less convincing. When I see a bold statement without qualifiers or sources, my response turns to questioning (e.g., "how do you know that for a fact?") rather than acceptance of its plausibility. I question whether Beckert's purpose is to convince me of the myriad ways a capitalism-driven history has impeded climate progress. I almost feel that this book means to just aggravate readers who don't have prerequisite knowledge of the ideas and exacerbate the confirmation bias of those who do. I had similar criticisms about Malm and Carton's writing in Overshoot; the recurrence of these issues is revealing about academics in this field.
To reiterate, I generally agree with the idea that humans exist in economic systems that reward growth and accumulation regardless of the societal and environmental costs. I would agree that this book adds to that discourse, but not by very much. It does tie all the discussion nicely in its conclusion, but it questions the purpose of the rest of the book. This could have been more compelling as the "What's next?" chapter in a short-form essay format with adequate citations. Beckert's views may not be wrong, but I would still exercise caution in reading his work (and maybe extend this to other European professors who attempt to frame the climate crisis under capitalist versus Marxist ideologies). If you are interested in this book, I would start with the introduction and conclusion and then decide if you think the middle is worth it (I did not).