מלחמת יום הדין: 50 שנה למלחמת יום כיפור

by Chaim Herzog, חיים הרצוג, יצחק הרצוג (Introduction)

מאז ראה אור לראשונה היה מלחמת יום הדין לגרסה בת-סמכא של אירועי מלחמת יום הכיפורים ונהפך לקלאסיקה על מדף הספרים של מלחמות ישראל. הוא תורגם לשפות רבות ונלמד כספר חובה בבתי ספר צבאיים ברחבי העולם.

מלחמת יום הכיפורים סימנה קו שבר בתולדות מדינת ישראל ועוררה ויכוחים ציבוריים נוקבים. בספר, המבוסס על מחקר יסודי ועל ראיונות עם כלל גורמי ההנהגה הישראלית, הצבאית והמדינית גם יחד, מביא חיים הרצוג סקירה מעמיקה של ההתפתחויות שהובילו למלחמה, תיאור מפורט של מהלכה וניתוח מקיף של השלכותיה הצבאיות והפוליטיות. הוא חושף כיצד למרות סימני האזהרה הברורים הפתיעו צבאות ערב את הממסד הישראלי ומתאר בצורה מרתקת איך הפך צה"ל את הקערה על פיה והוביל לניצחון גדול.

במלאות 50 שנה למלחמה מובאת כאן מהדורה מחודשת של הספר.

למהדורה זו נוספו הקדמות מאת שניים מבניו של המחבר – נשיא המדינה יצחק הרצוג ושגריר ישראל בארצות הברית תא"ל (במיל') מיכאל הרצוג. הקדמות אלה בוחנות את המלחמה ואת השפעתה על החברה הישראלית בפרספקטיבה היסטורית.

אלוף (במיל') חיים הרצוג (1918-1997), מי שכיהן כנשיאה השישי של מדינת ישראל בשנים 1993-1983, נולד באירלנד ועלה לארץ בהיותו נער. כאן למד בישיבה ובמקביל שירת בארגון ההגנה. אחר כך למד משפטים באוניברסיטאות לונדון וקיימברידג', ובמלחמת העולם השנייה התנדב לצבא הבריטי והשתתף כקצין קרבי בפלישה לאירופה. החל ממלחמת העצמאות שירת בצה"ל במגוון תפקידים, ועם פרישתו משירות פעיל כראש אמ"ן, נעשה לאחד הפרשנים הצבאיים המקוריים והמוערכים ביותר בישראל ובעולם. בשנים 1978-1975 שימש כשגריר ישראל באו"ם, ועם שובו משליחות זו כיהן כחבר בכנסת העשירית.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, War, Middle East, Israel, Military History

384 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1975

About the author

Major-General Chaim Herzog was an Israeli military officer, attorney, politician and writer who served as the sixth President of Israel between 1983 and 1993.

He was born in Belfast and raised predominantly in Dublin, where his father, Yitzhak HaLevi Herzog, served as Ireland's Chief Rabbi. In 1935 he emigrated to Mandatory Palestine, then served in the Haganah during the 1936–39 Arab revolt. He volunteered for service in the British Army during World War II, and was commissioned as an officer of the Intelligence Corps in 1943. He left the British Army in 1947 as a major, and returned to Palestine. After the end of the British Mandate and Israel's Declaration of Independence, he served as an officer of the Israel Defence Forces during the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. He retired from the IDF in 1962 with the rank of major-general.

After practising law for a few years, Major-General Herzog served as Israel's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from 1975 to 1978. He was elected to the Knesset in the 1981 elections, and in March 1983 he was elected President of Israel. He served two terms in that position, and retired in 1993.

Reviews

[Gary · Rating 5 out of 5]

The 1973 Yom Kippur War left in it's wake shattered illusions , an escalation in the energy crisis and a reshaped poltiical situation in the Middle East.

This work , originally written two years after the Yom Kippur War , by one of Israel's foremost millitary analysts and later President of Israel, traces the roots of the war to the Six Day War , and gives a detailed analysis of the war on two fronts , the Northern Front , in the Golan against the Syrian attackers (aided by auxiliaries from Iraq, Jordan , Morocco , Saudi Arabia . Kuwait and Cuba among others) and the Southern Front , in the Sinai , against the Egyptian invaders.

The author , in tracing the conflict from the 1967 Six Day War , illustrates how the Soviet Union instigated the war , arming the Arabs , falsely advising the Syrians about the concentrations of Israeli troops on their borders , playing down the escalation in the United Nations and heavily arming Syria , Egypt and Iraq , egging them on to a war of anihilation against Israel.

Herzog details the backdrop to the war with the reality that Israel was faced with:
"As Arab hysteria rose and the Arab media promised the Israeli population - men , women and children - destruction and anihilation in the most brutal manner , the horrors of the Nazi holocaust rose to the fore in Jewish consciousness. The Jewish people knew that these where not mere words , recalling how many nations nurtured on the tenets of Christianity had either participated in the previous bloody massacres or had looked on. And indeed the world looked on , petrified , incapable of taking action".

Herzog details how Israel's extraordinary victory in the Six Day War lulled that nation into a false sense of security. The War of Attrition (1969-1970) by Egypt against Israel. The very magnitude of the Arab defeat in the Six Day War , with it's damaging implications for Arab pride , self-respect and honour set the stage for the next war , points out the author , detaling Nasser's resolve that "what was taken by force must be returned by force". The Soviet Union rebuilt the armed might of Egypt , Syria and Iraq , with the latest weapons and equipment , continually urging the Arabs into another war with Israel.
The author details the political machinations of the Soviet Union and Arab powers leading to the war , and reveals the shocking fact that Israel knew several days before the war that a massive Arab attack was imminent on Yom Kippur but miscalculated the hour , believing it would be four hours later then when it actually took place.

The author details how "the inherent strength and resilience of the people of Israel was revealed in the stark , grim and tragic days at the outset of the war , when fighting back against overwhelming odds , they overcame the initial setbacks and achieved millitary success."
He sizes up in his opinion the strengths and weaknesses of Israel's foremost Generals in the conflict such as Moshe Dayan , David Elazar , Shmuel Gonen , Ariel Sharon , Chaim Bar Lev and Raful Eitan. Finally he detailed the political implications of the war.
Looking at his comments today about perfidious role of the Soviet Union in encouraging the Arabs not to compromise with Israel , and egging them on to belligerance , one realizes that although the Soviet Union is no more , Communist rule having collapsed in that part of the world , it's role has been overtaken by others with an implacable hostility to Israel, including Red China ,and the South African led Non Aligned Movement , which continue the Marxist inspired hatred of Israel , originally created by the Soviets.
Finally Herzog reminds us how Israel has never been the elment to block peace moves and that the basic problem continues to be Arab insistence that Israel has no right to exist (today backed up by the international hard left).
"Only when Arab actions indicate a willingness to modify their atttitude to the basic issue of the existance of the State of Israel will it be possible for Israel make concessions."
Unfortunately the failed Oslo process proved that the Arabs only saw the agreement of Arab rule of the disputed territories as an intitial stage in the road to Israel's destruction.
Those on the international Left who encourage the Arab dream of Israel's destruction , only make genuine peace more unrealizable.
The Israeli people desperately want peace and always have wanted peace , but must fight to
survive and avoid a second holocaust.
If the Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence.

If the Jews put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel.

[Jonny · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very interesting account of how the Israelis nearly congratulated themselves into a major military defeat. Having raced to an astounding victory in 1967, the military allied itself to be blinded to any possibility of a combined Arab resurgence and was caught flat footed when massively reinforced Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a massive and nearly surprise attack.
The tension, shock and nearness to victory of the Syrian offensive in the Golan is brilliantly brought to light, and in a pleasing display of honesty the errors in the campaign in the Sinai are also described with clarity.
If you have any preconceptions about the Middle East situation, I doubt they'd be challenged (written in the 70's, there's no input from Egyptians or Syrians) but praise is given where due. It filled in a lot of blanks for me and if you can keep a clear mind it's a good account of Israel's war.

[Olethros · Rating 4 out of 5]

Explicación meridianamente clara del conflicto.-

Género. Historia.

Lo que nos cuenta. Relato de las circunstancias geopolíticas y militares que desembocaron en la Guerra del Yom Kippur a comienzos de octubre de 1973, su preparación, concepción y desarrollo, para terminar ofreciendo un análisis de desempeños, especialmente centrado en un bando, y de algunas conclusiones que se podrían extraer.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[yoav · Rating 4 out of 5]

תיאור מלחמת הכיפורים על פי תחקיר שערך חיים הרצוג (לימים נשיא המדינה) מספר שנים לאחר המלחמה על בסיס מסמכים, לרבות מסמכים שנתפסו מהצד השני, וראיונות שערך. הספר הזה יצא בכמה מהדורות: בשנת 1975 סמוך למלחמה; בתחילת שנות התשעים הוסיף חיים הרצוג סוף דבר מעודכן; וב- 2013 אחרי חשיפת מסמכים נוספים, הספר יצא שוב הפעם עם הקדמה מאת בנו, מיכאל (מייק) הרצוג, קצין בכיר לשעבר וחוקר מזרח תיכון בעצמו.
הספר מחולק למספר חלקים עיקריים: הקדמה שסוקרת את המצב המדיני והצבאי מששת הימים ועד המלחמה, את הלך הרוח המצרי וההתקרבות לסובייטים ואת הלך הרוח הישראלי, חילופי השלטון וההשפעה שלהם וכו' וכן את הניסיונות המדיניים.
החלק השני סוקר את המערכה מול הסורים.
החלק השלישי את המערכה מול המצרים.
הרביעי בחיל האוויר והים
והחמישי עוסק בתוצאות שהיו ידועות אז ובתוספת שנוספה בשנת 1993.

הספר מעניין ומפורט מאוד. החלק המדיני מרתק ממש והרצוג אינו חוסך את ביקורתו מהתנהלות הצד הישראלי שבמידה מסויימת הובילה למלחמה וטוען למעשה שסאדאת יצא למלחמה כדי לשבור את התיקו המדיני ולשנות את תנאי היסוד ביחס לתעלה וסיני ולא התכוון לקדם את המלחמה מעבר לכך. בסופו של יום סאדאת השיג את מטרתו מספר שנים אחר כך.

תיאורי הקרבות בחלקים השני והשלישי אניליטיים מפורטים מאוד (עד לרמה שקשה לפעמים לעקוב בוודאי כשלא מכירים את השטח היטב) ומצד שני מרתקים ומותחים. מדי פעם מבליח תיאור רגשי מעיני הנלחמים ועל רקע הדיווח הקר יש לזה אפקט רגשי חזק מאוד.
התחושה המתקבלת היא שבצפון היתה מוכנות גדולה יותר מול אויב טוב יותר והיה הרבה מזל שבנקודה מסויימת הסורים עצרו להתארגנות והדבר איפשר לכוחות הישראלים לגבש את הכוח ולבסוף לעבור להתקפה.
בצד המצרי, הבלאגן וההזנחה חגגו, קונספציות התגוננות התגלו כשגויות, המצרים למדו את הצד הישראלי והתכוננו לו היטב. הכוחות סבלו מחוסר קומניקציה ומחוסר סדר שנבע גם מכך שהפיקוד בראשותו של גורודיש ובהמשך בר לב לא הסתדר עם הכוח של אריאל שרון (ולאורך הספר הרצוג מאוד מצדד בגונן-גורדיש ומותח ביקורת על שרון). הצליחה לצד השני, היתה בלאגן גדול אבל הצליחה בגלל היוזמה של שרון מצד שני ההחלטות שהתקבלו בעניין הזה הצילו את הצליחה, כי למצרים היה מידע על תכניות מוקדמות של שרון.

החלק הרביעי, פחות מפורט וגם מעט יותר מעודד.
החלק האחרון, עוסק בעיקר במסקנות צבאיות (ההנחה ששריון ואוויר מספיקים למלחמה - לא נכונה) ובעניינים גיאופוליטיים בעיקר כי בשלב הזה עוד לא החל המו"מ לשלום. התוספת משנת 1993 לא מוסיפה הרבה.
ספר מעניין מאוד.

[Mike · Rating 4 out of 5]

Essential military history. What happens when you get too cocky and dismiss your enemy as incompetent. Unflinching look at mistakes and brilliance of the lead up to, actual war and post-war lessons. Exciting reading.

[Peter Corrigan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hard to believe--50 years ago these events occurred! About now (late August) in 1973 the Egyptian/Syrian plans for what came to be known as the Yom Kippur War were firmly in place. The Israelis were not expecting it for a variety of reasons and while strategic surprise was achieved the book makes clear that tactical surprise was less complete. Chaim Herzog is one of the many interesting Israelis of that period, he later became President of Israel (1983-1993) and was born in Belfast, Northern Ireland of all places. His father was chief rabbi of Ireland and spoke fluent Irish! More than most native Irish could claim then or now.

This is a solid, first-hand account almost strictly from the Israeli point of view. But he does not ignore the Arab side and provides plenty of insight into their thinking especially before the war. We almost get a seat at the table with those now giants of history--Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and numerous generals who are certainly legends in the IDF today such as Bar-Lev, Bren, Elazar, Eytan, Hofi, Laner, Peled, Matt and many others including of course 'Arik' Sharon (who we find was nearly sacked for insubordination on several occasions during the brief war). The Arab generals are rather more invisible and perhaps they might prefer it that way as they were thoroughly trounced after the initial success. Herzog does not really provide much insight on the why's and wherefores of the clear superiority of the IDF other than superior training, flexibility and perhaps morale. There are numerous accounts of IDF armor destroying Arab tanks at 'stand-off' ranges at which they were apparently not vulnerable. Obviously, the raw material (soldiers) of the Israelis Army was way ahead of the conscript Arab armies. The Egyptian literacy rate was around 33% in the early 1970s (I looked it up) so these troops, while brave at times, were clearly at a disadvantage in mobile 'modern' warfare. He does mention the far superior tank recovery system of the Israelis as an important factor.

Herzog's post-war analysis at the end is also quite good with interesting comments about the role of Meir and a fair take-down of the 1967 hero Dayan. Altogether this is an excellent account albeit a bit one-sided as you might expect, but not without a measure of respect toward the defeated enemy.

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 3 out of 5]

The War of Atonement is an uneven account of the Yom Kippur War. Herzog was a retired IDF general and Israeli politician. Around the time the book was first published in 1975 he was Israeli ambassador to the UN, and he would later serve as the (largely ceremonial) President of Israel. This book is at its worst, and paradoxically at its most interesting, when it argues for Israeli military reforms, and is otherwise a workman-like account of a war that had barely faded from the headlines.

The strategic situation heading into 1973 was one of instability. The Arab powers, particularly Egypt and Syria, were itching for a chance to reverse their catastrophic defeat in 1967. Israel knew that a second war was coming, but conventional wisdom was that it would be in 1975, when Egypt had rebuilt its medium bomber fleet. Israeli defense policy was based around taking the initial attack with outposts and what little strategic depth was available, and then counter-attacking with an armored force composed from reserves, which required between 46 and 72 hours to be organized. And this time, diplomatic realities preventing the kind of brilliant preemptive strike which began the Six Day War. The Arabs would launch the first strike.

The long War of Attrition in the lead-up to October 1973 served Egypt and Syria better than Israel. Israeli defenses were small and undermanned, its command structure weakened by rotation of senior officer, and its defense plans ambiguous. Meanwhile, Egypt and Syria trained for years on the initial attacks, every part of the plan rehearsed, while concentrating artillery and new anti-air missiles. While Israeli military intelligence did get wind of the attack with perhaps a days notice, they specified H-hour as 6:00 PM local time, 4 hours later than the actual H-hour of 2:00 PM. The initial Arab attacks met with great success, but Israeli defenders managed to inflict outsized losses in the fine defensive terrain of the Golan heights, and desperately mobilized forces finally turned back the Syrians. Meanwhile, in the south, Egypt crossed that Suez canal across its entire 110 mile length, but failed to move deeper into Sinai. A daring counter-crossing by the Israeli military drove deep into Egyptian territory, severing the Egyptian supply lines.

This book was published before the Camp David accords were finalized, so the diplomatic resolution is out of scope of the book. And while Israeli won, its military resolve was shaken. Herzog goes after Moshe Dayan for irresponsibility as defense minister in the lead up to the war, and defeatism in command during the war. Ariel Sharon is criticized for being unable to work as part of a unified command team, a charismatic asshole after glory. And the Israeli military as a whole assumed the ongoing supremacy of its armor and airpower, neglecting its infantry and artillery and the counters of new Soviet guided missiles in Arab hands, which caused excessive causalities.

[William · Rating 5 out of 5]

The details of the conflict, evaluations of Israeli military commanders, and descriptions of Israeli modus operandi are exceptional. Herzog's analysis of the causes of this war and the lessons learned from it are outstanding. My only problem with the publication is the difficulty one has with the maps and trying to follow the flow of battle.

[David Timma · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good book, well written, and easy to understand with clear descriptions of the force movements both tactically and strategically. Would have helped to have had more and more detailed maps. Interesting analysis that is VERY relevant to today!!

[S. Barckmann · Rating 4 out of 5]

This account of the 1973 Arab Israeli war is full of facts and vignettes that were not previously discussed in the popular press. Chaim Herzog has a very interesting bio, which I urge you to look up on Wikipedia. But to summarize he was a prominent member of the founding generation of Israeli leaders, as a general, politician, and prominent Labour Party Leader. He was President of Israel for a period.

The account of the war is an hour-by-hour, day-by-day, dispassionate story of the two week long war. It was fought on two fronts, in the north against Syria, and the south against Egypt. In many ways it was a proxy fight between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with the weaponry and strategies of the two sides being tested out.

For Israel it was a life or death struggle. The first three days could have gone either way. It was in the middle of the Yom Kippur holiday, and it took Israel by surprise. Herzog points out all of the blunders of the Israeli intelligence establishment, of the political leadership, as well as its tactical and strategic shortcomings that led to the near disaster. He also praises the Arab strategy from a military point of view.

It also points out the sacrifice, and heroism that saved Israel. He explains the reasons for the superiority of Israeli pilots and tankers. He also says that dependence on tanks and airpower, while relatively playing down the importance of infantry and artillery was a serious mistake. It was also interesting to see his disdain for Ariel Sharon, a rising political rival at the time and of course eventual Prime Minister of the country. He points out that Sharon’s "primadonna" behavior led to some indecision as well as other problems on the battlefield initially, but in the end gives Sharon his due as a brilliant and fearless tactical general.

If you are interested in modern military history, this is a very good read.

[robert · Rating 4 out of 5]

4.5 stars. I always wanted to learn more about how the Israelis were able to withstand the massive surprise (not all Israelis were surprised) attack by the Arab coalition and turn it around and kick some serious Arab butt. Herzog goes into great detail about the numerous battles on all fronts. It actually got very confusing trying to follow the battles especially without more battle maps. I was a bit surprised to learn about the naval engagements involved. What I really wanted to learn and understand was how such an outnumbered country was able to withstand and defeat a numerically superior adversary with the advantage of surprise. There I was disappointed. Reason for not giving it 5 stars. Herzog was very detailed in the casualty counts, tank and aircraft losses. But failed to explain the disparities. Granted the Israelis were better trained and motivated. But how did they consistently out gun the Arabs? It would have helped a lot to explain why an Israeli tank or jet performed so much better. I understand that Israeli tanks were much more accurate at greater distances and took full advantage of this. But what was the difference in armor thickness, shell penetration capacity, jet missile capabilities, etc. That detail, at least for me, was sorely lacking.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent telling of the Yom Kippur war. The author gives a thorough account of the events leading up to the war. He then covers the northern fighting in the Golan Heights followed by the southern campaign along the Suez Canal and into Egypt. Found his analysis of the Soviets' role instigating the war to be spot on.

I would have liked more on the air war, but understand the author's reasons for minimal coverage. The final chapter covers IDF successes, failures, and further implications. Here I believe Gen. Herzog was a bit too harsh on some of the generals. Found his thoughts to be very interesting in light of 49 years distance from the war.

[Eduardo Fort · Rating 4 out of 5]

Jaim Herzog (1918-1997) fue presidente de Israel (1983-1993), pero antes tuvo una distinguida carrera militar en el Ejército Británico y en las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel. En este pequeño y vibrante libro, cuenta todas las vicisitudes de la Guerra de Yom Kipur (1973), conflicto armado que marcó a fuego la historia moderna del país judío.

[Don · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book I must say that repeatedly reading the way over and over the Israeli forces were outnumbered by unbelievable margins summons up biblical connotations re chosen people. Strongly recommend for those who are interested in this subject in modern world

[K C · Rating 3 out of 5]

oldie but goodie, a particularly good recounting of the military movements and rationale during the Yom Kippur war.

[Ronald Rafajko · Rating 4 out of 5]

The details are incredible. May not be interesting to someone not familiar with tank battles.

The last chapter on lessons learned is very well done.
delete

[Richard McCubbin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Enlightening

I remembered the war as a child. It was great to read the details and gain a better understanding of what actually happened.

[Frank · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good read for those interested in Israel history or those interested in tank battles. Well written.

[Tomer Bany · Rating 5 out of 5]

ספר מעולה להבנת השתלשלות האירועים היומיומית במישור הצבאי.

דבר אחד שהספר היה יכול לעשות טוב יותר הוא לתת סקירה גם לבמה הפוליטית והדיפלומטית בזמן המלחמה (אבל כנראה שהספר לא נועד לזה)

[Scott Martin · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is an updated publication of an earlier work that focused on the Yom Kippur War of 1973, one which initially saw Israel failing to stop a coordinated attack from Egyptian and Syrian forces. Eventually, Israel did manage (with logistical help from the US) to counterattack and inflict heavy loses on Egyptian and Syrian forces. However, while the Israelis could claim a final victory, this work does not paint Israel (the author’s homeland) in a good light.

Prior to the Yom Kippur/War of Atonement, Israel could feel pretty confident about its military situation. After the Six Day War of 1967, the nation held significantly more territory and had inflicted a severe beating against its Arab neighbors. Yet, the Arabs, particularly the Egyptians and Syrians, learned their lessons well, or at least at first showed that they had. They rebuilt their forces, changed some of their doctrine, and obtained significant military support from the USSR. As for the Israelis, they grew overconfident, and were blinded to the military build-up facing them in the fall of 1973. If their intelligence apparatus and leadership had been paying more attention and taken the threats more seriously, perhaps the War would not have put Israel in a bad situation. As it was, the Israeli Defense Forces were very slow to react.

However, they did manage to halt the Arab offensives, and went on significant counterattacks, taking advantage of the mistakes from the Syrian and Egyptian military and political leadership. Eventually, a UN-backed cease-fire ended the war, but only after both sides suffered heavy and embarrassing losses. This work highlights those, especially in the conclusions. However, it does not significant acts of bravery and individual success from the Israeli fighters.

Overall, this book reads like a good after-action report on the Yom Kippur/War of Atonement. There are detailed military and political discussions and issues, but they are presented in a readable fashion. There are some misprints in the work, but not sure if that is a publishing or writing error. Still, a good/solid read about a significant political and military event in the Middle East over the past 50 years.

[Ricardo García Sánchez · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mi nota es un 8/10
Leí Guerra del Yom Kippur de Chaim Herzog buscando una crónica detallada de uno de los conflictos más complejos del siglo XX, y en gran parte, el libro cumplió con mis expectativas. Herzog, quien tuvo un papel relevante en la inteligencia militar de Israel, ofrece un relato exhaustivo de los eventos que rodearon esta guerra, desde las maniobras políticas hasta las operaciones en el campo de batalla.
Lo que más aprecio del libro es la precisión con la que Herzog presenta los hechos. Se nota su conocimiento de primera mano y su capacidad para desglosar la estrategia militar, algo que me resultó fascinante. Para alguien como yo, con interés en la historia militar, las explicaciones tácticas de las batallas y las decisiones de los líderes en ambos lados del conflicto son puntos fuertes. Es un libro informativo y bien documentado, ideal para quienes buscan un análisis detallado de la guerra.

Dicho esto, el libro puede resultar algo denso en algunas secciones, especialmente si no estás familiarizado con la historia o con los aspectos más técnicos de la guerra. Aunque Herzog hace un gran trabajo contextualizando los eventos, por momentos sentí que el relato se volvía demasiado técnico y perdía algo de ritmo. Esto hizo que, en ciertos capítulos, la lectura se volviera un poco pesada.
En resumen, Guerra del Yom Kippur es una lectura recomendada para aquellos que buscan una visión profunda y detallada de este conflicto crucial en la historia de Oriente Medio. No es una obra ligera ni especialmente emocional, pero si lo que buscas es una perspectiva táctica y bien fundamentada, te resultará muy valioso.

[Luis · Rating 3 out of 5]

Chaim Herzog, militar y presidente de Israel desde 1983 a 1993, describe y analiza la guerra del Yom Kippur desde el punto de geopolítico, técnico y humano.

Para los no iniciados en la materia, la parte fundamental, el desarrollo de la contienda, es muy denso e incluso difícil de leer. Sin embargo es interesante también, ya que permite acercarse, al menos superficialmente, a la complejidad técnica y logística que entraña una guerra. Y a cómo, por difícil que parezca, existe un factor humano que a veces puede ser determinante.

Además de eso, proporciona una visión histórica y geopolítica del contexto en el que tuvo lugar la guerra, y permite entender el papel de las potencias que apoyaron a Israel (Estados Unidos) y los países árabes (Rusia).

En definitiva, no es un libro demasiado entretenido, pero sí que es interesante en cuanto que permite entender el conflicto desde todas sus dimensiones, y nos acerca también a la perspectiva del pueblo de Israel.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very enjoyable military history page turner. As good a history of the war as could be written by an Israeli General in 1975. Herzog knows all the Generals and Colonels he discusses - and has been on campaign with almost all of them. My only quibble is with the maps which are there in enough quantity, but not in large enough scale to discuss the epic "Battle of Chinese Farm" well enough. Apart from that- I found this as much entertainment as a military history can be. For the gamer/modeler, this has a few good plates, but they are far more about personalities of the war and less about equipment. The scale of the maps will not be helpful to the tactician/gamer - but will be fine for the mainstream reader.

[Tom · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great Book. A very good job of telling the story of why the IDF got caught with its pants halfway down. Chaim provides a lot of detail about the actual massive tank battles that pushed back and forth. This stuff could get dull, especially at this level of detail, but i think he kept it pretty lively by focusing on personal stories.

Woulda been better with one more chapter. The book abruptly ends with the second cease-fire, but there was a bit more that could have been said about the Great Powers chessmatch that followed. Still, an excellent read for anyone who wonders how the Middle East got into such a pickle. Goes well with Six Days of War by Oren.

[Mike Glaser · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting retelling of the Yom Kippur war as we approach its 50th anniversary. It is interesting that the failure of Soviet equipment was always placed on Arab soldiers but the time since the war has shown that the equipment had plenty of limitations. This was also one of the conflicts that reinforced the fact that the expenditure of ammunition is always underestimated. Solid read.

[LB · Rating 5 out of 5]

Interesting, comprehensive book that served as a reference point for many others about the subject of the Yom Kippur War. Covers both fronts, Sinai and the Golan Heights, gives an overview of the situation, politics, etc. Balanced, clearly states the war was won by Israel, unlike some other sources which are not sure. Had this war been lost by Israel, there would be no Israel today.

[Sean Murphy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely the best account of both fronts! The good and the bad. the book ranges from the tactical experiences of the individual soldiers to the Strategic thinking of the upper echelons of the combatant nations.

[Jaume A. · Rating 4 out of 5]

The best book I've read about the Yom Kippur War

[Álvaro · Rating 3 out of 5]

A detailed account of the Yom Kippur War, although mostly just from the Israeli point of view.

[Jonathan · Rating 4 out of 5]

These two authors make a very good team.