What do you think?
Rate this book
Does God Have a Nature?
Book by Plantinga, Alvin
146 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1980
7 people are currently reading
235 people want to read
About the author
Alvin Plantinga
50 books369 followersHe is an American analytic philosopher, the John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Notre Dame and the inaugural holder of the Jellema Chair in Philosophy at Calvin College.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
Plantinga is widely known for his work in philosophy of religion, epistemology, metaphysics and Christian apologetics.
He has delivered the Gifford Lectures three times and was described by TIME magazine as "America's leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God"
Plantinga is the current winner of the Templeton Prize.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
March 31, 2016
The first half of Plantinga's essay critiques Thomas Aquinas' notion of absolute divine simplicity as embodied in the Identity Thesis: God is his attributes. Thomas said
(1) God's nature is identical with his attributes.
From this Plantinga draws the inference:
(2) God has the properties of life, power, goodness, etc.
Given Thomas' Identity Thesis (1) we can infer
(3) God is the property “life,” goodness, etc.
Since divine simplicity precludes God's being made up of parts, we reason
(4) the property life = the property goodness = the property power, etc.
(5) Thus, there is no difference between the properties.
(6) If there is a property with which God is identical, then God is that property [1, 3]
(7) If God is a property, then he is not a person.
So far, so good. We applaud Plantinga's careful argumentation. Unfortunately, he has another agenda. This concerns what kind of nature God has. For example, if eternal truths depend upon God (are contingent upon him), then they are within his control.
(8) God is a se and sovereign.
(9) It is the nature of an a se being to not be dependent on x.
(10) Therefore, Plantinga argues, abstract forms like truth and goodness are not external to God but depend upon him.
(11) God can thus create a world where he knows he doesn't exist.
(12) [11] is absurd.
The above is extreme nominalism and Plantinga rightly argues that it is absurd. However, Plantinga construes the opposite position—Platonic realism—as something which no Christian theist can accept. He argues that the Forms are not dependent upon God for their truth, but are necessarily true. Therefore,
~(13)
The denial that God is sovereign, for their exist a truth independent of his power.
Plantinga steers out of this problem by endorsing Descartes' universal possibilism. I think there is another option for traditional Christians: St Maximus the Confessor. St Maximus said that the one LOGOS is the many LOGOI (I am summarizing key parts from his Ambiguum 7). Collectively, the Forms are LOGOI, which is LOGOS, which is the Second Person of the Trinity. The Logos is revealed and multiplied in the Forms (logoi) which are then recapitulated back into the Logos (Ephesians 1:10). The Logos is the interconnecting cause that holds the Forms together. The Logoi, therefore, pre-exist in God.
Thus, we disagree with Plantinga. It is not the case that affirming what he calls “abstract properties,” but which are better known as the Forms, is to posit a realm of truth outside of God's nature and control. But rather, the Forms—viewed through the prism of St Maximus the Confessor—are God, or more particularly, they are the manifestation of Logos.
(1) God's nature is identical with his attributes.
From this Plantinga draws the inference:
(2) God has the properties of life, power, goodness, etc.
Given Thomas' Identity Thesis (1) we can infer
(3) God is the property “life,” goodness, etc.
Since divine simplicity precludes God's being made up of parts, we reason
(4) the property life = the property goodness = the property power, etc.
(5) Thus, there is no difference between the properties.
(6) If there is a property with which God is identical, then God is that property [1, 3]
(7) If God is a property, then he is not a person.
So far, so good. We applaud Plantinga's careful argumentation. Unfortunately, he has another agenda. This concerns what kind of nature God has. For example, if eternal truths depend upon God (are contingent upon him), then they are within his control.
(8) God is a se and sovereign.
(9) It is the nature of an a se being to not be dependent on x.
(10) Therefore, Plantinga argues, abstract forms like truth and goodness are not external to God but depend upon him.
(11) God can thus create a world where he knows he doesn't exist.
(12) [11] is absurd.
The above is extreme nominalism and Plantinga rightly argues that it is absurd. However, Plantinga construes the opposite position—Platonic realism—as something which no Christian theist can accept. He argues that the Forms are not dependent upon God for their truth, but are necessarily true. Therefore,
~(13)
The denial that God is sovereign, for their exist a truth independent of his power.
Plantinga steers out of this problem by endorsing Descartes' universal possibilism. I think there is another option for traditional Christians: St Maximus the Confessor. St Maximus said that the one LOGOS is the many LOGOI (I am summarizing key parts from his Ambiguum 7). Collectively, the Forms are LOGOI, which is LOGOS, which is the Second Person of the Trinity. The Logos is revealed and multiplied in the Forms (logoi) which are then recapitulated back into the Logos (Ephesians 1:10). The Logos is the interconnecting cause that holds the Forms together. The Logoi, therefore, pre-exist in God.
Thus, we disagree with Plantinga. It is not the case that affirming what he calls “abstract properties,” but which are better known as the Forms, is to posit a realm of truth outside of God's nature and control. But rather, the Forms—viewed through the prism of St Maximus the Confessor—are God, or more particularly, they are the manifestation of Logos.
November 26, 2020
Philosophically interesting, but not a convincing refutation of divine simplicity.
March 27, 2025
Sıfâtlardan ziyade bence varlık ve mâhiyetlerin mec‘ûliyyeti meselesiyle ilgilenenlerin hoşuna gidebilecek çerezlik bir çalışma. Eser eski olduğu için Batı teolojisi hakkında çok yorum yapmak istemesem de henüz itibârî sıfât kavramını oluşturmadıkları ve hatta zâtî sıfâtla arasını tam manasıyla ayıramadıklarını görünce bir gülme gelmedi değil. Üç puan verecek kadar kötü değil, beş puan verecek kadar da iyi değil. "Tanrı, Mûsâ ile konuştuysa zamana içkindir" gibi saçma ve basit çıkarımlarda bulunup yer yer okurun sinirini hoplatmıyor değil Plantinga hocamız.
October 19, 2019
Written by the highly praised contemporary christian philosopher, Plantinga introduces the outline of the debate regarding God and abstract objects. He introduces some popular positions, rebuts them, then advances the common sense view that the problem started with. He accomplishes this is less than 200 pages with minimal jargon, hence the reason it's a good read for the beginner
February 22, 2024
In my opinion, this is Plantinga's most difficult book to understand.
January 20, 2026
it was a long time ago when I read this one and it was my introduction to analytic philosophy. Not my cup-o-tea, but I can respect it for what it is.
July 13, 2016
A little gem.
Does God have properties essentially? If so, did he create those properties or are they somehow prior to God? If not, then what can be said of God? Perhaps nothing. Perhaps there are no properties and only truths about God.
Plantinga untangles our intuitions about God's nature and presents the case for a version of Christian platonism according to which there are abstract objects: eternally existing propositions exist at the behest of God's beliefs which in turn are part of God's nature; to explore mathematical truths, therefore, is to explore the mind of God.
Plantinga surveys various views on the matter and finds them lacking. Consider the simplicity doctrine according to which God is identical with his properties. Plantinga argues that the simplicity doctrine is incoherent: If God is identical with his properties, then (i) his properties are identical with one another and (ii) God is a property. Since God is a person, he cannot be a property and, consequently, the simplicity doctrine is false. Nominalism, the view that there are no such things as properties, won't solve the problem because there is still the sticky matter of truths being necessary. If there are no such things as properties, then it might be truth that God does not have any properties (since there are none), but it is still necessarily true that God is good, wise, loving etc. If so, then the problem facing the Platonist is no more severe than the problem facing the nominalist. Plantinga also rejects the view that there is no part of God's nature that we have concepts for. For we have the concept of something having no properties for which we have concepts. So it turns out we do have one concept that matches a property of God and the veiw is rendered self-referentially incoherent.
Much more besides rests between the covers of this slim book. All of it worth reading.
Does God have properties essentially? If so, did he create those properties or are they somehow prior to God? If not, then what can be said of God? Perhaps nothing. Perhaps there are no properties and only truths about God.
Plantinga untangles our intuitions about God's nature and presents the case for a version of Christian platonism according to which there are abstract objects: eternally existing propositions exist at the behest of God's beliefs which in turn are part of God's nature; to explore mathematical truths, therefore, is to explore the mind of God.
Plantinga surveys various views on the matter and finds them lacking. Consider the simplicity doctrine according to which God is identical with his properties. Plantinga argues that the simplicity doctrine is incoherent: If God is identical with his properties, then (i) his properties are identical with one another and (ii) God is a property. Since God is a person, he cannot be a property and, consequently, the simplicity doctrine is false. Nominalism, the view that there are no such things as properties, won't solve the problem because there is still the sticky matter of truths being necessary. If there are no such things as properties, then it might be truth that God does not have any properties (since there are none), but it is still necessarily true that God is good, wise, loving etc. If so, then the problem facing the Platonist is no more severe than the problem facing the nominalist. Plantinga also rejects the view that there is no part of God's nature that we have concepts for. For we have the concept of something having no properties for which we have concepts. So it turns out we do have one concept that matches a property of God and the veiw is rendered self-referentially incoherent.
Much more besides rests between the covers of this slim book. All of it worth reading.
January 22, 2012
I really enjoyed this, and gained from it. I am rethinking the whole realist/nominalist thing, and this helped. Good stuff.
September 3, 2013
calm, but mindblowing
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews