Road to October 7: A Brief History of Palestinian Islamism

by Erik Skare

How Islamism became a leading force in the Palestinian resistance

In Road to October 7, Erik Skare argues that Palestinian Islamism is far more complex and dynamic than generally assumed. The phenomenon has continuously developed through disputes between moderates and hardliners. These struggles have largely been settled by external drivers – intra-Palestinian competition, Israeli violence and repression, or shifts in the regional power balance.

Genres: History, Politics, Israel, Middle East, Religion, Islamism, Nonfiction

222 pages, Paperback

First published May 13, 2025

Reviews

[Brian Bean · Rating 4 out of 5]

A sharp retort to the simplistic and wooden treatment of the various trends and groups of Palestinian Islamism like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad that characterizes both mainstream Islamophobic narratives and the unfortunately cursory analysis of many on the left. Skare demonstrates how resistance against Zionism shaped the development and debates of these groups far more than any religious project. He traces out how dynamics of “hardliners” and “moderates” within the trends shaped by the external developments of Israel’s settler colonial project and resistance to it. In that you see how the popularity of groups like Hamas and PIJ are because of the failures of Fatah and the gambles it made with Oslo. And also how the failure of Hamas’ gamble with its 2006 electoral project in many ways paved the way for the gamble of the events of the Al Aqsa Flood. This book presents a good deal of context and depth for understanding the politics of two groups who currently play a large role in Palestinian resistance. Skare’s has been one of the few scholars to have seriously written about PIJ and this expertise is of tremendous value to this short, vital, illuminating book.

[Sascha Döring · Rating 5 out of 5]

Anyone who is interested in a sober analysis of Palestinian Islamism and its contradictions without the incessant moralizing we have grown so accustomed to in the press, should read this book.

[Isaac Wade · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don't know why I thought a book thats title is literally "A Brief History of Palestinian Islamism" would cover anything other than just that. Probably better read alongside something else if you want more of an overview on the Occupation/Conflict more generally and is rewarded by having a solid level of prior knowledge on the historical events leading up October 7th.
However, in its remit, it does an exceptional job of covering the history of Islamist movements and organisations in Gaza and the West Bank and helps explain the differences we see between the two.
I'd say an absolute must-read.

Also, don't know if this is good form but, I had to include these quotes from the start and end:
"October 7 reveals how suffering does not turn the victim into a moral agent".
"The Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not commence with the foundation of Hamas, nor with the emergence of Palestinian Islamism, In the hypothetical absence of Hamas, other outlets of Palestinian nationalism will necessarily appear. Although external drivers will always influence preferred choices and tactics in the Palestinian resistance, whether opting for violence or non-violence, such nationalism will persist if these grievances remain unaddressed. And it will do so with or without the phenomenon to which we refer as Palestinian Islamism."

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent

[João Nunes · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is impressive how a work of just 200 pages can deliver such a substantial amount of information. This is a highly academic text, much of which is comprised of quotations from some of the most well-known books on the subject.
As anti-Zionists like myself often point out, the creation of Israel was never fundamentally about Judaism; similarly, Skare states that the struggle for a free Palestine was never essentially about Islamism.
As I mentioned, this can be a challenging task without prior knowledge of the topic. The sheer number of acronyms, names, and events can be challenging to follow. However, the book's focus lies on three key entities: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. It then traces how the material conditions surrounding the first two led to the inevitability of the third.
The author argues flawlessly that October 7th became a possible event only after every means of moderation and capitulation had failed. This, according to Skare, had little to do with the rise of Islamism in Gaza, but rather with the blunt fact that the periods of hypothetical "peaceful resistance" yielded the Palestinians nothing except more assassinations of innocents.
I would not recommend this as a starter on the subject, but I cannot recommend it enough for those who, like me, wish to deepen their understanding of what is arguably the most critical issue of our time.

[JKR Baisy · Rating 5 out of 5]

There is a lot of competing talking points out there about Hamas, some ridiculously comparing them to global jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, others saying they are an Israeli-sponsored organization which seeks to discredit the Palestinian movement. Neither of these talking points are true, and this book charts the fall of leftist Palestinian resistance and the rise to prominence of Hamas alongside the especially important and lesser-known role of PIJ in pushing Hamas towards armed resistance. This book is not-at-all apologetic of Hamas, exposing their early history of acting as moralistic thugs whose only violence was against other Palestinians (for which Israel was initially supportive), but also clearly distinguishes their current position as a principally nationalist anti-colonial movement from groups such as ISIS whose goals are to create a caliphate on vast swathes of the Middle-East and wider world. The book also has a good history of Islamism as a whole, and the various stances Islamists have taken in relation to the nation-state, quietism, and pacifism as well as a breakdown of the internal organization of Hamas and the sometimes stark divisions between its armed wing, political wing, and support base.

[Natasha · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was looking for a book about the development of Hamas that wasn’t selective of history and evidence to reach a specific ideological conclusion, but this wasn’t entirely it. To his credit Skare says at the start that although he’s set out to evaluate the huge range of sources he’s amassed in his career, he still naturally has his own bias. This slipped in from the first half of the book but by the second half leant heavily towards Hamas apologia.

In my opinion Skare became much more sympathetic as he wrote about figures which are still or were recently alive, based on having a much more well-rounded and humanised account of them than a distant leader from the 1930s. He prioritises skewed statements they’ve made publicly in an attempt to appear favourable to the west over mountains of evidence to the contrary, such as claims that Hamas aren’t antisemitic or that they don’t have much control over militants shooting rockets into Israel. As such the book got pretty frustrating towards the end and I was just pushing through for the last couple of chapters.

It’s an interesting book if you’re specifically interested in this area but I would definitely want to read other analyses to cover some of the very obvious and selective gaps.

[Mark]

Really good.

It's a 'brief' history for sure, but it really delineates the difference between palestinian islamic jihad and hamas in a way I was totally ignorant of. It also much more neatly than my vibes based understanding details how exactly Islamic and religious organizations on the ground 'inherit' the Palestinian cause after leftist and nationalist secular groups are defeated or suppressed continuously by Israel during the 50's-70's.

Really cool book! Didn't realize that in many ways Palestinian Islamic Jihad is the 'hardline' option to Hamas relative pluralist interior. Will continue reading. About 50% through now.

[Differengenera · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Egyptian Free Officers’ movement, which developed among a group of military officers led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, was one of the most important consequences of the failures of the Arab regimes to respond adequately to the Nakba. The Officers had no single unified programme whether liberalism, Christianity or socialism, but anti-colonialism, Republicanism as well as frustration with the Wafd – a nationalist liberal party that had been instrumental in getting Egypt’s 1923 constitution – were through-lines. In 1952 they occupied strategic buildings surrounding King Farouk’s palace and demanded he abdicate to his son; once they were in power they abolished the monarchy.

The Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation founded a few decades earlier with the aim of preserving the core values of Islam, rejecting what it saw as the decadent modernising ideas coming from the west, was initially supportive, until Nasser suppressed all political parties as divisive agents of colonialism. The Palestinian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood therefore operated primarily in the Jordanian-administered West Bank, under headquarters in Amman. Unlike most political parties the Brotherhood did not seek to implement structural change through direct action or political processes, but rather worked towards individual salvation through recitations of the Quran or discussions of religious texts. They were given a relatively free hand by authorities, as they were seen as a useful means of sapping the energies of the other political currents (communists / Ba’athists / Nasserists) and crucially did not engage in violence against Israeli targets, though they did occasionally co-operate with these nationalist parties in the context of resistance campaigns or mobilisations. Their status was formalised in 1973 with the establishing of the Islamic Complex welfare network in which doctors, dentists, pharmacists and engineers educated abroad provided charitable medical and educational services. At the same time they waged campaigns against other Palestinians, attacking cinemas, cafés, libraries and individuals whose behaviour did not align with their ideological standards. A particularly acrimonious feud with the PFLP was downstream from these ideological disagreements.

1967 marked the beginning of a phase of defeats for the Arab nationalist movements: the Six-Day War, Black September, the PLA’s defeat in Gaza, the crushing of the DFLP in Jordan. It was in this context that the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ) was founded, fusing Islamist ideology and Palestinian nationalism with anti-colonial thought. These secular tendencies gave it a more materialist character than the Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 seemed to strengthen their view that Islam rather than mainstream Arab nationalism, or indeed socialism, was a promising vehicle for political transformation.

PIJ’s disagreements with the Muslim Brotherhood arose from their greater degree of liberalism on social issues — PIJ was more focused on violent resistance to the Israelis than unmarried couples holding hands — but there were also organisational and generational questions here; they criticised the Islamic Complex for its passivity and the Brotherhood became anxious about a younger generation of Islamists with a desire for a more confrontational policy. This is the context in which Hamas is founded. Contrary to the meme, it was not a creation of Israeli intelligence.

Hamas’ 1988 charter was unambiguously anti-Semitic and seemed to attribute responsibility for the French and Russian Revolutions to the Jews. This was revised in 2017 to recognise the distinction between Judaism and Zionism, to adopt human rights or international law as a moral and political baseline rather than religion and to signal a willingness to compromise on the legitimacy of the Israeli state in the context of a two-state solution.

The more recent gains these organisations made after years of obscurity derives from the increasing disillusionment with the so-called peace process and the worsening of conditions for the Palestinians following the imposition of the Oslo Accords. Settlers confiscated 51k additional acres between 1993 and 2000, fragmenting the Occupied Territories into enclaves. Everyone entering or leaving Gaza, or even certain neighbourhoods had to go through fortified checkpoints while politicians in the PLO or PA were granted VIP passes.

Hamas and PIJ’s tactics included the organisation of protests, demonstrations, but they also pioneered suicide bombing as a means of demoralising the Israeli population and thwarting the peace process by weakening Arafat as a representative. The Israeli response was one of extreme brutality; fifty Palestinians were killed and more than 1k injured in the first five days of the Second Intifada, which constrained the capacity of the leadership to call for moderation; this was a godsend to Hamas and the PIJ. Both organisations began to collaborate more often either with each other or brigades within the PFLP, subject to factional strength and geography. Suicide bombing as a means of wearing Israeli civilians down was a failure. The international environment post 9/11 was less favourable to terrorism as a political tactic and the bombings seemed to steel Israeli resolve, making targeted assassinations of the leadership more popular. This is a large part of the reason why they have fallen off as a tactic in the years since.

In order to prevent the kind of crackdowns which would have destroyed the leadership Hamas is divided into political, military and social / welfare service wings. Within each of these is the usual contradiction between the indigenous leadership and those in the diaspora. Over time these have fed into a greater disconnect between the moderates abroad — who might be oriented towards a ceasefire in pursuit of greater legitimacy or popularity — and hardliners grappling with a military enemy in a far more immediate sense — who may be, for example, planning an insurgency with an anti-Shiite character. This is a matter of material conditions rather than just personality; Mahmoud al-Zahar was viewed in the 90s as a dove — he received death threats from the Qassam Brigades for discussing a peace agreement with Israel — but in 2003 Israel tried to assassinate him by dropping explosives on his house. His son was killed and his daughter was maimed, which has moved him to a far less conciliatory position.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad boycotted the presidential election of 2005 as they had earlier PA elections in line with their rejection of the Oslo Process and the Palestinian Authority, but in 2006 Hamas contested them, downplaying their conservative message and its advocacy of armed resistance in favour of a reform and change agenda, seeking to take the PA from Fatah to strengthen the resistance. They took 74 seats to Fatah’s 45 in a 132 member assembly, on 44% of the vote. As confrontations between Fatah and Hamas began to escalate, a prisoners' group from many different resistance organisations called for a unified front. However Fatah cracked under pressure exerted by Israel, the US and attempted a coup. Hamas carried out its own counter-coup, taking power in Gaza. Israel imposed a siege, reduced the amount of goods and fuel entering the strip to a minimum, ceased exports and turned the area into an open air prison. The EU and US boycotted the Gazan government.

Hamas struggled to govern according to the requirements or desires of their constituents while satisfying their rank-and-file’s impatience for resistance. The military brigades complained at being reduced to the status of a border control force, arresting militants attempting to carry out attacks as a means of keeping the peace against Israel represents one of their own points of leverage. An increasing perception that negotiations are useless facilitated the increasing popularity of the PIJ. Hamas has also been unlucky in its attempts to negotiate the changing situation in the region after the Arab Spring. Its bet that events in Syria and Egypt would go a different direction than they did let to a cut in funding coming from Iran. The PIJ succeeded in keepin the Republic on board by maintaining a studied neutrality on the potential for democratisation. These diplomatic failures, for which the outside leadership was largely responsible, allowed for the strengthening of the Qassam brigades, who developed additional breathing room through revenue generated from what’s referred to as the tunnel economy. Qassam also preserved ties to Iran and over time increased their presence on Hamas’ political bureau.

Sinwar was initially perceived as a hardliner but made clear his support for peaceful popular resistance and that another war was not in Hamas’ interests. He sought negotiations towards a long-term truce with Israel and reconciliation with Abbas and the PA. A turning point came with the Great March of Return in 2018, an attempt to revive the peaceful march as a tactic of mass resistance. Palestinians of all ages, genders, political and social groups committed to the cause of peace marched to the border. Despite the fact that it was primarily a cultural mobilisation, with field clinics, culture live music dancing, poetry and weddings, in an optimistic atmosphere, Israeli snipers shot and killed civilians and medical staff. At the end of the protests at least 10k people were injured including 2k children. This, along with the ongoing normalisation of relations with Israel across the region, made clear that Hamas had not gained much by taking administrative control of Gaza. October 7 arises out of this bleak scenario.

Skare is sceptical that PIJ and Hamas’ prominence point to a sharp religious turn in the Palestinian resistance movement, describing the extent of Fatah’s religiosity — Arafat’s use of the Quran and oral teachings from the Hadith, separation of boys and girls in the youth organisation, Arafat’s dismissal of the DFLP’s idea of a secular democratic state, Fatah’s founders being Brotherhood members — to make the case that the secular tendencies of the left-wing or Marxist groups can be overstated. The PIJ and Hamas are also working in a different international context, after the decline of communism and developmentalist decolonisation as an international force. In actuality this is not that much of a stark leap from one motor of history to another. If you, like me, are of the totally unbiased point of view that James Connolly is the most interesting figure in the history of Marxist internationalism you will find a lot that is of interest in these arguments, given Connolly was a devout Catholic — more than once being denounced from the pulpit of his own church as one of his daughters recalled — while also being a one-man Zimmerwald left completely isolated from the Second International.

In some reviews of this book coming from an Ordotrotskyist position there is some snobbery about social conservatism within revolutionary movements, which I can comprehend, but at the risk of making excuses — organisations have to answer for their positions — it is not the case that the history of putatively secular or internationalist labour movements have in practice always chosen class over chauvinism, of whatever type. I get the sense that at times these are not being weighed according to the same standards. This is all complicated by how contemporary political parties lay claim to the past, e.g. culture wars over Seán South’s anti-communism or the intentions behind Jimmy Steele’s 1969 speech.

This book is hugely informative and I would recommend it without reservation. If I had one criticism to make I would say there’s a few weeks more editing in this, with a fair amount of repeated information across chapters. Introduction features a critique of something called 'postmodern historians' via Mieksins Wood, Hiroo Onoda vibes.

[Brumaire Bodbyl-Mast · Rating 5 out of 5]

It’s a very good work, dareisay great work, with a stacked bibliography. It does of course, have a few serious flaws. Looking at those first, a glaring problem is the book’s framing. By making on Al-Aqsa flood its goalpost, it restricts itself in the subjects of discussion it covers. It can’t deviate too much into the extensive role which the social mission has played in serving as the foundation of Palestinian political Islam, nor can its focus stray too far into the West Bank, indeed, its majority focus is on Gaza. I also of course take issue with the term “Islamism,” but that’s neither here nor there. The author is painfully prone to the problem which plagues most writers on Palestine, that being the desire to over critique the actions of Palestinians. Skare is not nearly as guilty of this as many of his colleagues, seeing as this is his subject matter, and many of his prior works cover Palestinian Islamic Jihad (something I’ll elaborate on later). He is biased against Sinwar, in part because he stupidly believes that October 7th was some unique evil. Howe et this bias is largely expressed in the usual sardonic manner of the academic, and the occasional treatment of Sinwar as a brute. My other main critique has to do with is brevity. Much of the discussion has in the book is tantalizingly done, and there are many glaring omissions, ranging from the reaction of the Islamic resistance to the gulf war & Arafat’s backing of Saddam, to a real coverage of 2014. One last whine, which is that sometimes the way the book is written and paced can be confusing. Anyway, the actual coverage for the most part is incredible! It’s a very well done work of history, and its bibliography is a true treasure trove, something I was picking through like a vulture throughout the whole thing. It is a very good comprehensive history of all the major factions of the Islamic resistance, and makes a cohesive argument, that being that they can be only understood as Palestinian national movements with an expressly Islamic character, rather than their secular counterparts, which while doubtlessly influenced and largely composed of Muslims, are officially not Islamic. Their difference is merely in strategy. They all split from the original Muslim brotherhood, due to the fact that the Ikhwan were principally quietist on the issue of resistance. As well, much of the earlier operations dealt with intra Palestinian conflict, and the institutions of morality. Worth nothing as Skare points out, that Fatah was also a brotherhood split off. He doesn’t touch much on the allegations that Hamas was curried by the Zionists in order to drive away from Fatah. He does point to an interesting between all the factions, starting from the Muslim brotherhood, that being that the quietists and moderates usually fail, and help to bolster the militants and radical’s popularity, much as is seen in the relationship between Hamas and PIJ, and inside Hamas itself. A worthwhile read! Pick it up!!

[Eli Darby · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good primer on the conflict in Gaza.

[Roberto · Rating 5 out of 5]

absolutely necessary reading material at this moment in time.

[TJ · Rating 5 out of 5]

Erik Skare har i alt skrevet en bok som forklarer utvilkingen av palestinsk islamisme, fra Det muslimske brorskapet, Hizb al-Tahrir, PIJ og Hamas. Hver av disse med sin egen tolkning og konsept for frigjøring. Svært interessant å lese om de forskjellige dynamikkene mellom disse gruppene og om deres vekst.

Det Palestinske Muslimske Brorskapet prioriterte sosialt arbeid, utdanning og religiøs fornyelse hos andre i forbilde av brorskapet i Egypt opprettet av Hassan al-Banna i 1928.

Hizb al-Tahrir fra 1952 med Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani hadde ingen ønske om væpnet kamp eller sosiale tjenester. Fokuset lo i å gjenopprette et islamsk kalifat. Deres passive posisjon var lite populært og varte kort.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, opprettet på 1970- og 80-tallet av en gjeng studenter og under ledelse av Fathi al-Shiqaqi brøt med brorskapet og båret på troen at væpnet konflikt mot “Israel” var den eneste veien til frigjøring. En tydelig konkurrerent til Hamas.

Hamas dukket frem på slutten av 1980-tallet, med Seikh Ahmad Yassin som leder. Gruppen utviklet seg som ny fra brorskapet og begikk en langvarig opprustning. Fra en vekkelsesbevegelse i hektiske perioder som Intifadaen, til en direkte motstandsorganisasjon mot "Israel" og sekulære palestinske grupper. Boken går dypt inn i deres styring av Gaza selv på rundt 200 ish sider. Og man ser hvordan gruppen måtte tilpasse seg mellom motstand og statsstyre.

Salafi-grupper blir også kort nevnt som en av Hamas sine rivaler, dannet av bortreiste studenter fra eks, Saudi-Arabia med forhold til Shi’isme, klaner i Gaza som Dughmush familien og nær forhold til al-Qaeda, men likevel ikke “pro-qaeda”. Den nokså skjedelige kapittelet.

Religion ble en utvei for mange palestinere, spesielt unge etter så mange harde opplevelser og tap, særlig de i flyktningleirer. Seks dagers krigen og 1967 nederlaget ga rom for konservative retninger, i motsetning til venstre sekulære grupper som for mange hadde mistet sitt preg og trofasthet til befolkningen. Jeg forsøkte å notere meg frem, men innholdet er dyp, kanskje gjør jeg det hvis jeg kjøper fysisk bok i fremtiden. Ellers en utrolig reise gjennom temaet.