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The Easter Offensive: Vietnam, 1972
On 30 March 1972 the North Vietnamese Army launched a large-scale attack on the South known as the Easter Offensive. The massive invasion forced author G. H. Turley, then a U.S. Marine lieutenant colonel on an introductory tour of South Vietnam's northern bases, to act as chief advisor to the 3rd ARVN Division. Writing from the depth of his experiences in the chain of command, Colonel Turley views the offensive as a historical lesson, a study in the impact of variables - both human and nonhuman - on the eventual outcome of a conflict. This is a story of incredible courage, action, determination, and heartbreak. Fully documented by official records, after-action reports, North Vietnamese orders of battle, and personal interviews, The Easter Offensive stands as a remarkable war memoir that as part of the Commandant's Professional Reading List is required reading for Marine officers and staff NCOs.
368 pages, Paperback
First published May 1, 1985
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February 25, 2023
This book was written by Colonel Gerald H. Turley, who served in Vietnam during the Easter Offensive and had interesting observations to share about South Vietnam, its military and high-ranking commanders. His work provides a new perspective on the offensive, bringing attention to things that are easy to overlook if you were not in Vietnam back then.
For instance, he discusses treason within South Vietnam's military hierarchy. He argues that the decisions Generel Giai, the commander of the 3rd ARVN division, made before the Easter Offensive were highly questionable and played an important part in the initial success of the Communists' onslaught. By late March, it had become known to all ARVN units that North Vietnam would most likely attack on March 29. Although he did receive the news, Giai went on with his plan to rotate two of his regiments as if nothing happened. On March 30, around nine in the morning, the two ARVN regiments began to march to their new positions. Tactical command posts were vacated, and antennas were dismantled. In other words, Giai's 3rd ARVN division went non-tactical and was unable to act as a combat force for the duration of the rotation. This was happening at a moment when the Communists were expected to invade – and they did. As the author helpfully explains, rotations should be carried out in darkness, not in the morning, so that the enemy would not realize and attack, but Giai did precisely the opposite. It is difficult to believe that he did not know what to do, so the reasoning behind his decision is definitely questionable.
Furthermore, as the author found out later, at noon on the same day General Giai and his American adviser were planning to fly to Saigon for the Easter weekend instead of supervising the rotation. This surprised him greatly because again, Giai was a proven commander, and it was unreasonable for him and his staff to leave after ordering one of the most difficult tactical operations without making sure that everything is being done well and on time. Not only had Giai misinterpreted North Vietnam's military buildup despite being in the field and in contact with the enemy, but he weakened the ARVN forces with an attempt to execute a rotation, and then decided to go on a holiday at a time when, as he knew, the enemy could attack. As Turley writes, this was "absolutely baffling," and he speculates that Giai could have been a traitor. According to him, the date of Giai's rotation operation, the unprofessional way in which he approached it, and his disregard of the warnings of a massive offensive were not a coincidence – the timing was too good.
Whether General Giai was guilty of treason or just stupidity did not become known. However, I appreciate that the author mentioned this. Most accounts of the Vietnam conflict usually focus on deception and treason at the lowest levels, such as among soldiers and civilians. It is known that many people in South Vietnam supported the Communists and just as many turned their backs on them as soon as the Americans entered their villages. It was also known that many ARVN soldiers deserted. Treason, if it could be called that, was widespread among the population. However, the fact that deception abounded in the government and military command too has not been discussed much, although there were opportunists and double agents there. General Giai's questionable decisions were not the first time the ARVN soldiers suffered because someone in Saigon or in the highest levels of South Vietnam's military secretly sympathized with North Vietnam.
This is an interesting topic, and I had not given it much thought before. I wonder now how many times South Vietnam's government, which was considered inept, sabotaged the Americans and its own army on purpose. This has not been studied as far as I know.
Otherwise, the author's account of the Easter Offensive is well-written. His strength is definitely the military aspect of the offensive, so his analysis of tactics and logistics are informative and allow readers who have never head any military experience to learn how to see the situation from the perspective of commanders. Although Turley includes many weapon and operation names, his narrative does not overwhelm with technicalities – he has obviously made sure that it will be understandable even for people who have read little military history before, which I appreciate.
THE EASTER OFFENSIVE is not the most comprehensive account of the Easter Offensive. When it comes to the political aspect of the offensive and North Vietnam's perspective, it is inferior to Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle and North Vietnam's 1972 Easter Offensive: Hanoi's Gamble, but it is good in its own right. This book will be of interest to those readers who would like to focus on the military tactics and on the ARVN and their American advisers.
For instance, he discusses treason within South Vietnam's military hierarchy. He argues that the decisions Generel Giai, the commander of the 3rd ARVN division, made before the Easter Offensive were highly questionable and played an important part in the initial success of the Communists' onslaught. By late March, it had become known to all ARVN units that North Vietnam would most likely attack on March 29. Although he did receive the news, Giai went on with his plan to rotate two of his regiments as if nothing happened. On March 30, around nine in the morning, the two ARVN regiments began to march to their new positions. Tactical command posts were vacated, and antennas were dismantled. In other words, Giai's 3rd ARVN division went non-tactical and was unable to act as a combat force for the duration of the rotation. This was happening at a moment when the Communists were expected to invade – and they did. As the author helpfully explains, rotations should be carried out in darkness, not in the morning, so that the enemy would not realize and attack, but Giai did precisely the opposite. It is difficult to believe that he did not know what to do, so the reasoning behind his decision is definitely questionable.
Furthermore, as the author found out later, at noon on the same day General Giai and his American adviser were planning to fly to Saigon for the Easter weekend instead of supervising the rotation. This surprised him greatly because again, Giai was a proven commander, and it was unreasonable for him and his staff to leave after ordering one of the most difficult tactical operations without making sure that everything is being done well and on time. Not only had Giai misinterpreted North Vietnam's military buildup despite being in the field and in contact with the enemy, but he weakened the ARVN forces with an attempt to execute a rotation, and then decided to go on a holiday at a time when, as he knew, the enemy could attack. As Turley writes, this was "absolutely baffling," and he speculates that Giai could have been a traitor. According to him, the date of Giai's rotation operation, the unprofessional way in which he approached it, and his disregard of the warnings of a massive offensive were not a coincidence – the timing was too good.
Whether General Giai was guilty of treason or just stupidity did not become known. However, I appreciate that the author mentioned this. Most accounts of the Vietnam conflict usually focus on deception and treason at the lowest levels, such as among soldiers and civilians. It is known that many people in South Vietnam supported the Communists and just as many turned their backs on them as soon as the Americans entered their villages. It was also known that many ARVN soldiers deserted. Treason, if it could be called that, was widespread among the population. However, the fact that deception abounded in the government and military command too has not been discussed much, although there were opportunists and double agents there. General Giai's questionable decisions were not the first time the ARVN soldiers suffered because someone in Saigon or in the highest levels of South Vietnam's military secretly sympathized with North Vietnam.
This is an interesting topic, and I had not given it much thought before. I wonder now how many times South Vietnam's government, which was considered inept, sabotaged the Americans and its own army on purpose. This has not been studied as far as I know.
Otherwise, the author's account of the Easter Offensive is well-written. His strength is definitely the military aspect of the offensive, so his analysis of tactics and logistics are informative and allow readers who have never head any military experience to learn how to see the situation from the perspective of commanders. Although Turley includes many weapon and operation names, his narrative does not overwhelm with technicalities – he has obviously made sure that it will be understandable even for people who have read little military history before, which I appreciate.
THE EASTER OFFENSIVE is not the most comprehensive account of the Easter Offensive. When it comes to the political aspect of the offensive and North Vietnam's perspective, it is inferior to Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, America's Last Vietnam Battle and North Vietnam's 1972 Easter Offensive: Hanoi's Gamble, but it is good in its own right. This book will be of interest to those readers who would like to focus on the military tactics and on the ARVN and their American advisers.
December 14, 2016
A great survey history about the last bit of participation by the US. The best part of this story is the participation of the US Army, USAF, USMC, and USN advisors that were still present with ARVN and VNMC units throughout the NVA's Easter Offensive and their actions throughout. Also a harbinger of things to come when the NVA invade SVN again in 1975 and then without our assistance in any form, fall in approximately 30 days. Well worth the read if you were/are an advisor to foreign military forces and to complete the US history of US direct involvement in South Vietnam.
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