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Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism And The Failure Of Good Intentions
During the six months prior to the World Trade Center attack, the United States walked away from a treaty to control the world traffic in small arms, the Kyoto accords, a treaty to combat bioterrorism, and many other international agreements. After 9/11 there was a flurry of coalition building, but Europe and Asia quickly came to see the conflict in Afghanistan as an American war with Tony Blair leading cheers from the sidelines. Recent American calls to action in Iraq have only reinforced international perception that the U.S. plans to remain a solitary actor on the world stage. Despite our stated good intentions--the causes of justice and democracy--we have become the world's largest rogue nation.The Bush administration did not invent the American tradition of unilateralism, but, Clyde Prestowitz argues, they have taken it to unprecedented heights. Rogue Nation explores the historical roots of the unilateral impulse and shows how it helps shape American foreign policy in every important area: trade and economic policy, arms control, energy, environment, drug trafficking, agriculture. Even now, when the need for multilateral action--and the danger of going it alone--has never been greater, we continue to act contrary to international law, custom, and our own best interests.
336 pages, Hardcover
First published May 1, 2003
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About the author
Clyde V. Prestowitz Jr.
16 books10 followersClyde Prestowitz (born 1941) is the founder and President of the Economic Strategy Institute. He formerly served as counselor to the Secretary of Commerce in the Reagan Administration. He is a labor economist.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clyde_V....
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clyde_V....
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
October 16, 2024
Ended up DNFing. very interesting to see the perspective of American foreign policy from an academic in the aftermath of 9/11 and pre-Iraq. Obviously very out-of-date but easy to draw parallels with other US presidents and those who came after the book was written.
May 28, 2011
Clyde Prestowitz is one of the more interesting conservative commentators upon the political policies of the United States, writing as he does from what would be considered by all but the current crop of radicals running the show in the Republican Party as a moderate center-right position. With Rogue Nation Prestowitz, a former official in the Reagan administration and a well-traveled man fluent in five languages, laid out the case for what he considered to be a disturbing trend in post-Cold War—and more specifically, post 9/11—US policy towards taking a unilateralist approach, accompanied by alternately bullying, scornful, or dismissive posturing, in its dealings with its global neighbors, partners, and competitors: abnegating or withdrawing from treaties, refusing to treat with the appropriate agencies in particular areas, and bucking the burgeoning and inclusive tendency by other liberal democratic nations to attempt to develop consensus agreement on both broad and select issues and problems, and then working in tandem to address them and push through shared and participatory solutions.
To Prestowitz, the inability of the US, as the world's sole remaining superpower, to bargain and/or act in good faith in matters of environmental, military, trade, and foreign policy—and its growing tendency to opt for unilateral and situational responses—were threatening to shatter the painstakingly developed agreement amongst the world's nations to address problems and grievances through empowered international organizations and agencies and potentializing a return to the dangerous state of affairs of the early twentieth century, when bloc alliances and balance of power coalitions perpetually teetered precariously upon the edge of conflict whilst operating to hamstring and undermine their opponents in various theaters and endeavors throughout the globe. Taking full-on aim at the post-millennial Bush administration, Prestowitz pleads the case for a return by the United States to co-operating with and working through the appropriate channels, methods, and agencies when confronted with challenges, and to honoring these agreements once they have been signed on to; in other words, return to being the good and reliable global neighbor that, prior to the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of the world's population considered it to be. Of course, one could chide Prestowitz for the presumption that policies he holds to be desirable should be pursued in such a manner, pointing out that refusal to hold to a common or popular course does not make one a bad neighbor, but rather an independent and sovereign state; however, throughout it is the approach and the form that such dismissals and disinclinations have recently taken that the author takes issue with, the desirability of interacting with the established forums for addressing global concerns in a measure—including leadership—commensurate with the United States' superpower status that Prestowitz repeatedly stresses.
One would assume that the transition to a Democratic presidency in 2008 would go a good ways towards answering the majority of Prestowitz's complaints—and while the tone definitely seems to have veered more towards the co-operative and responsible outreach that Prestowitz called for, the reality is that the US is no closer to locking itself into any serious commitments regarding Global Warming, Environmental, Alternative Energy, Israeli-Palestinian and Arms Limitation treaties or agreements. With three military engagements on the go and an economy still far from fully recovered, other priorities beckon—and the freedom to pursue an independent and self-beneficial policy a tantalizing political tool; and so it seems that while the US may currently prove a more pleasant neighbor to deal with than, say, over the first eight years of the new century, it remains one that can be most difficult to pin-down as regards the backyard barbecue, whatever the era—just ask the League of Nations.
To Prestowitz, the inability of the US, as the world's sole remaining superpower, to bargain and/or act in good faith in matters of environmental, military, trade, and foreign policy—and its growing tendency to opt for unilateral and situational responses—were threatening to shatter the painstakingly developed agreement amongst the world's nations to address problems and grievances through empowered international organizations and agencies and potentializing a return to the dangerous state of affairs of the early twentieth century, when bloc alliances and balance of power coalitions perpetually teetered precariously upon the edge of conflict whilst operating to hamstring and undermine their opponents in various theaters and endeavors throughout the globe. Taking full-on aim at the post-millennial Bush administration, Prestowitz pleads the case for a return by the United States to co-operating with and working through the appropriate channels, methods, and agencies when confronted with challenges, and to honoring these agreements once they have been signed on to; in other words, return to being the good and reliable global neighbor that, prior to the end of the Cold War, the vast majority of the world's population considered it to be. Of course, one could chide Prestowitz for the presumption that policies he holds to be desirable should be pursued in such a manner, pointing out that refusal to hold to a common or popular course does not make one a bad neighbor, but rather an independent and sovereign state; however, throughout it is the approach and the form that such dismissals and disinclinations have recently taken that the author takes issue with, the desirability of interacting with the established forums for addressing global concerns in a measure—including leadership—commensurate with the United States' superpower status that Prestowitz repeatedly stresses.
One would assume that the transition to a Democratic presidency in 2008 would go a good ways towards answering the majority of Prestowitz's complaints—and while the tone definitely seems to have veered more towards the co-operative and responsible outreach that Prestowitz called for, the reality is that the US is no closer to locking itself into any serious commitments regarding Global Warming, Environmental, Alternative Energy, Israeli-Palestinian and Arms Limitation treaties or agreements. With three military engagements on the go and an economy still far from fully recovered, other priorities beckon—and the freedom to pursue an independent and self-beneficial policy a tantalizing political tool; and so it seems that while the US may currently prove a more pleasant neighbor to deal with than, say, over the first eight years of the new century, it remains one that can be most difficult to pin-down as regards the backyard barbecue, whatever the era—just ask the League of Nations.
June 3, 2008
Published 5 years ago and before the US invaded Iraq, this book calmly illustrates how the US has been alienating the rest of the world with its political decisions especially post-Cold War. Has some editing mistakes and gets a little repetitive in places but hugely informative and has a good writing style.
November 13, 2012
This is a great book for anyone interested in understanding America's standing in the world. It is easy to read and each chapter tackles a different issue so you don't have to read it in order. The chapter on the Israeli/Palestinian issue one of the best.
January 22, 2008
This book changed the way I think about America.
June 30, 2014
summary/commentary of America
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews