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Hubris: The American Origins of Russia's War against Ukraine
A leading expert on US-Russian relations reveals how the United States and its European allies set the course for the war in Ukraine—and offers a sobering indictment of American foreign policy since the fall of the Soviet Union.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should not have taken the world by surprise. The attack escalated a war that began in 2014 with the Russian annexation of Crimea, but its origins are visible as far back as the aftermath of the Cold War, when newly independent Ukraine moved to the center of tense negotiations between Russia and the West. The United States was a leading player in this drama. In fact, Jonathan Haslam argues, it was decades of US foreign policy missteps and miscalculations, unchecked and often reinforced by European allies, that laid the groundwork for the current war.
Isolated, impoverished, and relegated to a second-order power on the world stage, Russia grew increasingly resentful of Western triumphalism in the wake of the Cold War. The United States further provoked Russian ire with a campaign to expand NATO into Eastern Europe—especially Ukraine, the most geopolitically important of the former Soviet republics. Determined to extend its global dominance, the United States repeatedly ignored signs that antagonizing Russia would bring consequences. Meanwhile, convinced that Ukraine was passing into the Western sphere of influence, Putin prepared to shift the European balance of power in Russia’s favor.
Timely and incisive, Hubris reveals the assumptions, equivocations, and grievances that have defined the West’s relations with Russia since the twilight of the Soviet Union—and ensured that collision was only a matter of time.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 should not have taken the world by surprise. The attack escalated a war that began in 2014 with the Russian annexation of Crimea, but its origins are visible as far back as the aftermath of the Cold War, when newly independent Ukraine moved to the center of tense negotiations between Russia and the West. The United States was a leading player in this drama. In fact, Jonathan Haslam argues, it was decades of US foreign policy missteps and miscalculations, unchecked and often reinforced by European allies, that laid the groundwork for the current war.
Isolated, impoverished, and relegated to a second-order power on the world stage, Russia grew increasingly resentful of Western triumphalism in the wake of the Cold War. The United States further provoked Russian ire with a campaign to expand NATO into Eastern Europe—especially Ukraine, the most geopolitically important of the former Soviet republics. Determined to extend its global dominance, the United States repeatedly ignored signs that antagonizing Russia would bring consequences. Meanwhile, convinced that Ukraine was passing into the Western sphere of influence, Putin prepared to shift the European balance of power in Russia’s favor.
Timely and incisive, Hubris reveals the assumptions, equivocations, and grievances that have defined the West’s relations with Russia since the twilight of the Soviet Union—and ensured that collision was only a matter of time.
368 pages, Hardcover
First published September 12, 2024
64 people are currently reading
315 people want to read
About the author
Jonathan Haslam
25 books24 followersJonathan Haslam is George F. Kennan Professor in the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton and Professor of the History of International Relations at the University of Cambridge.
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Displaying 1 - 25 of 25 reviews
September 27, 2024
Absolutely fascinating.
I have been fascinated by Russian history since my A levels when we covered the Russian revolution. If you believe one of the possible outcomes of Russia's war in Ukraine then you never know, we might see another one in my lifetime.
Jonathan Haslam is a professor of Hostorical Studies at Princeton. He has a particular interest in the history of the former Soviet Union and has written extensively on this subject. I'd rather listen to his opinion (and it is an opinion) than some secretary of state who has been in the job for 6 months.
I thought this book was an excellent summation of how we have arrived at this appalling situation. If you pick up the book and look at the cover you'd imagine the hubris to be Putin's but, unfortunately, because we seem to learn nothing from history in the west, it is ours as well.
The book takes us back to the origins of the conflict which begin after the official end of the Cold War then the end of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall coming down. The work of foreign powers to bring about a more democratic Russia (in the image of the USA), the collapse of the Yeltsin government and the rise of Putin have all played their part. Suffice it to say Haslam draws some uncomfortable conclusions about the role of the USA and western governments in bringing about the invasion of Ukraine.
If you're put off by the size of the book please bear in mind that one third of it is a glossary of source materials.
This certainly is a book worth reading. It draws some unsettling conclusions but, as we all know, the history of the world can turn on a dime and who knows what will happen following the US elections later this year. And if you think Putin is a Trump supporter you might want to read this too. Source material says otherwise.
Excellent. Highly recommended.
Thankyou to Netgalley and Head of Zeus for the advance review copy. Very much appreciated.
I have been fascinated by Russian history since my A levels when we covered the Russian revolution. If you believe one of the possible outcomes of Russia's war in Ukraine then you never know, we might see another one in my lifetime.
Jonathan Haslam is a professor of Hostorical Studies at Princeton. He has a particular interest in the history of the former Soviet Union and has written extensively on this subject. I'd rather listen to his opinion (and it is an opinion) than some secretary of state who has been in the job for 6 months.
I thought this book was an excellent summation of how we have arrived at this appalling situation. If you pick up the book and look at the cover you'd imagine the hubris to be Putin's but, unfortunately, because we seem to learn nothing from history in the west, it is ours as well.
The book takes us back to the origins of the conflict which begin after the official end of the Cold War then the end of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall coming down. The work of foreign powers to bring about a more democratic Russia (in the image of the USA), the collapse of the Yeltsin government and the rise of Putin have all played their part. Suffice it to say Haslam draws some uncomfortable conclusions about the role of the USA and western governments in bringing about the invasion of Ukraine.
If you're put off by the size of the book please bear in mind that one third of it is a glossary of source materials.
This certainly is a book worth reading. It draws some unsettling conclusions but, as we all know, the history of the world can turn on a dime and who knows what will happen following the US elections later this year. And if you think Putin is a Trump supporter you might want to read this too. Source material says otherwise.
Excellent. Highly recommended.
Thankyou to Netgalley and Head of Zeus for the advance review copy. Very much appreciated.
March 17, 2025
Edit 17/03/2025 : because I'm getting many of them for some reason, any pro Russia or pro Putin propaganda will be deleted, my comment section is not a place for that. I know Russian bots are working overtime, but there are also actual people who buy the propaganda and this is really sad on a website about books. Anyway not tolerating that, haven't read the book? Don't get to comment just because you have a hard on for dictators
So. Was this book written by Putin? Cause it’s very anti NATO, European leaders and USA, which we can totally discuss. But somehow Putin and Russia in general gets very little of the blame for the war in Ukraine.
I do agree that the situation today can directly be linked to the fall of the Soviet Union and so many decisions that were made by US and European leaders, where we’ll disagree is that I think countries like France and Germany (full disclaimer, I’m French) were very lenient when it comes to Russia’s actions (even before Putin’s election) for some misguided feeling of guilt after WW2. The fact that the author blames ex Soviet Union countries for wanting to join NATO (wonder why with a neighbor like Russia) and being the reason Russia felt threatened and retaliated is quite something. Cause that’s straight out Putin’s propaganda.
You can and you should be critical to of NATO, European Union and the USA, but if you don’t do the same for Russia? You can’t call yourself an academic. He’s also using some Russian propaganda’s talking points when talking about things like Maiden’s revolution.
Now to be fair, he is sometimes critical of Russia and Putin, but honestly? Not that much. Hope the paychecks from the Kremlin are worth it
So. Was this book written by Putin? Cause it’s very anti NATO, European leaders and USA, which we can totally discuss. But somehow Putin and Russia in general gets very little of the blame for the war in Ukraine.
I do agree that the situation today can directly be linked to the fall of the Soviet Union and so many decisions that were made by US and European leaders, where we’ll disagree is that I think countries like France and Germany (full disclaimer, I’m French) were very lenient when it comes to Russia’s actions (even before Putin’s election) for some misguided feeling of guilt after WW2. The fact that the author blames ex Soviet Union countries for wanting to join NATO (wonder why with a neighbor like Russia) and being the reason Russia felt threatened and retaliated is quite something. Cause that’s straight out Putin’s propaganda.
You can and you should be critical to of NATO, European Union and the USA, but if you don’t do the same for Russia? You can’t call yourself an academic. He’s also using some Russian propaganda’s talking points when talking about things like Maiden’s revolution.
Now to be fair, he is sometimes critical of Russia and Putin, but honestly? Not that much. Hope the paychecks from the Kremlin are worth it
July 27, 2024
I am grateful to NetGalley for providing an advance copy of this book in exchange for my honest review.
This book, subtitled “The Origins of Russia’s War Against Ukraine” is written by a British historian and author who mostly writes about the Soviet Union and Russia. He is associated with multiple prominent UK and US ‘Ivy-League’ universities. While this may have been something to emphasis the author’s credentials in the past, given the behaviour we have observed from many universities of late (problematic and very public views around several issues including politics, culture and finance) I’m a little wary now of certain academic and ‘elite’ viewpoints of history.
The context of this book surrounds the views, actions and events of the decades following World War II, leading up to the current war in Ukraine. Particular emphasis is placed on the downfall of the Soviet Union and repercussions since. We are given a summary of Cold War issues and the largely self-inflicted disintegration of the Soviet Union; events welcomed by Europe, the US and of course the many ‘Soviet’ States that suffered under Russian domination. The contributing role of Europe, the US and in particular NATO is presented along with multiple references, footnotes and quotations.
I found the factual elements of these decades useful and the Russian views (or at least those of the Russian ‘elites’, various diplomats, military, politicians and business leaders) informative and enlightening. However the author’s tone, language, presentation of facts, his views and conclusions are largely anti-American, occasionally anti-European and seldom critical of Russia. One is left with an excellent recounting of events but a biased almost apologetic view of Russia’s actions leading up to the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine invasions.
Nevertheless, this book is a great reference for those unfamiliar with or perhaps forgetful of the events of past decades. The author explains Russia’s concerns since WW II, particularly related to NATO expansion and the perceived ‘threat’ to the Soviet Union. Post the break-up of the Soviet Union, continued NATO expansion is a constant theme the author describes along with his views, and those of the US, Europe and Russia.
The author assigns much of the blame of the current conflict to NATO and Western leaders. Other background and foreground events are presented as contributory factors. The breakup of Yugoslavia, German Unification, European and American domestic & international politics and ambitions. Two Gulf Wars, conflicts in Kosovo and Georgia plus the ‘Arab Spring’ are presented, adding to the perceived threats and humiliations felt by Russia. More recent conflicts in the Arab world, particularly Libya and Syria are also presented alongside Russia’s actions, justifications and views. And of course the rise of Putin is documented and explained.
The author of course has the benefit of hindsight in forming his views and opinions as well as abundant published and private material now available. Perhaps this in some ways explains the superior, snide and sometime snarky references to US and European politicians, diplomats and military figures. Abundant quotations are presented, all referenced but frequently the context is unclear. Facts are presented as “undeniable” or “without question true”. Qualifications which are presumably not necessary, and leave me feeling a little uneasy. While participants in the West are usually named, castigated and much-maligned, those in Russia are often anonymous and vaguely referred to as Russians with certain “thoughts”, “views” or “feelings”. Given that author writes in English and perhaps his references are dominantly also in English, this is somewhat understandable. Nevertheless, it distracts from the factual events recounted and adds to the overall anti-American pro-Russian tone.
Few of the Western politicians, diplomats and military leaders receive any accolades for their actions. Disturbingly, the author judges their morals and judgements, as well as what he sees as their venal and self-serving behaviour. While Russian officials seem to be more generally viewed with tolerance, understanding and a grudging respect. Whilst he may have a point, indeed several valid points regarding Western officials, none of this actually justifies Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions into Ukraine. Are these invasions really the equivalent of the West ‘removing Kosovo from Serbia’ ?
The book draws to a conclusion shortly after the full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with abundant blame for various administrations including Reagan, Bush (HW), Clinton, Bush (W) Obama, Trump, Biden, Merkel, Macron and many more familiar names. Putin’s power has consolidated over time. The West has become ambivalent towards external conflicts. Europe has become reliant on Russia for energy resources providing prosperity.
Apart from the occasional glaring error (referring to Nord Stream II as an oil pipeline…) in totality, the book is an excellent, largely chronological recounting of events, issues, key decisions and outcomes over many decades, leading up to the war in Ukraine today. The interpretations and assumptions along with snide personal remarks clearly show the authors bias, which distracts from the factual narrative. Perhaps most useful are the author’s recounting of the Russian officials; their historical views, concerns, perceived humiliations and the circumstances that lead to their interventions and military actions in several countries, including of course Ukraine. This narrative allows the reader to better understand the Russian Worldview; without accepting or indulging their aggressive behaviour and attitudes.
Despite the above critique, I enjoyed this book, often seeking further information online when a particular person, issue or event left me wanting to know more. I recommend it to anyone unfamiliar with or forgetful of Soviet/Russian and Western/US views, activities and relationships since World War II. The author makes clear Russia’s justification for invasions of Ukraine. After reading this book, I am much better informed of the views and actions from many participants. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced the historical analysis, perceived threats and humiliations justify the Russian actions we see today.
This book, subtitled “The Origins of Russia’s War Against Ukraine” is written by a British historian and author who mostly writes about the Soviet Union and Russia. He is associated with multiple prominent UK and US ‘Ivy-League’ universities. While this may have been something to emphasis the author’s credentials in the past, given the behaviour we have observed from many universities of late (problematic and very public views around several issues including politics, culture and finance) I’m a little wary now of certain academic and ‘elite’ viewpoints of history.
The context of this book surrounds the views, actions and events of the decades following World War II, leading up to the current war in Ukraine. Particular emphasis is placed on the downfall of the Soviet Union and repercussions since. We are given a summary of Cold War issues and the largely self-inflicted disintegration of the Soviet Union; events welcomed by Europe, the US and of course the many ‘Soviet’ States that suffered under Russian domination. The contributing role of Europe, the US and in particular NATO is presented along with multiple references, footnotes and quotations.
I found the factual elements of these decades useful and the Russian views (or at least those of the Russian ‘elites’, various diplomats, military, politicians and business leaders) informative and enlightening. However the author’s tone, language, presentation of facts, his views and conclusions are largely anti-American, occasionally anti-European and seldom critical of Russia. One is left with an excellent recounting of events but a biased almost apologetic view of Russia’s actions leading up to the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine invasions.
Nevertheless, this book is a great reference for those unfamiliar with or perhaps forgetful of the events of past decades. The author explains Russia’s concerns since WW II, particularly related to NATO expansion and the perceived ‘threat’ to the Soviet Union. Post the break-up of the Soviet Union, continued NATO expansion is a constant theme the author describes along with his views, and those of the US, Europe and Russia.
The author assigns much of the blame of the current conflict to NATO and Western leaders. Other background and foreground events are presented as contributory factors. The breakup of Yugoslavia, German Unification, European and American domestic & international politics and ambitions. Two Gulf Wars, conflicts in Kosovo and Georgia plus the ‘Arab Spring’ are presented, adding to the perceived threats and humiliations felt by Russia. More recent conflicts in the Arab world, particularly Libya and Syria are also presented alongside Russia’s actions, justifications and views. And of course the rise of Putin is documented and explained.
The author of course has the benefit of hindsight in forming his views and opinions as well as abundant published and private material now available. Perhaps this in some ways explains the superior, snide and sometime snarky references to US and European politicians, diplomats and military figures. Abundant quotations are presented, all referenced but frequently the context is unclear. Facts are presented as “undeniable” or “without question true”. Qualifications which are presumably not necessary, and leave me feeling a little uneasy. While participants in the West are usually named, castigated and much-maligned, those in Russia are often anonymous and vaguely referred to as Russians with certain “thoughts”, “views” or “feelings”. Given that author writes in English and perhaps his references are dominantly also in English, this is somewhat understandable. Nevertheless, it distracts from the factual events recounted and adds to the overall anti-American pro-Russian tone.
Few of the Western politicians, diplomats and military leaders receive any accolades for their actions. Disturbingly, the author judges their morals and judgements, as well as what he sees as their venal and self-serving behaviour. While Russian officials seem to be more generally viewed with tolerance, understanding and a grudging respect. Whilst he may have a point, indeed several valid points regarding Western officials, none of this actually justifies Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions into Ukraine. Are these invasions really the equivalent of the West ‘removing Kosovo from Serbia’ ?
The book draws to a conclusion shortly after the full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with abundant blame for various administrations including Reagan, Bush (HW), Clinton, Bush (W) Obama, Trump, Biden, Merkel, Macron and many more familiar names. Putin’s power has consolidated over time. The West has become ambivalent towards external conflicts. Europe has become reliant on Russia for energy resources providing prosperity.
Apart from the occasional glaring error (referring to Nord Stream II as an oil pipeline…) in totality, the book is an excellent, largely chronological recounting of events, issues, key decisions and outcomes over many decades, leading up to the war in Ukraine today. The interpretations and assumptions along with snide personal remarks clearly show the authors bias, which distracts from the factual narrative. Perhaps most useful are the author’s recounting of the Russian officials; their historical views, concerns, perceived humiliations and the circumstances that lead to their interventions and military actions in several countries, including of course Ukraine. This narrative allows the reader to better understand the Russian Worldview; without accepting or indulging their aggressive behaviour and attitudes.
Despite the above critique, I enjoyed this book, often seeking further information online when a particular person, issue or event left me wanting to know more. I recommend it to anyone unfamiliar with or forgetful of Soviet/Russian and Western/US views, activities and relationships since World War II. The author makes clear Russia’s justification for invasions of Ukraine. After reading this book, I am much better informed of the views and actions from many participants. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced the historical analysis, perceived threats and humiliations justify the Russian actions we see today.
February 2, 2025
Last year I read a book (Memory Makers: The Politics of the Past in Putin's Russia by Jade McGlynn) which went into some depth as to how Russia currently sees itself in the world and the internal propaganda around building a shared national history that marks them as underdogs and justifies a national pathology of paranoia. What it didn't do so much, and Hubris fills in the gap admirably, is consider to what degree external factors, geopolitical and other nations' foreign policy, also forced Putin's hand. Haslam has very little time for anyone involved here, though the biggest perpetrators are the successive US Presidents who have chopped, changed and generally belittled Russia since the fall of the Iron Curtain. A lack of clarity with NATO's mission, and how they wanted to expand it, whilst also giving Russia commitments that they would not go up to their border, are clearly paradoxical, and Haslam does an excellent job of documenting conversations on the record, and many which were off the record, to show a grand streak of hypocrisy.
What comes out at the centre of Hubris - a very well chosen title - is an absolute lack of geopolitical empathy. Whilst it is understandable that the US and the West might have wanted to celebrate the end of the Cold War, and indeed triumphing in said shadow conflict, its nature as a war of primarily propaganda and economics meant that the lessons learnt from World War One for example were not followed here. Russia was not in ruin physically, there were no bomb sites that needed reconstruction. But once the Soviet bloc dissolved, and with no real sense of how to set up a capitalist democracy (and bad actors taking advantage), the years of hyper-inflation were inevitable. Yeltsin's own weakness in places, plus the growth of power of ex-KGB oligarchs all while a succession of US administrations appeared to be favouring the Eastern European states. Germany, often a key middleman, had its own issues with reunification, and at the heart of US foreign policy was the question about how to restructure NATO now that its very reason for existing had seemingly vanished. The Eastern European ex-Soviet states were keen to stop any return to Russian imperialism, Russia was keen to leave its options open with NATO moving to its borders. All of which had to play with a general Western misunderstanding that even if the Russian people in general were happy to be rid of communism (which wasn't a given), there was still a general sense of national humiliation, stupidity and loss when you lose an Empire (see Brexit).
Hubris is a very detailed, if mildly partisan, take on the story (my sense is that Haslam goes in a little harder on Clinton and Obama's mistakes - though that might be because they are in power at two very key junctures - Russian restructuring and the invasion of the Crimea). Its main point though is a call for geopolitical empathy, the more political failure books I read the more it seems the job is next to impossible. He also very much enjoys calling the UK the Monkey to the USA's organ grinder, which is a sense of where he feels the blame lives. I do think it needs to be read with a book about the internal issues in Russia - Memory Makers being a good example - and it ends in a surprisingly hopeful place for Ukraine (he believes that however it happens, this is Putin's last act).
What comes out at the centre of Hubris - a very well chosen title - is an absolute lack of geopolitical empathy. Whilst it is understandable that the US and the West might have wanted to celebrate the end of the Cold War, and indeed triumphing in said shadow conflict, its nature as a war of primarily propaganda and economics meant that the lessons learnt from World War One for example were not followed here. Russia was not in ruin physically, there were no bomb sites that needed reconstruction. But once the Soviet bloc dissolved, and with no real sense of how to set up a capitalist democracy (and bad actors taking advantage), the years of hyper-inflation were inevitable. Yeltsin's own weakness in places, plus the growth of power of ex-KGB oligarchs all while a succession of US administrations appeared to be favouring the Eastern European states. Germany, often a key middleman, had its own issues with reunification, and at the heart of US foreign policy was the question about how to restructure NATO now that its very reason for existing had seemingly vanished. The Eastern European ex-Soviet states were keen to stop any return to Russian imperialism, Russia was keen to leave its options open with NATO moving to its borders. All of which had to play with a general Western misunderstanding that even if the Russian people in general were happy to be rid of communism (which wasn't a given), there was still a general sense of national humiliation, stupidity and loss when you lose an Empire (see Brexit).
Hubris is a very detailed, if mildly partisan, take on the story (my sense is that Haslam goes in a little harder on Clinton and Obama's mistakes - though that might be because they are in power at two very key junctures - Russian restructuring and the invasion of the Crimea). Its main point though is a call for geopolitical empathy, the more political failure books I read the more it seems the job is next to impossible. He also very much enjoys calling the UK the Monkey to the USA's organ grinder, which is a sense of where he feels the blame lives. I do think it needs to be read with a book about the internal issues in Russia - Memory Makers being a good example - and it ends in a surprisingly hopeful place for Ukraine (he believes that however it happens, this is Putin's last act).
April 13, 2025
What I learned: The word Tsar means Caesar. “In Russia the black market became the market, never entirely disconnected from organized crime.” “Nearly one-half of Russia’s foreign exchange income came from the sale of oil and gas by 2021. And the EU was its best customer.”
270 pages long and that’s it. This was easily the worst book I have reviewed in years, and the only reason I gave it two stars and not one was star because Jeffrey Sachs (who I respect) not only liked it but called it a “masterpiece.” I can only imagine him calling it a masterpiece, if he was blackmailed with Haslam holding Jeffrey’s children in a cellar somewhere. 270 pages long and I barely got three sentences of marginal info from it. Good Lord! On page 263, Haslam says Putin “persistently tried to dispose of his most fearsome opponent, the charismatic populist Alexei Navalny” as though Navalny was some great guy of and for the people but why didn’t Haslam tell us (as did Scott Horton in his book Provoked) that he was a right-wing nationalist kicked out of his own “party for demonizing Muslim immigrants, comparing them to cockroaches and dental cavities”? Scott Horton wrote “Navalny was not a liberal at all. He was far to the right of Putin.” Why didn’t Haslam tell the reader that too? As for Putin, who Haslam can’t say ANYTHING positive about, even the NYT conceded that Putin was at best a “soft” authoritarian compared to the nationalists, including Navalny. The 750-page Philip Short book on Putin says the CIA won’t assassinate Putin because they know he would only be replaced by a right-wing nationalist well to the right of Putin. This Haslam book won’t tell you any of that, nor will this book say anything about Putin that the Russophobic Atlantic Magazine or Russophobic neocon Anne Applebaum wouldn’t also say. On the plus side, however, this book might make good kindling if you need to start a fire. And it would make great propaganda reading for Rachel Maddow, who shoved that discredited Russiagate conspiracy thing down our throats LONG after it was debunked.
If you want to read books on Russia/Ukraine that don’t suck, put you to sleep, or give liberals neocon boners, try these instead: “Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order”, by Glenn Diesen, “Provoked”, by Scott Horton, “How the West Brought War to Ukraine”, by Benjamin Abelow, “War in Ukraine”, by Medea Benjamin, “Putin” by Philip Short, “Should the West Engage Putin’s Russia: the Munk Debates” by Stephen F. Cohen, “Democracy, Populism and Neoliberalism in Ukraine”, by Olga Baysha, “Ukraine in Crisis” editor Nicolai Petro, “Flashpoint in Ukraine” editor Stephen Lendman, “Western Mainstream Media, by Oliver Boyd-Barrett, “Ukraine in the Crossfire”, by Chris Kaspar de Ploeg, “Borderland”, by Anna Reid, and finally these three “Frontline Ukraine”, “The Lost Peace”, and “Putin’s Paradox” all by Richard Sakwa. Or you can read my reviews of all of these on Goodreads. Cheers…
270 pages long and that’s it. This was easily the worst book I have reviewed in years, and the only reason I gave it two stars and not one was star because Jeffrey Sachs (who I respect) not only liked it but called it a “masterpiece.” I can only imagine him calling it a masterpiece, if he was blackmailed with Haslam holding Jeffrey’s children in a cellar somewhere. 270 pages long and I barely got three sentences of marginal info from it. Good Lord! On page 263, Haslam says Putin “persistently tried to dispose of his most fearsome opponent, the charismatic populist Alexei Navalny” as though Navalny was some great guy of and for the people but why didn’t Haslam tell us (as did Scott Horton in his book Provoked) that he was a right-wing nationalist kicked out of his own “party for demonizing Muslim immigrants, comparing them to cockroaches and dental cavities”? Scott Horton wrote “Navalny was not a liberal at all. He was far to the right of Putin.” Why didn’t Haslam tell the reader that too? As for Putin, who Haslam can’t say ANYTHING positive about, even the NYT conceded that Putin was at best a “soft” authoritarian compared to the nationalists, including Navalny. The 750-page Philip Short book on Putin says the CIA won’t assassinate Putin because they know he would only be replaced by a right-wing nationalist well to the right of Putin. This Haslam book won’t tell you any of that, nor will this book say anything about Putin that the Russophobic Atlantic Magazine or Russophobic neocon Anne Applebaum wouldn’t also say. On the plus side, however, this book might make good kindling if you need to start a fire. And it would make great propaganda reading for Rachel Maddow, who shoved that discredited Russiagate conspiracy thing down our throats LONG after it was debunked.
If you want to read books on Russia/Ukraine that don’t suck, put you to sleep, or give liberals neocon boners, try these instead: “Ukraine War & the Eurasian World Order”, by Glenn Diesen, “Provoked”, by Scott Horton, “How the West Brought War to Ukraine”, by Benjamin Abelow, “War in Ukraine”, by Medea Benjamin, “Putin” by Philip Short, “Should the West Engage Putin’s Russia: the Munk Debates” by Stephen F. Cohen, “Democracy, Populism and Neoliberalism in Ukraine”, by Olga Baysha, “Ukraine in Crisis” editor Nicolai Petro, “Flashpoint in Ukraine” editor Stephen Lendman, “Western Mainstream Media, by Oliver Boyd-Barrett, “Ukraine in the Crossfire”, by Chris Kaspar de Ploeg, “Borderland”, by Anna Reid, and finally these three “Frontline Ukraine”, “The Lost Peace”, and “Putin’s Paradox” all by Richard Sakwa. Or you can read my reviews of all of these on Goodreads. Cheers…
September 26, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Эта книга из той же серии что и книги War in Ukraine by Medea Benjamin и How the West Brought War to Ukraine by Benjamin Abelow. Автор Hubris, как и авторы двух вышеназванных книг, фокус своего внимания переносит на тему НАТО и расширения НАТО на восток, как бы подразумевая, что в нынешнем российско-украинском военном конфликте виноваты в первую очередь США и страны НАТО.
Amid the embarrassing chorus of self-serving justification there was only one glaring exception: former Foreign Minister of France Roland Dumas, who did not hesitate to remind us that back in the days of German reunification: “The West had promised that NATO would not extend to Russia’s doorstep.”
<...>
At the beginning of 1997, by which time it was already too late, having lobbied incessantly those he knew in government to no avail, Kennan went public with the argument that “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era”.
Я уже писал в рецензиях к вышеназванным книгам, что расширения НАТО до 2014 года не играло особой роли в российской политике. Собственно, в книге A Little War That Shook the World by Ronald D. Asmus мы находим прямые цитаты, как Ельцина, так и Путина о том, что НАТО не представляет существенной угрозы безопасности для РФ.
President Yeltsin publicly opposed NATO enlargement although in private he would admit he did not consider the Alliance a threat and even expressed his understanding of the Central and Eastern European impulse to go West.
<...>
At the time President Vladimir Putin seemed completely relaxed about the prospect of other countries in the post-Soviet space eventually joining NATO. When asked at the post-summit press conference about Ukraine’s seeking membership, he answered, “Ukraine is an independent sovereign state and will choose its own path to peace and security.” Putin continued: “Such a conversation [between Ukraine and NATO] would be entirely appropriate and possible. I certainly don’t see there being anything particularly tricky here, anything that need or that could cast a shadow over relations between Russia and Ukraine.
Как видим, оба президента РФ заявляли, что не видят особой опасности для России исходящей от НАТО. Добавим к этому тот факт, что прибалтийские страны уже много лет как являются членами НАТО и это не смущало Путина. Более того, расстояние от ближайшего прибалтийского поселения до Москвы примерно такое же, как расстояние украинских поселений до столицы России. Путин никаких претензий на этот счёт не высказывал, значит, НАТО никак не может быть причиной начала военного вторжения России на территорию Украины. Но даже если рассматривать такое действие как попытку остановить расширение НАТО на восток, то оно очевидно контрпродуктивно, ибо показывает, что соседям России, нужна какая-та защита от этой самой России. А какая самая надёжная защита от потенциального вторжения РФ, если не НАТОвский зонтик? Так что это просто глупо рассматривать расширение НАТО как главную или даже существенную причину начала военного противостояния России с Украиной (на то, как бы намекает обложка этой книги).
There was no lobby for a Marshall Plan aid programme inside government. And it was not just the administration’s fault. Congress, which would have to vote the funds, was still congenitally anti-Russian, and now isolationist as well; fixated, of course, on the public benefits of peace for its constituents.
Я уже слышал этот аргумент, что, мол, никто не помог России в тот тяжёлый для неё период - начало и середина 90-ых. Но тут есть загвоздка, которая объясняет почему, возможно, это не было осуществлено. Дело в том, что демократизация в России при Ельцине была очень и очень слабая, а такие события как расстрел Белого дома в 1993 году, принятие суперпрезидентской конституции, вмешательство России в дела иностранных государств в виде поддержки сепаратистов в Приднестровье, Карабахе, Абхазии, война в Чечне, а также разыгравшийся конфликт между Украиной и Россией по вопросу Крыма (и угроза применить ядерное оружие, которое было высказано в виде слуха) и пр., могли указывать американским политикам на то, что Россия не полностью выбрала демократический путь развития. Да что там, эти события явно демонстрируют авторитарный и империалистический подход к решению всякой проблемы со стороны российского руководства. Я не утверждаю, что это и было истинной причиной, почему по отношению к России не был реализован План Маршалла, но вполне возможно, что отсутствие явных демократических перемен повлияло на это решение американских политиков. Возможно, многие американские политики отнеслись к новой России с настороженностью, но трудно их за это осуждать, учитывая тот факт, что демократизация в России в основном была на словах (риторикой), а дела были совсем другой направленности, т.е. авторитарной направленности. В то время у всех была иллюзия что "демократ Ельцин" не только победил красного дракона, но и что он построит "город-сад", но я думаю, американские политики очень хорошо знают цену словам, в том смысле, что они как раз больше внимания уделяют делам. Возможно, именно тут и нужно искать причину, почему американцы не предложили новой России что-то по типу Плана Маршалла. Германия после поражения во Второй Мировой войне не имела особого выбора (как и Япония) какой политический строй строить и поэтому там демократия появилась по определению. Россия же всегда была авторитарной страной, лишь с небольшими и короткими эпизодами либерализации общества даваемого к тому же всегда сверху, т.е. высшей властью, а не получившее эту свободу, как это имело место в Европе, благодаря противоборству общества с властью.
Я прочитал лишь четверть книги, но уже этого для меня было достаточно, чтобы понять суть. Я уже читал подобные книги, и поэтому читать очередную книгу возлагающую вину главным образом на НАТО и США у меня желания не было. С моей точки зрения, это типичный путинский нарратив, а читать пропаганду Кремля у меня особого желания нет. Хотя подчеркну, что в нынешнем российско-украинском конфликте виновна не только Россия, но и западные и украинские элиты, пусть и в меньшей степени.
This book is from the same series as "War in Ukraine" by Medea Benjamin and "How the West Brought War to Ukraine" by Benjamin Abelow. The author of "Hubris," like the authors of the above two books, shifts the focus of his attention to NATO and NATO's eastward expansion, as if to imply that the United States and NATO countries are primarily to blame for the current Russian-Ukrainian military conflict.
Amid the embarrassing chorus of self-serving justification there was only one glaring exception: former Foreign Minister of France Roland Dumas, who did not hesitate to remind us that back in the days of German reunification: “The West had promised that NATO would not extend to Russia’s doorstep.”
<...>
At the beginning of 1997, by which time it was already too late, having lobbied incessantly those he knew in government to no avail, Kennan went public with the argument that “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era”.
I have already written in my reviews of the above-mentioned books that NATO expansion did not play a major role in Russian policy until 2014. In fact, in the book "A Little War That Shook the World" by Ronald D. Asmus, we find direct quotes from both Yeltsin and Putin that NATO does not pose a significant security threat to Russia.
President Yeltsin publicly opposed NATO enlargement although in private he would admit he did not consider the Alliance a threat and even expressed his understanding of the Central and Eastern European impulse to go West.
<...>
At the time President Vladimir Putin seemed completely relaxed about the prospect of other countries in the post-Soviet space eventually joining NATO. When asked at the post-summit press conference about Ukraine’s seeking membership, he answered, “Ukraine is an independent sovereign state and will choose its own path to peace and security.” Putin continued: “Such a conversation [between Ukraine and NATO] would be entirely appropriate and possible. I certainly don’t see there being anything particularly tricky here, anything that need or that could cast a shadow over relations between Russia and Ukraine.
As we can see, both Russian presidents stated that they saw no particular danger for Russia coming from NATO. Add to this the fact that the Baltic states have been NATO members for many years and this did not embarrass Putin. Moreover, the distance from the nearest Baltic settlement to Moscow is about the same as the distance of Ukrainian settlements to the Russian capital. Putin did not make any claims on this matter, so NATO can in no way be the reason for Russia to launch a military invasion of Ukraine. But even if we consider this action as an attempt to stop NATO's eastward expansion, it is counterproductive because it shows that Russia's neighbors need some kind of protection from this very Russia. And what is the most reliable defense against a potential invasion of Russia, if not the NATO umbrella? So it's just silly to consider NATO expansion as the main or even essential reason for Russia's military confrontation with Ukraine (as the cover of this book seems to hint).
There was no lobby for a Marshall Plan aid programme inside government. And it was not just the administration’s fault. Congress, which would have to vote the funds, was still congenitally anti-Russian, and now isolationist as well; fixated, of course, on the public benefits of peace for its constituents.
I've heard this argument before that nobody helped Russia during that difficult period - the early and mid-90s. But there is a catch here, which explains why, perhaps, it was not realized. The fact is that democratization in Russia under Yeltsin was very, very weak, and events such as the shooting of the White House in 1993, the adoption of a super-presidential constitution, Russia's interference in the affairs of foreign countries in the form of support for separatists in Transnistria, Karabakh, Abkhazia, the war in Chechnya, and the conflict between Ukraine and Russia over Crimea (and the rumored threat to use nuclear weapons), etc., could indicate to U.S. policymakers that Russia had not chosen the democratic path of development. Indeed, these events demonstrate an authoritarian and imperialistic approach to solving any problem on the part of the Russian leadership. I am not suggesting that this was the real reason why the Marshall Plan was not implemented for Russia but it is quite possible that the lack of democratic change influenced this decision of American politicians. Perhaps many American politicians were wary of the new Russia, but it is hard to condemn them for that, given the fact that democratization in Russia was mostly rhetoric, while the deeds were of a very different direction, i.e., authoritarian. At the time, everyone had the illusion that “democrat Yeltsin” had not only defeated the red dragon but that he would build a “garden city,” so I think American politicians know very well the value of words in the sense that they pay more attention to deeds. Perhaps this is the reason why the Americans did not offer the new Russia something like the Marshall Plan. Germany, after its defeat in World War II, did not have much choice (as well as Japan) about what political system to build therefore democracy appeared there by definition. Russia has always been an authoritarian country, with only small and short episodes of liberalization of society, which is always given from above, i.e., by the supreme power, not obtaining this freedom, as it happened in Europe.
I read only a quarter of the book, but it was enough for me to understand the essence. I had already read similar books, so I had no desire to read another book that blames NATO and the United States. From my point of view, this is a typical Putin narrative, and I have no desire to read Kremlin propaganda. However, I would like to emphasize that not only Russia but also Western and Ukrainian elites, albeit to a lesser extent, are to blame for the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Эта книга из той же серии что и книги War in Ukraine by Medea Benjamin и How the West Brought War to Ukraine by Benjamin Abelow. Автор Hubris, как и авторы двух вышеназванных книг, фокус своего внимания переносит на тему НАТО и расширения НАТО на восток, как бы подразумевая, что в нынешнем российско-украинском военном конфликте виноваты в первую очередь США и страны НАТО.
Amid the embarrassing chorus of self-serving justification there was only one glaring exception: former Foreign Minister of France Roland Dumas, who did not hesitate to remind us that back in the days of German reunification: “The West had promised that NATO would not extend to Russia’s doorstep.”
<...>
At the beginning of 1997, by which time it was already too late, having lobbied incessantly those he knew in government to no avail, Kennan went public with the argument that “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era”.
Я уже писал в рецензиях к вышеназванным книгам, что расширения НАТО до 2014 года не играло особой роли в российской политике. Собственно, в книге A Little War That Shook the World by Ronald D. Asmus мы находим прямые цитаты, как Ельцина, так и Путина о том, что НАТО не представляет существенной угрозы безопасности для РФ.
President Yeltsin publicly opposed NATO enlargement although in private he would admit he did not consider the Alliance a threat and even expressed his understanding of the Central and Eastern European impulse to go West.
<...>
At the time President Vladimir Putin seemed completely relaxed about the prospect of other countries in the post-Soviet space eventually joining NATO. When asked at the post-summit press conference about Ukraine’s seeking membership, he answered, “Ukraine is an independent sovereign state and will choose its own path to peace and security.” Putin continued: “Such a conversation [between Ukraine and NATO] would be entirely appropriate and possible. I certainly don’t see there being anything particularly tricky here, anything that need or that could cast a shadow over relations between Russia and Ukraine.
Как видим, оба президента РФ заявляли, что не видят особой опасности для России исходящей от НАТО. Добавим к этому тот факт, что прибалтийские страны уже много лет как являются членами НАТО и это не смущало Путина. Более того, расстояние от ближайшего прибалтийского поселения до Москвы примерно такое же, как расстояние украинских поселений до столицы России. Путин никаких претензий на этот счёт не высказывал, значит, НАТО никак не может быть причиной начала военного вторжения России на территорию Украины. Но даже если рассматривать такое действие как попытку остановить расширение НАТО на восток, то оно очевидно контрпродуктивно, ибо показывает, что соседям России, нужна какая-та защита от этой самой России. А какая самая надёжная защита от потенциального вторжения РФ, если не НАТОвский зонтик? Так что это просто глупо рассматривать расширение НАТО как главную или даже существенную причину начала военного противостояния России с Украиной (на то, как бы намекает обложка этой книги).
There was no lobby for a Marshall Plan aid programme inside government. And it was not just the administration’s fault. Congress, which would have to vote the funds, was still congenitally anti-Russian, and now isolationist as well; fixated, of course, on the public benefits of peace for its constituents.
Я уже слышал этот аргумент, что, мол, никто не помог России в тот тяжёлый для неё период - начало и середина 90-ых. Но тут есть загвоздка, которая объясняет почему, возможно, это не было осуществлено. Дело в том, что демократизация в России при Ельцине была очень и очень слабая, а такие события как расстрел Белого дома в 1993 году, принятие суперпрезидентской конституции, вмешательство России в дела иностранных государств в виде поддержки сепаратистов в Приднестровье, Карабахе, Абхазии, война в Чечне, а также разыгравшийся конфликт между Украиной и Россией по вопросу Крыма (и угроза применить ядерное оружие, которое было высказано в виде слуха) и пр., могли указывать американским политикам на то, что Россия не полностью выбрала демократический путь развития. Да что там, эти события явно демонстрируют авторитарный и империалистический подход к решению всякой проблемы со стороны российского руководства. Я не утверждаю, что это и было истинной причиной, почему по отношению к России не был реализован План Маршалла, но вполне возможно, что отсутствие явных демократических перемен повлияло на это решение американских политиков. Возможно, многие американские политики отнеслись к новой России с настороженностью, но трудно их за это осуждать, учитывая тот факт, что демократизация в России в основном была на словах (риторикой), а дела были совсем другой направленности, т.е. авторитарной направленности. В то время у всех была иллюзия что "демократ Ельцин" не только победил красного дракона, но и что он построит "город-сад", но я думаю, американские политики очень хорошо знают цену словам, в том смысле, что они как раз больше внимания уделяют делам. Возможно, именно тут и нужно искать причину, почему американцы не предложили новой России что-то по типу Плана Маршалла. Германия после поражения во Второй Мировой войне не имела особого выбора (как и Япония) какой политический строй строить и поэтому там демократия появилась по определению. Россия же всегда была авторитарной страной, лишь с небольшими и короткими эпизодами либерализации общества даваемого к тому же всегда сверху, т.е. высшей властью, а не получившее эту свободу, как это имело место в Европе, благодаря противоборству общества с властью.
Я прочитал лишь четверть книги, но уже этого для меня было достаточно, чтобы понять суть. Я уже читал подобные книги, и поэтому читать очередную книгу возлагающую вину главным образом на НАТО и США у меня желания не было. С моей точки зрения, это типичный путинский нарратив, а читать пропаганду Кремля у меня особого желания нет. Хотя подчеркну, что в нынешнем российско-украинском конфликте виновна не только Россия, но и западные и украинские элиты, пусть и в меньшей степени.
This book is from the same series as "War in Ukraine" by Medea Benjamin and "How the West Brought War to Ukraine" by Benjamin Abelow. The author of "Hubris," like the authors of the above two books, shifts the focus of his attention to NATO and NATO's eastward expansion, as if to imply that the United States and NATO countries are primarily to blame for the current Russian-Ukrainian military conflict.
Amid the embarrassing chorus of self-serving justification there was only one glaring exception: former Foreign Minister of France Roland Dumas, who did not hesitate to remind us that back in the days of German reunification: “The West had promised that NATO would not extend to Russia’s doorstep.”
<...>
At the beginning of 1997, by which time it was already too late, having lobbied incessantly those he knew in government to no avail, Kennan went public with the argument that “expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era”.
I have already written in my reviews of the above-mentioned books that NATO expansion did not play a major role in Russian policy until 2014. In fact, in the book "A Little War That Shook the World" by Ronald D. Asmus, we find direct quotes from both Yeltsin and Putin that NATO does not pose a significant security threat to Russia.
President Yeltsin publicly opposed NATO enlargement although in private he would admit he did not consider the Alliance a threat and even expressed his understanding of the Central and Eastern European impulse to go West.
<...>
At the time President Vladimir Putin seemed completely relaxed about the prospect of other countries in the post-Soviet space eventually joining NATO. When asked at the post-summit press conference about Ukraine’s seeking membership, he answered, “Ukraine is an independent sovereign state and will choose its own path to peace and security.” Putin continued: “Such a conversation [between Ukraine and NATO] would be entirely appropriate and possible. I certainly don’t see there being anything particularly tricky here, anything that need or that could cast a shadow over relations between Russia and Ukraine.
As we can see, both Russian presidents stated that they saw no particular danger for Russia coming from NATO. Add to this the fact that the Baltic states have been NATO members for many years and this did not embarrass Putin. Moreover, the distance from the nearest Baltic settlement to Moscow is about the same as the distance of Ukrainian settlements to the Russian capital. Putin did not make any claims on this matter, so NATO can in no way be the reason for Russia to launch a military invasion of Ukraine. But even if we consider this action as an attempt to stop NATO's eastward expansion, it is counterproductive because it shows that Russia's neighbors need some kind of protection from this very Russia. And what is the most reliable defense against a potential invasion of Russia, if not the NATO umbrella? So it's just silly to consider NATO expansion as the main or even essential reason for Russia's military confrontation with Ukraine (as the cover of this book seems to hint).
There was no lobby for a Marshall Plan aid programme inside government. And it was not just the administration’s fault. Congress, which would have to vote the funds, was still congenitally anti-Russian, and now isolationist as well; fixated, of course, on the public benefits of peace for its constituents.
I've heard this argument before that nobody helped Russia during that difficult period - the early and mid-90s. But there is a catch here, which explains why, perhaps, it was not realized. The fact is that democratization in Russia under Yeltsin was very, very weak, and events such as the shooting of the White House in 1993, the adoption of a super-presidential constitution, Russia's interference in the affairs of foreign countries in the form of support for separatists in Transnistria, Karabakh, Abkhazia, the war in Chechnya, and the conflict between Ukraine and Russia over Crimea (and the rumored threat to use nuclear weapons), etc., could indicate to U.S. policymakers that Russia had not chosen the democratic path of development. Indeed, these events demonstrate an authoritarian and imperialistic approach to solving any problem on the part of the Russian leadership. I am not suggesting that this was the real reason why the Marshall Plan was not implemented for Russia but it is quite possible that the lack of democratic change influenced this decision of American politicians. Perhaps many American politicians were wary of the new Russia, but it is hard to condemn them for that, given the fact that democratization in Russia was mostly rhetoric, while the deeds were of a very different direction, i.e., authoritarian. At the time, everyone had the illusion that “democrat Yeltsin” had not only defeated the red dragon but that he would build a “garden city,” so I think American politicians know very well the value of words in the sense that they pay more attention to deeds. Perhaps this is the reason why the Americans did not offer the new Russia something like the Marshall Plan. Germany, after its defeat in World War II, did not have much choice (as well as Japan) about what political system to build therefore democracy appeared there by definition. Russia has always been an authoritarian country, with only small and short episodes of liberalization of society, which is always given from above, i.e., by the supreme power, not obtaining this freedom, as it happened in Europe.
I read only a quarter of the book, but it was enough for me to understand the essence. I had already read similar books, so I had no desire to read another book that blames NATO and the United States. From my point of view, this is a typical Putin narrative, and I have no desire to read Kremlin propaganda. However, I would like to emphasize that not only Russia but also Western and Ukrainian elites, albeit to a lesser extent, are to blame for the current Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
August 3, 2025
Let me do you a favor, read Provoked by Scott Horton for a much more comprehensive history of America, Russia and what led to its invasion of Ukraine.
March 12, 2025
A more generous chronicler might interpret the United States-Russia relationship, post-Cold War, as a series of missteps and fumbles. Not Jonathan Haslam.
Haslam’s sharp, well-researched book makes stark the disdain and contempt successive US administrations had for Russia, their realization that NATO, even in the absence of a worthy adversary, was the vehicle to maintain US presence in Europe, and that expanding the alliance eastward ensured the US’s indispensability.
A sense of encroachment and dismissal limited the politically viable decisions available to Presidents Yeltsin and Putin. Haslam portrays the horrowshow currently underway in Ukraine as a crime and a strategic error by Russia, but one that had a certain brutal logic.
No one emerges from this book looking particularly good.
Many are downright venal. Others stupid or weak, frequently both.
This is a valuable summary of the post Cold War period. It doesn’t try to imagine a better world but it shows us how we got to this point. Recommended.
Haslam’s sharp, well-researched book makes stark the disdain and contempt successive US administrations had for Russia, their realization that NATO, even in the absence of a worthy adversary, was the vehicle to maintain US presence in Europe, and that expanding the alliance eastward ensured the US’s indispensability.
A sense of encroachment and dismissal limited the politically viable decisions available to Presidents Yeltsin and Putin. Haslam portrays the horrowshow currently underway in Ukraine as a crime and a strategic error by Russia, but one that had a certain brutal logic.
No one emerges from this book looking particularly good.
Many are downright venal. Others stupid or weak, frequently both.
This is a valuable summary of the post Cold War period. It doesn’t try to imagine a better world but it shows us how we got to this point. Recommended.
December 8, 2024
Really enjoyed this alternative history that wasn't as soaked in US propaganda. A bear of a book and very high context but great information on Russia's 30+ year insistence that US dominated NATO not expand eastward or invite Ukraine in unless Russia could also be involved and seen as an equal not an adversary.
March 13, 2025
I was hoping for something more insightful than what John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs already have talked about extensively. It was still a decent read, though.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, and by March, both sides were already in the middle of peace talks in Turkey and getting close to an agreement. Then a wild Boris Johnson, the prime minister of UK back then, appeared in Kyiv and personally told Zelensky in April to back out of the deal since Putin is a war criminal who should be pressured and not negotiated with and that UK would not be willing to sign any deals with Russia even if Ukraine would. Thus Ukraine backed out of the negotiations unilaterally and a nice “honorable” war went on full blast were a million people have died by now and another refugee crisis to Europe was ignited.
This dismissive, hostile attitude towards Russia from the UK has been brewing for decades since the 90’s when the Cold War ended but it originated from the deep state apparatus in the US. Zbigniew Brzezinski articulated very clearly in his 1997 The Grand Chessboard how NATO should be expanded endlessly towards the east and Russia wouldn’t do anything about it since it’s weak and would never ally with China. This is just one person but he was immensely influential in American politics and this kind of understanding of international politics permeated the political class in the US.
Thus NATO was continuously expanded and in international talks with Russia, the West kept repeating and promising endlessly that NATO wouldn’t be expanded further and then in 2002, US unilaterally withdrew from the anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia and started installing its missile systems in the NATO countries surrounding Russia. Then in 2004, 7 new members were introduced to NATO, including Estonia. Then some more members were introduced into NATO and in 2008 Ukraine was also promised an eventual NATO membership. In 2014, the pro-Russia president of Ukraine was overthrown in a US-backed and largely US-orchestrated uprising called Maidan and a pro-Western, pro-NATO leader was supplanted as the new president. Then Russia attacked Crimea, as it reportedly feared losing its strategic naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea, to the new pro-NATO government in Ukraine.
Eventually, after the promises of Ukraine joining NATO continued and Russia’s demand to halt the expansion of NATO and to remove its military infrastructure from Eastern Europe was denied in December 2021 by the literally senile president Biden and also gaining confidence from witnessing the catastrophic blunder of the US withdrawing from Afghanistan in August 2021, Russia’s full-scale invasion started in Ukraine.
All this seems like a logical picture of international relations where actions follow consequences rather than the childish bed-time story that permeates the Western media of, “Russia is bad and Putin is Hitler” which precludes any possibility of negotiations with Russia and never mentions how all the lost lives and the lives that will be lost could have been avoided through peace talks.
Now this attitude of the Western political class and mainstream media towards international relations where the main thing that matters is US supremacy in the global stage maybe worked to some extent some of the time but the Pandora’s box that was opened in the ruins of Afganistan, Iraq, Lybia, Syria and now, Russia, is apparently making the United States reconsider this strategy. Fucking finally.
The issue here is that Europe has long been an unthinking zombie following whatever the US does in international politics and now they’re angry headless chickens without a master to tell them what to do. They, including Estonian politicians, have been toeing the never-changing deep state party line of the US for decades hoping for a nice carrot at the end of it. Now this carrot has been burned in front of their eyes and they’re very angry. Very angry indeed. They don’t give a shit about all the lives lost that could have been avoided but they very much care about the emotions of their prophet Zelensky and proper decorum, of course. Can’t say harsh words, no sir, no indeed. Very bad. We’ll see how it ends. They’ll probably give a Nobel peace prize to Zelensky even if he’s the last Ukrainan alive.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, and by March, both sides were already in the middle of peace talks in Turkey and getting close to an agreement. Then a wild Boris Johnson, the prime minister of UK back then, appeared in Kyiv and personally told Zelensky in April to back out of the deal since Putin is a war criminal who should be pressured and not negotiated with and that UK would not be willing to sign any deals with Russia even if Ukraine would. Thus Ukraine backed out of the negotiations unilaterally and a nice “honorable” war went on full blast were a million people have died by now and another refugee crisis to Europe was ignited.
This dismissive, hostile attitude towards Russia from the UK has been brewing for decades since the 90’s when the Cold War ended but it originated from the deep state apparatus in the US. Zbigniew Brzezinski articulated very clearly in his 1997 The Grand Chessboard how NATO should be expanded endlessly towards the east and Russia wouldn’t do anything about it since it’s weak and would never ally with China. This is just one person but he was immensely influential in American politics and this kind of understanding of international politics permeated the political class in the US.
Thus NATO was continuously expanded and in international talks with Russia, the West kept repeating and promising endlessly that NATO wouldn’t be expanded further and then in 2002, US unilaterally withdrew from the anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia and started installing its missile systems in the NATO countries surrounding Russia. Then in 2004, 7 new members were introduced to NATO, including Estonia. Then some more members were introduced into NATO and in 2008 Ukraine was also promised an eventual NATO membership. In 2014, the pro-Russia president of Ukraine was overthrown in a US-backed and largely US-orchestrated uprising called Maidan and a pro-Western, pro-NATO leader was supplanted as the new president. Then Russia attacked Crimea, as it reportedly feared losing its strategic naval base in Sevastopol, Crimea, to the new pro-NATO government in Ukraine.
Eventually, after the promises of Ukraine joining NATO continued and Russia’s demand to halt the expansion of NATO and to remove its military infrastructure from Eastern Europe was denied in December 2021 by the literally senile president Biden and also gaining confidence from witnessing the catastrophic blunder of the US withdrawing from Afghanistan in August 2021, Russia’s full-scale invasion started in Ukraine.
All this seems like a logical picture of international relations where actions follow consequences rather than the childish bed-time story that permeates the Western media of, “Russia is bad and Putin is Hitler” which precludes any possibility of negotiations with Russia and never mentions how all the lost lives and the lives that will be lost could have been avoided through peace talks.
Now this attitude of the Western political class and mainstream media towards international relations where the main thing that matters is US supremacy in the global stage maybe worked to some extent some of the time but the Pandora’s box that was opened in the ruins of Afganistan, Iraq, Lybia, Syria and now, Russia, is apparently making the United States reconsider this strategy. Fucking finally.
The issue here is that Europe has long been an unthinking zombie following whatever the US does in international politics and now they’re angry headless chickens without a master to tell them what to do. They, including Estonian politicians, have been toeing the never-changing deep state party line of the US for decades hoping for a nice carrot at the end of it. Now this carrot has been burned in front of their eyes and they’re very angry. Very angry indeed. They don’t give a shit about all the lives lost that could have been avoided but they very much care about the emotions of their prophet Zelensky and proper decorum, of course. Can’t say harsh words, no sir, no indeed. Very bad. We’ll see how it ends. They’ll probably give a Nobel peace prize to Zelensky even if he’s the last Ukrainan alive.
February 12, 2025
Jonathan Haslam's "Hubris: The Origins of Russia's War Against Ukraine" offers a thought-provoking analysis of the events leading to Europe's largest conflict since World War II. Haslam, a distinguished historian and expert on Russian foreign policy, traces the roots of the current war back to the early 1990s, challenging conventional narratives. The book argues that NATO's expansion and the West's post-Cold War triumphalism played a significant role in stoking Russian aggression. Haslam contends that successive American administrations, along with their Western allies, pursued policies that ignored Russian interests and fears, ultimately contributing to the rise of Russian nationalism and imperialism. While Haslam's perspective may be controversial, his extensive knowledge of both NATO and Kremlin operations lends credibility to his arguments. He provides valuable insights into the mentality of American, European, and Russian elites from the 1990s onwards, highlighting the West's willful ignorance of Russia's neo-imperial intentions. However, the book is not without its critics. Some reviewers point out that by focusing primarily on events post-1991, Haslam overlooks 300 years of Russian imperialism that occurred without NATO's influence. This narrow historical scope potentially limits the accuracy of his analysis. Haslam's work serves as a warning against the dangers of hubris in international relations. He draws parallels to the diplomatic missteps that led to World War I, echoing the concerns of historical figures like George F. Kennan. It's important to note that while Haslam provides context for Russian actions, he does not excuse their aggression. Instead, he aims to offer a more nuanced understanding of the conflict's origins, challenging readers to consider the complex interplay of historical, political, and emotional factors that have shaped the current crisis. “Hubris" is likely to spark debate among scholars, policymakers, and the public. While some may disagree with Haslam's conclusions, his book undoubtedly contributes to a deeper understanding of the historical forces at play in the Russia-Ukraine war. As we grapple with the ongoing conflict, Haslam's work reminds us of the importance of learning from history to avoid repeating past mistakes.
May 13, 2025
Thank you to Head of Zeus Audiobooks, the author and NetGalley for an audio ARC in return for an honest review
*This was an audio ARC but the audio edition wasn't available to select on Goodreads*
I appreciate the Author narrating his own Audiobook. It adds a sense of authenticity as you are hearing the words exactly how they were intended.
Jonathan Haslam is well qualified to write this book, being one of the foremost historians of international relations. He focuses on how the hubris of certain political leaders directly and indirectly lead to major 20th-century wars and in particular how arrogance, ideology, and miscalculation lead to the ongoing Russia Ukraine conflict. Putin's decision to invade Ukraine, whilst unjustifiable, was partly shaped by the actions of the US and NATO expansion.
Like many people, since 24 February 2022, I have followed the extensive news coverage of the Russian-Ukraine War. Having skin in the game (I have a relative who has family in Ukraine) I wanted to go behind the headlines and delve deeper into why the conflict started in the first place. Being born in 1972, I have lived through many of the conflicts mentioned in this book, but I now feel as though I have a greater understanding of the politics involved. Though the book centres on major wars in the 20th century, it extends into the late Cold War period and post–Cold War conflicts, covering relevant conflicts from the 1980s and 1990s.
This is a fascinating and informative read. If you have more than a passing interest in foreign politics and wish to delve beneath the surface, this is the book to read. Haslam delivers an analysis of the catastrophic consequences of overconfidence in military and political decision-making.
Having read some reviews of this book I can see that there are some concerns as to how much blame Haslam lays at Putin's door. If you’re looking for a more direct polemic moral indictment of Putin, Haslam may feel too restrained and this is definitely not the book for you. But if you're after historical insight into how and why leaders make catastrophic decisions, then his approach offers real depth. To be honest, in this day and age, I don't blame anyone for taking a cautious approach in criticizing Putin - for obvious reasons.
*This was an audio ARC but the audio edition wasn't available to select on Goodreads*
I appreciate the Author narrating his own Audiobook. It adds a sense of authenticity as you are hearing the words exactly how they were intended.
Jonathan Haslam is well qualified to write this book, being one of the foremost historians of international relations. He focuses on how the hubris of certain political leaders directly and indirectly lead to major 20th-century wars and in particular how arrogance, ideology, and miscalculation lead to the ongoing Russia Ukraine conflict. Putin's decision to invade Ukraine, whilst unjustifiable, was partly shaped by the actions of the US and NATO expansion.
Like many people, since 24 February 2022, I have followed the extensive news coverage of the Russian-Ukraine War. Having skin in the game (I have a relative who has family in Ukraine) I wanted to go behind the headlines and delve deeper into why the conflict started in the first place. Being born in 1972, I have lived through many of the conflicts mentioned in this book, but I now feel as though I have a greater understanding of the politics involved. Though the book centres on major wars in the 20th century, it extends into the late Cold War period and post–Cold War conflicts, covering relevant conflicts from the 1980s and 1990s.
This is a fascinating and informative read. If you have more than a passing interest in foreign politics and wish to delve beneath the surface, this is the book to read. Haslam delivers an analysis of the catastrophic consequences of overconfidence in military and political decision-making.
Having read some reviews of this book I can see that there are some concerns as to how much blame Haslam lays at Putin's door. If you’re looking for a more direct polemic moral indictment of Putin, Haslam may feel too restrained and this is definitely not the book for you. But if you're after historical insight into how and why leaders make catastrophic decisions, then his approach offers real depth. To be honest, in this day and age, I don't blame anyone for taking a cautious approach in criticizing Putin - for obvious reasons.
December 6, 2024
Jonathan Haslam's Hubris provides an insightful overview of the geopolitical shifts in Europe over the last 30 years. The historical analysis of events leading up to Russia's war against Ukraine is thorough and well-researched, offering readers a detailed understanding of the complexities involved.
However, the book falters in its latter chapters, where the narrative becomes noticeably biased toward Western policies. While it's clear Haslam has a perspective, the lack of balance diminishes the credibility of his arguments. For instance, his discussion of Syria omits critical factors like Operation Timber Sycamore, leaving a significant gap in the context. Additionally, labeling Russia a "mafia state" comes across as overly simplistic and detracts from a nuanced analysis of the country’s political landscape.
For those seeking an alternative perspective, I would recommend Scott Horton's Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine. Horton's work provides a critical examination of Western policies, offering a more balanced and comprehensive view of the factors that have contributed to the conflict.
However, the book falters in its latter chapters, where the narrative becomes noticeably biased toward Western policies. While it's clear Haslam has a perspective, the lack of balance diminishes the credibility of his arguments. For instance, his discussion of Syria omits critical factors like Operation Timber Sycamore, leaving a significant gap in the context. Additionally, labeling Russia a "mafia state" comes across as overly simplistic and detracts from a nuanced analysis of the country’s political landscape.
For those seeking an alternative perspective, I would recommend Scott Horton's Provoked: How Washington Started the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine. Horton's work provides a critical examination of Western policies, offering a more balanced and comprehensive view of the factors that have contributed to the conflict.
May 12, 2025
An interesting read on the recent political history behind the causes of the Ukraine war and why Russia was essentially forced to react in order to remain relevant in the face of mindless incompetence by the West led by the US.
The book ends with the previous Biden Administration and leaves open the most recent developments towards a ceasefire and negotiations tentatively discussed to be held in Istanbul.
What will come out of this is anyones guess. With the "new" Trump administration it is very hard to know with any degree of certainty what they will bring, take away or destroy at the table assuming they are even involved at all. At the present it appears to be an EU backed initiative.
This is highly reccomended reading to anyone wanting to gain background information on this highly volitile chapter in modern geopolitics.
The outcome of this "war" can have huge ramifications for Europe. Should it go south it will lead to an untold number of casualties and the danger of widening into a much greater conflict with NATO countries along the borders of Russia.
At any rate, what is to come is an open question and how it is resolved will determine the immediate future of Europe.
The book ends with the previous Biden Administration and leaves open the most recent developments towards a ceasefire and negotiations tentatively discussed to be held in Istanbul.
What will come out of this is anyones guess. With the "new" Trump administration it is very hard to know with any degree of certainty what they will bring, take away or destroy at the table assuming they are even involved at all. At the present it appears to be an EU backed initiative.
This is highly reccomended reading to anyone wanting to gain background information on this highly volitile chapter in modern geopolitics.
The outcome of this "war" can have huge ramifications for Europe. Should it go south it will lead to an untold number of casualties and the danger of widening into a much greater conflict with NATO countries along the borders of Russia.
At any rate, what is to come is an open question and how it is resolved will determine the immediate future of Europe.
June 11, 2025
This book explores an important angle to the tragic Russo-Ukrainian war - namely the big power relations between the West and Russia after the fall of the USSR which provided a pretext in the mind of the Russian leadership, to attack Ukraine in 2014 and since 2022. It is principally a tale of catastrophic errors made by US administrations, especially over their handling of NATO enlargement. The other European countries have mainly walk-on parts, save to show how powerless they were in the nineties and noughties in seeking to persuade the USA not to be so dismissive of Russian concerns about NATO expansion. The book is well researched, using primary sources (including interviews) as well as critical secondary analyses.
For me, this can only be part of the story. There is little here about how the people, particularly the Ukrainians themselves, felt or feel about this big power play. They are, after all, the main victims of the conflict, along with the ordinary soldiers of both sides. But I do recommend the book as offering a good overview of the politics that lie behind the tragedy.
For me, this can only be part of the story. There is little here about how the people, particularly the Ukrainians themselves, felt or feel about this big power play. They are, after all, the main victims of the conflict, along with the ordinary soldiers of both sides. But I do recommend the book as offering a good overview of the politics that lie behind the tragedy.
March 25, 2025
difficile giudicare, per cominciare io sono abituata al greco e per me è Hybris non Hubris. Ma questa tracotanza di chi è? bene, l'Ucraina occupa solo una piccolissima parte del libro e fa la parte de vaso di argilla fra quelli di metallo. Ritroviamo tutta la storia mondiale dal 1989 in poi, con particolare riguardo agli USA. La tesi del libro sembra essere che gli USA non contenti di aver vinto la guerra fredda hanno voluto stravincere attraverso la NATO. E che invece la Russia post sovietica si crede ancora una grande potenza e vuole dir la sua su tutti i suoi ex- come li chiamiamo? domini? colonie? zone di influenza?
Molte affermazioni sono senza supporto... per cui ok un ripasso dei libri di storia con alcune informazioni anche nuove, ma se ci chiediamo le origini della guerra sono il non accettare da parte della Russia odierna che gli ex satelliti non siano più ai suoi piedi
Molte affermazioni sono senza supporto... per cui ok un ripasso dei libri di storia con alcune informazioni anche nuove, ma se ci chiediamo le origini della guerra sono il non accettare da parte della Russia odierna che gli ex satelliti non siano più ai suoi piedi
May 24, 2025
One of the more balanced books on the subject that i have ever read.
I consider myself to be very much well read on Russian/Ukrainian issues as i have been following it all my adult life, but this book taught me things, cited speeches and articles that i was previously unaware of.
It is one of those rare accounts that makes a very strong case for NATO expansion being a core issue, whilst still being critical of various Russian figures and policies where it is warranted.
It would have been nice to see the author make more than a fleeting mention, towards the end of the book, of America's missile defence system that has spread east through Europe like an untamed weed.
The cancelling of ABM & INF treaties were covered well but not linked to this system, a missed opportunity.
Wonderful piece of work regardless.
I consider myself to be very much well read on Russian/Ukrainian issues as i have been following it all my adult life, but this book taught me things, cited speeches and articles that i was previously unaware of.
It is one of those rare accounts that makes a very strong case for NATO expansion being a core issue, whilst still being critical of various Russian figures and policies where it is warranted.
It would have been nice to see the author make more than a fleeting mention, towards the end of the book, of America's missile defence system that has spread east through Europe like an untamed weed.
The cancelling of ABM & INF treaties were covered well but not linked to this system, a missed opportunity.
Wonderful piece of work regardless.
September 24, 2025
With so many biased (pro nato and pro west) media narratives, this (also biased) account was a breath of fresh air.
To me, the bias doesn’t account for significant lack of stars, because that is what his thesis is: the western origins of the Russia Ukraine issue. So many people only discuss Russias involvement with rarely anyone EVER knowing that the west played a huge role in instigating violence and agitation after being warned many times that their actions would be detrimental.
I also found that the author did point out where russia did not work in its own favor…it was heedlessly violent at pivotal moments when it should have laid low and focused on itself and its broader world relations.
Just a great read and I feel glad to have some more facts that are often left out of main stream narratives.
To me, the bias doesn’t account for significant lack of stars, because that is what his thesis is: the western origins of the Russia Ukraine issue. So many people only discuss Russias involvement with rarely anyone EVER knowing that the west played a huge role in instigating violence and agitation after being warned many times that their actions would be detrimental.
I also found that the author did point out where russia did not work in its own favor…it was heedlessly violent at pivotal moments when it should have laid low and focused on itself and its broader world relations.
Just a great read and I feel glad to have some more facts that are often left out of main stream narratives.
April 22, 2025
I found this a fascinating and informative book about events that I have only a very general understanding of. The book covers the period from the fall of the Soviet Union to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, and delves into the international relationships, attitudes, and actions that affected Russia's approach to the West. Much of this looks at how US foreign policy towards what it now saw as unimportant versus it's position in Europe and the Middle East, the push east of post Warsaw pact nations to become members of both the EU and Nato, and ultimately the nature of Putin and his regime. There is a lot here and I felt the author managed it well and had an accessible style that made it easy enough to follow. I was left with a much better understanding not just of how we got here with the war in Ukraine but also of recent European political history. Comprehensive and very readable, I did enjoy this.
My thanks to the publisher and NetGalley for the audiobook version in return for an honest review.
My thanks to the publisher and NetGalley for the audiobook version in return for an honest review.
August 28, 2025
If people can put their own prejudices and emotions to one side and read this from an objective position then I believe it can prove to be insightful and interesting. I’ve seen a few one star reviews given under the guise that the book is “pro-Russian”. Respectfully, I think those interpretations are a load of nonsense. The book provides solid historical background and interpretation of events relevant to the present day situation. I don’t think it paints any party in a particularly positive or negative light. Instead, it lays out facts relatively objectively and tries to demonstrate how decisions and actions (on both sides) have consequences. Those of which we are seeing today.
April 26, 2025
Thanks to NetGalley and Head of Zeus Audiobooks for the Audio ARC!
Hubris is a terrific look at long-ago, but still influential events that led to the eventual invasion of Ukraine by Vladimir Putin and Russia. This book details a lot of the failings of the world governments in the 90s and early 2000s that led to Putin seizing power. I learned a lot about the ways that UN and NATO policies led to the invasion of Ukraine. Very timely read, and very relevant to current world events.
Hubris is a terrific look at long-ago, but still influential events that led to the eventual invasion of Ukraine by Vladimir Putin and Russia. This book details a lot of the failings of the world governments in the 90s and early 2000s that led to Putin seizing power. I learned a lot about the ways that UN and NATO policies led to the invasion of Ukraine. Very timely read, and very relevant to current world events.
August 22, 2025
I like books that challenge my assumptions and this one hits the mark. Not convinced that America put Ukraine into a bad spot but the author does a very detailed deep dive into the history and current state of play between the US and Russia. Also has some stuff on Georgia. Very informative.
May 2, 2025
I just did not like it. Gave a lot of detail but little overarching analysis.
August 6, 2025
A very informative and excellent-written book. A true page turner.
March 17, 2025
good book
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