We make moral judgments about all sorts of things, both mundane and momentous. But are any of these moral judgments actually true? The moral error theorist argues that they are not. According to this view, when people make moral judgments (e.g.,"Stealing is morally wrong") although they purport to say true things about the world, in fact the world does not contain any of the properties or relations that would be necessary to render such judgments true. Nothing is morally right; nothing is morally wrong. The first part of this book argues in favor of this version of moral skepticism. Moral properties, it is claimed, have features that cannot be accommodated within the naturalistic worldview. Some of these problematic features pertain to the “reason-giving” nature of moral properties; some pertain to puzzles surrounding the notion of moral responsibility. Suppose, then, that we decided that this radical skepticism about morality is correct-what, then, should we do with our faulty moral discourse? The abolitionist presents the most obvious that we should just do away with morality (in the way that in the past we eliminated talk of bodily humors, say). The fictionalist presents a less obvious that we should retain moral discourse even though we know (at some level) that it is false. The second part of this book advocates an ambitious version of moral fictionalism. This book is a sequel to the author's 2001 work The Myth of Morality.
Morality: From Error to Fiction is a rigorous and thought-provoking exploration of one of the most challenging positions in contemporary metaethics. Richard Joyce revisits and expands his influential work on moral error theory, arguing that while moral judgments aim to describe objective moral facts, such facts do not exist. Rather than stopping at skepticism, he goes on to develop a compelling case for moral fictionalism, offering an innovative account of how moral discourse can remain useful even if it is not literally true.
One of the book's greatest strengths is its clarity and philosophical precision. Joyce carefully examines the assumptions underlying morality, engaging with questions about moral properties, practical reasons, and responsibility while addressing objections with characteristic rigor. His transition from defending moral error theory to advocating fictionalism gives readers a comprehensive framework for understanding both the challenges to objective morality and the practical implications of living without it.
Overall, Morality: From Error to Fiction is an outstanding contribution to contemporary moral philosophy and metaethics. It is essential reading for philosophers, students, and anyone interested in moral realism, moral skepticism, error theory, or the foundations of ethical thought. Whether or not readers ultimately agree with Joyce's conclusions, the book provides an intellectually rewarding and deeply engaging examination of morality's philosophical foundations.
The topic was interesting and Joyce has an ability to bring humor to such an abatract topic as meta-ethics. This I found helped the book from becoming too dense. Would recommend if interested in meta-ethics in particular, moral error theory.