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Death Is Our Business: Russian Mercenaries and the New Era of Private Warfare
"Extraordinary."-CHRIS MILLER, author of Chip War
"Incredible."-ANNIE JACOBSEN, author of Nuclear War, via X
From John Lechner, "an amazingly bold reporter" (Adam Hochschild), the shocking inside story of how the Wagner Group made private military companies inextricable from Russia's anti-Western foreign strategy.
In 2014, a well-trained, mysterious band of mercenaries arrived in Ukraine, part of Russia's first attempt to claim the country as its own. Upon ceasefire, the “Wagner Group” faded back into shadow, only to reemerge in the Middle East, where they'd go toe-to-toe with the U.S., and in Africa, where they'd earn praise for “tough measures” against insurgencies yet spark outrage for looting, torture, and civilian deaths. As Russia gained a foothold of influence abroad, Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin's Chef,” went from caterer to commander to single greatest threat Putin has faced in his over-twenty-year rule.
Dually armed with military and strategic prowess, the Wagner Group created a new market in a vast geopolitical landscape increasingly receptive to the promises of private actors. In this trailblazing account of the Group's origins and operations, John Lechner-the only journalist to report across its many warzones-brings us on the ground to witness Wagner partner with fragile nation states, score access to natural resources, oust peacekeeping missions, and cash in on conflicts reframed as Kremlin interests. After rebelling, Prigozhin faced an epic demise-but Wagner lives on, its political, business, and military ventures a pillar of Russian operations the world over.
Featuring exclusive interviews with over thirty Wagner Group members, Death Is Our Business is the terrifying true tale of the renegade militia that proved global instability is nothing if not an opportunity.
"Incredible."-ANNIE JACOBSEN, author of Nuclear War, via X
From John Lechner, "an amazingly bold reporter" (Adam Hochschild), the shocking inside story of how the Wagner Group made private military companies inextricable from Russia's anti-Western foreign strategy.
In 2014, a well-trained, mysterious band of mercenaries arrived in Ukraine, part of Russia's first attempt to claim the country as its own. Upon ceasefire, the “Wagner Group” faded back into shadow, only to reemerge in the Middle East, where they'd go toe-to-toe with the U.S., and in Africa, where they'd earn praise for “tough measures” against insurgencies yet spark outrage for looting, torture, and civilian deaths. As Russia gained a foothold of influence abroad, Wagner founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, known as “Putin's Chef,” went from caterer to commander to single greatest threat Putin has faced in his over-twenty-year rule.
Dually armed with military and strategic prowess, the Wagner Group created a new market in a vast geopolitical landscape increasingly receptive to the promises of private actors. In this trailblazing account of the Group's origins and operations, John Lechner-the only journalist to report across its many warzones-brings us on the ground to witness Wagner partner with fragile nation states, score access to natural resources, oust peacekeeping missions, and cash in on conflicts reframed as Kremlin interests. After rebelling, Prigozhin faced an epic demise-but Wagner lives on, its political, business, and military ventures a pillar of Russian operations the world over.
Featuring exclusive interviews with over thirty Wagner Group members, Death Is Our Business is the terrifying true tale of the renegade militia that proved global instability is nothing if not an opportunity.
283 pages, Kindle Edition
First published February 25, 2025
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May 15, 2025
In June 2023, it appeared for the first time there was a clear threat to the rule of Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin. This risk to Putin’s reign was fostered by the inability of Russian forces to achieve a quick victory after it invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and was unable to overthrow and replace Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The danger Putin faced was the work of the Wagner Group, under the leadership of Yevgeny Prigozhin, his former chef and caterer who led the armed rebellion against the Russian government. This rebellion, which lasted for about a day, was a culmination of simmering tensions between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense and the fact that the fighting had reached a World War I type of stalemate. Prigozhin accused the Russian military of shelling Wagner positions, refusing to resupply his troops, and also criticized the Russian leadership for their "maximalist positions" in the war in Ukraine. It is interesting to analyze Putin’s response to Prigozhin and his private army since it was Russia’s most effective fighting force against the Ukrainian army. The rebellion ultimately failed, as Prigozhin got cold feet as his army marched toward Moscow. Prigozhin turned his forces away from the Russian capital and reached an agreement to move Wagner forces to Belarus. However, in the end Prigozhin went the way of others who opposed Putin as he died in a plane crash on August 23, 2023. Despite the death of their leader, the Wagner group lives on with its political business and military ventures as a pillar of the Russian government’s operations the world over.
As the bloody conflict continues to play out in Ukraine journalist John Lechner’s latest book, DEATH IS OUR BUSINESS: RUSSIAN MERCENARIES AND THE NEW ERA OF PRIVATE WARFARE has been published at a propitious time. Lechner’s excellent monograph is an education describing the origins of the Wagner group, its methods, and operations. We witness how the Wagner group gains a foothold in fragile nation states, gains access to a country’s natural resources, removes peacekeeping forces, all to cash in on the instability of weak states that possess resources that are viewed as vital for Russian strategic interests, and the profitability of the group itself.
Lechner points out in his introduction that after a two hundred year hiatus, private warfare has returned, albeit in new ways. For most of history private armies and mercenaries were the norm, nevertheless at the end of the Thirty Years War (1660) European rulers saw the advantage in recruiting public standing armies within their borders. By the 19th century, the nation state was largely responsible for the prosecution of warfare on the continent. However, private armies were employed by colonial powers to subdue far-flung regions and governments would outsource the exploitation of colonies to private companies. Once decolonization made headway following World War II and late in the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union began to relax its financial and military support from previous colonial regions, they would partly turn to privatization both internally and externally. Newly independent countries would outsource their security requirements to private military companies, and the United States would turn to the privatization of warfare following 9/11. By 2010, private contractors outnumbered American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the most famous of which was Blackwater. Lechner describes two types of private military companies. First, mercenary companies are private armies that conduct autonomous military campaigns. Military enterprises, like Blackwater, augment a powerful state’s regular armed forces and embed with one government. Secondly, the two types were merged into a new novel private military company. This new organization was cultivated and advanced by Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Lechner delves into a number of Private Military Contractors (PMC) providing details on recruitment, operations, geographic involvement, and important personnel. However, the author’s most important focus is the Wagner Group under the direction and tight control of Yevgeny Prigozhin. In 2014, on the heels of Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Prigozhin linked up with Dmitry Utkin, a career soldier a member of an intelligence unit, and carried out training and proxy wars for the GRU to create the Wagner Group which would prove to be an effective fighting force with brutal enforcers in the rear. By 2015, working closely with the Ministry of Defense in Syria, and autonomously in northern and central Africa the group spread its influence and profitability. By 2018 Wagner forces seemed everywhere from Madagascar to Mozambique, in addition to becoming the “tip of the spear” of Russian assertiveness. By August 2022 Wagner mercenaries were fighting in eastern Ukraine and successfully reached the outskirts of Bakhmut. Prigozhin’s success rested on his ability to recognize opportunity in unstable situations, bringing a team together to take advantage of the situation in a nation’s capital and on the ground, especially in Africa which had over 100 million refugees, and employing social media highlighted by misinformation to enhance his reputation and ego.
Lechner is clear that today there is little distinction between soldiers and mercenaries in large part because of globalization. When one examines Russian recruitment of PMC and those in other countries it is clear that Lechner is correct. Russian mercenaries presented as “little green men,” many on “vacation” and began appearing in 2014 in Crimea and the Donbas. Lechner accurately explains Putin’s motivations involving the expansion of NATO, western plots against Russia, and his desire to recreate the Russian empire. Putin was supported by the growth of domestic nationalist Russian ideologues witnessed by the number of volunteers who came to fight in Ukraine believing that Ukraine belonged to Russia harkening back to Catherine the Great and Lenin who artificially designated Ukraine and Belarus.
The turning point for Prigozhin came with the invasion of Crimea as his contacts with the Ministry of Defense provided a degree of access to Putin who allowed him to become the handler of mercenaries in the Donbas – it is here that he and Utkin created the Wagner Group. Slowly they were able to do away with other mercenary leaders and centralize other separatist militias into one. This would be accomplished for the most part in 2015. Prigozhin was an entrepreneur who envisioned a PMC like Erik Prince’s Blackwater. He would get his start in Syria, supported the regime of Bashir Assad and helped arm, train, and participate in the brutal civil war designed to overthrow the murderous government in Damascus.
Russia formally intervened in Syria in 2015, and the first Wagner fighters entered the conflict in September of that year. Lechner describes the brutality of the civil war, highlighted by Assad’s use of poisonous gases, cluster bombs, and doing anything to remain in power. He could not have done so without the Wagner Group. The key for the group is that it developed its own esprit de corps. Their soldiers were mercenaries, but they were also Russian patriots, men willing to fight and die for the motherland, more so than the Russian military. Their success provided Prigozhin with greater access to Putin directly to circumvent the Ministry of Defense.
Lechner carefully lays out the structure of the Wagner Group and breaks it down into its military and business components. Prigozhin would create a corporate structure, first called Evro-Polis from which he negotiated contracts with governments and gained access to their natural resources, provided military services, and protection. The group drew from varying ideologies and priorities, most of which were various degrees of nationalists and white supremacists. Much of the group’s strategy was designed to seize oil and gas fields, mineral mining, and other lucrative opportunities in the countries they were involved.
The Wagner Group proliferated across central and northern Africa feasting on the resources of the Central African Republic, Libya, Chad, Sudan, Mali, Syria, and Niger. Most people think of the Wagner forces as it relates to the Donbas, but Lechner spends a good part of his monograph detailing how Prigozhin penetrated Africa, the contracts he signed, the coups and counter coups he was involved in, and the many personalities he dealt with, many of course were as ruthless as he was – perhaps that was why he was so successful. By 2021 Prigozhin and his PMC were truly global. The threat he represented for the west was proof to the Kremlin that his initiatives were a worthy investment. Their effectiveness was less important than the west’s reaction to them.
In developing his material, Lechner relied on interviews with the relevant government officials and soldiers, especially 30 members of the Wagner Group. Lechner’s success rests on beautiful first-person writing with granular reporting. Further, the author is an exceptional linguist as he speaks Russian and Chechen as well as Sango, the language of the Central African Republic. His interviews saw him travel across war zones in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East to the point he was almost kidnaped. Lechner witnessed the viciousness and cruelty in which the Wagner Group operated, a group that would eventually morph into a 50,000 man private army.
Prigozhin’s forces were initially deployed after the annexation of Crimea, a year later the Wagner Group was sent to the Donbas region to support the pro-Russian separatists. They would participate in destabilizing the region, taking control of key locations, and directly engaging in combat. A major component of their actions was to eliminate dissident pro-Russian commanders, potentially through assassination. The Wagner Group's actions contributed to the escalation of the Donbas conflict and the overall instability in eastern Ukraine. By 2022 and onward they played a significant role in the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, even recruiting prison inmates for frontline combat operations – estimated to number between 48-49,000. These men would die by the thousands in the Donbas meat grinder, but for Prigozhin they served their purpose. Eventually Prigozhin let his substantial ego get in the way and threatened to march on Moscow, as stated earlier it did not go well.
In the end, according to Nicolas Niarchos in his May 13, 2025, review in the New York Times, the Wagner Group “was an effective boogeyman, mercenaries of all stripes have proliferated across the map of this century’s conflicts, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Yemen. “The West was happy to leverage Wagner as shorthand for all the evils of a war economy,” Lechner writes. “But the reality is that the world is filled with Prigozhins.”
Lechner is right. When Wagner fell, others rose in its stead, although they were kept on a tighter leash by Russian military intelligence. In Ukraine, prisoners are still being used in combat and Russia maintains a tight lid on its casualty figures. Even if the war in Ukraine ends soon, as President Trump has promised, Moscow’s mercenaries will still be at work dividing their African cake. Prigozhin may be dead, but his hammer is still a tool: It doesn’t matter if he’s around to swing it or not.”
As the bloody conflict continues to play out in Ukraine journalist John Lechner’s latest book, DEATH IS OUR BUSINESS: RUSSIAN MERCENARIES AND THE NEW ERA OF PRIVATE WARFARE has been published at a propitious time. Lechner’s excellent monograph is an education describing the origins of the Wagner group, its methods, and operations. We witness how the Wagner group gains a foothold in fragile nation states, gains access to a country’s natural resources, removes peacekeeping forces, all to cash in on the instability of weak states that possess resources that are viewed as vital for Russian strategic interests, and the profitability of the group itself.
Lechner points out in his introduction that after a two hundred year hiatus, private warfare has returned, albeit in new ways. For most of history private armies and mercenaries were the norm, nevertheless at the end of the Thirty Years War (1660) European rulers saw the advantage in recruiting public standing armies within their borders. By the 19th century, the nation state was largely responsible for the prosecution of warfare on the continent. However, private armies were employed by colonial powers to subdue far-flung regions and governments would outsource the exploitation of colonies to private companies. Once decolonization made headway following World War II and late in the Cold War the United States and Soviet Union began to relax its financial and military support from previous colonial regions, they would partly turn to privatization both internally and externally. Newly independent countries would outsource their security requirements to private military companies, and the United States would turn to the privatization of warfare following 9/11. By 2010, private contractors outnumbered American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, the most famous of which was Blackwater. Lechner describes two types of private military companies. First, mercenary companies are private armies that conduct autonomous military campaigns. Military enterprises, like Blackwater, augment a powerful state’s regular armed forces and embed with one government. Secondly, the two types were merged into a new novel private military company. This new organization was cultivated and advanced by Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Lechner delves into a number of Private Military Contractors (PMC) providing details on recruitment, operations, geographic involvement, and important personnel. However, the author’s most important focus is the Wagner Group under the direction and tight control of Yevgeny Prigozhin. In 2014, on the heels of Russia’s invasion of Crimea, Prigozhin linked up with Dmitry Utkin, a career soldier a member of an intelligence unit, and carried out training and proxy wars for the GRU to create the Wagner Group which would prove to be an effective fighting force with brutal enforcers in the rear. By 2015, working closely with the Ministry of Defense in Syria, and autonomously in northern and central Africa the group spread its influence and profitability. By 2018 Wagner forces seemed everywhere from Madagascar to Mozambique, in addition to becoming the “tip of the spear” of Russian assertiveness. By August 2022 Wagner mercenaries were fighting in eastern Ukraine and successfully reached the outskirts of Bakhmut. Prigozhin’s success rested on his ability to recognize opportunity in unstable situations, bringing a team together to take advantage of the situation in a nation’s capital and on the ground, especially in Africa which had over 100 million refugees, and employing social media highlighted by misinformation to enhance his reputation and ego.
Lechner is clear that today there is little distinction between soldiers and mercenaries in large part because of globalization. When one examines Russian recruitment of PMC and those in other countries it is clear that Lechner is correct. Russian mercenaries presented as “little green men,” many on “vacation” and began appearing in 2014 in Crimea and the Donbas. Lechner accurately explains Putin’s motivations involving the expansion of NATO, western plots against Russia, and his desire to recreate the Russian empire. Putin was supported by the growth of domestic nationalist Russian ideologues witnessed by the number of volunteers who came to fight in Ukraine believing that Ukraine belonged to Russia harkening back to Catherine the Great and Lenin who artificially designated Ukraine and Belarus.
The turning point for Prigozhin came with the invasion of Crimea as his contacts with the Ministry of Defense provided a degree of access to Putin who allowed him to become the handler of mercenaries in the Donbas – it is here that he and Utkin created the Wagner Group. Slowly they were able to do away with other mercenary leaders and centralize other separatist militias into one. This would be accomplished for the most part in 2015. Prigozhin was an entrepreneur who envisioned a PMC like Erik Prince’s Blackwater. He would get his start in Syria, supported the regime of Bashir Assad and helped arm, train, and participate in the brutal civil war designed to overthrow the murderous government in Damascus.
Russia formally intervened in Syria in 2015, and the first Wagner fighters entered the conflict in September of that year. Lechner describes the brutality of the civil war, highlighted by Assad’s use of poisonous gases, cluster bombs, and doing anything to remain in power. He could not have done so without the Wagner Group. The key for the group is that it developed its own esprit de corps. Their soldiers were mercenaries, but they were also Russian patriots, men willing to fight and die for the motherland, more so than the Russian military. Their success provided Prigozhin with greater access to Putin directly to circumvent the Ministry of Defense.
Lechner carefully lays out the structure of the Wagner Group and breaks it down into its military and business components. Prigozhin would create a corporate structure, first called Evro-Polis from which he negotiated contracts with governments and gained access to their natural resources, provided military services, and protection. The group drew from varying ideologies and priorities, most of which were various degrees of nationalists and white supremacists. Much of the group’s strategy was designed to seize oil and gas fields, mineral mining, and other lucrative opportunities in the countries they were involved.
The Wagner Group proliferated across central and northern Africa feasting on the resources of the Central African Republic, Libya, Chad, Sudan, Mali, Syria, and Niger. Most people think of the Wagner forces as it relates to the Donbas, but Lechner spends a good part of his monograph detailing how Prigozhin penetrated Africa, the contracts he signed, the coups and counter coups he was involved in, and the many personalities he dealt with, many of course were as ruthless as he was – perhaps that was why he was so successful. By 2021 Prigozhin and his PMC were truly global. The threat he represented for the west was proof to the Kremlin that his initiatives were a worthy investment. Their effectiveness was less important than the west’s reaction to them.
In developing his material, Lechner relied on interviews with the relevant government officials and soldiers, especially 30 members of the Wagner Group. Lechner’s success rests on beautiful first-person writing with granular reporting. Further, the author is an exceptional linguist as he speaks Russian and Chechen as well as Sango, the language of the Central African Republic. His interviews saw him travel across war zones in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East to the point he was almost kidnaped. Lechner witnessed the viciousness and cruelty in which the Wagner Group operated, a group that would eventually morph into a 50,000 man private army.
Prigozhin’s forces were initially deployed after the annexation of Crimea, a year later the Wagner Group was sent to the Donbas region to support the pro-Russian separatists. They would participate in destabilizing the region, taking control of key locations, and directly engaging in combat. A major component of their actions was to eliminate dissident pro-Russian commanders, potentially through assassination. The Wagner Group's actions contributed to the escalation of the Donbas conflict and the overall instability in eastern Ukraine. By 2022 and onward they played a significant role in the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, even recruiting prison inmates for frontline combat operations – estimated to number between 48-49,000. These men would die by the thousands in the Donbas meat grinder, but for Prigozhin they served their purpose. Eventually Prigozhin let his substantial ego get in the way and threatened to march on Moscow, as stated earlier it did not go well.
In the end, according to Nicolas Niarchos in his May 13, 2025, review in the New York Times, the Wagner Group “was an effective boogeyman, mercenaries of all stripes have proliferated across the map of this century’s conflicts, from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Yemen. “The West was happy to leverage Wagner as shorthand for all the evils of a war economy,” Lechner writes. “But the reality is that the world is filled with Prigozhins.”
Lechner is right. When Wagner fell, others rose in its stead, although they were kept on a tighter leash by Russian military intelligence. In Ukraine, prisoners are still being used in combat and Russia maintains a tight lid on its casualty figures. Even if the war in Ukraine ends soon, as President Trump has promised, Moscow’s mercenaries will still be at work dividing their African cake. Prigozhin may be dead, but his hammer is still a tool: It doesn’t matter if he’s around to swing it or not.”
October 9, 2024
ARC from Netgalley.
An interesting and well-written read. I don't know if it is truly long enough to be comprehensive. It is a very good primer.
An interesting and well-written read. I don't know if it is truly long enough to be comprehensive. It is a very good primer.
February 18, 2025
Dmitry Syty, head Wagner honcho in the Central African Republic, is a “slim twenty-something sporting long shaggy hair” who starts a brewery in Bangui as part of an effort to increase Russia’s popularity in CAR. Thought this was funny.
June 27, 2025
One of the few non-fiction books that I’ve recently read that I wished were longer. Amazing the quantity of Wagner fighters the author was able to build a relationship with for this book.
August 29, 2025
A nonfiction narrative of the evolvement, power, wealth, military and political prowess of the mercenary operations of the Russian controlled Wagner group.
The military arms and brutality reached Africa and Ukraine, and the Middle East….
Well written and thoroughly researched. Interesting and sad, and another chapter ‘of the way of the world’.
The military arms and brutality reached Africa and Ukraine, and the Middle East….
Well written and thoroughly researched. Interesting and sad, and another chapter ‘of the way of the world’.
July 25, 2025
Gripping read providing a far better view of PMC's than Scahill's bleeding heart nonsense directed at Blackwater.
May 30, 2025
LOTS of good detail on the promised subject-- perhaps too much for me to process quickly. To really get something out of this, I think it requires a slow and thoughtful read... which is not what I did. So it's probably me, not the book. I'm generally interested, but this was probably more than I cared to focus on. If it's an interest and you have some background about global conflicts (in Ukraine and Africa, primarily), this is probably a much better read than what I'm rating it.
November 19, 2025
This is a compelling story of the world's most popular private military, PMC Wagner. The pace is perfect and keeps you deeply interested in the crescendo of the PMC and it's popularity seeking founder.
May 4, 2025
This book is a very detailed and interesting read on the Wagner group's rise and eventual demise. The author having interviewed current and former Wagner fighters added a perspective usually not told.
August 10, 2025
Dave's Summary
John Lechner’s book, "Death Is Our Business," traces the rise, global reach, and violent fall of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner Group, Russia’s most notorious private military company. Beginning as a Kremlin-backed tool for covert foreign policy in places like Syria, Libya, and Africa, Wagner evolved from a shadowy mercenary force into a central player in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Prigozhin, a former convict turned caterer with deep political connections, proved adept at seizing opportunities in instability, building a network of fighters—many recruited from prisons—who were expendable in the Kremlin’s eyes. Wagner’s battlefield tactics, secrecy, and deniability allowed Russia to wage war while keeping political costs low, mirroring the U.S. use of private contractors during the War on Terror.
The book also explores the broader history of mercenaries and the geopolitical value of outsourcing war. Lechner shows how Prigozhin’s operations blurred the lines between state and private warfare, influencing events from African civil conflicts to U.S. elections. His death in a mysterious 2023 plane explosion—widely believed to be an assassination—did not end Wagner’s influence. The group’s methods have been absorbed into the Russian military, cementing a “Wagnerization” of warfare. In the end, Prigozhin’s career reflects both the enduring appeal of private armies and the dangerous entanglement of business, politics, and violence in modern geopolitics.
Top Takeaways
1. Russia’s quick-victory expectations in Ukraine collapsed, creating demand for Wagner’s experienced mercenaries.
2. Prigozhin built Wagner by exploiting instability, prison recruitment, and battlefield deniability.
3. Private militaries allow governments to wage war with fewer political costs and less public scrutiny.
4. Wagner’s roots trace to both Russian state sponsorship and the global growth of private contractors like Blackwater.
5. The group expanded globally, operating in Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic.
6. Prisoner recruitment in 2022 became a defining feature of Wagner’s manpower strategy.
7. Wagner’s tactics—small, agile assault units, heavy use of artillery, execution of deserters—proved effective but brutal.
8. Prigozhin used media and disinformation, including U.S. election interference, to boost his profile and secure funding.
9. His 2023 death in a plane explosion is widely seen as Kremlin retaliation, though officially blamed on a grenade.
10. Wagner’s methods have been adopted by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, ensuring its influence continues beyond Prigozhin’s life.
Memorable Highlights
Without hundreds of thousands of private contractors employed by firms like Blackwater, the War on Terror, as it had been fought and planned, would have required a civilian draft. To detractors, private contractors made it far easier for U.S. administrations to go to war without the “sufficient backing and involvement of the nation.” The U.S. military is not obligated to report deaths of contractors in Afghanistan, where more civilian contractors were killed than U.S. troops, the political costs of war were kept, for a long time, artificially low.
On September 27, 2022, the cameras in prison colonies across the Samara region were switched off.34 Administrators called on a few prisoners and threatened “harsh” punishments if a single photo emerged of whatever was to come. Then, the prisoners, or zeky, of No. 6 were called into the yard. The man walked up to the assembled convicts. A baseball cap in hand. Then he began to shout, in a blunt style zeky know well. “I am a representative of a private military company,” he yelled over the crowd. “You’ve probably heard of it … it’s called PMC Wagner. And I have the permission from higher authorities for a prisoner-to-soldier program.” The war the man was recruiting for was harsh. The Chechen campaigns Russians were familiar with didn’t come close. My losses, the man said, are two-and-a-half times greater than Stalingrad. The rewards for those who survive would be profound. “I can take anyone out of this prison. And in exchange for six months of fighting, you get a clean record and pay up to 240,000 rubles [$2,700] per month. Your children and family will be eligible for government benefits, and you’ll have access to credit again.”
John Lechner’s book, "Death Is Our Business," traces the rise, global reach, and violent fall of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner Group, Russia’s most notorious private military company. Beginning as a Kremlin-backed tool for covert foreign policy in places like Syria, Libya, and Africa, Wagner evolved from a shadowy mercenary force into a central player in Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Prigozhin, a former convict turned caterer with deep political connections, proved adept at seizing opportunities in instability, building a network of fighters—many recruited from prisons—who were expendable in the Kremlin’s eyes. Wagner’s battlefield tactics, secrecy, and deniability allowed Russia to wage war while keeping political costs low, mirroring the U.S. use of private contractors during the War on Terror.
The book also explores the broader history of mercenaries and the geopolitical value of outsourcing war. Lechner shows how Prigozhin’s operations blurred the lines between state and private warfare, influencing events from African civil conflicts to U.S. elections. His death in a mysterious 2023 plane explosion—widely believed to be an assassination—did not end Wagner’s influence. The group’s methods have been absorbed into the Russian military, cementing a “Wagnerization” of warfare. In the end, Prigozhin’s career reflects both the enduring appeal of private armies and the dangerous entanglement of business, politics, and violence in modern geopolitics.
Top Takeaways
1. Russia’s quick-victory expectations in Ukraine collapsed, creating demand for Wagner’s experienced mercenaries.
2. Prigozhin built Wagner by exploiting instability, prison recruitment, and battlefield deniability.
3. Private militaries allow governments to wage war with fewer political costs and less public scrutiny.
4. Wagner’s roots trace to both Russian state sponsorship and the global growth of private contractors like Blackwater.
5. The group expanded globally, operating in Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Madagascar, and the Central African Republic.
6. Prisoner recruitment in 2022 became a defining feature of Wagner’s manpower strategy.
7. Wagner’s tactics—small, agile assault units, heavy use of artillery, execution of deserters—proved effective but brutal.
8. Prigozhin used media and disinformation, including U.S. election interference, to boost his profile and secure funding.
9. His 2023 death in a plane explosion is widely seen as Kremlin retaliation, though officially blamed on a grenade.
10. Wagner’s methods have been adopted by Russia’s Ministry of Defense, ensuring its influence continues beyond Prigozhin’s life.
Memorable Highlights
Without hundreds of thousands of private contractors employed by firms like Blackwater, the War on Terror, as it had been fought and planned, would have required a civilian draft. To detractors, private contractors made it far easier for U.S. administrations to go to war without the “sufficient backing and involvement of the nation.” The U.S. military is not obligated to report deaths of contractors in Afghanistan, where more civilian contractors were killed than U.S. troops, the political costs of war were kept, for a long time, artificially low.
On September 27, 2022, the cameras in prison colonies across the Samara region were switched off.34 Administrators called on a few prisoners and threatened “harsh” punishments if a single photo emerged of whatever was to come. Then, the prisoners, or zeky, of No. 6 were called into the yard. The man walked up to the assembled convicts. A baseball cap in hand. Then he began to shout, in a blunt style zeky know well. “I am a representative of a private military company,” he yelled over the crowd. “You’ve probably heard of it … it’s called PMC Wagner. And I have the permission from higher authorities for a prisoner-to-soldier program.” The war the man was recruiting for was harsh. The Chechen campaigns Russians were familiar with didn’t come close. My losses, the man said, are two-and-a-half times greater than Stalingrad. The rewards for those who survive would be profound. “I can take anyone out of this prison. And in exchange for six months of fighting, you get a clean record and pay up to 240,000 rubles [$2,700] per month. Your children and family will be eligible for government benefits, and you’ll have access to credit again.”
June 7, 2025
Mercenaries have been around almost as long as war. The rise of the nation state in the last 600 years has changed the role of the mercenary, leading to the creation of PMCs (private military companies)...the most well known being the East India Company in the 1600-1800s (read The Anarchy by William Dalrymple for this fascinating story), and now Blackwater (USA) and Wagner Group (Russia). Recent iterations of the PMC provide convenient moral/ethical cover for nation state activities, most recently in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Sahel, Syria, and Ukraine. This book focuses on Wagner Group. Their history in Ukraine in 2014 really sets the table for the invasion in 2022. Their time in Africa in between is of interest, but this section of the book was very hard to follow as the locations and cast of characters are large and everchanging. Wagner Group's adventures and misadventures in the recent invasion of Ukraine and brief rebellious march towards Moscow are a cautionary tale for both the PMCs and the nation states that hire them. The author is uniquely qualified to tell these tales, but the book can be hard to follow if you don't come to it with significant background knowledge of recent geopolitics.
March 9, 2025
Fascinating insight into PMC Wagner and it's evolution from a minor player in the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, to misadventures in Syria, to a player across multiple countries in Africa, at times in support of Russian foreign policy and at times, filling in a void left by the West, especially France. Even while the African operations and contracts continued, Wagner and Prigozhin came to play an outsized role in the second invasion of Ukraine. A very public role in a war the Russians have sought to keep deliberately vague. Ultimately culminating in an almost Hollywood movie of armed mutiny. The book is a good introduction into understanding the role PMCs in general have played and will play, and of Wagner in particular.
July 24, 2025
John Lechner’s Death Is Our Business is an extensively researched and crisply reported account of the Wagner Group and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin. The book explores how Prigozhin’s drive for personal enrichment and influence with Putin fueled Wagner’s rise as a shadowy instrument of Russian power in Syria, Ukraine and Africa.
Lechner’s on-the-ground reporting adds depth and nuance to these complex conflicts, revealing the blend of ambition, brutality and geopolitics that define Wagner’s global operations. Essential reading for understanding how Wagner and other private military companies serve both state interests and personal agendas.
Lechner’s on-the-ground reporting adds depth and nuance to these complex conflicts, revealing the blend of ambition, brutality and geopolitics that define Wagner’s global operations. Essential reading for understanding how Wagner and other private military companies serve both state interests and personal agendas.
July 27, 2025
My only criticism is regarding map placement. The book is so dense that I wish there was a section to flip back and forth a bit more seamlessly, but this is mostly a personal preference and isn't a slight in any way against the material. Excellent and proactive coverage that provides valuable context.
March 23, 2025
Really good! Lechner does a lot of on the ground reporting with Wagner fighters which is pretty rare. Also most of the book takes place in Africa instead of tunnel visioning on Ukraine which is very refreshing. I learned a lot!
March 9, 2025
Great read! Makes me want to learn more about how Wagner operates and if they had similar internal issues as did Blackwater before they started rebranding themselves over and over
May 4, 2025
Interesting book - I’d probably give 3.75 but closer to 4 than 3. I appreciated the author’s examination of not only the Wagner group but also how Wagner illustrated a larger trend in geopolitics today, and perhaps the future.
December 23, 2025
A very well-done history that doesn't overstay its welcome by dallying too long on Prigozhin's origins, etc. If anything, I felt like the Ukraine saga and the odd attempted coup could have been discussed in more detail, but I really appreciated Lechner's focus on keeping this a lean, brisk non-fiction read that devotes plenty of attention to Africa.
April 8, 2025
Probably the best insight was that Wagner was not directly tied to the Russian MOD- it was a vehicle for Prigozhin to seek wealth and influence- and that Wagner's sweet spot was in Africa, where it helped Russia influence but at the price of granting the mercs. greater autonomy.
August 6, 2025
Lots of insights into what Lechner argues is not a one-off but rather an increasingly widespread phenomenon.
June 29, 2025
A deeply researched and insightful piece investigation into the Wagner group and its role in Russian increasing grab for global influence.
April 6, 2025
A pretty interesting set of stories about one weird and interesting guy. It felt at times like Lechner was trying to tie it all together, but ultimately i don’t think he made a super salient point about Wagner and the environment in which it grew. A few times he gestured at something really interesting: almost everyone involved, Russian or Western, seemed more interested in being scared of Wagner than in pragmatically assessing their capabilities. I would have liked to see a deeper interrogation of that. Or more discussion of how states diffuse power to non-state actors, foreign and domestic, as a way to square the circle of a popular mandate and a competing need to do war. Maybe a different book.
October 24, 2025
The moment in June 2023 when everyone thought we were witnessing live-streamed the fall of the Russian regime—when Wagner Group, named for the German composer (Hitler’s favorite), marched on Moscow. Tanks, vehicles, thousands of Russian mercenaries experienced on battlefields from Ukraine to Crimea to Syria to the Central African Republic and across the Sahel left the frontlines and raced north all the way to the outskirts of Russia’s capital, hellbent, or so the story went from Yevgeny Prigozhin, their oligarch leader, on overthrowing the Ministry of Defense which, supposedly, had failed to adequately supply frontline troops. Or was Prigozhin, a.k.a. Putin’s chef who once served George W. in a state dinner in St. Petersburg, simply trying to take out one oligarch (Sergei Shoigu) to put himself inside Putin’s inner circle? All the while playing up the “truth telling” about the corrupt oligarchs and conduct of the war in Ukraine on social media to the delight and empowerment of Russia’s own citizens?
The exploding and crashing of Prigozhin’s plane, along with all onboard, in August 2023, with no clear rebuttal by Putin about whether the Kremlin was involved or not, probably says it all. But the story about Prigozhin and how Wagner Group became this semi-mythical private army of one man’s own is years in the making, and that is what John Lechner uncovers in approximately 9 hours of audiobook listening. (I could take or leave the person they found to record the audiobook (not the author), guy sounds a bit too much like “badass” advertiser voice, though I ended up finishing anyways.)
Two things particularly noteworthy: the history of the shootout between U.S. Green Berets and Wagner Group in Syria (wow, did we kinda dance around the line of starting a Third World War with that one) where Russian mercenaries made up of volunteers, ex-convicts, pro-imperium boys out for a sense of adventure suffered heavy, heavy casualties against vehicle-mounted .50 cals with something like a CROW-system control and American air support that quickly took out Wagner’s antiaircraft capacities and just laid waste before they even got within a 500 meters. Oh, and what about Russian air support? Well, the Ministry of Defense back in Moscow could neither confirm nor deny the presence of Russian “forces” in and around that oil field in Syria. Oh, and in case you had any doubt what U.S. and Russian meddling in the Middle East had to do with—yeah, literally a shootout over an oil field.
Second thing: Lechner’s on-point reflections about the state of mercenary forces around the world. In a mirroring of what happened in June 2023 when Wagner Group shot down four Russian military aircraft, killing Russian servicemembers, on their “March for Justice” to Moscow, so in Sudan (where Wagner forces had been deployed on one side or the other) a Sudanese mercenary group turned on its own head of state and began a civil war. In other words, states and governments around the world create and fund mercenary groups at their own peril. That goes for the United States as well. Undoubtedly, we are in a time when “war for hire” is increasingly in demand and there’s plenty of experienced operators out there from Syria to Chad to Niger to North Carolina more than willing to make a buck fighting someone else’s fight, i.e. taking care of “problems” for governments who don’t want to be seen as getting their hands dirty.
It's apparently a booming, ever-evolving business these days—worth billions—and it’s only growing. Will we, one day, have toothpaste conglomerates duking it out with their own private armies? Stranger things have happened.
The exploding and crashing of Prigozhin’s plane, along with all onboard, in August 2023, with no clear rebuttal by Putin about whether the Kremlin was involved or not, probably says it all. But the story about Prigozhin and how Wagner Group became this semi-mythical private army of one man’s own is years in the making, and that is what John Lechner uncovers in approximately 9 hours of audiobook listening. (I could take or leave the person they found to record the audiobook (not the author), guy sounds a bit too much like “badass” advertiser voice, though I ended up finishing anyways.)
Two things particularly noteworthy: the history of the shootout between U.S. Green Berets and Wagner Group in Syria (wow, did we kinda dance around the line of starting a Third World War with that one) where Russian mercenaries made up of volunteers, ex-convicts, pro-imperium boys out for a sense of adventure suffered heavy, heavy casualties against vehicle-mounted .50 cals with something like a CROW-system control and American air support that quickly took out Wagner’s antiaircraft capacities and just laid waste before they even got within a 500 meters. Oh, and what about Russian air support? Well, the Ministry of Defense back in Moscow could neither confirm nor deny the presence of Russian “forces” in and around that oil field in Syria. Oh, and in case you had any doubt what U.S. and Russian meddling in the Middle East had to do with—yeah, literally a shootout over an oil field.
Second thing: Lechner’s on-point reflections about the state of mercenary forces around the world. In a mirroring of what happened in June 2023 when Wagner Group shot down four Russian military aircraft, killing Russian servicemembers, on their “March for Justice” to Moscow, so in Sudan (where Wagner forces had been deployed on one side or the other) a Sudanese mercenary group turned on its own head of state and began a civil war. In other words, states and governments around the world create and fund mercenary groups at their own peril. That goes for the United States as well. Undoubtedly, we are in a time when “war for hire” is increasingly in demand and there’s plenty of experienced operators out there from Syria to Chad to Niger to North Carolina more than willing to make a buck fighting someone else’s fight, i.e. taking care of “problems” for governments who don’t want to be seen as getting their hands dirty.
It's apparently a booming, ever-evolving business these days—worth billions—and it’s only growing. Will we, one day, have toothpaste conglomerates duking it out with their own private armies? Stranger things have happened.
May 12, 2025
This is a great book about Wagner, the famous Russian PMC. I mostly knew about the origins and use in Ukraine, the prison recruiting program, and time in Syria, although some of the details of the Battle of Conoco Fields in Syria were new (the Wagner + militia forces vs. US special operations and SDF). The new and interesting content was primarily Wagner's operations in Africa, and the motivations for why all of this was happening.
Specifically, it looks like operations in Africa were much less Kremlin-directed and more "commercial" than I thought, but were also tied into Russian ambitions for military bases and involvement. I had no idea just how low-stakes the Central African Republic operations were (millions of dollars being enough to substantially shift outcomes), and how broadly positive much of the Wagner interventions throughout Africa were.
Ultimately, Wagner was a vehicle for Prigozhin to try to be an inner circle "player" in Russian politics, rather than just an implementor for others -- and it looks like he was well on his way to that through Africa and Syria, but the 100x scale required for Ukraine operations, and resulting conflicts with other people especially in MOD, were his undoing.
This book does a good job of explaining the basics and going into details without excessive moralizing either way (even though the author was embedded with Ukraine forces which were routinely fighting Wagner) -- just factual reporting and intellectual analysis.
Specifically, it looks like operations in Africa were much less Kremlin-directed and more "commercial" than I thought, but were also tied into Russian ambitions for military bases and involvement. I had no idea just how low-stakes the Central African Republic operations were (millions of dollars being enough to substantially shift outcomes), and how broadly positive much of the Wagner interventions throughout Africa were.
Ultimately, Wagner was a vehicle for Prigozhin to try to be an inner circle "player" in Russian politics, rather than just an implementor for others -- and it looks like he was well on his way to that through Africa and Syria, but the 100x scale required for Ukraine operations, and resulting conflicts with other people especially in MOD, were his undoing.
This book does a good job of explaining the basics and going into details without excessive moralizing either way (even though the author was embedded with Ukraine forces which were routinely fighting Wagner) -- just factual reporting and intellectual analysis.
July 31, 2025
Why do we have to live in a world dominated by stupid power mad psychopaths? It's more than a little depressing. This book, which is focused primarily on Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner Group, has a one damned evil thing after another quality about it. The pride of the Wagner mercenaries in their extreme senseless brutality is horrible. I wish I could say that it is shocking, but we have been so numbed by senseless cruelty that it is hard to shock anyone anymore. Another execution with a sledgehammer? Ho hum.
I did learn a few things about the rise of the Wagner Group. There was a bit of a rough start. Problems in Syria and Sudan, but then some successes in the Central African Republic, Mali and elsewhere in Africa. They became a force to be reckoned with in Africa, seemingly on a roll. Next came Ukraine. It was a golden opportunity. Easy recruitment of cannon fodder soldiers from prisons and a chance to become a big power player closer to home. But Prigozhin overplayed his hand. What an idiot! It was so obvious. And then after his unsuccessful mutiny, did he really think that Putin would let him live and rebuild in Belarus? If Prigozhin had had a brain that was even 10% of the size of his ego, he would have handed over all of his Ukraine operations to Putin and moved back to a focus on Africa where he could be brutal, useful and non-threatening to Putin.
I did learn a few things about the rise of the Wagner Group. There was a bit of a rough start. Problems in Syria and Sudan, but then some successes in the Central African Republic, Mali and elsewhere in Africa. They became a force to be reckoned with in Africa, seemingly on a roll. Next came Ukraine. It was a golden opportunity. Easy recruitment of cannon fodder soldiers from prisons and a chance to become a big power player closer to home. But Prigozhin overplayed his hand. What an idiot! It was so obvious. And then after his unsuccessful mutiny, did he really think that Putin would let him live and rebuild in Belarus? If Prigozhin had had a brain that was even 10% of the size of his ego, he would have handed over all of his Ukraine operations to Putin and moved back to a focus on Africa where he could be brutal, useful and non-threatening to Putin.
June 10, 2025
The book's subtitle accurately captures its content: it explores the political impact of private military organizations.
The author provides a brief overview of the role of mercenaries in various conflicts throughout history but primarily focuses on recent events, particularly those leading to and including the war between Russia and Ukraine.
His main emphasis is on the Russian private military organization known as the Wagner Group, examining its involvement in various global conflicts and the resulting political implications.
Due to the numerous events discussed, the timeline is somewhat fragmented. The author frequently shifts back and forth in time, which can be confusing without taking notes. Keeping track of all the key political players can also be challenging without a reference or a well-constructed diagram.
The book is written clearly and concisely. The author presents facts, lists events, and then analyzes their causes and effects.
The most significant benefit this book offers is its insight into the behind-the-scenes political maneuvers of various nations, particularly Russia, in contemporary military conflicts. This information is absent from mainstream media.
Anyone interested in international military interventions should read this book. I highly recommend it.
The author provides a brief overview of the role of mercenaries in various conflicts throughout history but primarily focuses on recent events, particularly those leading to and including the war between Russia and Ukraine.
His main emphasis is on the Russian private military organization known as the Wagner Group, examining its involvement in various global conflicts and the resulting political implications.
Due to the numerous events discussed, the timeline is somewhat fragmented. The author frequently shifts back and forth in time, which can be confusing without taking notes. Keeping track of all the key political players can also be challenging without a reference or a well-constructed diagram.
The book is written clearly and concisely. The author presents facts, lists events, and then analyzes their causes and effects.
The most significant benefit this book offers is its insight into the behind-the-scenes political maneuvers of various nations, particularly Russia, in contemporary military conflicts. This information is absent from mainstream media.
Anyone interested in international military interventions should read this book. I highly recommend it.
September 2, 2025
I needed to know a little bit more about Wagner PMC, and well, this book largely didn't disappoint either. It's not an exhaustive read, and could have had more to learn, but overall I do get a feeling of that I learned more than I knew before reading the book. It's informative, as you may have gathered, and also shows the underbelly of the Russian PMCs that generally don't get much attention compared to groups like Black Water/Xe/Triple Canopy/Executive Outcomes and so on. It highlights the Prighozin years mainly, and ends on the note of his assassination after the "March for Justice", when Wagner turned on Russia during the current conflict. What's interesting is that it includes some photos of the organization, and the text reads well too, so I think you'd like this book about the organization.
August 13, 2025
Interesting read, incredibly researched, nice conclusion, but not the strongest presentation of the content as a whole. I found myself floating in and out of the audiobook, only grounded by the narrator's mispronunciation of Ukrainian and Russian terms or places (even Kyiv, which isn't niche or hard to check your pronunciation of!). I'd recommend it if you're not familiar with the basics of how private military companies work, but otherwise, I think news articles would suffice.
June 15, 2025
How does the US wage wars without a draft? Mercenaries. In the US we have firms like blackwater. Russia had the Wagner group. This is their story.
Incredibly well researched and full of on the ground insights; not as well written. Reads more like a list of facts than a compelling story. I was left wanting more synthesis and big picture thinking.
Incredibly well researched and full of on the ground insights; not as well written. Reads more like a list of facts than a compelling story. I was left wanting more synthesis and big picture thinking.
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