What do you think?
Rate this book
A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks
After more than two years of bitter negotiations during which combatants & civilians continued to suffer casualties, the Korean armistice was concluded in July 1953. Focusing on the Americans formulation of negotiating positions & on their attempts to coordinate political goals with military tactics, Rosemary Foot here charts the tortuous path to peace & offers a new explanation for the agonizing length of the talks. She also takes into account the role of the Western allies & the Indian, South Korean, North Korean, & Chinese governments as she examines the complex international setting in which the armistice took place.
248 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1990
13 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
November 21, 2018
A clear, solid and well-researched history of the Korean armistice negotiations, which dragged on for two years, consisted of no less than 575 meetings, and took place amidst fighting that resulted in almost half of America’s wartime casualties, with huge losses on the South Korean and communist sides as well. Foot focuses on the question of why the talks took so long to reach a conclusion. To answer this, Foot looks at America’s relations with its allies, America’s domestic political situation, and the era’s “psychological and bureaucratic features.”
Foot makes sense of the debate between Ridgway and his superiors over whether or not a show of force would further US interests or snub world opinion (she ends up siding against Ridgway’s view). She also describes how both sides seemed to view each and every item on the agenda as non-negotiable rather than as a basis for a settlement. Foot also describes how the US was less inclined than both its allies and enemies to see opportunities for negotiations (due to the need to appease Rhee, the military’s cool attitude to negotiations, and Truman’s opposition to the forcible repatriation of POWs) and how the opening of the talks was heavily influenced by these allies. She also covers the obstructionism of Rhee, whose forces violated the neutrality of Panmunjom and released a sizable number of North Korean prisoners on the verge of the final settlement, which prolonged the war by a month.
Foot also brings up the contentious prisoner-of-war issue, arguing that this was even more complicated at the time than histories acknowledge, and that few communist prisoners wanted to return home, which the Chinese and North Koreans found unacceptable. Washington knew that many of the POW camps were also run by Chinese nationalists, which had a certain dampening effect on those prisoners who wanted to return home, and Foot notes the hypocrisy and stubbornness of the Communists’ position on POWs. She also argues that the effect of Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ nuclear threats has been exaggerated, pointing out that the vast majority of communist concessions occurred before these hints were dropped, and questioning whether the Chinese even received Dulles’ veiled threats (besides, Mao had a history of downplaying and even belittling the effect a nuclear weapon could have on a battlefield)
A rich, thorough, interesting and engaging work, although Foot claims that the US has some sort of natural aversion to negotiations, and coverage of the communist side is much lighter.
Foot makes sense of the debate between Ridgway and his superiors over whether or not a show of force would further US interests or snub world opinion (she ends up siding against Ridgway’s view). She also describes how both sides seemed to view each and every item on the agenda as non-negotiable rather than as a basis for a settlement. Foot also describes how the US was less inclined than both its allies and enemies to see opportunities for negotiations (due to the need to appease Rhee, the military’s cool attitude to negotiations, and Truman’s opposition to the forcible repatriation of POWs) and how the opening of the talks was heavily influenced by these allies. She also covers the obstructionism of Rhee, whose forces violated the neutrality of Panmunjom and released a sizable number of North Korean prisoners on the verge of the final settlement, which prolonged the war by a month.
Foot also brings up the contentious prisoner-of-war issue, arguing that this was even more complicated at the time than histories acknowledge, and that few communist prisoners wanted to return home, which the Chinese and North Koreans found unacceptable. Washington knew that many of the POW camps were also run by Chinese nationalists, which had a certain dampening effect on those prisoners who wanted to return home, and Foot notes the hypocrisy and stubbornness of the Communists’ position on POWs. She also argues that the effect of Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ nuclear threats has been exaggerated, pointing out that the vast majority of communist concessions occurred before these hints were dropped, and questioning whether the Chinese even received Dulles’ veiled threats (besides, Mao had a history of downplaying and even belittling the effect a nuclear weapon could have on a battlefield)
A rich, thorough, interesting and engaging work, although Foot claims that the US has some sort of natural aversion to negotiations, and coverage of the communist side is much lighter.
Displaying 1 of 1 review