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The Defeat and Attrition of the 12. SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend”: Volume I: The Normandy Bridgehead Battles 7–11 June 1944
“Following his two-volume work, Bloody Verrieres, Arthur W Gullachsen has again written a fantastic book, this time covering the opening days of the Normandy battles involving the Allied Forces and the Hitlerjugend Division. His attention to detail regarding the units fighting between the 6.6.44 to the 11.6.44 is immense." — Russell A. Hart, Ph.D., Professor of History, Hawai'i Pacific University and author of Clash of Arms How the Allies Won in Normandy
Following the Normandy invasion of 6 June, 1944, Heersgruppe B under German Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel rushed reserves to the newly created bridgehead in order to crush it and drive the Allied forces into the sea. One of these armored reserves was the newly created 12. SS-Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend. Extremely well equipped and at near full strength by mid-1944 standards, it was seen as an extremely capable formation that could defeat any Allied invasion.
During this period studied in this volume, 7-11 June 1944, the 12. SS-Panzer-Division attempted to capture and hold the battlefield initiative, and in conjunction with other Panzer-Divisionen, throw what would become the Second British Army into the sea. The main thesis presented will be that despite this division's best efforts, it was defeated by a firm Allied defence that repulsed their offensive operations, eventually robbing the Germans of the initiative in a grinding series of bridgehead battles.
This first volume will study combat in the period 7-11 June 1944 in the eastern sector of the Normandy Bridgehead. Chapters will analyze the Anglo-Canadian D-Day assault and the deployment of the division, then analyze in detail the fighting of the Hitlerjugend in the following northern Caen, Putot, Bretteville l'Orgueilleuse, Norrey-en-Bessin, Hill 103, Le-Mesnil-Patry, and finally Rots. Also studied will be contrasting German and Anglo-Canadian tactical doctrine, the influence of tactical airpower, and the war crimes committed by the Hitlerjugend immediately after the invasion.
The conclusion will reinforce the thesis presented above and a detailed set of appendices will analyze German personnel, equipment, and armored losses during the battles, and losses inflicted on the Allies. This will be Volume 1 of a planned multi-volume commitment.
Following the Normandy invasion of 6 June, 1944, Heersgruppe B under German Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel rushed reserves to the newly created bridgehead in order to crush it and drive the Allied forces into the sea. One of these armored reserves was the newly created 12. SS-Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend. Extremely well equipped and at near full strength by mid-1944 standards, it was seen as an extremely capable formation that could defeat any Allied invasion.
During this period studied in this volume, 7-11 June 1944, the 12. SS-Panzer-Division attempted to capture and hold the battlefield initiative, and in conjunction with other Panzer-Divisionen, throw what would become the Second British Army into the sea. The main thesis presented will be that despite this division's best efforts, it was defeated by a firm Allied defence that repulsed their offensive operations, eventually robbing the Germans of the initiative in a grinding series of bridgehead battles.
This first volume will study combat in the period 7-11 June 1944 in the eastern sector of the Normandy Bridgehead. Chapters will analyze the Anglo-Canadian D-Day assault and the deployment of the division, then analyze in detail the fighting of the Hitlerjugend in the following northern Caen, Putot, Bretteville l'Orgueilleuse, Norrey-en-Bessin, Hill 103, Le-Mesnil-Patry, and finally Rots. Also studied will be contrasting German and Anglo-Canadian tactical doctrine, the influence of tactical airpower, and the war crimes committed by the Hitlerjugend immediately after the invasion.
The conclusion will reinforce the thesis presented above and a detailed set of appendices will analyze German personnel, equipment, and armored losses during the battles, and losses inflicted on the Allies. This will be Volume 1 of a planned multi-volume commitment.
542 pages, Kindle Edition
Published August 31, 2024
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February 17, 2025
This is one of the finest operational histories I have ever read.
This is a meticulously researched critical analysis of the operations of the German 12th SS Division, “Hitlerjugend,” in the immediate aftermath of D-Day. The author leveraged seldom-used primary sources to precisely establish the activities of the units involved on both sides of the action.
The writing is commendably clear, and the author describes extraordinarily complex actions in an understandable and fast-paced, entertaining narrative.
The author is a professional soldier as well as a first-rate historian. This perspective enabled the author to leaven his analysis with an understanding of intangible factors such as friction, time, fatigue, and communication lapses. The result is a highly authentic description of this division’s struggles and failures to mass its combat power in its doctrinal method of attack.
A secondary theme of the book is the atrocities committed by the Hitlerjugend Division during this period, particularly the execution of Canadian prisoners of war. The author does not sidestep these war crimes but shows how these criminal acts were as much a leadership failure within the division as a cultural phenomenon of veterans used to the brutality of the Eastern Front.
Overall, the author makes a compelling argument that the Hitlerjugend Division was forced by a number of factors to fight a defensive battle for which it was ill-suited. This prevented it from launching the combined-arms, division-level counter-attack for which it was designed.
Readers interested in combined arms warfare, the Normandy campaign, Third Reich studies, and British and Canadian Army history will not be disappointed in this book.
This is a meticulously researched critical analysis of the operations of the German 12th SS Division, “Hitlerjugend,” in the immediate aftermath of D-Day. The author leveraged seldom-used primary sources to precisely establish the activities of the units involved on both sides of the action.
The writing is commendably clear, and the author describes extraordinarily complex actions in an understandable and fast-paced, entertaining narrative.
The author is a professional soldier as well as a first-rate historian. This perspective enabled the author to leaven his analysis with an understanding of intangible factors such as friction, time, fatigue, and communication lapses. The result is a highly authentic description of this division’s struggles and failures to mass its combat power in its doctrinal method of attack.
A secondary theme of the book is the atrocities committed by the Hitlerjugend Division during this period, particularly the execution of Canadian prisoners of war. The author does not sidestep these war crimes but shows how these criminal acts were as much a leadership failure within the division as a cultural phenomenon of veterans used to the brutality of the Eastern Front.
Overall, the author makes a compelling argument that the Hitlerjugend Division was forced by a number of factors to fight a defensive battle for which it was ill-suited. This prevented it from launching the combined-arms, division-level counter-attack for which it was designed.
Readers interested in combined arms warfare, the Normandy campaign, Third Reich studies, and British and Canadian Army history will not be disappointed in this book.
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