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El misterio de la conciencia (Paidso Studios / Studies)
El funcionamiento del cerebro y el misterio de la conciencia humana son dos de los asuntos más importantes con los que deben enfrentarse la filosofía y la ciencia de nuestros días, pues afectan a todos los ámbitos de la existencia, desde la inteligencia artificial hasta las promesas de una vida ultraterrena. La mayoría de la gente cree, en uno u otro sentido, en la idea de que la conciencia está por encima y más allá de todo. John Searle, en cambio, sostiene que los estados de conciencia no son otra cosa que avatares del cerebro causados por procesos neurológicos. Y para demostrar su afirmación no sólo se opone a las tesis de pensadores como Daniel Dennett o Roger Penrose, según los cuales las características del cerebro son susceptibles de representación y reproducción mediante programas de ordenador, sino también a la idea de que la conciencia pueda reducirse a una serie de pasos como los diseñados para ciertos programas informáticos. A partir de ahí, destaca el papel que debe desempeñar la neurociencia en el progreso hacia una verdadera comprensión de los problemas de la conciencia y, acto seguido, sugiere vías de intervención posterior que puedan conducirnos a una explicación biológica del surgimiento de estados de conciencia a partir de la actividad de las neuronas y otros componentes del cerebro.
200 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1990
63 people are currently reading
1848 people want to read
About the author
John Rogers Searle
97 books376 followersJohn Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is an American philosopher and was the Slusser Professor of Philosophy and Mills Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley). Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy, he was the first tenured professor to join the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley. He received the Jean Nicod Prize in 2000, and the National Humanities Medal in 2004.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 58 reviews
April 17, 2012
This book is not for a beginner in the Philosophy of Mind. For that, you want Searle's Mind: A Brief Introduction. That said, as someone who entered into this book cynical about materialism, I think this book should be subtitled, "How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Brain".
This is a superb book for a couple different reasons. First of all, it presents a fascinating exploration of the problems in cognitive science (at least the philosophical subset) by looking over a number of key texts in the field with a leader in the field. Second of all, it pulls the curtain back on professional philosophy, revealing exchanges between philosophers and the way that conversations are carried out. Anyone considering a career in professional philosophy should read these texts.
Searle does not just review other texts, though: he is advocating his own position, which is that consciousness should not be treated as some kind of weird "other stuff", but instead should be viewed as a natural process. He admits to being baffled about how consciousness could be natural, but compares it to how baffled the 18th century natural philosophers were about "life", and whether life was purely mechanical or whether there was some irreducible vital quality.
On a personal side, I was pleased to find that my analysis of Consciousness Explained was roughly in line with Searle's. Dennet's response makes him sound like quite a bully, although it should be noted that Searle had the final edit (and gave himself the last word) in that conversation, so perhaps that's not fair.
The book as a whole is great. The overview of the other texts were enjoyable and gave me a few interesting books to add to my reading list. The introductory and concluding chapters alone were worth the price of entry: Searle's refinement of the Chinese Box thought experiment, as well as some of the clarifying points at the end, really helped to make sense of some of the issues that are circulating.
This is a superb book for a couple different reasons. First of all, it presents a fascinating exploration of the problems in cognitive science (at least the philosophical subset) by looking over a number of key texts in the field with a leader in the field. Second of all, it pulls the curtain back on professional philosophy, revealing exchanges between philosophers and the way that conversations are carried out. Anyone considering a career in professional philosophy should read these texts.
Searle does not just review other texts, though: he is advocating his own position, which is that consciousness should not be treated as some kind of weird "other stuff", but instead should be viewed as a natural process. He admits to being baffled about how consciousness could be natural, but compares it to how baffled the 18th century natural philosophers were about "life", and whether life was purely mechanical or whether there was some irreducible vital quality.
On a personal side, I was pleased to find that my analysis of Consciousness Explained was roughly in line with Searle's. Dennet's response makes him sound like quite a bully, although it should be noted that Searle had the final edit (and gave himself the last word) in that conversation, so perhaps that's not fair.
The book as a whole is great. The overview of the other texts were enjoyable and gave me a few interesting books to add to my reading list. The introductory and concluding chapters alone were worth the price of entry: Searle's refinement of the Chinese Box thought experiment, as well as some of the clarifying points at the end, really helped to make sense of some of the issues that are circulating.
July 9, 2015
I give Searle credit for recognizing that there is no current explanation or understanding of how consciousness works. However, despite this lack of explanation in the physical realm he goes on to state the wonderfully outdated Cartesian ideas that have increasingly hindered rather than helped this understanding. I think that arguing along the lines of 'we will never have a third-person understanding of consciousness because consciousness is simply a first-person experience' and that neuroscience and other fields of research into consciousness' lack of explanation is an automatic sign that there is no explanatoin are both faulty arguments and one's that seem to keep humanity in a further state of ignorance rather than in a state of exploration and revelation.
Perhaps consciousness is something that cannot be explained, perhaps it is simply a first person "insight" that only each individuals can know of themselves better than anyone else, but I do not believe that at all to be the case. I kind of see the problems of consciousness in the same way that various philosophical problems from the greeks or even more modern philosophies were solved as human progress and understanding of the world expanded. Luckily for Searle and the others in his camp, we are not yet at the stage at which consciousness has a vast and proven framework with which it works so there theses are, in their eyes, currently holding ground. But I can not stand on ground myself that bases itself off the idea of ignorance (or better stated, that my own personal understanding of myself and my world is automatically more colorful than those around me, in a sort of "third-person ignorance" way) and hope that these grounds hold. I much rather prefer the further research into these ideas, especially as our understanding of the world progresses, as a potential means of truly explaining these concepts and not just leaving them as a pandora's box not needing to be open.
I should state that this is, however, not a formal book in it's own right. It is more or less just a republication of Searle's review of other books in regards to consciousness. He attempts to argue against most of the ideas expressed in the books and works of others, and although he does manage to make some good points at times, I believe he is misguided in his overarching idea of consciousness. It is the sort of things that philosophers do that irritates the rest of the world, and it is the sort of philosophy that I personally stand against.
Since it is a review of other books and thus not a formal writing, I believe it is better as a companion to other works of philosophy of consciousness, although even in that regard there are enough arguments between philosophers that you can find anywhere else online simply by searching that the ideas in this book are nothing that couldn't be acquired in shorter versions elsewhere. The area of consciousness is probably the msot hotly debated area of philosophy, so there is no shortage of arguments and counter-arguments and counter-counter-arguments from all sides.
Perhaps consciousness is something that cannot be explained, perhaps it is simply a first person "insight" that only each individuals can know of themselves better than anyone else, but I do not believe that at all to be the case. I kind of see the problems of consciousness in the same way that various philosophical problems from the greeks or even more modern philosophies were solved as human progress and understanding of the world expanded. Luckily for Searle and the others in his camp, we are not yet at the stage at which consciousness has a vast and proven framework with which it works so there theses are, in their eyes, currently holding ground. But I can not stand on ground myself that bases itself off the idea of ignorance (or better stated, that my own personal understanding of myself and my world is automatically more colorful than those around me, in a sort of "third-person ignorance" way) and hope that these grounds hold. I much rather prefer the further research into these ideas, especially as our understanding of the world progresses, as a potential means of truly explaining these concepts and not just leaving them as a pandora's box not needing to be open.
I should state that this is, however, not a formal book in it's own right. It is more or less just a republication of Searle's review of other books in regards to consciousness. He attempts to argue against most of the ideas expressed in the books and works of others, and although he does manage to make some good points at times, I believe he is misguided in his overarching idea of consciousness. It is the sort of things that philosophers do that irritates the rest of the world, and it is the sort of philosophy that I personally stand against.
Since it is a review of other books and thus not a formal writing, I believe it is better as a companion to other works of philosophy of consciousness, although even in that regard there are enough arguments between philosophers that you can find anywhere else online simply by searching that the ideas in this book are nothing that couldn't be acquired in shorter versions elsewhere. The area of consciousness is probably the msot hotly debated area of philosophy, so there is no shortage of arguments and counter-arguments and counter-counter-arguments from all sides.
November 16, 2020
Konuya dair okuduğum en keyifli kitaplardan biri.
Özellikle Dennett ve Chalmers'a ayrılan bölümlerde; zeki, bilgili ve sivri dilli filozofların fikren birbirlerini yıpratmaları tam seyirlik.
Searl ev sahibi olmanın verdiği avantajı da kullanarak ibreyi kendine çevirmeyi başarıyor. Geliştirdiği biyolojik doğalcılık fikri ile hem bilinci bir gizem olmaktan çıkarmaya hem de klasik maddeci ve ikici kalıpların dışında tanımlamaya çalışıyor. Ancak, sıklıkla sağduyuya oynuyor. Bolca kullandığı "apaçık" kelimesi ile dile getirdiği iddialarının bilimsel olduklarından fazlasıyla emin.
Özellikle Dennett ve Chalmers'a ayrılan bölümlerde; zeki, bilgili ve sivri dilli filozofların fikren birbirlerini yıpratmaları tam seyirlik.
Searl ev sahibi olmanın verdiği avantajı da kullanarak ibreyi kendine çevirmeyi başarıyor. Geliştirdiği biyolojik doğalcılık fikri ile hem bilinci bir gizem olmaktan çıkarmaya hem de klasik maddeci ve ikici kalıpların dışında tanımlamaya çalışıyor. Ancak, sıklıkla sağduyuya oynuyor. Bolca kullandığı "apaçık" kelimesi ile dile getirdiği iddialarının bilimsel olduklarından fazlasıyla emin.
August 5, 2007
Philosopher John R. Searle is known for his strong disagreement toward the idea of strong AI --that human thought is merely computational. I myself, having much exposed to individuals such as neuroscientist Francis Crick, computer scientist Marvin Minksy, and cognitivist Steven Pinker (and the likes), believe that biology and mathematics are two places to start in understanding completely human thoughts. In The Mystery of Consciousness Searle is debating human thought explorer --Kurt Godel, Daniel Dennet to name only two. I believe we are only one generation lifetime away from understanding the human brain.
April 20, 2009
Like Minds Brains and Science 1984 Reith Lectures, which I read earlier, Searle's collection of essays is a good survey of current positions. Searle offers six critiques of other prominent philosophers of consciousness, and the ones that interested me most were those of Daniel Dennett and Roger Penrose.
I read about half of Dennett's Consciousness Explained and quit in disgust, because I thought his reductivist effort to substitute behavioral paraphrases for features of consciousness amounted to an impoverishment of intellectual life. Searle is perhaps the foremost champion of the idea that consciousness is irreducible, even though it may ultimately be explained neurologically.
Searle criticizes Roger Penrose for approaching consciousness from the point of view of information, that is, as something that is computable. I have much more sympathy and fascination with this approach. Searle argues that information, as handled by a computer, or even by an abacus, has no semantic content, no relationship to the world, except as it is interpreted by human beings. This is a good argument, but I am not sure it is correct. If people can express semantic relationships in language, and if computers in some way do interact with the world (with sensors, for example), then I think it may be plausable to consider computers as handling semantic content.
In passing, Searle dismisses panpsychism, the position that all things, even rocks and trees, have consciousness. While rocks don't have consciousness in the way that humans do, there is something to be said for the idea that every object shows the impact of its environment, and thus reflects the rest of the world.
This points to a larger truth, I think, that consciousness ranges from the simple to the complex, just as life does, and that any single defining characteristic is arbitrary. I think an author like Antonio Damasio who shows the continuity of conscious phenomena from animals to humans, and from unconscious to conscious, is on the right track.
A characteristic that seems to me important, but which Searle neglects, is self-knowledge, the ability not only to know something, but to know that one knows it, to be self-aware. While I wouldn't want to deny that an animal reacting to pain is conscious in a way, even if it lacks self-knowledge, nevertheless I think that self-knowledge is critical to what human beings mean by consciousness. Or, as Akeel Bilgrami argues, self-knowledge is key to being a moral agent.
I read about half of Dennett's Consciousness Explained and quit in disgust, because I thought his reductivist effort to substitute behavioral paraphrases for features of consciousness amounted to an impoverishment of intellectual life. Searle is perhaps the foremost champion of the idea that consciousness is irreducible, even though it may ultimately be explained neurologically.
Searle criticizes Roger Penrose for approaching consciousness from the point of view of information, that is, as something that is computable. I have much more sympathy and fascination with this approach. Searle argues that information, as handled by a computer, or even by an abacus, has no semantic content, no relationship to the world, except as it is interpreted by human beings. This is a good argument, but I am not sure it is correct. If people can express semantic relationships in language, and if computers in some way do interact with the world (with sensors, for example), then I think it may be plausable to consider computers as handling semantic content.
In passing, Searle dismisses panpsychism, the position that all things, even rocks and trees, have consciousness. While rocks don't have consciousness in the way that humans do, there is something to be said for the idea that every object shows the impact of its environment, and thus reflects the rest of the world.
This points to a larger truth, I think, that consciousness ranges from the simple to the complex, just as life does, and that any single defining characteristic is arbitrary. I think an author like Antonio Damasio who shows the continuity of conscious phenomena from animals to humans, and from unconscious to conscious, is on the right track.
A characteristic that seems to me important, but which Searle neglects, is self-knowledge, the ability not only to know something, but to know that one knows it, to be self-aware. While I wouldn't want to deny that an animal reacting to pain is conscious in a way, even if it lacks self-knowledge, nevertheless I think that self-knowledge is critical to what human beings mean by consciousness. Or, as Akeel Bilgrami argues, self-knowledge is key to being a moral agent.
March 18, 2010
This is an overview and critique of mid-1990s thinking about the issue of consciousness. I read the 1997 edition which updates the 1990 edition, and includes some exchanges between Searle and people critiqued in the book.
Searle has his own ideas and measures others against them. If you're familiar with Dennett, Penrose, Edelman, Crick and their theories of consciousness, you'll find the book a fairly easy read. If they're all new to you, you may have to grapple a bit. While Searle defines terms well, if a concept is new, it may take time for it to soak in and feel familiar.
Overall, Searle maintains consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, eschews Cartesian duality. It may or may not be, but I think the path to discovering what it is will be through the brain, so I'm on his side. There were times I felt he was more than fair to muddy thinkers in presenting and critiquing their arguments; there were other times I felt he may have been a little too critical and didn't present the ideas of others fully.
For example, I'm not convinced he really understood the information theory people's idea of what information is in their terms. He seemed to confuse our common idea of information with theirs by saying it was user-dependent. If I understand info-theory definitions correctly, to them, information simply means coherence, which is not dependent on a user or observer. If you don't clearly understand another's thesis, it's hard to make good arguments against it.
Overall, an interesting read.
Searle has his own ideas and measures others against them. If you're familiar with Dennett, Penrose, Edelman, Crick and their theories of consciousness, you'll find the book a fairly easy read. If they're all new to you, you may have to grapple a bit. While Searle defines terms well, if a concept is new, it may take time for it to soak in and feel familiar.
Overall, Searle maintains consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the brain, eschews Cartesian duality. It may or may not be, but I think the path to discovering what it is will be through the brain, so I'm on his side. There were times I felt he was more than fair to muddy thinkers in presenting and critiquing their arguments; there were other times I felt he may have been a little too critical and didn't present the ideas of others fully.
For example, I'm not convinced he really understood the information theory people's idea of what information is in their terms. He seemed to confuse our common idea of information with theirs by saying it was user-dependent. If I understand info-theory definitions correctly, to them, information simply means coherence, which is not dependent on a user or observer. If you don't clearly understand another's thesis, it's hard to make good arguments against it.
Overall, an interesting read.
October 15, 2019
Searle starts with his own thought experiment on consciousness - the Chinese Room. From there, he gives a short survey of consciousness as a phenomenon, going through many different authors on the subject. He seeks to understand each author on their own terms and then apply those terms to see if can contain his own experience of consciousness. He finds something lacking in each author, although he also finds aspects of their exploration admirable.
Ultimately for Searle consciousness is an experience, and thus "exists" at a different level than brain processes -- even if brain processes can be correlated with each aspect of conscious awareness. What is missing from each author's text is a way to account for the self-awareness of each agent, although in the case of Dennett this is purposeful as he argues against such a phenomenon as existing in the first place.
All in all, a good summary and critique of many different positions. This suggests in large part that consciousness is a social phenomenon as well, as recognition of self-awareness requires that the recognitizer be able to recognize a subjectivity "someone being there" in the object of recognition -- something we've seen before when slaves and natives from foreign lands were thought by European scientists as being "well trained" or somehow an animal that was not aware or even a person. The implications of this aspect are not discussed by Searle, but this social layer acts as a field of existent for a subjectivity that cannot be recognized is in that sense, non-existent for the recognizer. If only all self aware creatures could speak the same language, then we would know the extent of each being's awareness.
Ultimately for Searle consciousness is an experience, and thus "exists" at a different level than brain processes -- even if brain processes can be correlated with each aspect of conscious awareness. What is missing from each author's text is a way to account for the self-awareness of each agent, although in the case of Dennett this is purposeful as he argues against such a phenomenon as existing in the first place.
All in all, a good summary and critique of many different positions. This suggests in large part that consciousness is a social phenomenon as well, as recognition of self-awareness requires that the recognitizer be able to recognize a subjectivity "someone being there" in the object of recognition -- something we've seen before when slaves and natives from foreign lands were thought by European scientists as being "well trained" or somehow an animal that was not aware or even a person. The implications of this aspect are not discussed by Searle, but this social layer acts as a field of existent for a subjectivity that cannot be recognized is in that sense, non-existent for the recognizer. If only all self aware creatures could speak the same language, then we would know the extent of each being's awareness.
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March 19, 2025This is my first real excursion into philosophy of the mind, so it’s kind of hard to rate this book. I will say that it was shockingly easy to read, almost as if it was a standard non-fiction book and not a philosophy book written by a prominent philosopher.
Searle’s theory seems interesting and has the virtue of being very simple, but I honestly do not know enough about philosophy of the mind to say whether it’s good. Obviously—and I think with any amount of self-reflection this should be perfectly evident—eliminative reductionism is impossible, and Searle makes this very clear very persuasively. My main issue is only whether it’s even conceivable that consciousness is physical—I really don’t know. I’m gonna need to read a lot more about this topic before I can say.
I’m a Christian and a theist, so I hold to something like classical dualism, but I don’t necessarily have any arguments for dualism directly; any justification right now would come from my justifications for theism. I’m really excited to do more research though, this is a fascinating subdiscipline.
Searle’s theory seems interesting and has the virtue of being very simple, but I honestly do not know enough about philosophy of the mind to say whether it’s good. Obviously—and I think with any amount of self-reflection this should be perfectly evident—eliminative reductionism is impossible, and Searle makes this very clear very persuasively. My main issue is only whether it’s even conceivable that consciousness is physical—I really don’t know. I’m gonna need to read a lot more about this topic before I can say.
I’m a Christian and a theist, so I hold to something like classical dualism, but I don’t necessarily have any arguments for dualism directly; any justification right now would come from my justifications for theism. I’m really excited to do more research though, this is a fascinating subdiscipline.
June 15, 2025
Far and away the best book on the subject I’ve read. Searle seems to appreciate more than most what the true problem of consciousness is and what any conceivable solution must look like. The one blemish I would say is how he sticks to a view of conscious choice which seems to be at odds with neuroscience – perhaps he needed to express those parts in a different way.
April 4, 2019
Good.
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March 11, 2019قبل از اینکه در مورد کتاب بخوام توضیح بدم یکم در مورد نویسنده کتاب مینویسم. جان سرل یکی از افراد بسیار مهم و تاثیر گذار در علوم شناختی و فلسفه ذهن هست که افرادی که در این حوزه مطالعه دارند ایشون رو خوب میشناسند. آقای سرل دکتری خودشون رو از دانشگاه آکسفورد گرفتن و الان هم استاد فلسفه دانشگاه برکلی آمریکا هستن. معروفترین چیزی که بشه ایشون رو باهاش معرفی کرد بازی اتاق چینی برای اثبات رد نظریه محاسباتی ذهن هست. بنابراین ایشون یکی از معتبرترین افراد معاصر در زمینه فلسفه ذهن هستن. کتابهایی هم که منتشر کردن در زمینههای فلسفه ذهن و آگاهی و خودآگاهی بوده .
اما خود کتاب. کتاب راز آگاهی کتابی هست در مورد آگاهی و متشکل هست از یک مقدمه و موخره که خود جان سرل نوشته و بررسی پنج مقاله در مورد آگاهی که نویسندگان بزرگ دیگری که در این زمینهها فعالیت داشرند نوشتهاند. و جان سرل ابتدا خلاصه و چکیدهای از اون مقالات بیان میکنه و بعد شروع به نقد اونها میکنه. برای خوندن کتاب به نظرم باید قبلا کمی طالعه در مورد علوم شناختی و فلسفه ذهن داشته باشین تا با ادبیات موضوع و نظریههای مختلفی که در مورد آنها بحث میشه دید خوبی داشته باشید. بنابراین بدون مطالعه قبلی خوندن این کتاب رو پیشنهاد نمیکنم.
از اونجایی که کتاب بیشتر فضای فلسفی دارد برای همین نیاز به تفکر و تحلیل داره. به همین خاطر فکر میکنم یک بار خوندن کتاب برای این فضا کم باشه و من خودم حتما باید چندین بار دیگر بخونم. ولی یک جانبداری خاصی جان سرل تو این کتاب داره که در بررسی و نقد پنج کتاب و نظریه دیگه خیلی قاطعانه نظریهها رو رد میکنه و من در فضای فلسفی این قاطعیت رو نمیپسندم. زمانی که شما خودت اثبات و دلیل محکمی برای نظریه خودت نداری نمیتوانی از نظر منطقی نظریات دیگه رو هم با دلایل محکم رد کنی. از این منظر جانبداری جان سرل رو در کتاب نمیپسندم. ولی به عنوان شخصی که نظاره گر بحث فلاسفه ذهن هستم و با تفکر در اندیشههاشون بدون اینکه بخوام جانبداری کس خاصی رو انجام بدم، از نظریههاشون لذت میبرم.
در کل حوزه فلسفه ذهن به دلیل اینکه شکل و رنگ انسانشناسانه داره و برای من که دانشجوی هوش مصنوعی هستم و در مورد علوم شناختی زیاد مطالعه میکنم خیلی فضای جذابی هست. مفهوم آگاهی انسان هنوز یک راز بسیار بزرگ جهان مادی ما هست و قرار نیست فعلا هم جواب و حل قاطعی برای اون پیدا بشه. ولی فکر کردن به اون و ساختار دادن به کوچکترین ویژگیهای اون میتونه برای کسانی که مدلسازی های مصنوعی از ذهن انسان انجام میدن بسیار مفید باشه.
اما خود کتاب. کتاب راز آگاهی کتابی هست در مورد آگاهی و متشکل هست از یک مقدمه و موخره که خود جان سرل نوشته و بررسی پنج مقاله در مورد آگاهی که نویسندگان بزرگ دیگری که در این زمینهها فعالیت داشرند نوشتهاند. و جان سرل ابتدا خلاصه و چکیدهای از اون مقالات بیان میکنه و بعد شروع به نقد اونها میکنه. برای خوندن کتاب به نظرم باید قبلا کمی طالعه در مورد علوم شناختی و فلسفه ذهن داشته باشین تا با ادبیات موضوع و نظریههای مختلفی که در مورد آنها بحث میشه دید خوبی داشته باشید. بنابراین بدون مطالعه قبلی خوندن این کتاب رو پیشنهاد نمیکنم.
از اونجایی که کتاب بیشتر فضای فلسفی دارد برای همین نیاز به تفکر و تحلیل داره. به همین خاطر فکر میکنم یک بار خوندن کتاب برای این فضا کم باشه و من خودم حتما باید چندین بار دیگر بخونم. ولی یک جانبداری خاصی جان سرل تو این کتاب داره که در بررسی و نقد پنج کتاب و نظریه دیگه خیلی قاطعانه نظریهها رو رد میکنه و من در فضای فلسفی این قاطعیت رو نمیپسندم. زمانی که شما خودت اثبات و دلیل محکمی برای نظریه خودت نداری نمیتوانی از نظر منطقی نظریات دیگه رو هم با دلایل محکم رد کنی. از این منظر جانبداری جان سرل رو در کتاب نمیپسندم. ولی به عنوان شخصی که نظاره گر بحث فلاسفه ذهن هستم و با تفکر در اندیشههاشون بدون اینکه بخوام جانبداری کس خاصی رو انجام بدم، از نظریههاشون لذت میبرم.
در کل حوزه فلسفه ذهن به دلیل اینکه شکل و رنگ انسانشناسانه داره و برای من که دانشجوی هوش مصنوعی هستم و در مورد علوم شناختی زیاد مطالعه میکنم خیلی فضای جذابی هست. مفهوم آگاهی انسان هنوز یک راز بسیار بزرگ جهان مادی ما هست و قرار نیست فعلا هم جواب و حل قاطعی برای اون پیدا بشه. ولی فکر کردن به اون و ساختار دادن به کوچکترین ویژگیهای اون میتونه برای کسانی که مدلسازی های مصنوعی از ذهن انسان انجام میدن بسیار مفید باشه.
January 25, 2018
Terrific mental/philosophical queries posed here with implications for self-awareness, AI, and just understanding other sub-human zombies you encounter in everyday life.
Dennett denies the existence of conscious states completely. His critics claim that according to his theory, he cannot distinguish between conscious zombies (computers that simulate actions that make them appear conscious, but aren't) and human beings. His response is that any machine regardless of what it is made of that behaved like us would have to have consciousness just as we do. His claim is that we are zombies, that there is no difference between us and machines that lack conscious states. Dennett argues that there is no such thing as conscious life for us, animals, zombies or anything else. There is only complex zombie-hood. In one of his several discussions of zombies, he considers whether there is any difference between human pain and suffering and a zombie's:
"Why should a zombie's crushed hopes matter less than a conscious person's crushed hopes? There is a trick with mirrors here that should be exposed and discarded. Consciousness, you say, is what matters, but then you cling to doctrines about consciousness that systematically prevent us from getting any purchase on why it matters. Postulating special inner qualities that are not only private and intrinsically valuable, but also unconfirmable and uninvestigatable is just obsucratism."
To analyze beliefs you have to have desires, and conversely, to analyze desires you have to have beliefs.
Dennett denies the existence of conscious states completely. His critics claim that according to his theory, he cannot distinguish between conscious zombies (computers that simulate actions that make them appear conscious, but aren't) and human beings. His response is that any machine regardless of what it is made of that behaved like us would have to have consciousness just as we do. His claim is that we are zombies, that there is no difference between us and machines that lack conscious states. Dennett argues that there is no such thing as conscious life for us, animals, zombies or anything else. There is only complex zombie-hood. In one of his several discussions of zombies, he considers whether there is any difference between human pain and suffering and a zombie's:
"Why should a zombie's crushed hopes matter less than a conscious person's crushed hopes? There is a trick with mirrors here that should be exposed and discarded. Consciousness, you say, is what matters, but then you cling to doctrines about consciousness that systematically prevent us from getting any purchase on why it matters. Postulating special inner qualities that are not only private and intrinsically valuable, but also unconfirmable and uninvestigatable is just obsucratism."
To analyze beliefs you have to have desires, and conversely, to analyze desires you have to have beliefs.
February 13, 2018
Very interesting compilation of six of Searle's reviews of others' books regarding the foundations and/or existence of consciousness. I found both Searle's analyses of the books very insightful, and his arguments against authors' views powerful. I think that Searle is probably right in arguing that taking neuroscience seriously requires admitting that consciousness can only be caused by (or realised in) some system with similar causal power (or sufficient threshold causal power) to the human (or some animals') brain.
As a note, it is concerning that at least two other reviewers on this book's main Goodreads page say that Searle is flogging a form of Cartesianism, or thinks that consciousness is scientifically inexplicable and epiphenomenal. Searle made it quite clear numerous times that he thinks that an adequate account of consciousness is not dualist (or monist, for that matter), should be explicable by modern science, and that the denial of its existence or causal efficacy is highly implausible.
As a note, it is concerning that at least two other reviewers on this book's main Goodreads page say that Searle is flogging a form of Cartesianism, or thinks that consciousness is scientifically inexplicable and epiphenomenal. Searle made it quite clear numerous times that he thinks that an adequate account of consciousness is not dualist (or monist, for that matter), should be explicable by modern science, and that the denial of its existence or causal efficacy is highly implausible.
April 17, 2018
This book is more of a collection or articles written by Searle that investigate the theories of consciousness that have been proposed by a handful of other proponents in the area. Philosophers might be a better term for these "experts" because as the books title says, consciousness is still a complete mystery.
I wanted to get a better idea of where consciousness arises, what components cause it to work, and how it can be experimented on. I was disappointed by the fact that none of those answers currently exist.
Searle allows some of the authors he criticizes to respond which makes for an interesting dynamic. The arguments Searle makes are strong and go rather in-depth but at the end of the day, I believe there is too much focus on computer systems when approaching this question.
At the end, you will leave this book with a knowledge of what consciousness is NOT and have an understanding of why even the smartest computers still do not solve the problem of semantics.
I wanted to get a better idea of where consciousness arises, what components cause it to work, and how it can be experimented on. I was disappointed by the fact that none of those answers currently exist.
Searle allows some of the authors he criticizes to respond which makes for an interesting dynamic. The arguments Searle makes are strong and go rather in-depth but at the end of the day, I believe there is too much focus on computer systems when approaching this question.
At the end, you will leave this book with a knowledge of what consciousness is NOT and have an understanding of why even the smartest computers still do not solve the problem of semantics.
June 23, 2017
This is a delightful, down-to-earth overview of the philosophy of consciousness. Searle's writing is refreshingly clear. He manages to get at how weird the problem is without succumbing to the temptation to be overly flowery or metaphorical. (Not that there's anything wrong with being flowery and metaphorical when it comes to consciousness; indeed, the subject practically begs for poetry. It's just maybe not the best philosophical approach.)
Don't let the publication date of 1997 put you off. Fortunately (?) for the reader of this book, the sheer intractability of the problem as well as the stubbornness of the people involved has prevented any meaningful progress from being made in the past twenty years.
Don't let the publication date of 1997 put you off. Fortunately (?) for the reader of this book, the sheer intractability of the problem as well as the stubbornness of the people involved has prevented any meaningful progress from being made in the past twenty years.
February 12, 2017
In "The Mystery of Consciousness" philosopher John Rogers Searle reviews several modern theories to explain how it is that the objective brain gives rise to (or is associated with) the subjective sense of consciousness. He does an effective job of showing the weaknesses of those theories. However, his own theory fares no better. He repeatedly postulates that brain CAUSES consciousness, which seems to both beg and evade the question. After having read the book, I was more appreciative of the title: consciousness remains a mystery, the mystery we all share.
December 7, 2017
I think John searle has delivered the best book on this subject here. His search for a causal explanation of consciousness and against reductionism (claims consciouness cannot be reduced) seems to me to be the right path for making a dent in this problem of all problems. He takes on Dan Dennett head on and I am currently reading Dennett for his side. If you are at all interested in the phenomenon of the mind and consciousness you must read this. I read it twice.
May 29, 2019
I think this was a good honest assessment of consciousness study as it was at this time. I think the recent rise of affective neuroscience lends some support to his claims and argues against the purely cognitive, computational, functional accounts of consciousness that would separate off some informational content to consciousness and ignore the rest of felt consciousness.
July 14, 2023
"The Mystery of Consciousness" is simply an expansion and revision of a series of book reviews from the mid 90s. Searle has added a first and last chapter in which he expounds his own views and included the written responses of a couple of the authors to his original reviews. Essentially then, the book is a work of criticism with a dash of the author's own views.
The book is well-written and interesting. Searle can tear an argument into its constituent pieces, summarize it and raise objections as clearly as anyone. It also provides an excellent survey of some important authors on the subject: Crick, Penrose, Dennett, etc. However, as usual with unsolved philosophical problems, it is far easier to tear down the arguments of others than to make a clear, correct argument yourself. Further, it becomes obvious that the authors (including Searle) are talking past each other...using the same words with different meanings.
The problem is illustrated at the very beginning. On page 5, Searle writes:
"One issue can be dealt with swiftly. There is a problem that...does not seem very serious to me, and that is the problem of defining "consciousness" .... if we distinguish between analytic definitions, which aim to analyze the underlying essence of a phenomenon, and common-sense definitions .... it does not seem to me at all difficult to give a common-sense definition of the term: 'consciousness' refers to those states of sentience and awareness that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue until we go to sleep again"
And hence come many difficulties, because the other authors Searle is studying are not all using this definition. They are not all even using their own common-sense definitions but may be using analytic definitions. Thus, Searle's comments like "consciousness is irreducible" are obvious to him, using his exact definition, but not all obvious if consciousness is defined some other way. Further, science and mathematics are littered with common-sense definitions that turned out to be useless or wrong, for example, the assumption that light consisted of waves and matter of particles, and the absolute monistic nature of each as one or the other. His mantra that "Consciousness is a biological phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis" is tautological if we are referring to his intuitive definition, but flatly false if defined in other ways.
Thus the weakest part of this book: the exchanges between Searle and Dennett and between Searle and Chalmers. In the Searle/Dennett debate, both end up shouting past each other, pointing out the absurdity of the other's positions and the obviousness of their own, because they are using different definitions of not only "consciousness" but "mind", "qualia", "artificial intelligence" and even such basic terms as "subjective" and "objective". The Chalmers conversation is a little less acrimonious, but just as unsatisfactory...Chalmers at least comes across as more of a gentleman than Dennett or Searle.
The final chapter, Searle's summary of his own position, is excellent. It is more balanced and self-critical than his remarks in the original reviews and offers an excellent Q&A that anticipates the objections to his views and answers them. Nonetheless, as Searle himself recognizes, the book leaves us mostly with questions, and we may eventually find even the questions are wrong.
The book is well-written and interesting. Searle can tear an argument into its constituent pieces, summarize it and raise objections as clearly as anyone. It also provides an excellent survey of some important authors on the subject: Crick, Penrose, Dennett, etc. However, as usual with unsolved philosophical problems, it is far easier to tear down the arguments of others than to make a clear, correct argument yourself. Further, it becomes obvious that the authors (including Searle) are talking past each other...using the same words with different meanings.
The problem is illustrated at the very beginning. On page 5, Searle writes:
"One issue can be dealt with swiftly. There is a problem that...does not seem very serious to me, and that is the problem of defining "consciousness" .... if we distinguish between analytic definitions, which aim to analyze the underlying essence of a phenomenon, and common-sense definitions .... it does not seem to me at all difficult to give a common-sense definition of the term: 'consciousness' refers to those states of sentience and awareness that typically begin when we awake from a dreamless sleep and continue until we go to sleep again"
And hence come many difficulties, because the other authors Searle is studying are not all using this definition. They are not all even using their own common-sense definitions but may be using analytic definitions. Thus, Searle's comments like "consciousness is irreducible" are obvious to him, using his exact definition, but not all obvious if consciousness is defined some other way. Further, science and mathematics are littered with common-sense definitions that turned out to be useless or wrong, for example, the assumption that light consisted of waves and matter of particles, and the absolute monistic nature of each as one or the other. His mantra that "Consciousness is a biological phenomenon like digestion or photosynthesis" is tautological if we are referring to his intuitive definition, but flatly false if defined in other ways.
Thus the weakest part of this book: the exchanges between Searle and Dennett and between Searle and Chalmers. In the Searle/Dennett debate, both end up shouting past each other, pointing out the absurdity of the other's positions and the obviousness of their own, because they are using different definitions of not only "consciousness" but "mind", "qualia", "artificial intelligence" and even such basic terms as "subjective" and "objective". The Chalmers conversation is a little less acrimonious, but just as unsatisfactory...Chalmers at least comes across as more of a gentleman than Dennett or Searle.
The final chapter, Searle's summary of his own position, is excellent. It is more balanced and self-critical than his remarks in the original reviews and offers an excellent Q&A that anticipates the objections to his views and answers them. Nonetheless, as Searle himself recognizes, the book leaves us mostly with questions, and we may eventually find even the questions are wrong.
August 22, 2024
SEARLE'S MAJOR BOOK ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He has written many other books, such as 'The Rediscovery of the Mind,' 'Mind: A Brief Introduction,' 'Mind, Language And Society,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1997 book, "all of these reductionist attempts to eliminate consciousness are as hopeless as the dualism they were designed to supplant... I believe the urge to reductionism and materialism derives from the underlying mistake of supposing that if we accept consciousness as having its own real existence, we will somehow be accepting dualism and rejecting the scientific worldview. If there is one theme that runs throughout this book it is this: consciousness is a natural, biological phenomenon. It is as much a part of our biological life as digestion, growth, or photosynthesis." (Pg. xiii)
He states early in the book, "Lower-level processes in the brain cause my present state of consciousness, but that state is not a separate entity from my brain; rather it is just a feature of my brain at the present time... this analysis---that brain processes cause consciousness but that consciousness is itself A FEATURE OF the brain---provides us with a solution to the traditional mind-body problem, a solution which avoids both dualism and materialism..." (Pg. 8)
He argues, "Now why does [Daniel] Dennett [Consciousness Explained] ... not tell us which of the three premises in the Chinese Room Argument he rejects? They are not very complicated, and take the following form: (1) programs are syntactical, (2) minds have semantic contents, (3) syntax by itself is not the same as nor sufficient for semantic content. I think... He does not address the actual formal argument because ... he would have to admit that what he really objects to is ... the claim that minds have mental contents. Given his assumptions, he is forced to deny the minds really do have INTRINSIC mental contents." (Pg. 109)
Searle also argues [not very convincingly, to me] against the 'Identity theory' proposed by J.J.C. Smart and others, "One difficulty is that we need to be able to explain what it is about a state of a brain that makes it a mental state as opposed to other states of the brain that are not mental states. Furthermore, it seems too restrictive to say that only brains can have mental states. Why couldn't we build a machine, for example a computer, that also had mental states but did not have anything like the physical states that exist in brains? Why couldn't there be organisms from other planets or other solar systems who had minds but had a different chemistry from ours?" (Pg. 138)
He rejects David Chalmers' panpsychism ['The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory]: "What about panpsychism, his view that consciousness is in rocks, thermostats, and electrons... indeed everywhere?... We know that human and some animal brains are conscious. Those LIVING SYSTEMS with CERTAIN SORTS OF NERVOUS SYSTEMS are the only systems in the world that we know for a fact are conscious. We also know that consciousness in these systems is caused by quite specific neurobiological processes." (Pg. 170)
This book is virtually "must reading" for any serious student of the philosophy of mind.
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He has written many other books, such as 'The Rediscovery of the Mind,' 'Mind: A Brief Introduction,' 'Mind, Language And Society,' etc.
He wrote in the Preface to this 1997 book, "all of these reductionist attempts to eliminate consciousness are as hopeless as the dualism they were designed to supplant... I believe the urge to reductionism and materialism derives from the underlying mistake of supposing that if we accept consciousness as having its own real existence, we will somehow be accepting dualism and rejecting the scientific worldview. If there is one theme that runs throughout this book it is this: consciousness is a natural, biological phenomenon. It is as much a part of our biological life as digestion, growth, or photosynthesis." (Pg. xiii)
He states early in the book, "Lower-level processes in the brain cause my present state of consciousness, but that state is not a separate entity from my brain; rather it is just a feature of my brain at the present time... this analysis---that brain processes cause consciousness but that consciousness is itself A FEATURE OF the brain---provides us with a solution to the traditional mind-body problem, a solution which avoids both dualism and materialism..." (Pg. 8)
He argues, "Now why does [Daniel] Dennett [Consciousness Explained] ... not tell us which of the three premises in the Chinese Room Argument he rejects? They are not very complicated, and take the following form: (1) programs are syntactical, (2) minds have semantic contents, (3) syntax by itself is not the same as nor sufficient for semantic content. I think... He does not address the actual formal argument because ... he would have to admit that what he really objects to is ... the claim that minds have mental contents. Given his assumptions, he is forced to deny the minds really do have INTRINSIC mental contents." (Pg. 109)
Searle also argues [not very convincingly, to me] against the 'Identity theory' proposed by J.J.C. Smart and others, "One difficulty is that we need to be able to explain what it is about a state of a brain that makes it a mental state as opposed to other states of the brain that are not mental states. Furthermore, it seems too restrictive to say that only brains can have mental states. Why couldn't we build a machine, for example a computer, that also had mental states but did not have anything like the physical states that exist in brains? Why couldn't there be organisms from other planets or other solar systems who had minds but had a different chemistry from ours?" (Pg. 138)
He rejects David Chalmers' panpsychism ['The Conscious Mind: in Search of a Fundamental Theory]: "What about panpsychism, his view that consciousness is in rocks, thermostats, and electrons... indeed everywhere?... We know that human and some animal brains are conscious. Those LIVING SYSTEMS with CERTAIN SORTS OF NERVOUS SYSTEMS are the only systems in the world that we know for a fact are conscious. We also know that consciousness in these systems is caused by quite specific neurobiological processes." (Pg. 170)
This book is virtually "must reading" for any serious student of the philosophy of mind.
March 27, 2022
5/10, rounded down to 2/5. The book gets progressively worse further in. Overall, worth reading to understand Searle's position and where some of the battlelines were drawn over the problem of consciousness, but be critical and do not take Searle as reliable when he talks about other authors.
Good: Searle gives a fair summary of the positions of Crick, Edelman, and Penrose. I share absolutely in Searle's contempt for Dennett's writings. I agree with Searle's inclination to "forget about the obsolete Cartesian categories." There are a few useful references for further reading.
Bad: Searle doesn't appear to have understood much at all of Chalmers' position. Searle is mocking and rude in his exchanges, and comes across almost as unpleasantly as Daniel Dennett. Generally, he chooses to simply mock ideas that he doesn't like, and calls them absurd without further explanation.
Worst of all, Searle's text is littered with unforgivable non sequiturs, and he often assumes the thing he is trying to prove:
• He assumes without argument, that "a conscious process directed towards a goal" could not be emergent from "brute, blind, natural forces". (On the analogy between gene and 'meme'.)
• He states without evidence, in argument against Chalmers, that conscious experience causes behavioural response. The problem of consciousness probably wouldn't be a problem anymore if we knew that to be true.
• Again stated without argument, "... consciousness causes other parts of the organization." We do not know that there is any causal interaction of consciousness on matter.
• Searle completely misunderstands Chalmers' functionalism, sneaking in the word "behaviour" when talking about Guillain-Barre patients who are materially and functionally different to a healthy patient.
• Searle is absolutely clueless r.e. information theories of consciousness.
• He makes a schoolyard dig at Chalmers about being a native English speaker and knowing the dictionary definition of some words, instead of contending Chalmers' arguments about the ontological status of the things the words refer to.
• "Of course, it is conceivable that science might show that we are mistaken about this, but to do so would require a major scientific revolution and such a revolution could not be established by the armchair theorising in which he [Chalmers] engages." This is even worse than the obnoxious passage in which Dennett imputes realists about consciousness of obscurantism, as if the difficulty of the subject matter is their fault. Why are you a philosopher, John, are you not just armchair theorising also?
• "I do not believe anyone who writes such prose can be serious about the results of neurobiology." This is a standard example of Searle's surly and dismissive blah. (Thank god he doesn't use Twitter.) Funnily enough, neurobiology has as of yet failed to solve the problem of consciousness, and as such has nothing to say about the prose referred to. This isn't quite the 'gotcha' that Searle seems to think it is.
Good: Searle gives a fair summary of the positions of Crick, Edelman, and Penrose. I share absolutely in Searle's contempt for Dennett's writings. I agree with Searle's inclination to "forget about the obsolete Cartesian categories." There are a few useful references for further reading.
Bad: Searle doesn't appear to have understood much at all of Chalmers' position. Searle is mocking and rude in his exchanges, and comes across almost as unpleasantly as Daniel Dennett. Generally, he chooses to simply mock ideas that he doesn't like, and calls them absurd without further explanation.
Worst of all, Searle's text is littered with unforgivable non sequiturs, and he often assumes the thing he is trying to prove:
• He assumes without argument, that "a conscious process directed towards a goal" could not be emergent from "brute, blind, natural forces". (On the analogy between gene and 'meme'.)
• He states without evidence, in argument against Chalmers, that conscious experience causes behavioural response. The problem of consciousness probably wouldn't be a problem anymore if we knew that to be true.
• Again stated without argument, "... consciousness causes other parts of the organization." We do not know that there is any causal interaction of consciousness on matter.
• Searle completely misunderstands Chalmers' functionalism, sneaking in the word "behaviour" when talking about Guillain-Barre patients who are materially and functionally different to a healthy patient.
• Searle is absolutely clueless r.e. information theories of consciousness.
• He makes a schoolyard dig at Chalmers about being a native English speaker and knowing the dictionary definition of some words, instead of contending Chalmers' arguments about the ontological status of the things the words refer to.
• "Of course, it is conceivable that science might show that we are mistaken about this, but to do so would require a major scientific revolution and such a revolution could not be established by the armchair theorising in which he [Chalmers] engages." This is even worse than the obnoxious passage in which Dennett imputes realists about consciousness of obscurantism, as if the difficulty of the subject matter is their fault. Why are you a philosopher, John, are you not just armchair theorising also?
• "I do not believe anyone who writes such prose can be serious about the results of neurobiology." This is a standard example of Searle's surly and dismissive blah. (Thank god he doesn't use Twitter.) Funnily enough, neurobiology has as of yet failed to solve the problem of consciousness, and as such has nothing to say about the prose referred to. This isn't quite the 'gotcha' that Searle seems to think it is.
December 12, 2025
•”que significaria uma "dor em si", de que não se tivesse
consciência?”
•”um pluralismo de formas de linguagem para a qual é possível falar significativamente, segundo registros conceituais diferentes, do "mesmo" mundo.”
•”a mera manipulação de símbolos formais não estabelece, por si só, a existência de conteúdos semânticos, nem é suficiente para garantir a presença de conteúdos semânticos (…) Você não pode extrair a semântica só a partir dos processos sintáticos.”
•”O fato que torna simbólicas estas pulsações elétricas é o mesmo que transforma as marcas da caneta nas páginas de um livro em símbolos: planejamos, programamos, imprimimos e fabricamos estes sistemas para que possamos considerá-los e usá-los como símbolos (…)
a computação não é intrínseca à natureza, mas é relativa ao observador ou usuário.”
•”Da mesma forma que o cérebro humano faz uso de algoritmos matemáticos, mas não consiste nesses algoritmos, a simulação do cérebro humano utiliza algoritmos matemáticos mas também não consiste nesses algoritmos.”
•”A objetividade epistêmica não impede a subjetividade ontológica”
•”a memória não deve ser compreendida como um armazém de informações, mas, antes, como uma atividade contínua do cérebro.”
•sobre descargas neuronais produzirem a consciência:
”Mesmo sabendo que duas coisas estão correlacionadas, ainda assim não explicamos a correlação. Pense no relâmpago e no trovão, por exemplo: uma correlação perfeita, mas não implica uma explicação enquanto não tivermos uma teoria (…) o próximo passo nas ciências é tentar descobrir se a correlação é ou não uma relação causal.”
consciência?”
•”um pluralismo de formas de linguagem para a qual é possível falar significativamente, segundo registros conceituais diferentes, do "mesmo" mundo.”
•”a mera manipulação de símbolos formais não estabelece, por si só, a existência de conteúdos semânticos, nem é suficiente para garantir a presença de conteúdos semânticos (…) Você não pode extrair a semântica só a partir dos processos sintáticos.”
•”O fato que torna simbólicas estas pulsações elétricas é o mesmo que transforma as marcas da caneta nas páginas de um livro em símbolos: planejamos, programamos, imprimimos e fabricamos estes sistemas para que possamos considerá-los e usá-los como símbolos (…)
a computação não é intrínseca à natureza, mas é relativa ao observador ou usuário.”
•”Da mesma forma que o cérebro humano faz uso de algoritmos matemáticos, mas não consiste nesses algoritmos, a simulação do cérebro humano utiliza algoritmos matemáticos mas também não consiste nesses algoritmos.”
•”A objetividade epistêmica não impede a subjetividade ontológica”
•”a memória não deve ser compreendida como um armazém de informações, mas, antes, como uma atividade contínua do cérebro.”
•sobre descargas neuronais produzirem a consciência:
”Mesmo sabendo que duas coisas estão correlacionadas, ainda assim não explicamos a correlação. Pense no relâmpago e no trovão, por exemplo: uma correlação perfeita, mas não implica uma explicação enquanto não tivermos uma teoria (…) o próximo passo nas ciências é tentar descobrir se a correlação é ou não uma relação causal.”
November 19, 2021
Searle, Anglosakson çağdaş zihin felsefesi içinde bilincin anlaşılması için bence en doğru damarı yakalamış olan kişi. Bu eser de 1997 gibi erken bir tarihte, bilinç araştırmalarının geleceği için en sağlam metafizik temelleri ortaya koyuyor. Ne fizikalist maddeciliğe (ya da elemeci indirgemeciliğe) ne de nitelik ikiciliğine mahkumuz. Bilinci, biyolojik bir olay olarak kavrayarak, evrene dair bildiklerimizle tutarlı bir bilinç kavrayışına ulaşabiliriz. Ne ki, bunun için bilincin ontolojik öznelliğini (yani açıklanması gereken şeyi) ortadan kaldırmaya çalışmaktan vazgeçmemiz lazım. Beynin, bilince neden olduğunu biliyoruz. Açıklamamız gereken şey bunun nasıl olduğu yani nedensel mekanizmaları. Bu da nörobiyolojinin konusu. Ancak henüz bu teorik-kavramsal modeli kurmaktan çok uzağız. 1997'de körgörü (blindsight) vakalarının bu yolu açacak önemli bir çalışma alanı olduğunu sezmiş olması ayrıca takdire değer. Gerçekten, Saffet Murat Tura'nın kitaplarından öğreniyoruz ki, bu ve yine eserde andığı bazı bilinç-beyin ilişkisine dair vakalar, bilinci bilimsel evrenimize yerleştirmek için bize önemli ipuçları sunuyor. Yine de, Searle'ün kavramsal eşölçümlülükle ilgili bazı tartışmaları (birinci şahıs ve üçüncü şahıs ontolojileri arasında nasıl ilişki kurulacağı) sonuna kadar götürmediğini belirtmeliyim. Belki başka kitaplarında yapmıştır. Kesinlikle yakaladığı damarın izini sürmeye değer.
September 16, 2019
This book actually consists of a review of 6 books on consciousness by prominent researchers/ philosophers in the field. Searle does a fantastic job of summarizing the key positions of the authors, though at the same time critiquing them and making his own views on the subject explicit.
To those, like me, who are not much familiar with the particular positions and their nuances of these philosophers/ scientists, this book provides a lucid account of the same ...the only chapter I found a little above my comprehension was on Penrose's theory- and I have read Penrose quite a few years back, and found him generally hard to follow.
While the calling out of Denette as someone who has got himself in a corener is soemthing i resonate with, his views on Chalmers seemed harsh. Coming from the Indian philosophical tradition, where consciousness is equated with two birds one acting, the other only observing, I find the Chalmers position of two kinds of pain - one as mental states that are a result of functionalism and the other a subjective consciousness that is akin to property dualism - acceptable an dam intrigued to read more of Chalmers thesis.
Searle's position himself is very clear, reasonable and generative and something with which I align a lot. An interesting 360 degree overview of the field in terms of the great man/ grand theory tradition.
To those, like me, who are not much familiar with the particular positions and their nuances of these philosophers/ scientists, this book provides a lucid account of the same ...the only chapter I found a little above my comprehension was on Penrose's theory- and I have read Penrose quite a few years back, and found him generally hard to follow.
While the calling out of Denette as someone who has got himself in a corener is soemthing i resonate with, his views on Chalmers seemed harsh. Coming from the Indian philosophical tradition, where consciousness is equated with two birds one acting, the other only observing, I find the Chalmers position of two kinds of pain - one as mental states that are a result of functionalism and the other a subjective consciousness that is akin to property dualism - acceptable an dam intrigued to read more of Chalmers thesis.
Searle's position himself is very clear, reasonable and generative and something with which I align a lot. An interesting 360 degree overview of the field in terms of the great man/ grand theory tradition.
July 9, 2021
In this collection of articles, which Searle produced for the New York review of books, the author and legendary philosopher of mind is uncompromising and clear: Brains cause consciousness. Brains are not computers. Consciousness exists. Qualia exist. Functionalism doesn’t explain anything. Panpsychism is absurd.
In this short yet refreshing book, Searle reviews the biggest and most controversial books in the world of philosophy of mind, carefully dissecting their arguments and providing plenty of personal opinion along the way. He goes toe-to-toe with Dan Dennett’s eliminative materialism, unpacks Sir Roger Penrose’s dense, convoluted quantum-mathematic-microtubule-computational theory (which I’m fairly certain hasn’t been fully understood by anyone except Penrose), and eviscerates David Chalmers and his wacky panpsychism.
Perhaps the greatest pleasure in the book is watching Searle deftly teach extremely difficult concepts while peppering his opponents with sarcastic jabs. Consider his summary of David Lewis’ position (which is that not only is consciousness non-reducible, but literally everything in the universe in conscious, including his thermostat): “it is one thing to bite the odd bullet here and there, but this book consumes an entire arsenal”
Although written more than 20 years ago, this is a must read for any philosophy of mind geek!
In this short yet refreshing book, Searle reviews the biggest and most controversial books in the world of philosophy of mind, carefully dissecting their arguments and providing plenty of personal opinion along the way. He goes toe-to-toe with Dan Dennett’s eliminative materialism, unpacks Sir Roger Penrose’s dense, convoluted quantum-mathematic-microtubule-computational theory (which I’m fairly certain hasn’t been fully understood by anyone except Penrose), and eviscerates David Chalmers and his wacky panpsychism.
Perhaps the greatest pleasure in the book is watching Searle deftly teach extremely difficult concepts while peppering his opponents with sarcastic jabs. Consider his summary of David Lewis’ position (which is that not only is consciousness non-reducible, but literally everything in the universe in conscious, including his thermostat): “it is one thing to bite the odd bullet here and there, but this book consumes an entire arsenal”
Although written more than 20 years ago, this is a must read for any philosophy of mind geek!
August 29, 2020
What is Consciousness? This volume contains John Searle’s series of New York Times essays discussing the various perspectives on consciousness and the mind-body problem from the preeminent thinkers, philosophers and neurobiologists of our time including the mistakes Searle thinks they make.
These thinkers include Francis Crick (the binding problem and forty hertz), Gerald Edelman (reentry mapping), Roger Penrose (Gödel’s theorem), Daniel Dennett (reductionist), David Chalmers (dualism), and Israel Rosenfield (body image and mapping). The essays range from covering dualism, materialism and computer-inspired "artificial intelligence”. The book also contains the published rebuttals and responses from Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers.
One does not have to be a neuroscientist to read the essays, but it helps to have background in some of the topics. On a first read it is a good overall view of the various positions on consciousness today and might help you decide which of these thinkers to dive into more deeply.
These thinkers include Francis Crick (the binding problem and forty hertz), Gerald Edelman (reentry mapping), Roger Penrose (Gödel’s theorem), Daniel Dennett (reductionist), David Chalmers (dualism), and Israel Rosenfield (body image and mapping). The essays range from covering dualism, materialism and computer-inspired "artificial intelligence”. The book also contains the published rebuttals and responses from Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers.
One does not have to be a neuroscientist to read the essays, but it helps to have background in some of the topics. On a first read it is a good overall view of the various positions on consciousness today and might help you decide which of these thinkers to dive into more deeply.
January 22, 2018
Pretty good introduction, especially useful given the fact I've had frequent recent discussions about people about whether or not the brain is computational in whole, in part, or neither. Sometimes Searle came off as a bit simplistic in defending his own view, and wasn't the most forthcoming about why he was right. Often his own argument seemed regressive. "Consciousness is a biological process, like any other." Yes, but what causes it? I think he listed it as an emergent property, which is a view I'm familiar with, but that came up for all of one sentence.
Of especial note here is the correspondence between him and Dennett. Very amusing, but I don't know if it did much for my respect of either author seeming them both take digs at eachother. I guess that's how it is though.
Of especial note here is the correspondence between him and Dennett. Very amusing, but I don't know if it did much for my respect of either author seeming them both take digs at eachother. I guess that's how it is though.
September 5, 2023
Bilinç kuramları üzerine bir beyin fırtınası. 3.5/5
Kitap daha çok belli başlı bilinç kuramlarının sunulması ve yazarın bu kuramları dair eleştirileri üzerine. Toplamda beş kuram verilmiş ve yazar bunları eleştirirken kendi bilinç kuramı ile karşılaştırıyor. Bazı bölümlerde eleştirilen kuramların yazarlarının bunlara cevabına da yer verilmiş. Onun için kitabı okurken bilince dair bir beyin fırtınası yapmış gibi oluyorsunuz. Tabii ki bilince dair hiçbirinin kesin bir yanıtı yok yine de. Ama bu alana ilgi duyanlara tavsiye edilir.
Kitap daha çok belli başlı bilinç kuramlarının sunulması ve yazarın bu kuramları dair eleştirileri üzerine. Toplamda beş kuram verilmiş ve yazar bunları eleştirirken kendi bilinç kuramı ile karşılaştırıyor. Bazı bölümlerde eleştirilen kuramların yazarlarının bunlara cevabına da yer verilmiş. Onun için kitabı okurken bilince dair bir beyin fırtınası yapmış gibi oluyorsunuz. Tabii ki bilince dair hiçbirinin kesin bir yanıtı yok yine de. Ama bu alana ilgi duyanlara tavsiye edilir.
March 19, 2024
The 90s was a great time for new theories of consciousness. Although there were high promises , few of those theories remain standing today. The discussion remains relevant and the failure of those theories are important to guide future proposals. This book offers a sober perspective on the excitement of that era and some good fights with Dennet and Chalmers. Would recommend for philosophy of mind nerds.
January 22, 2023
Not entirely sure what the author intended for this book, but I assume it’s to educate the readers of six (or so) prevailing views / theories on consciousness. While there are some educational elements, I could not get past unnecessarily convoluted descriptions and unbearable insertion of the author’s two cents about each theory.
I tried hard but had to put it down after reading it halfway.
I tried hard but had to put it down after reading it halfway.
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