This tiny volume, really more like a pamphlet, made more waves in Europe for the political storm it made between the authors and its title subject’s estate than for its actual content. That is not to say, however, that it isn’t a worthwhile, quick read.
The main text, by Cassin and Badiou, is a unexceptional if perhaps necessary evaluation of Heidegger’s thought in relation to his involvement in National Socialism. The authors describe their stance as “radically moderate” which makes a lot of sense and seems to me very sensible. Heidegger was indeed a Nazi, although not a politically significant one besides the celebrity that his name brought to the movement. He was also an exceptionally talented and seminal philosopher.
Did his politics in any way influence his philosophy or vice versa? Perhaps, the authors conclude, but not to the point of making an irrefutable connection between the two. The political ugliness of Heidegger the human individual’s life does not in any way discredit the writer’s philosophical oeuvre or those of the generations of thinkers, including the two authors of this little book, who have been influenced by it.
My personal reaction to this “take” is that it seems so obviously true as to be trite. Cassin and Badiou have a right, however, to label their stance as “radically” moderate. For the trend continues amongst European and American intellectuals to insist on either a complete divorce or radical unity between the philosophy and its author’s political life. Heidegger’s defenders insist he was an entirely innocent dupe of the Nazi regime who at worst failed to refuse to join the Party under extreme pressure, and who perhaps even did all he could to minimize harm to his colleagues. His harshest detractors deride him as nothing less than a “Nazi philosopher” whose magnum opus “Being and Time” is an intellectualization of an essentially fascistic world view. In light of all this hullabaloo, Cassin and Badiou’s work is a welcome addition to the literature devoted to the “Heidegger debate”.
Having said that, the most rewarding thing about the book is not its main text, but the excellent and stimulating introduction by Kenneth Reinhard. For this reader, the first thing Reinhard’s essay accomplished was to provide a pithy introduction into the philosophical work of Barbara Cassin, to which I had not previously been exposed. Cassin takes her inspiration not from the Platonic tradition but through that of the “sophists” who Socrates/Plato so excoriated. This is a poetic and rhetorical fashion of philosophy that in no way demands ontology’s insistence on linguistic stability, in which a word must maintain the same meaning regardless of speaker/ listener/ user or context. Cassin’s work proposes instead a “logology” in which language acts on and creates in the world through performance.
Reinhard’s description of Cassin’s project would lead me to link her work to that of the latter Heidegger of the “linguistic turn”. (Indeed, Cassin met Heidegger a few times late in his life at the retreats the philosopher hosted with his leftist-poet friend Rene Char. Cassin’s antidotes about these gatherings in the main text are quite interesting and enjoyable to read.) For the latter Heidegger, language was the shelter of being and humanity, language’s wielder, the shepard. Language therefore plays a more creative role in Cassin’s thought than in that of the late Heidegger. Language, for Cassin, would seem to play the role of Being’s mother more than its cradle. Nonetheless, both thinkers direct link between being and language, and the creative power of poetic language to rereveal or recreate being have undeniable resonances.
The majority of Reinhard’s essay is a comparison between the notions of Being in Heidegger (particularly, it seems to me, the Heidegger of “Being and Time”) and Badiou. Both thinkers, posits Reinhard, propose a distinction between knowledge and truth. For Heidegger, truth is the unconcealing of being and perhaps eventually Being. For some readers of “Being and Time” the truth of human being (“Dasein”) is revealed through Dasein’s relation to the objects that it knows how to use. For more existentially minded reader’s of Heidegger’s opus, it is Dasein that reveals the truth of the world through its use of objects as tools. In either reading, it is a reciprocal revealing of being between Dasein and world.
Heidegger contrasts his notion of truth with “knowledge” which is knowledge of a conceptual ideal as fatefully introduced into the history of thought by Plato. This form of idealized knowledge, even as early as “Being and Time” and even more pronouncedly after the Linguistic Turn, actually obfuscates truth/ Being.
Badiou, according to Reinhard, attempts to undo the connection made by Heidegger between being and truth. For Badiou being is not a static entity that can be revealed, or even interpreted. Rather, Badiou’s truth simply is the elaboration of consequences of the interruption of being by an “event” (a radical political, scientific, artistic or romantic production). Truth, then, is a procedure, not an uncovering. And human subjectivity is not revealed by the world or revealing of the world, but simply is the knowledge produced by its own evaluation of the procedure.