Why Paramilitary Operations Fail

by Armin Krishnan

This book analyzes U.S. pro-insurgency paramilitary operations (PMOs) or U.S. proxy warfare from the beginning of the Cold War to the present and explains why many of these operations either failed entirely to achieve their objective, or why they produced negative consequences that greatly diminished their benefits. The chapters cover important aspects of what PMOs are, the history of U.S. PMOs, how they function, the dilemmas of secrecy and accountability, the issues of control, criminal conduct, and disposal of proxies, as well as newer developments that may change PMOs in the future. The author argues that the general approach of conducting PMOs as covert operations is inherently flawed since it tends to undermine many possibilities for control over proxies in a situation where the interests of sponsors and proxies necessarily diverge on key issues.  

367 pages, Kindle Edition

First published May 16, 2018

Reviews

[Zulfiqar · Rating 5 out of 5]

“The parallels between Operation Cyclone in Afghanistan and Operation Timber Sycamore are striking and history seems to repeat itself. As in Afghanistan the US relied on Saudi money in on regional partners (in this case Jordan and Turkey) to carry out a regime change operation dragged on for many years and that require the inflow of substantial numbers of jihadist foreign fighters to beef up the weekend and greatly disunited Syrian opposition forces. According to UN estimates there were 30,000 foreign fighters from 100 countries in Syria as of 2016. It is hard to find details of Operation Timber Sycamore, Especially as to how many rebel’s were trained and which Syrian groups receives CIA support since the program remains classified. Press reports suggest that about $1 billion were spent over four years to support some 50 rebel groups and 15,000 fighters. Several thousand fighters had reportedly gone through CIA/SOF training programs in Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Jordan with minimal vetting. It is also widely reported that many of the CIA supported fighters in groups defected to radical Islamic groups such as Jabhat Al Nusra and later ISIS.” (Krishnan, Armin. “ Why Paramilitary Operations Fail.” Syrian Rebels Pg. 209)