An honest question: is Christopher Beckwith okay? Can his friends or family get him some help or support? This is a man who is so upset about, well, something?, that he needs to italicize the following sentence: "No one from either people [i.e., the Medians and Assyrians] wears bashlyqs, trousers, etc." (28). Reader, do not doubt the importance of this statement!!!! It shows us that the Scythians invented trousers. Is your world completely upended? Do you feel adrift from EVERYTHING YOUR BAD SPECIALIZED MODERN HISTORY TEACHERS EVER TOLD YOU ABOUT WORLD HISTORY? I know I do.
But more seriously, this is a man who feels so confident in his own judgement that he can complain about the way 'Silk Road' is used as a term, not for the obvious reasons, but because the term has 'succumbed to the forces of Modernism (q.v. Beckwith 2009)' (297) That reference is to Beckwith's earlier book, 'Empires of the Silk Road'. You might think that, in order to bolster your claim about the degrading effects of 'Modernism,' you might want to appeal to a text about, I don't know, 'Modernism,' but that would no doubt be to fall victim to another 'Modernist' heresy, under which 'scholars now work almost exclusively as specialists within one discipline and one region,' and so don't think 'in terms of a sufficiently wide picture, an absolute necessity for study of a continent-spanning phenomenon' (261). Luckily, Beckwith is here to save us from Modernism.
He does so with some SHOCKING NEW REVELATIONS. The Scythians invented: really good ranged weapons--which everyone always knew; trousers--which makes sense for people who are really good at riding horses; 'feudalism'--here meaning something like 'federalism,' which, okay, maybe, or maybe not, but since Beckwith doesn't compare their 'feudalism' to any other political systems, it's impossible to know what he even means; monotheism--although, rather confusingly, they also believe in multiple Gods, e.g., Beckwith tells me that at least some Scythians thought the river Dnieper was a god as well as the sky; the idea of a divine and legitimate 'royal line'--a claim based on Beckwith's own translation of one Akkadian word... and also the kind of thing that Mesopotamian rulers had been saying about themselves for a *long* time; and 'a new language'--meaning, really, that they spoke a language of their own. Multiple pages of this book are taken up with tables of words to illustrate the difference between a dialect and a language. One such page compares the orthography of English, American, and Australian English. You may be shocked to know that they are all the same. Beckwith apparently wanted that point to be so clear that he lists 21 words that are all orthographically the same. Astonishing. We all spell 'sun' s, u, n.
After listing these innovations, Beckwith offers a *lot* of very detailed linguistic work developing the above points at great length, despite the foundational silliness of much of the above points.
To conclude--you might like to sit down for this--Beckwith 'solves' the 'problem' of the Axial Age. Finally, someone has been able to break away from MODERNISM and SPECIALIZATION in order to see the whole continent, from the edge of Spain to the land of the rising sun, and to grasp that the reason 'philosophy' sprang up at the same time in the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia, south Asia, and east Asia, is because the first philosophers were all Scythians.
Now, in order to properly judge this argument, you'll probably want to know what philosophy is. Let me tell you, Beckwith is not talking about philosophy in any loosey-goosey way, so sir, because this is a man who, quote, will never 'ignore or bury or misrepresent the data' (267; there are *many* references to *data* in this book, which should make you wonder: is someone who thinks 'data' is 'evidence' to 'prove' an 'argument' really the person you want to be defining 'philosophy' for you?). No, Beckwith is talking about 'philosophy in the strict sense, with a capital "P": Philosophy.' (FYI: Beckwith italicises 'Philosophy' here, because you might still think he's talking about ordinary, small-p, regular everyday word philosophy--he is not).
What does that mean? You did PHILOSOPHY if you "criticized and rejected the traditional beliefs and practices of the countries where" you teach (235). (So, okay, that sounds like 'modernism' to me, but I digress). Who invented philosophy, you ask? Four people:
First: Anacharsis, who, despite being called a Scythian by Greeks like Diogenes Laertius, and being discussed as a Scythian in plenty of very accessible books on this region (e.g., the charmingly nerdy and not at all italicized 'Empires of the Steppes' by Kenneth Harl), and being described in the first line of his wikipedia page as, quote 'a Scythian prince and philosopher,' is apparently *not* considered a Scythian, or not considered real, by... I dunno, someone. Anyway, what did Anarcharsis teach? According to Diogenes L, he 'wondered why among the Greeks the experts contend, but the non-experts decide' (236). He was claimed as an ancestor of sorts by the later Cynics. This is, Beckwith says, 'a sceptical comment about the Greeks' quasi-religious political belief in "equality",' 236.
[If one were conspiratorially minded, one might think that an author who rages against 'Modernism,' acclaims those who can 'criticize and reject' the 'beliefs' and 'practices' of the country in which they reside, bases their claims on 'data,' has solved the eternal problem of philosophy, believes that 'the Greeks' had a 'quasi-religious political belief in equality' (which Greeks, I wonder? The slaves?), *and* clearly has a self-image as an outstanding but tragically misunderstood intellectual, *might just* be one small step away from publishing elaborate conspiracy theories about the decline of Western values with Arktos press].
Wait, you say: didn't Anarcharsis live after Thales and Heraclitus and many others, and at roughly the same time as Parmenides, who is well-attested for his extremely capital P PHILOSOPHICAL thinking? Yes. But they're not Scythian, so they can't have invented philosophy. Instead, Thales and Solon are merely 'wise men' or 'lawgivers' or 'natural philosophers,' which is to say, 'engineer or inventor.' Therefore, the data tells us, 'Anarcharsis the Scythian seems to be the earliest actual Greek philosopher' (238).
If you think that's wild(ly irresponsible and unreasonable), just you wait.
Second: Zoroaster. No stretch here. Since the Scythian were monotheists (who believed in many Gods), and since Zoroaster taught monotheism, unlike the polytheists around him in the Ancient Near East, and since the Gathas are written in a language that Beckwith has already used data to show is basically Scythian, Zoroaster must have been a Scythian.
[This also proves that anyone who has a different 'religion' to those around them was a philosopher. Therefore, the earliest philosopher was not Scythian, but Egyptian, since Akhenaten was, strictly speaking, way more monotheistic and contrarian than the Scythians as presented by Beckwith. Akhenaten tried to destroy an entire tradition and build a new one, like, literally, with stone and stuff! In the freaking desert! But I digress. It must be my MODERNISTIC SPECIALIZATION getting in the way of me following the data].
Third: The Buddha. Short version: Sakyamuni means 'of the Scythians,' according to Beckwith. QED. Rather more surprisingly, we're told, the Buddha taught nothing about 'metaphyical topics' or the 'natural, physical world' (243). Instead, he taught that all dharmas are impermanent (quoting the Numerical Discourses iii 134). Now, you might think that sounds awfully metaphysical and physical, since the point is that individual objects do not have permanent identities. But no: according to Beckwith--and contra, like, everyone who writes anything about Buddhism to the best of my knowledge--'dharma' here means 'ethical things'. Pyrrho (you know, the Greek skeptic) describes the Buddha as teaching that 'there can be no absolute difference between true and false' (243). Now, that proves that the Buddha was a skeptic, like Anacharsis. Just follow the data people. There is *no relevance at all in the fact that Pyrrho was a skeptic*, and that all studies of Buddhism understand the Buddha differently here, and that skepticism of this type renders much of the rest of the Numerical Discourses, for instance, utterly unintelligible. Whatever else might not be true or false, it certainly *cannot be true* that Pyrrho, the skeptic Greek philosopher, is understanding Buddha as a skeptic because Pyrrho is a sceptic. No way, nuh uh.
[I can only imagine what Rupert Gethin thinks of being roped in a reference to all of this. Beckwith references Gethin's excellent 'Foundations of Buddhism,' page 187, to support his claim that 'the chief goal of Buddhist practice' remains the insights of the 'three characteristics.' What does Gethin say on page 187? That page is about the four 'divine abidings,' the final stage of 'calm meditation'. He then moves on to 'insight meditation,' which is a *different practice* than 'calm meditation.' Still on page 187, Gethin tells us (accurately) that insight meditation is aimed at our understanding 'three aspects [what Beckwith calls the three characteristics] of the nature of things: that they are impermanent and unstable, that they are unsatisfactory and imperfect, and that they are not self.' I.e., the 'three characteristics' are tied *not* to calmness, but to insight; the 'three characteristics' give us insight into the metaphysical nature of things, not into 'ethical things', and the end of insight meditation is to become an 'arhat' (Gethin, 198), not merely a really chill hang].
Anyway, since the Buddha was a skeptic according to Pyrrho who most definitely a skeptic and so could recognize one when he saw one; and Anarchasis was a skeptic; and Anarchasis was a Scythian (and, therefore, all skepticism is Scythian)... well, the Buddha was a Scythian. Did he teach the exact opposite of what Zoroaster taught? Yes, but they were both contrarian edge-lords, and that's the main thing.
Fourth: Still with me? Because *now* we're getting crazy. Laozi. Entirely mythical author of an astonishingly incoherent text of genius, the Daodejing. Now, 'lao' just means 'old,' so his name means 'old master.' Also, there's a certainly not true story of him leaving China because his thought hadn't taken hold there. So, he was foreign. After all, other Chinese philosophers didn't have nicknames, they had proper names, like 'Kong' and 'Meng' and 'Xun'. So he must have been foreign. Also, I quote, 'before modern times no Chinese would leave home to die' (245). But Laozi left home to die. Therefore, he must have been foreign. [Everything went wrong in modern times]. Having followed this data to reach the true statement that Laotzu was both a) real, contra literally everyone who studies this stuff; and b) foreign, we are free to draw the obvious following conclusions. For instance, 'Lao' was probably pronounced 'k'ao', and sometimes people called Laotzu Laotan, which would obviously have been prono0unced 'kaodan', which 'can be straightforwardly reconstructed for Old Chinese as... a perfect transcription of Gandhari 'Gudama' or Sanskrit 'Gautama', the personal name of the Buddha' (246-7). Now, Beckwith is a responsible scholar, so he is not insisting that 'the Buddha came to China in early Antiquity and wrote the Daodejing,' 247. But this does 'confirm [??!??] that some knowledge of the Buddha and his teachings made their way to China, as suggest by even a cursory reading of the book,' a knowledge that 'could only have been transmitted orally by a living person who actually traveled from the West to China and wrote the *original early core* of the first Taoist classic,' the Daodejing (247). So, he's not *not* saying that the Buddha wrote the Daodejing. Now, a cursory reading of the Daodejing might lead you to think that it's saying the exact *opposite* thing to the Buddha, who said that dharmas have no self, while the Daodejing says that there is a permanent and abiding way that is beyond human comprehension. But never mind that, because the data has already proved to us that the Buddha was a skeptic who didn't care about metaphysics. Now, you might object: the Daodejing postdates Chinese philosophy; we have no evidence that it existed before Confucianism as a system had arisen, and there are other philosophers who aren't Confucians who also predate the Daodejing. You fool. Confucius isn't a philosopher, he's a 'wise man.' 'The first to teach epistemology and serious logic in Chinese is clearly Laotzu,' 250. Thus, Mozi, the inventor of actual logic in China, the first person in China to come up with a system for the judgment of knowledge claims (i.e., an epistemology), is written out of history, because no matter what you say about him--revolutionary who sought to undermine the norms of his society? Check. Contrarian edge-lord? Good lord, yes--he wasn't Scythian. Pour one out for one of the world's greatest thinkers.
In short: yes, there were philosophers before all of these people, but those philosophers weren't Scythians, and so they weren't philosophers. Just follow the data. You have now answered the question of why philosophy, suitably defined, arose at the same time in many places. It's because there aren't really many places. There is only one place: Scythia. It has been shamefully ignored by scholars, for no obvious reason, indeed, perhaps, even, it hasn't been shamefully ignored--see Cunliffe's works, or Benjamin's or whomever. But resentment runs deep, and conspiracy theorists will find evidence for anything, and claim that they're just 'following the data,' and that your feelings and facts, and that if only you better understood the grammar of Akkadian you would see that, I don't know, Modernism is undermining the eternal natural verities or something.
So, I ask once more: is Christopher Beckwith okay? Or has he followed the path of so many other authors of books on the Steppe into paranoia and world-spanning conspiracy theorising? After reading this book, I confess, I was a bit shocked that Lev Gumilev didn't merit a single mention in the bibliography.
Princeton University Press should be ashamed of itself.