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384 pages, Hardcover
First published September 15, 2014
If there’s one way to summarize Zephyr Teachout’s extraordinary book Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United, it is that today we are living in Benjamin Franklin’s dystopia. Her basic contention, which is not unfamiliar to most of us in sentiment if not in detail, is that the modern Supreme Court has engaged in a revolutionary reinterpretation of corruption and therefore in American political life....What makes the book so remarkable is its scope and ability to link current debates to our rich and forgotten history.
Creating laws that deter bribery of legislators, but do not democratic organizing, has been among the most vexing problems of the American political experiment. To put another way, Democracy's internal threat: responsiveness to donors, is deeply intertwined with Democracy's greatest promise: responsiveness to citizens.
Citizens United is a complicated opinion, with many moving parts. But to my mind, the radicalism of the opinion, even beyond the flawed framework of Buckley, rests on two connected determinations. First, the Court found that the First Amendment protects political speech regardless of the identity of the speaker. Second, the Court found that no sufficiently important countervailing governmental or constitutional goal was served by limiting corporate political advertising. It conclusively held that corruption was the only possible government interest that might permit First Amendment restrictions and that anticorruption interests were not served by the law. Political equality concerns are not constitutionally legitimate reasons to pass such a law.
The opinion comprehensively redefined corruption, and in so doing, redefined the rules governing political life in the United States. As a matter of federal constitutional law, corruption now means only “quid pro quo corruption.” And quid pro quo exists only when there are “direct examples of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures.” Corruption does not include undue influence and cannot flow from donors trying to influence policy through campaign contributions, unless these donors are utterly crass. “Ingratiation and access” are not corruption. Corruption does not include “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” And perhaps as surprisingly, Kennedy held that as a matter of law— regardless of the facts that are presented—“independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.
"An act is corrupt if when private interests trump public ones in the exercise of public power. And a person is corrupt when they use public power for their own ends, disregarding others... The book challenges four commonly held misconceptions: 1) That corruption began in the post-Watergate era, 2) That criminal bribery law is the dominant sphere in which corruption law plays out, 3) That bribery law is coherent and consistent, and 4) that quid-pro-quo is the heart of corruption law"
"In short, we have two thoughts: (1) men are not always angels, and therefore structures must help us; and (2) virtue is necessary, and structures alone cannot help us. THe reconciliation between these two Madisonian beliefs holds the key to understanding the moral psychology of most of the framers. These can both be true if one perceives a dynamic relationship between constitutional struture and political morality... corruption cannot be made to vanish, but its power can be subdued with the right combination of culture and political rules".
The old law of lobbying changed in three steps. First, state courts recording lobby contracts as contracts for professional instead of personal influcence as a general matter. Instead of default suspcicion, they defaulted toward assuming lobbying contracts were legitimate. Second, judges changed their attitudes toward contracts. While nineteenth-century judges saw themselves a providding public subsidies that out not be used for activities that were against public policy, twentieth-century courts saw themselves as neutral arbiters, agnistic as to the content of contracts, responsible only for a technical, not moral, review. The third step involved a changing view of the First Amendment, as the Supreme Court gained prominence in the political vision of the mid-twentieth-century justices.