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Nation Builder: John Quincy Adams and the Grand Strategy of the Republic
“America goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy”―John Quincy Adams’s famous words are often quoted to justify noninterference in other nations’ affairs. Yet when he spoke them, Adams was not advocating neutrality or passivity but rather outlining a national policy that balanced democratic idealism with a pragmatic understanding of the young republic’s capabilities and limitations. America’s rise from a confederation of revolutionary colonies to a world power is often treated as inevitable, but Charles N. Edel’s provocative biography of Adams argues that he served as the central architect of a grand strategy that shaped America’s rise. Adams’s particular combination of ideas and policies made him a critical link between the founding generation and the Civil War–era nation of Lincoln.
Examining Adams’s service as senator, diplomat, secretary of state, president, and congressman, Edel’s study of this extraordinary figure reveals a brilliant but stubborn man who was both visionary prophet and hard-nosed politician. Adams’s ambitions on behalf of America’s interests, combined with a shrewd understanding of how to counter the threats arrayed against them, allowed him to craft a multitiered policy to insulate the nation from European quarrels, expand U.S. territory, harness natural resources, develop domestic infrastructure, education, and commerce, and transform the United States into a model of progress and liberty respected throughout the world.
While Adams did not live to see all of his strategy fulfilled, his vision shaped the nation’s agenda for decades afterward and continues to resonate as America pursues its place in the twenty-first-century world.
Examining Adams’s service as senator, diplomat, secretary of state, president, and congressman, Edel’s study of this extraordinary figure reveals a brilliant but stubborn man who was both visionary prophet and hard-nosed politician. Adams’s ambitions on behalf of America’s interests, combined with a shrewd understanding of how to counter the threats arrayed against them, allowed him to craft a multitiered policy to insulate the nation from European quarrels, expand U.S. territory, harness natural resources, develop domestic infrastructure, education, and commerce, and transform the United States into a model of progress and liberty respected throughout the world.
While Adams did not live to see all of his strategy fulfilled, his vision shaped the nation’s agenda for decades afterward and continues to resonate as America pursues its place in the twenty-first-century world.
432 pages, Hardcover
First published October 6, 2014
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
May 21, 2021
The plethora of recent books written about John Quincy Adams have been something of a mixed bag. Because he's judged to have had a failed presidency, most authors tend to focus on his upbringing, his personality and the life and times in which he lived, as opposed to his policies and his administration. Charles Edel strips away almost all of this in order to write about Adams's convictions and objectives. As a result, his book is one of ideas, not of events.
I am a mere armchair historian/political scientist, so I wasn't really aware that "grand strategy" has become something of a loaded and controversial phrase. It's in the book's title, but I didn't really notice until finding that the book's introduction alone mentions "grand strategy" 22 times. So I paused to read up on it before continuing the book. It's a somewhat loosely-defined term, depending on who's defining it and/or using it to advance their interests, but Edel generally defines it as an integrated, multi-phased plan of action aimed at achieving long-term objectives. And Adams more than most, he argues, deftly envisioned what he wanted to achieve for his country, and identified several distinct but related steps aimed at doing so - first by staying out of European conflicts, then by expanding the country's territory, then embarking on internal improvements and finally trying to resolve the lingering problem of slavery.
The main problem with the idea of grand strategy is that it can be used to assign post hoc structure and foresight to events of the past. Did Adams really display greater wisdom or far-sightedness than others in articulating a long-term grand strategy? Or did it have more to do with the fact that his career serving in various influential public-service roles lasted longer than most, thereby allowing him to define and achieve several long-term goals along the way?
Either way, Edel does make a persuasive argument that Adams was often thinking at least two steps ahead of everyone else, particularly as Secretary of State, as he influenced and persuaded the more impetuous President Monroe to play the long game. It's ironic, then, that the roles were somewhat reversed when Adams became president - his Secretary of State, Henry Clay, was the one who had the grand strategy in the form of his American System, and he tried influencing Adams to do a better job in selling his program to Congress and the public. But Adams failed, Edel concludes, because he was simply a better strategist than a politician.
So in his last act, as Congressman, all bets were off, as Adams didn't have to worry so much about politicking or compromising anymore. His grand strategy for the lasting success of the country at this point relied upon the abolition of slavery, which could really only be achieved by NOT politicking or compromising. He didn't live to see that happen, but playing the long game meant planting the seeds for others to harvest.
This is not a true biography of John Quincy Adams, but a book about his ideas, his influence and his legacy. He was not always successful in achieving his goals in the short term, but by taking the long view, Edel shows how he ended up being much more successful than he ever could have realized in his own lifetime.
I am a mere armchair historian/political scientist, so I wasn't really aware that "grand strategy" has become something of a loaded and controversial phrase. It's in the book's title, but I didn't really notice until finding that the book's introduction alone mentions "grand strategy" 22 times. So I paused to read up on it before continuing the book. It's a somewhat loosely-defined term, depending on who's defining it and/or using it to advance their interests, but Edel generally defines it as an integrated, multi-phased plan of action aimed at achieving long-term objectives. And Adams more than most, he argues, deftly envisioned what he wanted to achieve for his country, and identified several distinct but related steps aimed at doing so - first by staying out of European conflicts, then by expanding the country's territory, then embarking on internal improvements and finally trying to resolve the lingering problem of slavery.
The main problem with the idea of grand strategy is that it can be used to assign post hoc structure and foresight to events of the past. Did Adams really display greater wisdom or far-sightedness than others in articulating a long-term grand strategy? Or did it have more to do with the fact that his career serving in various influential public-service roles lasted longer than most, thereby allowing him to define and achieve several long-term goals along the way?
Either way, Edel does make a persuasive argument that Adams was often thinking at least two steps ahead of everyone else, particularly as Secretary of State, as he influenced and persuaded the more impetuous President Monroe to play the long game. It's ironic, then, that the roles were somewhat reversed when Adams became president - his Secretary of State, Henry Clay, was the one who had the grand strategy in the form of his American System, and he tried influencing Adams to do a better job in selling his program to Congress and the public. But Adams failed, Edel concludes, because he was simply a better strategist than a politician.
So in his last act, as Congressman, all bets were off, as Adams didn't have to worry so much about politicking or compromising anymore. His grand strategy for the lasting success of the country at this point relied upon the abolition of slavery, which could really only be achieved by NOT politicking or compromising. He didn't live to see that happen, but playing the long game meant planting the seeds for others to harvest.
This is not a true biography of John Quincy Adams, but a book about his ideas, his influence and his legacy. He was not always successful in achieving his goals in the short term, but by taking the long view, Edel shows how he ended up being much more successful than he ever could have realized in his own lifetime.
June 30, 2015
Repetitive, unevenly paced narrative. No particularly novel analytic insights, just well-known facts from publicly available sources viewed through the questionable prism of "grand strategy."
Edel was educated at Yale, and it shows: he hews to the "grand strategy" concept beloved of Walter Russell Mead, John Lewis Gaddis, and Paul Kennedy, each of whom is prominently thanked in the acknowledgments. It's not clear to me that this perspective has any real explanatory or analytic value; quite often the scholars who look at things this way are simply using hindsight to ascribe foresight and conceptual coherence to the thinking and actions of various historical leaders and polities. (I'm looking at you, Luttwak.)
Especially awkward are the parallels the author attempts to draw between Adams's "grand strategy" for his own personal development and career and the "grand strategy" he envisions for the country.
None of which is to say that Adams lacked a clear idea of America's interests and priorities or a guiding vision for both international action and internal development. It's just that it doesn't offer us any advantages to speak of all this in terms of "grand strategy," an ambiguous term that muddles meaningful distinctions between concepts, policy, strategy, plans, aspirations, and preferences (and thereby allows Edel to suggest that Adams was a brilliant "grand strategist" who was totally incapable of implementing the vast majority of what he envisioned. This seems to me a contradiction in terms).
This isn't a terrible book, not by any means. But it's pretty thin stuff, and it's hard for me to imagine that in the glut of recent writing about JQA, a better one hasn't been written.
Edel was educated at Yale, and it shows: he hews to the "grand strategy" concept beloved of Walter Russell Mead, John Lewis Gaddis, and Paul Kennedy, each of whom is prominently thanked in the acknowledgments. It's not clear to me that this perspective has any real explanatory or analytic value; quite often the scholars who look at things this way are simply using hindsight to ascribe foresight and conceptual coherence to the thinking and actions of various historical leaders and polities. (I'm looking at you, Luttwak.)
Especially awkward are the parallels the author attempts to draw between Adams's "grand strategy" for his own personal development and career and the "grand strategy" he envisions for the country.
None of which is to say that Adams lacked a clear idea of America's interests and priorities or a guiding vision for both international action and internal development. It's just that it doesn't offer us any advantages to speak of all this in terms of "grand strategy," an ambiguous term that muddles meaningful distinctions between concepts, policy, strategy, plans, aspirations, and preferences (and thereby allows Edel to suggest that Adams was a brilliant "grand strategist" who was totally incapable of implementing the vast majority of what he envisioned. This seems to me a contradiction in terms).
This isn't a terrible book, not by any means. But it's pretty thin stuff, and it's hard for me to imagine that in the glut of recent writing about JQA, a better one hasn't been written.
August 9, 2022
My ratings are based purely on my enjoyment of the book so this receives 3/5 stars. This was an academic study of John Quincy Adams' strategic vision throughout his amazing and unprecedented life and while I enjoyed much of it, I found it to be a bit dry and at parts repetitive. I thought the author did a good job of covering the evolution of Adams' view of the U.S. and its relations to the world, and I always enjoy reading anything about JQA and enjoyed this book as well.
October 2, 2024
Nation Builder
- “In the broadest sense, grand strategy is a comprehensive and integrated plan of action, based on the calculated relationship of means to large ends. 15 It requires both conceptualizing those large ends and ensuring optimal use of the means available. Its successful practice demands the ability to see the interconnectivity of widely disparate events, to develop the capacity for flexibility and adaptability, and to act when opportunities arise.” (5)
- “For a nation, it involves not only defining long-term objectives, but also integrating the military, diplomatic, economic, political, and moral resources of a nation to accomplish its goals.” (5)
- John Quincy wrote that the Bible taught the three cardinal virtues of Christianity: piety, benevolence, and humility. But he cautioned against confusing these attributes with weakness. "Never be tame or abject," he advised his son, adding, "never show yourself yielding or complying to prejudice, wrong-headedness or intractability which would lead you astray from the dictates of your con-science." John Quincy was passing on to his son what he had long ago learned from his parents. It was his own mother who had repeatedly lectured him that "he who will not turn when he is trodden upon is deficient in point of spirit." (23)
- Instability plagued Europe for decades. Worried that this influence would reach the United States if European presence continued on the North American continent, Adams, Monroe, and others sought to expand the US’s territory and predominance on the continent.
- According to Adams, Europe regarded the US (and not Revolutionary France) as the primary cause of increasing republican sentiment and increasingly unstable European monarchies. (125)
- Hits at the perceived, inherent incompatibility of US and European coexistence on the North American continent.
- America benefited from the distractions and shifting power alliances in Europe, and without those distractions, Europe would likely turn its attention and its reach westward. The War of 1812 and attack on Washington in 1814 served as a reminder of the problems that a peaceful and potentially expansionist Europe posed.
- “In addition to the internal threat that slavery posed to the na-tion, Adams saw the danger of U.S. missionary zeal outstripping American capabilities. This was particularly true in regard to the rebelling Spanish states in South America. Inspired by the American and French Revolutions, Simón Bolívar and others led the Latin American colonies to declare independence from Spain as early as 1810 and asked the United States to recognize their sister republics. For years the United States delayed recognition, not wanting to offend Spain as it negotiated for large tracts of land and navigation rights. But the ideological appeal of supporting a republican revolution was powerful, and most Americans had a natural sympathy for the fledgling republics to their south.” (129)
- Adams vigorously defended General Andrew Jackson’s problematic campaign against the Seminole in Florida. (150)
- I’d honestly say that he was less so defending the actions and more so defending what the actions meant and what they led to. Adams saw the power vacuum in Florida (currently being overseen by a weak Spain) as a threat to American independence — at any moment, a stronger power (and greater enemy) could come in and seize Florida if the US didn’t act. Adams felt it important to project force in this moment. (150)
- Indication that Monroe (and Adams) thought including Texas in the Adams-Onís Treaty might inflame internal division over slavery. Concerned with sectional balance. May or may not have fed into negotiated terms, which left Texas to the Spanish. (156)
- “Adams’s privileging of the Declaration over the Constitution anticipated Lincoln’s arguments some forty years later…” (158)
- “If the Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon which it ought to break.” (158)
- Slavery vs. Territorial Expansion:
- “But it is also clear what he thought was the lesser evil to be suffered, lest the greater one prevail. This was a corrupt bargain the founders had bound the nation to at its birth.” (159)
- “A country with a strong and diversified economy of agriculture, commerce, and manufacture would be wealthier and more unified at home and stronger in its relations with other countries abroad. Adams saw this as the central purpose of his presidency, declaring in 1828 that "independence and union are the ends" and "internal improvement, and domestic industry, the means."” (191)
- “The presidency was the prize he had been aiming for throughout his life. But the actions he took in pursuit of that prize undercut his principle of disinterested service to the republic and undermined his goal of inspiring national unity. To act in accordance with his principles would have meant abandoning the field to his opponents, whose surrogates were doing everything in their power to secure the election for their preferred candidates.” (192)
- “Disinterested statesman” (193-194)
- The only way his countrymen could secure the nation's continuing rise was to improve upon their present state of peace and prosperity. That improvement would come through advances in education, governmental funding of scientific endeavor, and innovations in manufacture and agriculture.
- The key to such improvements was promoting a culture of innovation through responsible governmental stewardship of the coun-try. And even though states had made important advances-here Adams pointed to Virginia's establishment of its university and New York's enterprise in opening the Erie Canal-their resources were limited and their economic interests were often parochial. Only the federal government could undertake coordinated projects important to the whole country, and Adams appealed to Congress to hold "up the torch of human improvement to eyes that seek the light." (214)
- As context and America’s stature changed, so too did its foreign policy. As president, Adams believed Washington’s “stay out of it” policy no longer applied to the country, and that changing circumstances required America to take an active role in global affairs. (217-218)
- But actually, he thought that this more active role/perspective was “directly deducible” from Washington’s policy. (218)
- “Adams's agenda rested on three separate but interrelated policies: reducing foreign threats, fostering social cohesion, and promoting domestic development.” (219)
- “In all of American history [as of writing in 2014], only Adams and his father skipped their successors' inaugurations. The morning that Andrew Jackson was sworn in as the nation's seventh president, a spring breeze blew through Washington. But Adams was not to be found at the Capi-tol, having chosen to opt out of the day's festivities and instead set out on a solitary horseback ride. Halfway through his route, a stranger approached and asked the former president if he could be so kind as to point him in the direction of John Quincy Adams. Adams informed the rider he had found the man he was looking for. It would be hard to imagine a scene that could have made Adams feel more insignificant and forgotten.” (242-243)
- Adams “refused to play by the new political rules,” effectively hamstringing his administration’s ability to enact change. (246)
- “In public messages and in private correspondence, Adams gave no hint of a desire to abolish of even restrict slavery during his presidency. But southern anxiety saw Adams's desire for moral and national improvement in ominous tones. Jeffersonian Republicans had always been ideologically suspicious of a powerful federal government. During and increasingly after Adams's presidency, that same fear turned its focus onto a government that could employ its power to emancipate its slaves. Years later, reflecting on the failure of his presidency, Adams attributed it to "the Sable Genius of the South" that sensed its "own inevitable downfall" and vindictively destroyed his program of national improvements.” (247)
- Adams succeeded in setting a grand strategy for the nation but failed in the art of politics. He was unable to use political skills to transform his strategy into policy. (248)
- Nullification was advanced by John Calhoun, and it argued that states could declare federal laws they saw as unconstitutional null and void. Adams argued against this vociferously, as the Constitution made “the states subordinate to the Constitution,” and the federal government. (260-262)
- Our government is founded on the principles of human rights (281-282)
- “Often, Adams despaired of the country’s direction. But he attempted to encourage his supporters with the knowledge that history did not always march in a straight line. "The improvements in the condition of mankind upon earth have been achieved from time to time by slow progression," he noted. This progression, though, was "sometimes retarded, by long stationary periods.” (285-286)
- “Different leaders proposed approaches aimed at accomplishing one or more of the country's goals, but Adams was the first to articulate a grand strategy that integrated the nation's political objectives, set priorities among them, and sequenced them. First, as a diplomat, he strove to isolate America from Europe's wars. Then, as secretary of state, he promoted territorial enlargement and continental do-minion. Next, as president, he labored to advance the nation's long-term development in infrastructure, education, and commerce. At the end of his career as an antislavery congressman, he worked to reconcile the nation's founding principles with its actions. These actions were linked to a long-term grand strategy designed to reduce security risks to the United States and vindicate republicanism as the form of government best suited to the promotion of human progress and liberty. (295)
- “Building on Adams's foundation, Abraham Lincoln resolved the tension between the country's ideals and its laws by asserting that the country's founding document was the Declaration of Independence and not the Constitution. This argument had been an Adams innovation-and one that he advanced publicly for almost twenty years.” (297)
- “An advertise that is equally committed to projecting its power everywhere limits its ability to do so effectively save decisively.” (301)
- “As a congressman nearing the end of his life, Adams knew that it was now beyond his abilities to resolve the paradoxes of power and liberty, and of expansion and slavery. "My leisure is now imposed upon me by the will of higher powers, to which I cheerfully submit," he wrote, "and I plant trees for the benefit of the next age, and of which my own eyes will never behold a berry." (305)
- “In the broadest sense, grand strategy is a comprehensive and integrated plan of action, based on the calculated relationship of means to large ends. 15 It requires both conceptualizing those large ends and ensuring optimal use of the means available. Its successful practice demands the ability to see the interconnectivity of widely disparate events, to develop the capacity for flexibility and adaptability, and to act when opportunities arise.” (5)
- “For a nation, it involves not only defining long-term objectives, but also integrating the military, diplomatic, economic, political, and moral resources of a nation to accomplish its goals.” (5)
- John Quincy wrote that the Bible taught the three cardinal virtues of Christianity: piety, benevolence, and humility. But he cautioned against confusing these attributes with weakness. "Never be tame or abject," he advised his son, adding, "never show yourself yielding or complying to prejudice, wrong-headedness or intractability which would lead you astray from the dictates of your con-science." John Quincy was passing on to his son what he had long ago learned from his parents. It was his own mother who had repeatedly lectured him that "he who will not turn when he is trodden upon is deficient in point of spirit." (23)
- Instability plagued Europe for decades. Worried that this influence would reach the United States if European presence continued on the North American continent, Adams, Monroe, and others sought to expand the US’s territory and predominance on the continent.
- According to Adams, Europe regarded the US (and not Revolutionary France) as the primary cause of increasing republican sentiment and increasingly unstable European monarchies. (125)
- Hits at the perceived, inherent incompatibility of US and European coexistence on the North American continent.
- America benefited from the distractions and shifting power alliances in Europe, and without those distractions, Europe would likely turn its attention and its reach westward. The War of 1812 and attack on Washington in 1814 served as a reminder of the problems that a peaceful and potentially expansionist Europe posed.
- “In addition to the internal threat that slavery posed to the na-tion, Adams saw the danger of U.S. missionary zeal outstripping American capabilities. This was particularly true in regard to the rebelling Spanish states in South America. Inspired by the American and French Revolutions, Simón Bolívar and others led the Latin American colonies to declare independence from Spain as early as 1810 and asked the United States to recognize their sister republics. For years the United States delayed recognition, not wanting to offend Spain as it negotiated for large tracts of land and navigation rights. But the ideological appeal of supporting a republican revolution was powerful, and most Americans had a natural sympathy for the fledgling republics to their south.” (129)
- Adams vigorously defended General Andrew Jackson’s problematic campaign against the Seminole in Florida. (150)
- I’d honestly say that he was less so defending the actions and more so defending what the actions meant and what they led to. Adams saw the power vacuum in Florida (currently being overseen by a weak Spain) as a threat to American independence — at any moment, a stronger power (and greater enemy) could come in and seize Florida if the US didn’t act. Adams felt it important to project force in this moment. (150)
- Indication that Monroe (and Adams) thought including Texas in the Adams-Onís Treaty might inflame internal division over slavery. Concerned with sectional balance. May or may not have fed into negotiated terms, which left Texas to the Spanish. (156)
- “Adams’s privileging of the Declaration over the Constitution anticipated Lincoln’s arguments some forty years later…” (158)
- “If the Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon which it ought to break.” (158)
- Slavery vs. Territorial Expansion:
- “But it is also clear what he thought was the lesser evil to be suffered, lest the greater one prevail. This was a corrupt bargain the founders had bound the nation to at its birth.” (159)
- “A country with a strong and diversified economy of agriculture, commerce, and manufacture would be wealthier and more unified at home and stronger in its relations with other countries abroad. Adams saw this as the central purpose of his presidency, declaring in 1828 that "independence and union are the ends" and "internal improvement, and domestic industry, the means."” (191)
- “The presidency was the prize he had been aiming for throughout his life. But the actions he took in pursuit of that prize undercut his principle of disinterested service to the republic and undermined his goal of inspiring national unity. To act in accordance with his principles would have meant abandoning the field to his opponents, whose surrogates were doing everything in their power to secure the election for their preferred candidates.” (192)
- “Disinterested statesman” (193-194)
- The only way his countrymen could secure the nation's continuing rise was to improve upon their present state of peace and prosperity. That improvement would come through advances in education, governmental funding of scientific endeavor, and innovations in manufacture and agriculture.
- The key to such improvements was promoting a culture of innovation through responsible governmental stewardship of the coun-try. And even though states had made important advances-here Adams pointed to Virginia's establishment of its university and New York's enterprise in opening the Erie Canal-their resources were limited and their economic interests were often parochial. Only the federal government could undertake coordinated projects important to the whole country, and Adams appealed to Congress to hold "up the torch of human improvement to eyes that seek the light." (214)
- As context and America’s stature changed, so too did its foreign policy. As president, Adams believed Washington’s “stay out of it” policy no longer applied to the country, and that changing circumstances required America to take an active role in global affairs. (217-218)
- But actually, he thought that this more active role/perspective was “directly deducible” from Washington’s policy. (218)
- “Adams's agenda rested on three separate but interrelated policies: reducing foreign threats, fostering social cohesion, and promoting domestic development.” (219)
- “In all of American history [as of writing in 2014], only Adams and his father skipped their successors' inaugurations. The morning that Andrew Jackson was sworn in as the nation's seventh president, a spring breeze blew through Washington. But Adams was not to be found at the Capi-tol, having chosen to opt out of the day's festivities and instead set out on a solitary horseback ride. Halfway through his route, a stranger approached and asked the former president if he could be so kind as to point him in the direction of John Quincy Adams. Adams informed the rider he had found the man he was looking for. It would be hard to imagine a scene that could have made Adams feel more insignificant and forgotten.” (242-243)
- Adams “refused to play by the new political rules,” effectively hamstringing his administration’s ability to enact change. (246)
- “In public messages and in private correspondence, Adams gave no hint of a desire to abolish of even restrict slavery during his presidency. But southern anxiety saw Adams's desire for moral and national improvement in ominous tones. Jeffersonian Republicans had always been ideologically suspicious of a powerful federal government. During and increasingly after Adams's presidency, that same fear turned its focus onto a government that could employ its power to emancipate its slaves. Years later, reflecting on the failure of his presidency, Adams attributed it to "the Sable Genius of the South" that sensed its "own inevitable downfall" and vindictively destroyed his program of national improvements.” (247)
- Adams succeeded in setting a grand strategy for the nation but failed in the art of politics. He was unable to use political skills to transform his strategy into policy. (248)
- Nullification was advanced by John Calhoun, and it argued that states could declare federal laws they saw as unconstitutional null and void. Adams argued against this vociferously, as the Constitution made “the states subordinate to the Constitution,” and the federal government. (260-262)
- Our government is founded on the principles of human rights (281-282)
- “Often, Adams despaired of the country’s direction. But he attempted to encourage his supporters with the knowledge that history did not always march in a straight line. "The improvements in the condition of mankind upon earth have been achieved from time to time by slow progression," he noted. This progression, though, was "sometimes retarded, by long stationary periods.” (285-286)
- “Different leaders proposed approaches aimed at accomplishing one or more of the country's goals, but Adams was the first to articulate a grand strategy that integrated the nation's political objectives, set priorities among them, and sequenced them. First, as a diplomat, he strove to isolate America from Europe's wars. Then, as secretary of state, he promoted territorial enlargement and continental do-minion. Next, as president, he labored to advance the nation's long-term development in infrastructure, education, and commerce. At the end of his career as an antislavery congressman, he worked to reconcile the nation's founding principles with its actions. These actions were linked to a long-term grand strategy designed to reduce security risks to the United States and vindicate republicanism as the form of government best suited to the promotion of human progress and liberty. (295)
- “Building on Adams's foundation, Abraham Lincoln resolved the tension between the country's ideals and its laws by asserting that the country's founding document was the Declaration of Independence and not the Constitution. This argument had been an Adams innovation-and one that he advanced publicly for almost twenty years.” (297)
- “An advertise that is equally committed to projecting its power everywhere limits its ability to do so effectively save decisively.” (301)
- “As a congressman nearing the end of his life, Adams knew that it was now beyond his abilities to resolve the paradoxes of power and liberty, and of expansion and slavery. "My leisure is now imposed upon me by the will of higher powers, to which I cheerfully submit," he wrote, "and I plant trees for the benefit of the next age, and of which my own eyes will never behold a berry." (305)
January 14, 2015
What should be the organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy today? Should it be President Obama’s “don’t do stupid shit”, a return to President Bush’s doctrine of preemption, or something else? I don’t know the answer, but I welcome Professor Edel’s contribution to today’s debate through his study of JQA’s life and the organizing principles that underpinned his grand strategy for the United States. Through Professor Edel’s lens, I now appreciate how JQA’s foreign policy vision was inextricably linked to his vision for furthering the growth of the United States through “domestic peace and productivity”. (Edel, p.301) That the potential power of the U.S. rests upon the smart, nurturing and harnessing of the country’s domestic resources is a concept that should resonate loudly today as it did for JQA nearly two hundred years ago. Cleary, 2014 is not 1821 and our “domestic peace and productivity” is interwoven with the actions of foreign countries and transnational actors ”—terrorism and economic growth/trade come to mind—in ways that JQA couldn’t have possibly imagined. But Professor Edel makes a compelling case for the enduring legacy and relevance of JQA’s ideas for our current era. I highly recommend this book for those interested in the country’s past, but also those who are struggling to make sense of the current times.
December 28, 2014
This elegant book depicts the complete life of our sixth president. From upbringing to diplomat to politician, Adams had an extraordinary life that has made a lasting impression on US foreign policy and American politics. Edel navigates the biography with thoughtful and thorough research balanced with a literary approach. Understanding Adams as a melancholy, astute, stubborn man allows us to see him not just as a figure head or historical figure but as a real and sympathetic human. Edel looks at an expert statesman and gives him humanity and depth by exploring him through the lens of his family, his historical and political context, and the legacy he both hoped to achieve and what he did in actuality. A brilliant biography and a must read for any burgeoning politicians or diplomats, not to mention anyone who seeks to understand the history of not only this man but he nation as a whole (hence the title of Nation Builder, I get it). A well-written book that truly stands alone as a comprehensive biography of John Quincy Adams.
February 3, 2018
This is a good book. Its not neccesarily a breezy read; its still scholarly and not neccesarily for the layperson. But Edel's thesis is that John Quincy Adams had a strategy for how to make the United States into a great polity, and that strategy eventually succeeded. A good biography, that understands Adams' greatness in his moment.
July 10, 2017
I'd give it 1.5 stars. As an biography it hits it's marks with interesting insights not found in general history books. As a discussion of grand strategy it misses the mark.The pieces are there but Edel loses the policy discussion halfway through the book.
September 28, 2018
I found his personal life/young adulthood to be super interesting. But I kinda lost focus towards the second half of the book.
April 22, 2024
Excellent single volume biography of John Quincy Adams. Required for anyone interested in US foreign policy or the political development of the early Republic.
September 4, 2015
Charles Edel bring a singular passion and focus to this project. John Quincy Adams was a politician who did not hide being an intellectual. He was also arguably the most cosmopolitan American of his generation, having traveled widely throughout Europe in his teens and twenties.
This perspective, coupled with fearsome intelligence, made him uniquely qualified to serve as Secretary of State.
In an era when America's standing in the world is increasingly under threat, Edel -- a master researcher and storyteller -- provides a much needed reexamination of our roots as a nation, when we were an emerging rather than dominant power.
This perspective, coupled with fearsome intelligence, made him uniquely qualified to serve as Secretary of State.
In an era when America's standing in the world is increasingly under threat, Edel -- a master researcher and storyteller -- provides a much needed reexamination of our roots as a nation, when we were an emerging rather than dominant power.
March 10, 2015
Caused me to rethink my ideas about John Quincy Adams
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews