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To Forgive Design: Understanding Failure
When planes crash, bridges collapse, and automobile gas tanks explode, we are quick to blame poor design. But Henry Petroski says we must look beyond design for causes and corrections. Known for his masterly explanations of engineering successes and failures, Petroski here takes his analysis a step further, to consider the larger context in which accidents occur.
In To Forgive Design he surveys some of the most infamous failures of our time, from the 2007 Minneapolis bridge collapse and the toppling of a massive Shanghai apartment building in 2009 to Boston's prolonged Big Dig and the 2010 Gulf oil spill. These avoidable disasters reveal the interdependency of people and machines within systems whose complex behavior was undreamt of by their designers, until it was too late. Petroski shows that even the simplest technology is embedded in cultural and socioeconomic constraints, complications, and contradictions.
Failure to imagine the possibility of failure is the most profound mistake engineers can make. Software developers realized this early on and looked outside their young field, to structural engineering, as they sought a historical perspective to help them identify their own potential mistakes. By explaining the interconnectedness of technology and culture and the dangers that can emerge from complexity, Petroski demonstrates that we would all do well to follow their lead.
In To Forgive Design he surveys some of the most infamous failures of our time, from the 2007 Minneapolis bridge collapse and the toppling of a massive Shanghai apartment building in 2009 to Boston's prolonged Big Dig and the 2010 Gulf oil spill. These avoidable disasters reveal the interdependency of people and machines within systems whose complex behavior was undreamt of by their designers, until it was too late. Petroski shows that even the simplest technology is embedded in cultural and socioeconomic constraints, complications, and contradictions.
Failure to imagine the possibility of failure is the most profound mistake engineers can make. Software developers realized this early on and looked outside their young field, to structural engineering, as they sought a historical perspective to help them identify their own potential mistakes. By explaining the interconnectedness of technology and culture and the dangers that can emerge from complexity, Petroski demonstrates that we would all do well to follow their lead.
432 pages, Paperback
First published March 15, 2012
36 people are currently reading
676 people want to read
About the author
Henry Petroski
35 books261 followersHenry Petroski was an American engineer specializing in failure analysis. A professor both of civil engineering and history at Duke University, he was also a prolific author.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
December 30, 2018
This book is a combination memoir and history of design failures. From the patterns developed by the relationship between failures and the striving for economical design, the author draws conclusions regarding the dangers that can emerge from complexity and the subsequent passage of old designs on to new generations of designers who have forgotten old lessons.
Unexpected and unintended failures are obviously bad, but once they occur the lessons learned are very valuable. The whole process of understanding why the failure occurred as well as why the cause was missed in the design process are necessary for progress to be made.
Sometimes the design is adequate but the construction process or the manufacturing of the material failed to meet the design intent. Other times improper maintenance and corrosive environments are at fault for causing failure. Thus there are many tiers of responsibility and communication that need to perform smoothly if public safety is to be maintained.
Some of the more notable examples of failure that are discussed in the book include the 2007 Minneapolis bridge collapse, the 2009 Boston prolonged Big Dig, the 2010 Gulf oil spill, the 1912 sinking of the ship RMS Titanic, the 1940 Tacoma Narrows bridge collapse, and the 1986 Challenger and 2003 Columbia space shuttle accidents.
Unexpected and unintended failures are obviously bad, but once they occur the lessons learned are very valuable. The whole process of understanding why the failure occurred as well as why the cause was missed in the design process are necessary for progress to be made.
Sometimes the design is adequate but the construction process or the manufacturing of the material failed to meet the design intent. Other times improper maintenance and corrosive environments are at fault for causing failure. Thus there are many tiers of responsibility and communication that need to perform smoothly if public safety is to be maintained.
Some of the more notable examples of failure that are discussed in the book include the 2007 Minneapolis bridge collapse, the 2009 Boston prolonged Big Dig, the 2010 Gulf oil spill, the 1912 sinking of the ship RMS Titanic, the 1940 Tacoma Narrows bridge collapse, and the 1986 Challenger and 2003 Columbia space shuttle accidents.
December 29, 2014
I got this from the library with the intent of gleaning a few tidbits for a class assignment. I ended up reading the whole thing and not using any tidbits. The book gives good historical accounts of several engineering catastrophes and their human interfaces while highlighting the value of failure.
January 26, 2016
Este livro trata um tema crítico da atividade humana, “a falha”, o estudo e análise do modo como falhamos na realização das nossas ações. O livro foca-se sobre a engenharia, nomeadamente civil e mecânica, mas o ponto ilustrado serve qualquer outra engenharia, serve o design, serve toda a atividade criativa, acabando por servir toda a atividade humana. Mais serviria se o autor se tivesse conseguido focar nessa essência como promete o título, não o conseguindo perde o livro e perdemos nós.
Esta questão da falha tornou-se um tópico central dos estudos sobre criatividade na última década, contando com um livro dedicado ao tema por Sarah Lewis, “The Rise: Creativity, the Gift of Failure, and the Search for Mastery” (2014), foi também amplamente discutido por Catmull no “Creativity Inc.” (2014), sendo tópico de imensos artigos e até motivo de uma exposição artística, "Permission to Fail” , que termina este mês nos EUA.
A vantagem de Petroski é que não se interessou pelo tema agora, antes já tinha publicado “To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design” em 1985. O autor refere o facto do livro ter mantido procura a razão pela qual resolveu escrever este novo. Não tendo lido o livro de 1985, acredito, pela resenha do mesmo, que avançou pouco, nomeadamente naquilo que o título prometia, a formulação de conhecimento. Alguns dos exemplos que aparecem na resenha do livro anterior servem mais uma vez a discussão aqui, tendo-se acrescentado exemplos relevantes como a queda das Torres Gémeas em 2001, o acidente do poço de petróleo aberto durante meses debaixo do mar pela BP em 2010, ou entrando um pouco no design industrial o problema do iPhone 4 com a receção.
Podemos dizer que “To Forgive Design: Understanding Failure” falha, o que acaba por ser irónico. Mas ao manter-se quase todo o tempo colado à descrição dos acidentes, é verdade que Petroski vai à essência da falha de cada acidente reportado, mas isso não chega para um livro, menos ainda para um livro que pretende elencar a essência do conceito. Não basta dar exemplos, dissecá-los, dar mais exemplos, mais detalhados, mais suportados, mais focados. Quando se constrói conhecimento, é necessário olhar para o todo e retirar daí conclusões, sintetizar ideias, focar mas também criticar, sustentar a descrição mas também sustentar o conceito, e isso pouco acontece aqui.
Diga-se que este problema tinha surgido exatamente da mesma forma em “The Rise”. Nessa altura referi que era um problema de conhecimento tácito, ou seja o ato de falhar precisa de ser experimentado, tornando complicado o problema de expressar o mesmo por palavras. Contudo depois de ter lido mais este livro sobre o tópico, julgo que o problema é mais evidenciado pelo parágrafo com que abri o texto, o facto da falha estar presente em toda a ação humana, tornando difícil a sua conceptualização sem entrar por discussões abstracts e filosóficas que acabam por acrescentar pouco. No fundo o modo como Petroski e Lewis fazem o seu trabalho, despejando descrições de dezenas de casos, acaba por ser a única forma de chegar à sua essência, o problema é que para isso precisávamos de ter livros sobre falhas em cada domínio.
E era isso mesmo que pensava ao ler este livro. Porque razão fazemos tantos livros sobre Casos de Sucesso, quando o modo como as pessoas aprendem efetivamente é a partir dos casos de falhanço? Existe aqui um certo paradoxo que é querermos emular os melhores, os que não falharam, sem compreender onde estão os problemas que provavelmente se vão atravessar na nossa frente, e que só poderemos conhecer a partir dos exemplos de quem os enfrentou.
Ler com links em: http://virtual-illusion.blogspot.pt/2...
Esta questão da falha tornou-se um tópico central dos estudos sobre criatividade na última década, contando com um livro dedicado ao tema por Sarah Lewis, “The Rise: Creativity, the Gift of Failure, and the Search for Mastery” (2014), foi também amplamente discutido por Catmull no “Creativity Inc.” (2014), sendo tópico de imensos artigos e até motivo de uma exposição artística, "Permission to Fail” , que termina este mês nos EUA.
A vantagem de Petroski é que não se interessou pelo tema agora, antes já tinha publicado “To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design” em 1985. O autor refere o facto do livro ter mantido procura a razão pela qual resolveu escrever este novo. Não tendo lido o livro de 1985, acredito, pela resenha do mesmo, que avançou pouco, nomeadamente naquilo que o título prometia, a formulação de conhecimento. Alguns dos exemplos que aparecem na resenha do livro anterior servem mais uma vez a discussão aqui, tendo-se acrescentado exemplos relevantes como a queda das Torres Gémeas em 2001, o acidente do poço de petróleo aberto durante meses debaixo do mar pela BP em 2010, ou entrando um pouco no design industrial o problema do iPhone 4 com a receção.
Podemos dizer que “To Forgive Design: Understanding Failure” falha, o que acaba por ser irónico. Mas ao manter-se quase todo o tempo colado à descrição dos acidentes, é verdade que Petroski vai à essência da falha de cada acidente reportado, mas isso não chega para um livro, menos ainda para um livro que pretende elencar a essência do conceito. Não basta dar exemplos, dissecá-los, dar mais exemplos, mais detalhados, mais suportados, mais focados. Quando se constrói conhecimento, é necessário olhar para o todo e retirar daí conclusões, sintetizar ideias, focar mas também criticar, sustentar a descrição mas também sustentar o conceito, e isso pouco acontece aqui.
Diga-se que este problema tinha surgido exatamente da mesma forma em “The Rise”. Nessa altura referi que era um problema de conhecimento tácito, ou seja o ato de falhar precisa de ser experimentado, tornando complicado o problema de expressar o mesmo por palavras. Contudo depois de ter lido mais este livro sobre o tópico, julgo que o problema é mais evidenciado pelo parágrafo com que abri o texto, o facto da falha estar presente em toda a ação humana, tornando difícil a sua conceptualização sem entrar por discussões abstracts e filosóficas que acabam por acrescentar pouco. No fundo o modo como Petroski e Lewis fazem o seu trabalho, despejando descrições de dezenas de casos, acaba por ser a única forma de chegar à sua essência, o problema é que para isso precisávamos de ter livros sobre falhas em cada domínio.
E era isso mesmo que pensava ao ler este livro. Porque razão fazemos tantos livros sobre Casos de Sucesso, quando o modo como as pessoas aprendem efetivamente é a partir dos casos de falhanço? Existe aqui um certo paradoxo que é querermos emular os melhores, os que não falharam, sem compreender onde estão os problemas que provavelmente se vão atravessar na nossa frente, e que só poderemos conhecer a partir dos exemplos de quem os enfrentou.
Ler com links em: http://virtual-illusion.blogspot.pt/2...
May 30, 2016
I like it because it is a non-fiction book. I appreciate the thorough explanations about metal fatigue, testing strength of building materials, and intended planned failure. That was something I never thought of. For instance, crackers, stamps and chocolate bars, are perforated to break easily when a certain force is applied. I had not previously thought of this concept. A sprinkling system in case of fire has a thermo-sensitive device that breaks when the air around it reaches the design activation temperature of the individual sprinkler. Then the water starts flowing. That is the intended design failure of the design. "Sometimes a component must fail in order for the larger system to succeed."
I don't particularly LIKE the narrator but I don't hate him either. He is a bit annoying.
I noticed in Henry's last book, To Engineer is Human, that there is a sort of rivalry between physicists and engineers. I have actually seen something similar when my old Science Methods teacher at the U had some disdain for applied science. "This does not indicate that the university's proud physicists have any less of a sense universality of purpose or of superiority over their engineer colleagues than physicists everywhere." This line from the book says it all!
Reading about the horrible Challenger and Columbus failures, the bridge disasters etc. was fascinating. Getting to the root of the problem, understanding how to fix it for next time, that's so important. It requires real investment of time as well as open minds. There are so many variables around a plan crash, a bridge collapse, a chemical spill, one must be open to learning from it and not decide what happened before investigating.
One of my favorite premises from the book is about the Titanic. The Titanic was the most spectacular, the best ship of its time. If it had not hit an iceberg, how many other ships would have been made to the same specifications before another hit an iceberg or a dock or another ship and exposed the weak area in the design?
Awesome book. I will be reading more by this author.
I don't particularly LIKE the narrator but I don't hate him either. He is a bit annoying.
I noticed in Henry's last book, To Engineer is Human, that there is a sort of rivalry between physicists and engineers. I have actually seen something similar when my old Science Methods teacher at the U had some disdain for applied science. "This does not indicate that the university's proud physicists have any less of a sense universality of purpose or of superiority over their engineer colleagues than physicists everywhere." This line from the book says it all!
Reading about the horrible Challenger and Columbus failures, the bridge disasters etc. was fascinating. Getting to the root of the problem, understanding how to fix it for next time, that's so important. It requires real investment of time as well as open minds. There are so many variables around a plan crash, a bridge collapse, a chemical spill, one must be open to learning from it and not decide what happened before investigating.
One of my favorite premises from the book is about the Titanic. The Titanic was the most spectacular, the best ship of its time. If it had not hit an iceberg, how many other ships would have been made to the same specifications before another hit an iceberg or a dock or another ship and exposed the weak area in the design?
Awesome book. I will be reading more by this author.
July 23, 2014
Read _To Engineer is Human_ and _The Evolution of Useful Things_ and you'll have captured the main points in a more cohesive presentation.
I really wish that he had done more with the idea of the human factors which cause failure which he hasn't really covered before - the people who bypass systems which are perceived as too constraining, the employees who don't want to cause waves, the toxic workplaces that lead to accepting too much risk without realizing it, etc.
I really wish that he had done more with the idea of the human factors which cause failure which he hasn't really covered before - the people who bypass systems which are perceived as too constraining, the employees who don't want to cause waves, the toxic workplaces that lead to accepting too much risk without realizing it, etc.
January 7, 2017
While this book was written more for engineers, I (who am NOT an engineer) still found it thought-provoking, entertaining, and informative. Petroski is particularly good at interdisciplinary thinking, which makes this book useful for anyone who is willing to slog through the little bits of insider-writing about Engineering campuses and practices in order to mine the gold about what failure could (and should) teach us.
November 30, 2015
It took me forever to slog through this because I made the mistake of reading the rest of the author's work first. If you're going to read one book by Petroski, read this one. It has the most current examples and the same philosophy. It's a little heavy-handed at times and the memoir sections can seem unnecessary but it hits the high points in his field.
August 9, 2012
I wanted to like this book, but it needs an editor with a very sharp pencil. Stream-of-consciousness writing about mechanical engineering can only get you so far in this gal's heart. Also, what sort of engineer doesn't include at least one diagram/photo/design/illustration? Did not finish.
November 19, 2012
Meh. It starts out with some really interesting stories, but then bogs down after that. After the multitude of explanations for why fail-safe breaks count as failures (but successful failures!), I could barely motivate myself to read further.
May 28, 2012
I was hoping more about how things go wrong and less of the author's memoir of becoming a engineer of failure. I gave up on this book about halfway through.
April 25, 2020
And I thought I understood failure. Boy, how I understood failure. I thought I had mastered it, but evidently there is so much more to experience.
It must be more difficult to edit a book on a technical subject written by an expert. Perhaps the editor doesn't want to intervene forcefully at the risk of removing technical detail, or of interfering with the message. This book solidly deserves four stars but it meanders and is frequently repetitive. The author often restates exactly the same thing and can be laborious in doing so.
The strength of the book is the review of significant engineering and design failures. The author's objective is promote critical analysis and thereby prevent repeated mistakes. Many of these passages are excellent and very well written.
In this way, some themes are developed. Quoting from Walker and Sibley's survey of construction failures, the author points out:
"...when the first example of a technologically advanced structure was built, great care and research went into its design and construction. But as the new design concept was used again and again confidence grew to complacency and contempt for possible technical difficulties. Testing was considered unnecessarily expensive and so it was dispensed with. But in each case, the design was steadily modified and the changes not understood, until a previously ignored second order effect dominated and the structure collapsed."
Other similar and related aspects of design and construction failure are explored. The general conclusion is set out in the final page:
"...it is the nature of the human and technological condition that until incontrovertible failures do occur there is a tendency - even among designers, who should know better- to think that the technology has been mastered."
Earlier the author notes that "to design is to make decisions" and "all decisions are compromises". This theme is not explored with sufficient vigor. To my mind, all construction entails a myriad of qualities and objectives. Decisions must be made about their relative importance and a range of outcome goals.
A bridge may allow people to pass an obstruction more directly and easily - perhaps saving time and money. It can also involve other impacts and considerations, like wildlife habitat or varying economic flows. Construction can fail partially or completely in a number of these dimensions - it is a question of what we measure and how.
Clearly, the collapse or catastrophic failure of a structure is noteworthy and particularly tragic when it entails the loss of life and injury. And yet, these endeavors are significantly complex and their lifespans long. Bungled design like the Tacoma Narrows Bridge is distinguishable from others where a structure survived long and was put to good use. Even mountains crumble. Human efforts will always involve aspiration, unknowns, varying degrees of success and chance. That concoction will lead to failure - for sure.
The book's central theme that failure is a topic worthy of study - and should be central to an education and practice in engineering - is given an effective voice supported by detailed and interesting case studies. The book can drag at times but is definitely worth reading.
It must be more difficult to edit a book on a technical subject written by an expert. Perhaps the editor doesn't want to intervene forcefully at the risk of removing technical detail, or of interfering with the message. This book solidly deserves four stars but it meanders and is frequently repetitive. The author often restates exactly the same thing and can be laborious in doing so.
The strength of the book is the review of significant engineering and design failures. The author's objective is promote critical analysis and thereby prevent repeated mistakes. Many of these passages are excellent and very well written.
In this way, some themes are developed. Quoting from Walker and Sibley's survey of construction failures, the author points out:
"...when the first example of a technologically advanced structure was built, great care and research went into its design and construction. But as the new design concept was used again and again confidence grew to complacency and contempt for possible technical difficulties. Testing was considered unnecessarily expensive and so it was dispensed with. But in each case, the design was steadily modified and the changes not understood, until a previously ignored second order effect dominated and the structure collapsed."
Other similar and related aspects of design and construction failure are explored. The general conclusion is set out in the final page:
"...it is the nature of the human and technological condition that until incontrovertible failures do occur there is a tendency - even among designers, who should know better- to think that the technology has been mastered."
Earlier the author notes that "to design is to make decisions" and "all decisions are compromises". This theme is not explored with sufficient vigor. To my mind, all construction entails a myriad of qualities and objectives. Decisions must be made about their relative importance and a range of outcome goals.
A bridge may allow people to pass an obstruction more directly and easily - perhaps saving time and money. It can also involve other impacts and considerations, like wildlife habitat or varying economic flows. Construction can fail partially or completely in a number of these dimensions - it is a question of what we measure and how.
Clearly, the collapse or catastrophic failure of a structure is noteworthy and particularly tragic when it entails the loss of life and injury. And yet, these endeavors are significantly complex and their lifespans long. Bungled design like the Tacoma Narrows Bridge is distinguishable from others where a structure survived long and was put to good use. Even mountains crumble. Human efforts will always involve aspiration, unknowns, varying degrees of success and chance. That concoction will lead to failure - for sure.
The book's central theme that failure is a topic worthy of study - and should be central to an education and practice in engineering - is given an effective voice supported by detailed and interesting case studies. The book can drag at times but is definitely worth reading.
January 5, 2024
I heard about this book on the podcast "Cautionary Tales" by Tim Harford (an excellent podcast BTW) and since reading about engineering disasters seemed like it would be interesting, I started this book.
Although I try mightily to finish a book that an author took the time to write, this was a rare exception. I made it only half-way through.
It is a meandering view through several topics:
- Some meta thoughts on the practice of engineering and what it means to be a good engineer
- Remembrances of the author's time at university working in mechanical engineering labs
- Case studies of (mostly bridge) failures and why they failed.
It was the last item that could have been interesting had the author told the story of each bridge in a more compelling way, like a good popular non-fiction writer would. But he didn't. When getting into the nitty-gritty details of why each structure failed, he assumed some knowledge of bridge design. No diagrams to help the reader understand. No drama.
If anything, this book, while not overly technical, can probably best be appreciated by civil engineering practitioners (whether as designs, builders, regulators, or inspectors). As I don't fall into this category, I gave up after the 1967 Silver Bridge collapse over the Ohio River.
It's a good thing engineers over-design structures as it appears that construction is rife with substandard materials, sloppy practices, and perfunctory inspections. Not to mention (at least for bridges), that they were designed decades before today's traffic volumes and heavy duty trucks.
Although I try mightily to finish a book that an author took the time to write, this was a rare exception. I made it only half-way through.
It is a meandering view through several topics:
- Some meta thoughts on the practice of engineering and what it means to be a good engineer
- Remembrances of the author's time at university working in mechanical engineering labs
- Case studies of (mostly bridge) failures and why they failed.
It was the last item that could have been interesting had the author told the story of each bridge in a more compelling way, like a good popular non-fiction writer would. But he didn't. When getting into the nitty-gritty details of why each structure failed, he assumed some knowledge of bridge design. No diagrams to help the reader understand. No drama.
If anything, this book, while not overly technical, can probably best be appreciated by civil engineering practitioners (whether as designs, builders, regulators, or inspectors). As I don't fall into this category, I gave up after the 1967 Silver Bridge collapse over the Ohio River.
It's a good thing engineers over-design structures as it appears that construction is rife with substandard materials, sloppy practices, and perfunctory inspections. Not to mention (at least for bridges), that they were designed decades before today's traffic volumes and heavy duty trucks.
June 12, 2018
This is an engaging, although lengthy, read. I admit I resorted to skimming through much of the book since I got it from the library and only have so much time. However, the central premise of the book is clearly true - studying failure should be a never-ending activity for engineers (and those involved in management of engineering projects).
A few lines present the premise very clearly. One might as well just be the summary of the lesson we should take from the book - "It is imperative that the realistic prospect of failure be kept in the forefront of every engineer's mind." Another, in reflecting on the hundreds of years of books on what we today call engineering or design, captures the historical view as well "One thing that especially impressed me was that, seeming no matter when a book on design was published, it discussed either explicitly or implicitly the persistent problem of failure and how to avoid it."
This book probably could have been shorter, and focuses mostly on bridges, but nevertheless, it is a valuable commentary on engineering and is relevant to every branch of engineering.
A few lines present the premise very clearly. One might as well just be the summary of the lesson we should take from the book - "It is imperative that the realistic prospect of failure be kept in the forefront of every engineer's mind." Another, in reflecting on the hundreds of years of books on what we today call engineering or design, captures the historical view as well "One thing that especially impressed me was that, seeming no matter when a book on design was published, it discussed either explicitly or implicitly the persistent problem of failure and how to avoid it."
This book probably could have been shorter, and focuses mostly on bridges, but nevertheless, it is a valuable commentary on engineering and is relevant to every branch of engineering.
September 8, 2023
4.1 This is what happens when an engineer writes a book. It reads like an engineering book. However, I quite enjoyed his unnecessarily in-depth descriptions and verbose style. I certainly learned a lot about bridge engineering and failure analysis. In the end, he makes the point that we should make a more concerted effort to learn from failure and not just success.
February 25, 2018
The case studies presented have been discussed elsewhere in comparable detail with similar conclusions. Aside from the author's tales of his own past, there was little in the way of original insight.
January 21, 2025
DNF. The writing of this is even more dry and painful than To Engineer is Human. This book could be 200 pages, but the author drones on and on and on. There is good information, but it's such a boring read (that's coming from someone who loves engineering failure stories).
September 23, 2023
Book has good information but it seems to me that the author frequently just adds words to fill the page.
March 10, 2014
Numerous good accounts of why we need to break the taboo that holds that failure has nothing to teach us, other than not to repeat that particular mistake.
I liked it for the insights on the intersections of technology, socio-economic context, and learning/progress. On another level, I saw in it some good cross-over applications to the management of technology support services, which is my line of work.
Does get a bit tedious over-working some obvious "lessons" and personal anecdotes from the history of modern civil engineering. But this is one of those books where any one of a number of insights rewards the reading.
I liked it for the insights on the intersections of technology, socio-economic context, and learning/progress. On another level, I saw in it some good cross-over applications to the management of technology support services, which is my line of work.
Does get a bit tedious over-working some obvious "lessons" and personal anecdotes from the history of modern civil engineering. But this is one of those books where any one of a number of insights rewards the reading.
May 7, 2016
Petroski starts out strong with numerous descriptions in rapid succession of structural concrete related failures, highlighting the underlying non-obvious causes. It was a pleasant and confidence building beginning. And overall, I was impressed. The author emphasizes throughout the book, the importance of proper planning and analysis and shows respect for the complexity inherent in sophisticated engineering designs, refuting oversimplified 1:1 causality. But for some reason, I felt it was lacking. The book is good and well worth a serious read, but some tangential narratives of engineering history and such felt unimportant and detracted from the overall quality of the book. I still recommend it, but would also recommend skipping the portions that were extraneous to the case studies that I found much more interesting.
November 18, 2012
Petroski writes almost an ode to failure: why it happens, why it must be studied and why we must always welcome it. It is through failure that things are learned and designs improve. Petroski looks at failure in a very broad sense: not just failure of design or technology but of all of the human decisions that come into play when massive projects - like bridges or shuttles - are put together. Petroski hopes that modern colleges of engineering and modern engineers study failure and plan for failure so that new things can be learned and designs strengthened over time.
July 18, 2013
Petroski tells the stories of a number of engineering failures and what was learned from them. He does an excellent job, and makes a strong case for engineering training to include a better historical perspective. There appears to be a tendency for engineers to forget the lessons of past failures, and to build on recent successes without fulling understanding the rationale for them. Ergo, important considerations may be overlooked.
November 24, 2013
This was a great book for this time in my life. The author makes each paragraph into a little story of its own, which means he writes more than I would care to, but his prose still flows. I have enjoyed two of his other books, for much the same reasons. He gets the inside scoop and detailed accounts on long dead tales that bring history alive.
August 14, 2012
As we march into the future, we are destined to deal with failures of systems, buildings, networks. The author indicates it is sometimes generational. People forget what others have learned.
Nice ending about how we are all human and learn from our mistakes.
Nice ending about how we are all human and learn from our mistakes.
October 23, 2012
Good book on failure and the many ways they happen.
May 1, 2013
Written for the layman. A great and interesting read for sure.
April 26, 2017
Engineering history made exciting for nerds. Fun to read about bridges, buildings and construction. A bit of self agrandizing on the authors part.
Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews