Since Pakistan was founded in 1947, its army has dominated the state. The military establishment has locked the country in an enduring rivalry with India, with the primary aim of wresting Kashmir from it. To that end, Pakistan initiated three wars over Kashmir-in 1947, 1965, and 1999-and failed to win any of them. Today, the army continues to prosecute this dangerous policy by employing non-state actors under the security of its ever-expanding nuclear umbrella. It has sustained a proxy war in Kashmir since 1989 using Islamist militants, as well as supporting non-Islamist insurgencies throughout India and a country-wide Islamist terror campaign that have brought the two countries to the brink of war on several occasions. In addition to these territorial revisionist goals, the Pakistani army has committed itself to resisting India's slow but inevitable rise on the global stage.Despite Pakistan's efforts to coerce India, it has achieved only modest successes at best. Even though India vivisected Pakistan in 1971, Pakistan continues to see itself as India's equal and demands the world do the same. The dangerous methods that the army uses to enforce this self-perception have brought international opprobrium upon Pakistan and its army. And in recent years, their erstwhile proxies have turned their guns on the Pakistani state itself. Why does the army persist in pursuing these revisionist policies that have come to imperil the very viability of the state itself, from which the army feeds? In Fighting to the End, C. Christine Fair argues that the answer lies, at least partially, in the strategic culture of the army. Through an unprecedented analysis of decades' worth of the army's own defense publications, she concludes that from the army's distorted view of history, it is victorious as long as it can resist India's purported drive for regional hegemony as well as the territorial status quo. Simply put, acquiescence means defeat. Fighting to the End convincingly shows that because the army is unlikely to abandon these preferences, Pakistan will remain a destabilizing force in world politics for the foreseeable future.
A thorough and very well documented exposition of the Pakistan army's dominant strategic culture. I think she may slightly exaggerate the unanimity of this consensus. In actual fact the majority of officers are probably thinking far more about their plots and post-army jobs than about the strategic needs of Pakistan, but those who think they are thinking are indeed thinking exactly this. Her conclusions seem unimpeachable: the army will not reform in return for X or Y amount of money or even minor territorial concessions. Nothing less than the fall of India will be enough. Since that seems less likely than GHQ believes, it is therefore going to be Pakistan that will fight to the end....sad, but most likely true.
Let me sum this book up for you: "Pakistan started all wars, Pakistan lost all wars, Pakistan is sending militants to every corner of the world, Pakistan was never sincere in defeating the Soviets, Pakistan's military are jihadists with a myopic goal of toppling India."
It seems that Christine Fair has only recently wised up to the opportunity to sell lots of books in India, the world's third largest book market expected to become the largest in less than 10 years. It appears that strong profit motive drove her to write what Indians want to read. Those, like Professor Wendy Doniger of University of Chicago, who ignore this reality are punished by having their books withdrawn and pulped. No publisher wants to take this risk now. And authors who wish to get published have to understand it too.
Before writing and promoting this book, she said this in 2009: "Having visited the Indian mission in Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you they are not issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover, India has run operations from its mission in Mazar (through which it supported the Northern Alliance) and is likely doing so from the other consulates it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along the border. Indian officials have told me privately that they are pumping money into Baluchistan".
Talk about double standards and hypocrisy. For once, I am thankful of my friend's collection of 'controversial books' as I am glad I didn't have to spend any money on this load of baloney. It is a disgrace to nonpartisan scholarship.
Although written by an academic I found the arguments both compelling and intriguing. This book is an academic study of Pakistan army's view of the state of Pakistan and it's self appointed role as the defender of not only the boundaries but also of it's Islamic based ideology. Since Pakistan Army controls the state of Pakistan, it uses the state resources for its own corporate and institutional ends. Therefore as much as the state of Pakistan relies on its army, the Army also relies on the state for its own sustenance. Also this is probably the first book which spotlights the proper role of Pakistan Army as the real power in the state of Pakistan. Christine clearly defines the relationship vis-a-vis India; not winning, even repeatedly is not the same thing as losing, but simply giving up and accepting the status quo and India's supremacy is by definition is defeat for the Pakistani Army. Thus Pakistani generals would always prefer to take a calculated risk and be defeated than do nothing at all! A rather frightening conclusion indeed but does paint a pretty realistic view of the prevailing state of affairs.
States which have been colonies cannot progress without following a unique course in the World. Consider USA which has been a colony but has only progressed after proving its own unique developmental stamp on the World. They have their own sports, their own brand of democracy, their own corporations, their own academics, their own culture, media and film. This unique-ness sets them apart and keeps the others in awe giving them a certain mystique. Now in the case of the Pakistani army, it has not created any new path, but chosen to extend the policies of religious patronage exercised by its parent British Indian army, the difference being that while British had to accommodate Hinduism and Sikhism, Pakistani army only focuses on Islam. The only unique feature Pakistan introduces to the world is its ideology which is a state created in the name of Islam. So basically in order to Pakistan to make a difference in the world, a successful state based on Islamic values has to be realised. Unfortunately this is an Islamist dream which goes against what majority Pakistanis reject. In divorcing Islam from its ideology Pakistanis lose the only differentiating feature, but following the Islamic ideology dream means further chaos. But the author completely misses a fundamental point as this belief in ideology, however skewed has yielded rich dividends for Pakistan Army as the most successful institute produced by Pakistan, which explains its insistence on civilians to follow the same ideology. Trouble is, most civilians in Pakistan just don't see any benefit in following this convoluted ideology which fuels a distrust between the Army and the Civilians.
Christine also covers the unique strategic security challenges faced by Pakistan in some comprehensive detail. It becomes quite clear that Pakistan was envisaged and has been used as a buffer state by not only the Anglo-Americans but the Pakistan army; which over time has eagerly supplemented this strategy with their own twisted interpretation of events. And while Christine explains how the Pakistanis countered Pashtun and Baluchi nationalistic movements by encouraging Islamist ones, thus making Islam a binding force for all Pakistanis, she fails to mention that no US president has ever visited Pakistan during its democratic periods; thus demonstrating their apprehension with Pakistani political leadership. I also agree with Christine that Pakistan never possessed and never will have enough of their resources to counter all the different nationalist movements so therefore there has to be a huge rethinking of this insecure defensive ideology and its clear to me that the dialogue has to happen within the Army and its apologists, since the civilians have so little influence over such matters in the land of the pure.
Christine also ignored the elephant in the room when explaining Pakistan Army's paranoid obsession when she fails to give proportionate weight-age to India's covert and overt actions in the 1971 war in East Pakistan. As most of her references are from articles after 1971, the writers must be affected adversely by a huge defeat against their arch enemy. Now to expect a proud and assured Pakistan army to accept an embarrassing defeat and move on is impossible to consider, especially when they are still in denial.
The fact that successive American governments have been overtly sympathetic when providing arms to Pakistani Army since independence even when completely aware of the Islamic anti Indian ideology propertied by the Army also means that the Americans must also take responsibility for their part in the creation of the monster. Considering the strategic and security situation in the country, the civilians cannot go against the army which at the moment is the only hope for the country unfortunately.
Nope, sorry, I can't do it. Beyond the repetition and endless citation of previous works - to the extent they crowd out the original thesis here, which seems potentially interesting - it is an absolutely maddening experience trying to read a book-length work featuring inline citations and explicative footnotes.
Perhaps the fault in this instance lies with the Oxford University Press (or my own pedantry), but regardless, it makes for a highly unpleasant reading experience. No opportunity to engage with the argument or a narrative, as the interruption from parentheticals is endless and constant.
A well researched and scholarly work on Pakistan army's strategic culture, its ideological standpoint and how they influence its domestic and foreign policies. Shows the deep-rooted convictions and contradictions of the Pakistani State and the army.
Pakistan is an ideological Islamic state born out of a schism in the old Indo-Islamic civilisation of India. The idea of Pakistan grew out of a Muslim revivalist and nationalist atmosphere in the 19th century among the Urdu speaking elite in north India. The Two-nation theory posited the Hindus and Muslims and separate nations and identities. Pakistan’s nationalism was founded on negation coupled with religion: rejecting old land for new, dismissing Hindu India for Muslim Pakistan.
So Pakistan since its creation has been driven by a quest for a culture of its own, that is not only different but in opposition to "Hindu India". Christine Fair, in this work shows the importance of this Islamic ideology and the subsequent violent and "unsatisfactory" partition which led to the creation of Pakistan. These historical factors have determined the subsequent trajectory of Pakistan in both its development as a state and its difficult relations with India.
Based primarily upon the sources of the military publications and interviews, the author in this volume volume shows how the Pakistan army views itself as an ideological army that protects the not just the sovereignty of the state but the Islamic ideology on which it is based. This Islamic ideology based on an opposition to "Hindu India" has ever since driven the Pakistan army's quest towards parity with India in all respects. The author shows how the Pakistani army since the beginning has been driven by this civilisational and revisionist goal of resisting the "Hindu hegemony", no matter how unrealistic that goal maybe. But the fact is, despite its various insurmountable problems the Islamic Republic of Pakistan continues to endure. The conclusion from this, that of a state that is perpetually at war with India is quite stark.
A boring book to be honest. This is basically a very long scholarly journal that got published into a book. It is an interesting take on the Pakistani Military and how it operates in the country, but it was so dull that it almost became unforgettable. Cool topic, but the delivery was just bland.
C Christine Fair enjoys an established and accomplished academic & politico-diplomatic career. Her association with policy making institutions under the tutelage of US government has enabled her to outreach and influence power players and people from stratum of (national & international) society. A proponent of drone attacks inside other countries by the US military, she is a highly controversial figure repeatedly criticised by leading global peace organisations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Brookings Inst. A graduate of university of Cali, she is primarily a student of language and culture but prefers to write on military & militancy with special emphasis on Pakistan. Journalists like Conor Friedersdorf, Glen Greenward, Jeremy Scahill, Ben Norton, Sarah Waheed and M Idrees Ahmed are some of journalists who have raised serious questions on her neutrality, as well as intellectual & academic integrity.
She is a figure of controversy and disapproval internationally (because of alleged CIA links). A definite persona non grata in Pakistan because of her hawkish, inciting, pro drone and insanely biased anti Pakistan stance. She has a history of misusing her social media account for using profanity for contemporaries who do not fit into her school of thought. She used media account asking India to squash Pakistan militarily, diplomatically and economically. She also suggested that Pakistani embassy in Afghanistan should be burnt down.
Her work under review can at best be summed up as lame, intellectually bankrupt, offensive and lobbyist. I don't expect any sane and unbiased head to give this work of propaganda any serious consideration.
As of April 2017, Pakistan Army is undoubtedly successful in tackling the menace of terror and extremism inside its borders but Christine's work fails to acknowledge any positive side of Pak Army. Her poorly crafted & ill-intended work hardly deserves a defence of Pakistan or Pakistan Army.
If anyone is seriously interested in reading an outsider's neutral and unbiased take about Pakistan Army, I will recommend "The History of Pakistan Army - Wars & Insurrections" by Brian Cloughley. Brian is an accomplished military historian, associated with Jane's. He remained deployed on Indo-Pak border as deputy head of UN mission and later a defence attaché for Australia in Islamabad for fiver years.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
In this thoughtful survey of Pakistan's strategic culture, Professor Fair demonstrates that county's legitimate security concerns, but also that they are married to a revisionist anti-Indian and Islamo-nationalistic ideology. This world view permeates not only the armed forces but civil society as well, creating a nation that seems to be permanently at war which, in turn, allows the paramountcy of the army in Pakistan which, in fairness, is one of the very few competent and uncorrupted organizations there. Fair takes a historical viewpoint, tracing the rise of this culture back to pre-independence and partition days, especially in the role of the "two-nation theory." Pakistan's emphasis on armed strength, jihad and lack of flexibility in issues such as Kashmir makes it certain that the country will remain militaristic, poor and source of instability in South Asia for the foreseeable future. If this troubled region interests you, this book is a must-read, in spite of the fact that it's a bit of a slog.
This is a must read book for international affairs aficionados, political analysts, or even a general reader with a keen interest in gaining a deeper understanding of a flawed nation state. Although the book heavily focusses on the Pakistan's army strategic culture and how it influences both its domestic and foreign policies, it also sheds light on what is wrong with today's Pakistan and reaffirms 'the insecurity, fear and loathing in Islamabad', the constant antagonistic attitude towards India and its persistent revisionism even in the face of defeat. After reading this book and witnessing parallel developments across the border, it becomes quite clear that Pakistan is an adamant theocratic state (Islam heavily influences the administrative machinery and laws) and the army has an overarching reach and influence over most of the civilian institutions which undermines the sanctity of a parliamentary democracy.
The author has rigorously explored, through comprehensive field work and literature review, the border issues that Pakistan faces with its neighbours, the conflict zones and provinces, the role of the civil society within Pakistan, the 'nuclear shield' and 'proxy war' behind which Pakistan hides and justifies offensives, and its unwavering obsession with India that gets reflected in the provocative literature propagated among young army recruits (projecting India as a Kafir, Hindu nation which must be defeated at any cost following Allah's diktat). Despite the fact that Pakistan has repeatedly been vanquished in wars with India, Pakistani army does not treat those defeats as 'defeats' in true definition of the word. In fact, Fair highlights that its intentions have become more robust and taken a dangerous turn after the defeat in 1971; Pakistan has pursued more rigorously its nuclear proliferation strategy through tie-ups with China which (according to Pakistan) makes it equal to India, acts as a deterrent to any foreign attacks and maintains a balance of power within the Indian sub-continent. The author has also underlined that in the short-term it is difficult for Pakistan to successfully transition to a true parliamentary democracy and the eventual dissolution of Pakistani army's power over civilian institutions is an extremely remote possibility. Fair also provides scenarios wherein the transition to democracy is possible through both internal and external disruptions and discusses the likelihood of these events happening.
In a way, Pakistan presents a case study of a nation state that has neither completely embraced religion nor has been able to discard it completely in the interest of minorities (unlike that of Middle East), thus projecting itself as a befuddled country to the international community. The army, in particular, comes out as an institution that has weakened and exploited other institutions, politicians and change-makers only to grow more powerful each day. At the cost of the economic prosperity and political freedom, and its unflinching obsession with its nearest neighbour, the army has seriously undermined Pakistan’s prospects as a flourishing nation and continues to do so.
Indispensable insofar as it authoritatively makes a very specific, very important point backed up by evidence and faultless reasoning: viz., that Pakistan's ideological commitment to a monomaniacally anti-Indian orientation is its raison d'etre, overrides all other priorities, is fundamentally detached from reality, and isn't going anywhere. Can't make the case for this as great writing or particularly essential for a general audience -- it's basically an academic article, with all the turgid prose that implies, and is by no means a good intro to Pakistan issues -- but I certainly hope everyone in the foreign policy establishment reads it.
Hey people, how are you all doing? Its been a while I guess. However, I wasn't away for an unworthy reason. This book possesses all the legitimate reasons to remain absorbed because it is about our neighbor which is hell bent on doing anything in its power to scuttle our rise not only as a nation but also as a civilization. I came across this title while listening to one of J Sai Deepak's lecture and he said that in order to understand the 2 nation theory better, this books is an essential reading which will help one understand the psyche of Pakistan. Its been a long time since I have come across such an amazing book which thoroughly deserves a 5 star
For someone who is an American, the author has a remarkable grasp over the way the Pakistanis think and the influence that the Pakistani Army wields over the psyche of a common man in Pakistan. I feel that the starting point of this issue should be the fact that Pakistani army thinks of itself as not only the territorial but also the ideological defender of Pakistan. It means that they think that the idea of 2 nation theory is fundamental to its identity which is defined in 2 levels: 1) First aspect of the identity is Islamic in nature which acts as the fount of all that is Islamic in country i.e. Sharia law and other interpretations of the Islamic school of thought etc 2) The second and more curious aspect of their identity lies in the fact that they proudly claim that they are not Hindus
Since they define themselves as Islamic and not Hindus, they see their battle/competition with India as civilizational. Due to this reason, even when Hindu India progresses, that is seen as a threat to Islamic Pakistan. They believe that India's prosperity will enable it to be a regional hegemon which cannot be in their interest. It is important to note here that India is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious nation but in the eyes of Pakistanis, it gets reduced down to a Hindu nation (when India is home to 20 crore Muslims against 23-24 crore Muslims in Pakistan). Thus, this mindset tends to buttress the feelings of Pakistani army that the partition in 1947 was unfair because of many reasons & one of the most prominent amongst them is that they didn't get Kashmir. They also feel that they didn't get enough resources to deal with the problems that were inherited which included most of the threat frontiers managed by British Raj (NWFP in Afghanistan which is now known as FATA), hence, the business of partition in their minds is unfinished. It is important for Indians to realize that peace negotiations, friendly relations and bonhomie can only be tried and maintained with such neighbors who have a common interest of maintaining the same. Pakistan is not one of those countries
In order to understand the idea of Pakistan, it is necessary to know how it came into existence. Even though Mohammad Ali Jinnah is considered the father of their nation, Allama Mohammad Iqbal is the person who is credited with first coming up with the idea of Pakistan (The same poet who is celebrated in India as the author of the poem "Saare Jaha Se Acha Hindustan Hamara"). Muslim league is the second element which led to the formation of Pakistan. However, Muslim league was formed in 1906 but the name Pakistan was not coined until 1933. Furthermore, they didn't enjoy the support of provinces which form a part of present day Pakistan till 1937. So, deals had to be made with the power brokers of the respective provinces. More importantly, this insecurity which ailed the people who were responsible for this ideation came from a belief that if they were left in charge of "Hindu Majority" or that the Hindu majority rose in prominence, they will exact revenge from the Muslim community. There are no evidences which indicates that such a grudge was harbored, however, it is pertinent to note that such an insecurity can only exist in a community which is afraid that they will be treated the same way as they did with the others.
One of the most unique aspects of Pakistani Army is that it considers itself not only the defender of physical frontiers but also of the ideological frontiers. It was born as an ideological army that specifically espoused Islam as its corporate ideology. It is noteworthy that when Ayub Khan was the Army chief, he wanted the influence that comes due to espousing of Islamic ideologies but he stripped the ulema and pirs of any political influence. On the other hand, when Zia-Ul-Haq became the army chief, substantial Islamization of the army had started to take root and instead of nationalism, Islam became the clarion call to which the Pakistani soldiers answered.
If we look at the Pakistani army through a geopolitical angle, then also its history of friendship shines a light on past which illuminates the present as well as future. In 1967, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a pact formalizing Pakistan's role in defense of the Kingdom. Pakistani pilots flew Saudi fighter jets in 1970s and there were 15,000 troops stationed there. Since then, Pakistan army has been regularly deployed in the middle east from where the soldiers get influenced by Wahhabi ideology. Even the Mecca accords of 2026 will not be any different from the past. One of the reasons why Pakistani army is not seen as a professional army is because of the fact that in certain pockets of the army, ideology is stretched to radicalism and it tends to take precedence over professionalism. It is noteworthy that wars are always classified in religious terms with it being an everlasting one is an acceptable outcome for the Pakistanis. Interestingly, they define defeat in a curious way. If any resistance against India in any form is alive in Pakistan, they don't consider themselves to be defeated. So, this will include any terror attack, any international act embarrassing India in any way, basically any attempt which thwarts India's rise as a civilization/nation in the region as well in the global world order. Surprisingly enough, on one hand they classify India as inherently pusillanimous and use British era racial justifications to buttress their argument, yet on the other hand, they classify them as a formidable opponent whose rise must be thwarted and use this justification to claim major share of Pakistani resources to enrich themselves. Hypocrisy abound. I wonder if the Pakistani citizens realize this or not
During the British era, they used the NWFP (North Western Frontier Province) as a buffer zone to prevent Russian invasion into the heart of Indian subcontinent which was in the east of Indus river. When they left, Pakistan inherited a disturbed area because the Afghans started to demand Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as theirs due to the ethnic similarity between the people. In this pursuit of their demand, they disavowed all the treaties that Afghanistan signed with the Britishers in the past including the recognition of Durand Line. In the light of these issues, Pakistan considers itself to be embroiled in 2 front wars i.e. with Afghanistan and India. Creation of Pakistan was not something which was celebrated by the people of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as was evident from the movement of Khudai Khidmatgars spearheaded by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. The Muslim league lost all of their provincial seats in 1937 elections and the people living in these areas were against the idea of partition. However, this has often led many Indians to believe that there were such people who didn't want partition from their side as well but unfortunately, their reasons for the same are misguided. The Islamists who were opposing partition were doing so because they believed India to be their crown jewel and partition in the name of nationalism would weaken the supranational Islamic identity or the ummah. Thus, they wanted all of India under Islamic umbrella, not just a moth eaten part of it. It must also be noted in context of Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the breeding terror outfits in the region, Pakistan tends to shift all the blame on USA which funded and abetted these activities in the region in the aftermath of 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by Russians. However, Pakistani schemes of using Islamic identity as a political tool to attain geopolitical objectives long predates the American arrival in the picture. They were training militants to oust the Daoud regime in Afghanistan atleast since 1973 which got substantial impetus once General Zia-Ul-Haq came into the picture.
Considering the wars that Pakistan has fought with India, I had a flawed assumption that all of these wars were waged to secure more land, to fulfill one's expansionist objectives and all of them got instigated by the Army Generals. However, I was too quick to discount Mr. Z A Bhutto. He was a civilian President alright but he had nefarious schemes in mind for India. When he was foreign minister in 1963 and 1971, he was also the deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan and he was the one who was continuously pushing for Pakistan to have a nuclear program because he was afraid that India will get there before which will undermine Pakistan. However, he didn't have a lot of supporters even in the army because the army personnel were of the opinion that it was too expensive to undertake this activity plus if they would ever need one, they will be able to purchase it from the market but that didn't come to pass. Eventually, his vision of a nuclear Pakistan prevailed once he became the President of the nation. During the 1971 war, Yahya Khan was the President of Pakistan & elections were held to ensure that there is a peaceful transition of power from military to the elected leaders. However, the election was won by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who represented East Pakistan and a Prime Minister from that area was not acceptable to the Army as well as the leaders of the west Pakistan because they thought that he will prioritize Bengali interests plus he won't be a hardline leader against India as well. In response, they launched the operation search light which led to the refugee crisis in India which gave rise to Operation Mukti Bahini. After the war, this was the first opportunity in which Pakistan couldn't deny that they have lost because the Eastern part was cleaved away from them. Hence, they tried to color the whole incident as a Bengali flaw by claiming that Eastern Pakistanis were not true Muslims because they allowed the Hindu minority to stay and thrive in their mainland. Furthermore, Muslims who were there were Hindu converts who had not been able to let go of their Hindu identity. Not only that, they tried to downplay the whole refugee crisis as well by claiming that it wasn't much of a crisis because it was just the Hindu minority which was going back to their homeland.
Lastly, we must come to the US angle of the Pakistan story because whether anyone acknowledges this or not, the Pakistani story wouldn't have existed if it wouldn't have been for US support. At the time when these 2 countries came close, America was looking for anyone who would whole-heartedly criticize socialism and communism and Pakistan was looking for aid. Pakistan played US well as they professed their false allegiance to the cause of capitalism and against socialism while securing aid as well as military equipments from the USA. In exchange of these gifts, US got access to Badaber airbase which is some 10 miles away from Peshawar. US used this airbase to monitor soviet activities and they frequently sent their U-2 spy plane from the said airbase. However, in 1960, Russia managed to shoot down a U-2 and its pilot Gary Powers and they swore that they will wage war against Pakistan if this airbase is allowed to be used by US. After this incident, General Ayub started to maintain distance from USA which eventually led Pakistan closer to China. Administration after administration violated their own laws in assisting Pakistan be it by Richard Nixon or Jimmy Carter. In 1979, Carter administration realized that American assistance to any nation which is trafficking nuclear material outside of international safeguards is a violation of symington amendment to US Foreign assistance act which was later subsumed under Arms export control act. However, in the aftermath of soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they decided to assist Pakistan with a package of $400 million which was dismissed by Zia-Ul-Haq as peanuts. Mr. Haq's gamble paid off as within a few months, President Ronald Reagan came to power and offered them an aid of $3.2 billion. Furthermore, Pakistan also asked US to clarify their position on their nuclear program which Zia defended as Pakistan's sovereign right. US agreed that the Reagan administration would be able to live with Islamabad's nuclear program as long as they didn't explode a bomb. Thus, Pakistan's 6 year exemption from Symington amendment was codified in law along with modification in the language which said that the prohibition of American military assistance to any country would come into play if that nation has exploded a nuclear device. This new standard was then modified from no enrichment to maximum 5% enrichment of nuclear fuel allowed. The goal post was again shifted when it was said in the Pressler amendment of 1985 that US assistance will be prohibited if it was found that the nation possessed a nuclear explosive device. Under the terms of this amendment, POTUS had to submit a certificate to the Congress that Pakistan didn't possess a nuclear device and the provision of assistance would materially diminish the likelihood of such an eventuality. Thus, it can be seen that these relaxations to Pakistan kept on increasing with each subsequent administration until President Bush refused to certify this in 1990 and the restrictions were reimposed on Pakistan.
Pakistan had turned the tables in its favor by ensuring that any escalation with India would force US to come and mediate between the two and being the bigger and better equipped nation, India will always be asked to show restraint. Nuclear umbrella allowed it to increase the frequency of low level skirmishes along with the burden of international expectations on India that such skirmishes be tolerated and no concomitant escalation takes place. It also allowed Pakistan to re-introduce the issue of Kashmir on global platforms repetitively. Thus, in the aftermath of all these incidents, it is necessary to highlight the conclusion that the author has reached and it is as follows:
"Even if Pakistan was to undergo a permanent democratic transition in which civilians shape foreign and domestic policies, it doesn't obviously follow that the civilians would abandon the policy of persistent revisionism with respect to India. Pakistan is a very stable instability & the world should prepare for a Pakistan that is ever more dangerous and ever more committed to its suite of dangerous policies"
Christine Fair’sFighting to the End is an incisive examination of the enduring strategic culture & ideological orientation of Pakistan’s Army (PA). At the heart of Fair claims that the PA is driven by an “ideology of strategic persistence” instead of conventional rationalist cost-benefit calculations to oppose India, even at great national cost. Some of the book’s key points include:
Ideological Entrenchment: PA has cultivated a narrative that sees India as an existential threat & itself as the ultimate protector of the state & guardian of Muslim identity of Asia. This self-conception has justified repeated military adventurism
Persistent Conflict with India: From 1947 Kashmir conflict to Kargil War to continuing jihad based proxy war, Fair details how the PA has consistently chosen confrontation over reconciliation
Strategic Culture & Doctrine: Fair uses the concept of strategic culture to explain why PA does not behave like a rational actor in the Western sense. Instead of adjusting to the reality of India's conventional superiority, the army has increasingly relied on asymmetric warfare, including support for Islamist militants
Civil-Military Relations: Fair outlines the PA's dominance in domestic politics & foreign policy, particularly on India & Afghan. she argues that this dominance undermines democratic institutions & perpetuates a cycle of instability
Use of Jihadist Proxies: One of the most controversial but well-documented aspects of Fair’s book is her argument that Pakistan’s support for jihadist groups is not a tactical aberration but a strategic choice rooted in military doctrine
Through rigorous analysis Fair “ show that Pakistan’s revisionism persists in regards to its efforts not only to undermine the territorial status quo in Kashmir but also to undermine India’s position in the region & beyond. Pakistan will suffer any number of military defeats in its efforts to do so, but it will not acquiesce to India”(Loc:233) Thus, for the PA simply retaining the ability to challenge India is victory there by it has redefined sense of victory from each of its otherwise defeats in its numerous conflicts & confrontations with India.
Chapter-by-Chapter Summary of the book is :
Chapter 1: Introduction Fair introduces her central thesis: the Pakistan Army's strategic culture is deeply rooted in an ideological commitment to resist India, viewing the conflict as existential rather than purely territorial. Fair “ presents a framework of Pakistan’s political structure, based on the work of Zionts, to explain how both military & civilian regimes execute the army’s preferences. ”( Loc:346) This perspective leads the Army to persist in confrontational policies, even at significant cost to Pakistan's own stability & development.
Chapter 2: Can Strategic Culture Explain the Pakistan Army’s Persistent Revisionism? This chapter “ chronicle the events of Partition as experienced by the Pakistan Army & the lasting security competition between India & Pakistan that is the noxious fruit of that complicated & bloodied process of untangling the Raj”( Loc:1017) She explores the concept of strategic culture, arguing that the Pakistan Army's actions are driven by a unique set of beliefs & historical narratives. Fair posits that the Army's worldview is shaped by a perception of India as an enduring threat, necessitating continuous resistance to preserve Pakistan's sovereignty & Islamic identity.
Chapter 3: Born an Insecure State Fair examines Pakistan's inception, highlighting how the circumstances of partition & perceived injustices have fostered a national identity centered on insecurity & opposition to India. This foundational insecurity has been perpetuated by the military to justify its dominant role in governance & defense.
Chapter 4: The Army’s Defense of Pakistan’s ‘Ideological Frontiers’ This chapter delves into the Army's self-assigned role as the guardian of Pakistan's ideological boundaries. Fair discusses how the military intertwines Islamic ideology with national defense, positioning itself as the protector of Pakistan's Islamic character against perceived external & internal threats. Chapter 5: Pakistan’s Quest for Strategic Depth Fair analyzes the Army's pursuit of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan, aiming to secure a friendly regime to counterbalance India. She critiques this strategy as a continuation of colonial-era thinking, arguing that it has led to destabilizing policies & support for militant groups in the region.
Chapter 6: India under the Pakistan Army’s Gaze This chapter explores the Army's portrayal of India as an existential adversary. Fair discusses how anti-India narratives are propagated through military literature, education, & media, reinforcing a hostile perception that justifies the Army's aggressive posture. She “ conclude with a reflection on how the Pakistan Army has constructed India as the enemy & what implications this image of India has for the Pakistan Army’s strategic culture & its planning for the Indian threat”( Loc:3151)
Chapter 7: Seeking Security through Alliances Fair examines Pakistan's strategic alliances, particularly with the United States & China. She argues that these relationships have been leveraged by the Army to bolster its position against India, often at the expense of long-term national interests.
Chapter 8: Seeking Security under a Nuclear Umbrella This chapter discusses Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons as a means to achieve strategic parity with India. Fair contends that the nuclear arsenal has emboldened the Army's aggressive policies by providing a perceived deterrent against Indian retaliation
Chapter 9: Jihad under the Nuclear Umbrella Fair analyzes the Army's use of Islamist militants as proxies in its conflict with India, particularly in Kashmir. She sites that this proxies were not only used in India but also in Afghanistan and, in some cases, within Pakistan itself. She argues that the nuclear capability has allowed Pakistan to support these groups with a sense of impunity, complicating regional security dynamics.
Chapter 10: Is the Past Prologue This chapter reflects on the historical patterns of the Pakistan Army's behavior, suggesting that past actions are indicative of future conduct. Fair expresses skepticism about the possibility of significant change in the Army's strategic culture without substantial internal or external pressures
Chapter 11: The Army’s Strategic Culture & Implications for International Security In the concluding chapter, Fair discusses the broader implications of the Pakistan Army's strategic culture for regional & global security. She warns that the Army's persistent revisionism & support for militant proxies pose ongoing challenges to stability in South Asia & beyond. As per her “ Pakistan is a purely greedy state, driven by ideological motives, then appeasement is in fact the more dangerous course of policy prescription. ”( Loc:6267)
Christine has done well. Taking off from Hussain Haqqani's Between Mosque and Military, Christine goes on to highlight the faultlines within the Pak establishment and society. She goes on to explain in great detail how those faultlines were created and exploited by successive regimes and military chiefs to enhance personal gains and those of the entities they represented. A must read for people who want to understand how Pak came to be a 'jehadi terrorist' nation that it has become. Kudos!!
Deserves nothing more than a single star. The biases of the author towards defaming Pakistan army is not hidden. The author clearly reflect the Indian point of view which is understandable but while writing a book one should present both side of picture. More ever some points were repeated again and again to malign a corporate institution, which has every right to defend it self, from which a rational mind can assume perfidious intentions.
A well researched and documented book which gives you an insight into the workings of the Pakistani state and why over the years it has become the Epicentre of all that is wrong with this world. A must read for anyone who is interested in the Indian Subcontinent.
A cumbersome read (Definitely written by a research scholar / academician, not a book writer) yet superb. The Author presents a comprehensive & compelling picture of what Pakistan is today (backed by painstaking research) & the stark reality that the world needs to face. A must read for all.
This book is must read for anyone interested in the war on terror, south Asia or Pakistan in general or security of India. Most of all people from the subcontinent must read this book and ask tough questions from themselves and the future we are trying to build.
The book lays down compelling argument to suggest that Pakistan is a greedy state.
Glaser defines such greedy states as “fundamentally dissatisfied with the status quo, desiring additional territory even when it is not required for security.”Purely greedy states pursue revisionist policies to increase their prestige, to spread their ideology, or to propagate their religion. Whereas efforts to ameliorate the threat perceptions of states concerned, strictly speaking, about their security may be helpful, such appeasement strategies are counterproductive and dangerous for purely greedy states because their “non-security goals result in a fundamental conflict of interests that makes competition the only strategy with which a greedy state can achieve its goals”. If Pakistan is such a greedy state determined to pursue its revisionism for ideological and even religious goals, as my research suggests is the case, the world should prepare for a Pakistan that is ever more dangerous and should adjust multilateral and bilateral policy approaches appropriately.
In the backdrop of the fall of Afghanistan in the hands of Taliban this assessment by the author stands true and is very scary. India has tried to normalise its relation with Pakistan for a long time, but due to direct or indirect involvement of the Pakistani army all peace process has broken down. This book tries to bring forward the reasons. It also tries to answer why Pakistan has not been able to normalise its relation with India. The hateful ideology the Pakistan army is teaching its recruit is of grave concern. The army is also directing this propaganda in school textbooks.
The book starts with how Pakistan came to be, its different war adventures with India and the hateful ideology it propagates for so called national unity. The author is to the point and cites all her references. This book will open the eyes of many people in India who are living with a neighbour with genocidal tendencies, and will force them to evaluate their life choices.
Excellent analysis and well referenced. The author's understanding of the subcontinent, its culture and historical background is equally impressive.
I think the US government has finally taken heed and is now done with Pakistan.
Pakistan is a state which, appears to have as its overriding purpose, more than the peace and prosperity of its own people, opposition to India. Without this opposition, it can no longer justify its own existence. (Which betrays deep down its own unconscious conviction that it doesn't really have a right to exist in the first place. But don't expect the Pakistanis to acknowledge that. )
The purpose of Pakistan's nuclear weapons is to provide an umbrella under which jihadist groups (which Pakistan has cultivated almost like another branch of the armed services) can operate with relative impunity, to the detriment of both India and Afghanistan and to internationalize the Kashmir dispute, as witness Imran Khan's recent rant at the UN. (Despite his threat of nuclear disaster, no one took him seriously, so there is hope that the days of Pakistan wringing out concessions from the West are over. )
This state of affairs is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. India can weather it better in that it has virtually sealed its border with Pakistan to keep out jihadists. The tragedy of Afghanistan will alas continue.
Very fascinating read about Pakistan's army and how it has shaped Pakistan politics including its relations with India and Afghanistan.
It is particularly relevant given the recent conflict over the Pahalgam attacks. The book written in 2015 accurately maps how Pakistan plays its Low Intensity Conflicts while ensuring they do not escalate as Big Brothers like the US are expected to step in soon.
Basically the play is to provoke an attack from India, play around the conventional attack for a while until the US intervenes. There is minimal loss to Pak, but it usually helps internationalise the issue. Exactly what happened in May 2025.
It is also scary as this means that with the current chest-thumping approach to Pakistan, these kinds of escalations might become more common. India would be better advised to concentrate on preventing major attacks from happening.
An impartial and detailed scholarly analysis on Pakistan Army's dominance in determining domestic as well as foreign policy of Pakistan. Through their well defined and oft mentioned strategic culture, Pakistan Army claims to be the sole protector of Pakistan's territorial as well as ideological frontiers, and hence the dominant role which we have witnessed through military coups four times in Pakistan's political history. For their claimed objective of safety and security of Pakistani state as well as its ideology against the enemies, Army has been relying heavily on the proxy forces of various militant groups.
Fighting to the end presents a comprehensive analysis of thought process behind the functioning of Pakistani Army & it's attempts at grabbing more & more power in a so called democratic Pakistan. It makes an honest attempt at figuring out the evolution of strategic culture of Pakistan Army. The book revolves around the history of Pakistan as a nation & connects various important events to the development of it's Army's strategy culture. It finally brings out the current & envisaged future implications of Pakistan Army's increasing power in the state, on various regional & global issues.
C. Christine Fair’s this book is an intriguing account of Pakistan’s way of war fighting. She analyses the root cause of the problem starting from British Rule and then series of events which afterwards defined the behaviour of the state.
She portrays it very well that even after four major defeats and losing half of the country its army doesn’t nudge because of its ideological business, collusion with militants and so called strategic location to lure American interests is only to keep Army at the helm of affairs.
A must read for all those who think Pak and its Army can mend their ways.
A very prolix account of psychology of the Pakistan Army. although the book gets boring with addition of numerous sources, the central theme remains interesting. Must say a definitive account of inner working methodology of Pakistan vis a vis ISI. A must read book if you want to know why Pakistan Army does what it does.
Thorough research by the author trying to touch and capture all facets of Pakistan army’s functioning, interests, aims and apprehensions, successes and shortcomings. The book may get bit repetitive at times though. But overall a good read with a realistic and cautious outlook to the future of Pakistan and its effects on regional and international security scenario.
The text book like approach of the author is what makes this read special. It was an eye opener in terms of the baggage both countries have been carrying since independence that have now become a point of contention between the two.
Brief insights on Pakistan Army’s past agendas on its internal security and their psychology behind wars fought against India during 1948,1965,1971 and 1998. Links between ISI and home grown terrorist outfits like J-e-M, LeT , Hizbul muzahiddin etc. good read!