The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial

Yale Law Library Series in Legal History and Reference

by James Q. Whitman

To be convicted of a crime in the United States, a person must be proven guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” But what is reasonable doubt? Even sophisticated legal experts find this fundamental doctrine difficult to explain. In this accessible book, James Q. Whitman digs deep into the history of the law and discovers that we have lost sight of the original purpose of “reasonable doubt.” It was not originally a legal rule at all, he shows, but a theological one.

 

The rule as we understand it today is intended to protect the accused. But Whitman traces its history back through centuries of Christian theology and common-law history to reveal that the original concern was to protect the souls of jurors. In Christian tradition, a person who experienced doubt yet convicted an innocent defendant was guilty of a mortal sin. Jurors fearful for their own souls were reassured that they were safe, as long as their doubts were not “reasonable.” Today, the old rule of reasonable doubt survives, but it has been turned to different purposes. The result is confusion for jurors, and a serious moral challenge for our system of justice.

 

Genres: Law, Nonfiction, Religion, History

276 pages, Hardcover

First published January 8, 2007

About the author

James Q. Whitman is the Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law at Yale Law School. His books include Harsh Justice, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, and The Verdict of Battle. He lives in New York City.

Reviews

[Count Gravlax · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting Thesis, but all and all too muddled and too confuse. Could be a much more succint or at least better organized description of the origins of In dubio pro reo.

[Michael Kramer · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very interesting book looking at the development of the criminal trial. The author shows how much of the development came by way of moral theology. Many of the parts of the criminal trial that have been handed down to us and which we consider to be a protection for the defendant were actually designed to protect the souls of the judge and jury.

The book does a good job in showing how people used to be concerned about the effect their actions and inaction would have on their afterlife. There was a particular concern about convictions which led to execution and bodily punishment. There is also a good recounting of trial by combat or by ordeal. Despite current belief, such trials were used when the crime had been proven but there was no one to swear under oath about the facts. Testimony under oath was reserved for people of upper classes. Trial by combat or by ordeal was a way of the judge or jury not being the final decider of the case.

The author also shows how trials developed beyond combat and ordeal mainly through the Church, which asked governments to prohibit them.

I am left with a feeling that, overall, in many ways we have lost something valuable as the law and society developed and a person's word under oath carries little if any importance to them.

This book is of primary interest to someone interested in the law or in history, but is written so that it is accessible to all.