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The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History
The Iran-Iraq War is one of the largest, yet least documented conflicts in the history of the Middle East. Drawing from an extensive cache of captured Iraqi government records, this book is the first comprehensive military and strategic account of the war through the lens of the Iraqi regime and its senior military commanders. It explores the rationale and decision-making processes that drove the Iraqis as they grappled with challenges that, at times, threatened their existence. Beginning with the bizarre lack of planning by the Iraqis in their invasion of Iran, the authors reveal Saddam's desperate attempts to improve the competence of an officer corps that he had purged to safeguard its loyalty to his tyranny, and then to weather the storm of suicidal attacks by Iranian religious revolutionaries. This is a unique and important contribution to our understanding of the history of war and the contemporary Middle East.
412 pages, Hardcover
First published October 30, 2003
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522 people want to read
About the author
Williamson Murray
87 books50 followersWilliamson "Wick" Murray was an American historian and author. He authored numerous works on history and strategic studies, and served as an editor on other projects extensively. He was professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University from 2012 until his death.
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Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews
August 23, 2018
A long and brutal struggle between two militaries that suffered from high levels of incompetence, the war between Iraq and Iran was marked with largely failed offenses, the use of human wave tactics by the Iranians, the widespread utilization of poison gas by the Iraqis, air and missile bombardments of cities by both sides, and mutually lackluster military leadership and staff work. This book has the advantage over previous works on this war because the authors were able to peruse secret state papers from Iraq that had been captured by American forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Thus we are able to get into Saddam Hussein's head, and an empty and barren place it turns out to be. A very thorough and readable history and strategic analysis of this most unfortunate and unnecessary war.
January 2, 2015
This book is an old-school take on the conventional campaigns at the start of the Iraq War. Murray does a nice job providing historical background to both armies, especially the US. His prose is simple and interesting throughout. I actually recommend this book slightly more than Cobra II because it is shorter and simpler without obscuring the main ideas. I often have trouble following campaigns, but Murray breaks it down quite clearly. His lessons section at the end is excellent for future conventional conflicts.
This book has a funny feel to it because it was published in 2003 before the insurgency really exploded. By the summer of 2003, many people thought that the Iraq War looked like a success. Murray is much more subtle than this, but there is no denying that the US invasion was a military triumph. He shows just how good the US was at precision bombing, joint operations, forming ad hoc units, logistics, and intelligence. He also has an interesting section on the British campaign at Basra, which was downright brilliant. The US was never really in jeopardy of losing the conventional war, but their outstanding execution led to a much faster and less costly victory than most Americans and Iraqis expected. Granted, the Iraqis were disorganized, poorly led, and unmotivated, but US firepower and speed. Murray's sections on the Saddam Fedayeen are particularly interesting, given that they were a preview of the later insurgency.
My main criticism of this book is that it focuses a little too much on the conventional military campaigns and not the political sides of the war. His accounts of the campaign suggest that relatively few Iraqis were impacted by the invasion. This contrasts starkly with other accounts, especially Shadid's "Night Draws Near." A lot of infrastructure was broken already, but the bombing exacerbated these problems and terrified the Iraqi people, who were often angered by what they saw as unnecessary attacks. The numbers of civilian deaths weren't very high, but the Iraqi perception was still that the US had wasted many lives and wrecked the country. Murray's account is so fixated on the conventional campaign that it overlooks the long term political impact of the campaign. To be fair, this is a military history, but these political factors ended up becoming decisive in later military developments. Overall, I'd say this is an excellent account with forgivable flaws that nevertheless gives modern readers and interesting window into how people were thinking about the Iraq War before the insurgency fully developed.
This book has a funny feel to it because it was published in 2003 before the insurgency really exploded. By the summer of 2003, many people thought that the Iraq War looked like a success. Murray is much more subtle than this, but there is no denying that the US invasion was a military triumph. He shows just how good the US was at precision bombing, joint operations, forming ad hoc units, logistics, and intelligence. He also has an interesting section on the British campaign at Basra, which was downright brilliant. The US was never really in jeopardy of losing the conventional war, but their outstanding execution led to a much faster and less costly victory than most Americans and Iraqis expected. Granted, the Iraqis were disorganized, poorly led, and unmotivated, but US firepower and speed. Murray's sections on the Saddam Fedayeen are particularly interesting, given that they were a preview of the later insurgency.
My main criticism of this book is that it focuses a little too much on the conventional military campaigns and not the political sides of the war. His accounts of the campaign suggest that relatively few Iraqis were impacted by the invasion. This contrasts starkly with other accounts, especially Shadid's "Night Draws Near." A lot of infrastructure was broken already, but the bombing exacerbated these problems and terrified the Iraqi people, who were often angered by what they saw as unnecessary attacks. The numbers of civilian deaths weren't very high, but the Iraqi perception was still that the US had wasted many lives and wrecked the country. Murray's account is so fixated on the conventional campaign that it overlooks the long term political impact of the campaign. To be fair, this is a military history, but these political factors ended up becoming decisive in later military developments. Overall, I'd say this is an excellent account with forgivable flaws that nevertheless gives modern readers and interesting window into how people were thinking about the Iraq War before the insurgency fully developed.
August 29, 2015
A long and brutal struggle between two militaries that suffered from high levels of incompetence, the war between Iraq and Iran was marked with largely failed offenses, the use of human wave tactics by the Iranians, the widespread utilization of poison gas by the Iraqis, air and missile bombardments of cities by both sides, and mutually lackluster military leadership and staff work. This book has the advantage over previous works on this war because the authors were able to peruse secret state papers from Iraq that had been captured by American forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Thus we are able to get into Saddam Hussein's head, and an empty and barren place it turns out to be. A very thorough and readable history and strategic analysis of this most unfortunate and unnecessary war.
April 3, 2016
This book provides a military and strategic history of the Iran-Iraq War based on Iraqi records captured after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The Iran-Iraq War has in many ways shaped my life and the life of my family, and so I'm deeply interested to know more about the war.
This book provides a broad overview of the War, but at the same time often delves into a greater level of detail that I need to know. In fairness, the book is titled "A Military and Strategic History," and true to its title, it details the strategy (or lack thereof) of Iran and Iraq during the war. It often discusses not only how many men fought in each battle, but also the number and kinds of weapons each side possessed. Sometimes, I felt like the book got lost in the details of the weaponry -- and these details honestly meant very little to me.
The book often reads more like a textbook than other historical books I've read. Still, the book gives a good overview of the War. Iraq had three main objectives for the war: (1) capturing the Shat al-Arab waterway and territories Iran captured via the 1975 Algiers Agreement; (2) destabilizing Iran and the Khomeini regime; and (3) showing Arabs that Iraq is the leader of the Arab world and and showing the world the power of the Arab nation, in line with Saddam's Ba'athist beliefs.
The world basically allowed Iraq to invade Iran. Iran's first president, Bani Sadr, complained at the start of the war: "This is the first time in history that a country is being attacked and is supported by no one in the world. It is total isolation and it should make us think. We have to realize that our words and our slogans satisfy no one but us." (p. 97.)
Saddam's invasion of Iran in 1980 was initially successful. He captured Khoramshahr and reached Ahvaz. However, "[b]y spring [of 1982], Iran was ready to launch a series of offensives against the still ill-prepared, badly positioned Iraqi units remaining on Iranian soil. At this point the Iraqis were in serious trouble and they knew it. Saddam even declared a willingness to withdraw from all Iranian territory before the signing of a final peace agreement. Tehran replied with silence while a series of offensives battered the Iraqis back onto their own soil and nearly collapsed the Iraqi Army. At Khomeini's behest, the Iranians now aimed to destroy Iraq's military power and overthrow Saddam's regime." (p. 175.)
One thing that I found really interesting is how often Saddam offered Iran peace throughout the war, and how often Iran rejected this peace -- even when Iran was clearly losing the war. Saddam offered -- and Khomeini rejected -- peace (1) on September 23, 1980, after Iraqi ground forces advanced to Ahvaz (but before they captured Khorramshar and Abadan)// UN Security Council Resolution 479 calls for the cessation of hostilities, but Iran rejects the ceasefire; (2) on June 28, 1981, Iran rejected a Ramadan ceasefire offered by Iraq; (3) on November 5, 1981, Iran rejected a Muharram ceasefire offered by Iraq; (4) on April 12, 1982, Iran rejected Saddam's offer to withdraw Iraqi troops from Iran in exchange for a guarantee the conflict will end; (5) on June 10, 1982, Iran rejects another Iraqi offer of ceasefire (this is after Iran has retaken Abadan and Khorramshahr); (6) on July 13, 1982, Iran rejected UN Security Council Resolution 514, which called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of warring forces to the international border; (7) on June 7, 1983, Iran rejects another Iraqi offer of ceasefire (after Iran begins its invasion of Iraq); (8) on July 20, 1987, Iraq accepts and Iran rejects UN Security Council Resolution 598, which called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil. Finally, on July 17, 1988, Iran accepted Resolution 598 and a ceasefire after Iraqi forces crossed into Iran for the first time since 1982. (pp. 344-347.)
"The military events of 1983 and 1984 (when Iran began its invasion of Iraq) underlined that neither side was in a position to overthrow the other. The Iraqis had abandoned the simplistic hopes and assumptions with which they had wandered into Iran in 1980. Saddam would have accepted almost any settlement that left him in power at this point. But the Iranians under Khomeini remained adamant that war would continue; there would be no peace until either Iranian actions or an internal revolt in Iraq had overthrown Saddam's regime." (p. 240.)
The ultimate ceasefire in 1988 occurred after Saddam ramped up the firing of missiles at civilians in Tehran. "The bombardment of Tehran led nearly a million of the capital's citizens to flee into the countryside. After the war, the Iranians would admit that they suffered approximately 10,000-11,000 deaths as a result of air and missile attacks on their cities, most in 1988." (p. 317.) By the end of the war, Iran's army had been completely decimated. "Despite its enormous population advantage, by the end of the war, Iran's ground force numbers only totaled 600,000, while the Iraqi Army contained approximately 1,000,000 soldiers." (p. 317.) Perhaps more importantly, the ceasefire occurred after the United States shot down a civilian Iranian airliner: "The international community's virtual silence after the USS Vicennes shot down an Iranian airliner in July 1988 underlined for the Iranians that they had no worthwhile friends, something even Khomeini could no longer ignore." (p. 286.)
Khomeini, however, was not happy about the war ending. In accepting the ceasefire, he explained: "Taking this decision was more deadly than taking poison. I submitted myself to God's will and drank this drink for his satisfaction."
--
Ayatollah Montazeri described the length of the war in this way: "Do you know why the war has lasted so long? ... We had no planning, [no] coordination, [nor] a unified campaign." (p. 338.) This is another major theme of this book. The Iranians and Iraqis failed to attack one another with any coherent strategy.
--
Another thing I found interesting is how Iran was far from an angelic fighting force. For much of the war, Iran was the aggressor. And their military actions resulted in the senseless killing of civilians -- something I previously thought only Iraq did. In response to Iraq's bombing of Iranian cities, "[t]hroughout October [of 1987], [Iran] fired a number of missiles at Baghdad, one of which hit a primary school, killing thirty-two children and injuring 182 others." (p. 304.)
Also, I found fascinating the impact the war had on Iraq. The war bankrupted Iraq, which achieved military superiority over Iran by borrowing heavily from Arab neighbors and spending $14 billion over the last three years of the war on arms. Iran had been spent this much in 1986, but in the next two years its battered economy could afford less than half that in yearly military expenditures. In 1984, "[m]obilizing Iraq's manpower had reached the point where the regime had to import more than a million Egyptian guest workers to keep the economy functioning to free its male population for duty at the front." (p. 233.)
--
This excerpt, which the author quotes from the Greek historian Thucydides, reminds me so much of Trump today:
"As a rule those who were least remarkable for intelligence showed the greater powers of survival. Such people recognized their own deficiencies and the superior intelligence of their opponents; fearing that they might lose a debate or find themselves out-maneuvered in intrigue by their quick witted enemies, they boldly launched into action; while their opponents, overconfident in the belief that they would see what was happening in advance, and not thinking it necessary to seize by force what they could secure by policy, were more easily destroyed because they were off their guard." (p. 9.)
"With these early influences, one should not underestimate the pure anti-Persian bias that festered in Saddam's worldview. The Iraqi Sunnis were all too aware of the long history of conflict between the Sunni Arabs in the west and Shi'a Persians to the east. In 1981, Saddam gave voice to this tension by republishing another of his uncle's works: 'Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies'" (pp. 17-18.)
"Nevertheless, whatever their lack of military training, the Basij did at times press the Iraqis hard by their numbers and fanaticism. However, as one Iraqi officer recalled:
'They come on in their hundreds, often walking across the minefields, triggering them with their feet ... They chant Allahu Akbar and they keep coming, and we keep shooting, sweeping our fifty mills [sic] [machine guns] around like sickles. My men are eighteen, nineteen, just a few years older than these kids. I've seen them crying, and at times, the officers have to kick them back to their guns. Once we had Iranian kids on bikes cycling towards us, and my men started laughing, and then these kids started lobbing their hand grenades, and we stopped laughing and started firing.'" (p. 80.)
Throughout this book, sources indicate that Saddam wanted to end the war, but that Khomeini insisted that the war continue. The book also emphasizes that the Iranian commanders had relatively little regard for the lives of the Pasdaran, and accepted regular massacres of Iranian troops. In a meeting with his senior military advisors, Saddam said:
"Yesterday, I was speaking with the Pakistani minister. He said to me, no, they [the Iranians have] started to understand. I told him they do not understand. He said the whole world knows tha that the Iraqi Army is victorious and that they [the Iranians] are defeated. I told him that they do not understand, because they have no idea of what defeat means ... The situation, the situation is of denial ... he [Khomeini] will not feel anything until blood is at his feet ... and then he will say to his soldiers 'advance' and the soldiers will say they will not advance ... because you have made me lose my faith." (p. 150.)
--
"A conversation among the Iraqi leaders in summer 1982 indicated how radically their position had changed from fall 1980. Iraq, Saddam now argued, simply wanted peace. Specifically, the dictator told his senior ministers in summer 1982: 'We want the peace, which keeps our sovereignty and dignity intact. We are not going to use military forces ... to destroy the Iranian nation and the Iranian army. This is not our tradition. However, we will fight the Iranians when they fight us. We will fight them in an honorable way as we are supposed to fight them.' Regardless of his motives in seeking a ceasefire, Saddam's position was precarious. At home and abroad, the defeats of spring 1982 [defeats leading to Iran's recapture of Khorramshar], needless to say, did not project strength." (p. 187.)
"On July 9, 1982, the Iranians restated their war aims and further announced there would be no end to the conflict until Saddam had fallen and faced trial as a war criminal. Tehran made clear there would be no peace until the Iraqis had installed a proper government (presumably an Islamic one), paid reparations of $100 billion, returned the frontier to that of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, agreed to the repatriation of the 100,000 Shi'a Iraqis whom Saddam had deported, and admitted Iraqi war guilt." (p. 190)
--
Also, Iraq killed 250,000 Kurds (in addition to untold numbers of Iranian soldiers) during the war with chemical weapons. Insane.
This book provides a broad overview of the War, but at the same time often delves into a greater level of detail that I need to know. In fairness, the book is titled "A Military and Strategic History," and true to its title, it details the strategy (or lack thereof) of Iran and Iraq during the war. It often discusses not only how many men fought in each battle, but also the number and kinds of weapons each side possessed. Sometimes, I felt like the book got lost in the details of the weaponry -- and these details honestly meant very little to me.
The book often reads more like a textbook than other historical books I've read. Still, the book gives a good overview of the War. Iraq had three main objectives for the war: (1) capturing the Shat al-Arab waterway and territories Iran captured via the 1975 Algiers Agreement; (2) destabilizing Iran and the Khomeini regime; and (3) showing Arabs that Iraq is the leader of the Arab world and and showing the world the power of the Arab nation, in line with Saddam's Ba'athist beliefs.
The world basically allowed Iraq to invade Iran. Iran's first president, Bani Sadr, complained at the start of the war: "This is the first time in history that a country is being attacked and is supported by no one in the world. It is total isolation and it should make us think. We have to realize that our words and our slogans satisfy no one but us." (p. 97.)
Saddam's invasion of Iran in 1980 was initially successful. He captured Khoramshahr and reached Ahvaz. However, "[b]y spring [of 1982], Iran was ready to launch a series of offensives against the still ill-prepared, badly positioned Iraqi units remaining on Iranian soil. At this point the Iraqis were in serious trouble and they knew it. Saddam even declared a willingness to withdraw from all Iranian territory before the signing of a final peace agreement. Tehran replied with silence while a series of offensives battered the Iraqis back onto their own soil and nearly collapsed the Iraqi Army. At Khomeini's behest, the Iranians now aimed to destroy Iraq's military power and overthrow Saddam's regime." (p. 175.)
One thing that I found really interesting is how often Saddam offered Iran peace throughout the war, and how often Iran rejected this peace -- even when Iran was clearly losing the war. Saddam offered -- and Khomeini rejected -- peace (1) on September 23, 1980, after Iraqi ground forces advanced to Ahvaz (but before they captured Khorramshar and Abadan)// UN Security Council Resolution 479 calls for the cessation of hostilities, but Iran rejects the ceasefire; (2) on June 28, 1981, Iran rejected a Ramadan ceasefire offered by Iraq; (3) on November 5, 1981, Iran rejected a Muharram ceasefire offered by Iraq; (4) on April 12, 1982, Iran rejected Saddam's offer to withdraw Iraqi troops from Iran in exchange for a guarantee the conflict will end; (5) on June 10, 1982, Iran rejects another Iraqi offer of ceasefire (this is after Iran has retaken Abadan and Khorramshahr); (6) on July 13, 1982, Iran rejected UN Security Council Resolution 514, which called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of warring forces to the international border; (7) on June 7, 1983, Iran rejects another Iraqi offer of ceasefire (after Iran begins its invasion of Iraq); (8) on July 20, 1987, Iraq accepts and Iran rejects UN Security Council Resolution 598, which called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil. Finally, on July 17, 1988, Iran accepted Resolution 598 and a ceasefire after Iraqi forces crossed into Iran for the first time since 1982. (pp. 344-347.)
"The military events of 1983 and 1984 (when Iran began its invasion of Iraq) underlined that neither side was in a position to overthrow the other. The Iraqis had abandoned the simplistic hopes and assumptions with which they had wandered into Iran in 1980. Saddam would have accepted almost any settlement that left him in power at this point. But the Iranians under Khomeini remained adamant that war would continue; there would be no peace until either Iranian actions or an internal revolt in Iraq had overthrown Saddam's regime." (p. 240.)
The ultimate ceasefire in 1988 occurred after Saddam ramped up the firing of missiles at civilians in Tehran. "The bombardment of Tehran led nearly a million of the capital's citizens to flee into the countryside. After the war, the Iranians would admit that they suffered approximately 10,000-11,000 deaths as a result of air and missile attacks on their cities, most in 1988." (p. 317.) By the end of the war, Iran's army had been completely decimated. "Despite its enormous population advantage, by the end of the war, Iran's ground force numbers only totaled 600,000, while the Iraqi Army contained approximately 1,000,000 soldiers." (p. 317.) Perhaps more importantly, the ceasefire occurred after the United States shot down a civilian Iranian airliner: "The international community's virtual silence after the USS Vicennes shot down an Iranian airliner in July 1988 underlined for the Iranians that they had no worthwhile friends, something even Khomeini could no longer ignore." (p. 286.)
Khomeini, however, was not happy about the war ending. In accepting the ceasefire, he explained: "Taking this decision was more deadly than taking poison. I submitted myself to God's will and drank this drink for his satisfaction."
--
Ayatollah Montazeri described the length of the war in this way: "Do you know why the war has lasted so long? ... We had no planning, [no] coordination, [nor] a unified campaign." (p. 338.) This is another major theme of this book. The Iranians and Iraqis failed to attack one another with any coherent strategy.
--
Another thing I found interesting is how Iran was far from an angelic fighting force. For much of the war, Iran was the aggressor. And their military actions resulted in the senseless killing of civilians -- something I previously thought only Iraq did. In response to Iraq's bombing of Iranian cities, "[t]hroughout October [of 1987], [Iran] fired a number of missiles at Baghdad, one of which hit a primary school, killing thirty-two children and injuring 182 others." (p. 304.)
Also, I found fascinating the impact the war had on Iraq. The war bankrupted Iraq, which achieved military superiority over Iran by borrowing heavily from Arab neighbors and spending $14 billion over the last three years of the war on arms. Iran had been spent this much in 1986, but in the next two years its battered economy could afford less than half that in yearly military expenditures. In 1984, "[m]obilizing Iraq's manpower had reached the point where the regime had to import more than a million Egyptian guest workers to keep the economy functioning to free its male population for duty at the front." (p. 233.)
--
This excerpt, which the author quotes from the Greek historian Thucydides, reminds me so much of Trump today:
"As a rule those who were least remarkable for intelligence showed the greater powers of survival. Such people recognized their own deficiencies and the superior intelligence of their opponents; fearing that they might lose a debate or find themselves out-maneuvered in intrigue by their quick witted enemies, they boldly launched into action; while their opponents, overconfident in the belief that they would see what was happening in advance, and not thinking it necessary to seize by force what they could secure by policy, were more easily destroyed because they were off their guard." (p. 9.)
"With these early influences, one should not underestimate the pure anti-Persian bias that festered in Saddam's worldview. The Iraqi Sunnis were all too aware of the long history of conflict between the Sunni Arabs in the west and Shi'a Persians to the east. In 1981, Saddam gave voice to this tension by republishing another of his uncle's works: 'Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: Persians, Jews, and Flies'" (pp. 17-18.)
"Nevertheless, whatever their lack of military training, the Basij did at times press the Iraqis hard by their numbers and fanaticism. However, as one Iraqi officer recalled:
'They come on in their hundreds, often walking across the minefields, triggering them with their feet ... They chant Allahu Akbar and they keep coming, and we keep shooting, sweeping our fifty mills [sic] [machine guns] around like sickles. My men are eighteen, nineteen, just a few years older than these kids. I've seen them crying, and at times, the officers have to kick them back to their guns. Once we had Iranian kids on bikes cycling towards us, and my men started laughing, and then these kids started lobbing their hand grenades, and we stopped laughing and started firing.'" (p. 80.)
Throughout this book, sources indicate that Saddam wanted to end the war, but that Khomeini insisted that the war continue. The book also emphasizes that the Iranian commanders had relatively little regard for the lives of the Pasdaran, and accepted regular massacres of Iranian troops. In a meeting with his senior military advisors, Saddam said:
"Yesterday, I was speaking with the Pakistani minister. He said to me, no, they [the Iranians have] started to understand. I told him they do not understand. He said the whole world knows tha that the Iraqi Army is victorious and that they [the Iranians] are defeated. I told him that they do not understand, because they have no idea of what defeat means ... The situation, the situation is of denial ... he [Khomeini] will not feel anything until blood is at his feet ... and then he will say to his soldiers 'advance' and the soldiers will say they will not advance ... because you have made me lose my faith." (p. 150.)
--
"A conversation among the Iraqi leaders in summer 1982 indicated how radically their position had changed from fall 1980. Iraq, Saddam now argued, simply wanted peace. Specifically, the dictator told his senior ministers in summer 1982: 'We want the peace, which keeps our sovereignty and dignity intact. We are not going to use military forces ... to destroy the Iranian nation and the Iranian army. This is not our tradition. However, we will fight the Iranians when they fight us. We will fight them in an honorable way as we are supposed to fight them.' Regardless of his motives in seeking a ceasefire, Saddam's position was precarious. At home and abroad, the defeats of spring 1982 [defeats leading to Iran's recapture of Khorramshar], needless to say, did not project strength." (p. 187.)
"On July 9, 1982, the Iranians restated their war aims and further announced there would be no end to the conflict until Saddam had fallen and faced trial as a war criminal. Tehran made clear there would be no peace until the Iraqis had installed a proper government (presumably an Islamic one), paid reparations of $100 billion, returned the frontier to that of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, agreed to the repatriation of the 100,000 Shi'a Iraqis whom Saddam had deported, and admitted Iraqi war guilt." (p. 190)
--
Also, Iraq killed 250,000 Kurds (in addition to untold numbers of Iranian soldiers) during the war with chemical weapons. Insane.
May 15, 2020
3.5 stars [History]
(W: 3.15, U: 3.5, T: 3.75)
Exact rating: 3.47
#27 in genre, out of 80
A detailed "military and strategic history" of a war that has received less attention than some others. The writing was smooth [3] to tight [3.5], suffering occasionally from lengthy conversational transcripts and lack of solid segue between block quotations [-0.1]. Because Williamson and Woods conducted interviews with survivors and had access to a rather thorough record of Saddam's own cabinet meetings, rarer truths will be found here.
War crimes of chemical weapons [Iraq] and democide [Iran] are here. The Iranian leadership's byzantine tactics of sending human wave assaualts--hundreds of thousands of lightly-equipped men and boys--into the teeth of massed armor, artillery, and mine fields is nothing less than a crime against humanity.
(W: 3.15, U: 3.5, T: 3.75)
Exact rating: 3.47
#27 in genre, out of 80
A detailed "military and strategic history" of a war that has received less attention than some others. The writing was smooth [3] to tight [3.5], suffering occasionally from lengthy conversational transcripts and lack of solid segue between block quotations [-0.1]. Because Williamson and Woods conducted interviews with survivors and had access to a rather thorough record of Saddam's own cabinet meetings, rarer truths will be found here.
War crimes of chemical weapons [Iraq] and democide [Iran] are here. The Iranian leadership's byzantine tactics of sending human wave assaualts--hundreds of thousands of lightly-equipped men and boys--into the teeth of massed armor, artillery, and mine fields is nothing less than a crime against humanity.
Read
November 3, 2023One of the finest examples of war as tragicomedy. It wasn't even that long ago, but the Iran-Iraq war feels like some strange historical anachronism that doesn't belong in the twentieth century. Saddam went in there basically as soon as he took full power in Iraq, and if there was ever a moment when an invasion of Iran seemed somewhat feasible, 1980 was probably it. Despite initial successes, the terrain in the borderlands proved ruinously difficult, and by some miracle the Ayatollah managed to stay in power and organize a defense. Yet other then that things are basically all downhill from there-- for both sides. Iran, despite a huge manpower advantage and a much superior air force, slowly whittles itself down with future human wave attacks. Two years in Iraq was ready to call it quits but Khomeini flipped the script and rejected any peace armistice until the Ba'athist regime came down (it didn't). In this hostile climate, both sides went into battle with a self-inflicted handicap brought on by massive purges in the officer corps. In Iran's case, this severely weakened its air superiority, while the navies of both sides came out more or less untouched. While Iranian counteroffensives stabilized a front line more or less at the border, Iraqi attacks proved failed to make further advances, and attempts to shut down Iranian oil production with shipping raids likewise didn't cut it. In the strange world of the cold war, the arms logistics involved really did break my brain. For one thing, Iraq found itself in the strange position of receiving weapons from both the US and the USSR, while Iran's bizarre ideological turn meant making enemies with basically everyone. Yet by some weird turn of negotiation Khomeini was able to arrange weapons shipments from both Libya and North Korea. The sight of actual trenches in the desert feels eerily reminiscent of WW1, yet the gaudy violence of rocket attacks on major population centers is apropos of WW2. Despite the initial Iranian technological advantage, much of their arsenal was American-made (for the Shah's army), and replacements were hard to come by (if you ignore Iran-contra). A final Iranian offensive on Basra came closer to a decisive victory than anyone had in years, but a successful Iraqi counterattack by the Republican Guard broke the back of an exhausted Iran and brought the war to a conclusion...after eight years. Wild to think that the Gulf War happened just a few years after.
January 25, 2023
An orderly, ten-chapter tome:
1) Introduction
2) A context of “bitterness and anger”
3) The opponents
4) 1980: The Iraqi invasion begins
5) 1981–1982: Stalemate
6) Defeat and recovery
7) 1983–1984: A war of attrition
8) 1985–1986: Dog days of a long war
9) 1987–1988: An end in sight?
10) Conclusion
The sources of the Iran–Iraq War lie deep in history. In effect, until the early 20th century, when the British stitched together incongruent provinces of the Ottoman Empire that they had acquired in the political fallout from that empire’s crumple, there was no such political entity as Iraq.
Yet, the territory from which modern Iraq emerged has been at the midpoint of world events since the sunrise of history. Along with Egypt and China, the Mesopotamian Valley gave birth to the earliest of human civilizations.
Beginning in the 3rd millennium BC, small Semitic tribes combined with the Akkadians and Sumerians to build an affluent city-state culture around Ur and Babylon. Theirs were societies born in the unsympathetic conditions of subsistence agriculture, which forced them to continually poise their actions in a world caught between adversity and affluence.
Change in Mesopotamia was often speedy and aggressive. The life-giving rivers represented an impulsive reserve, often failing to flood or flooding too much. This gave rise to a particular fatalism – so-called Babylonian “pessimism” – within a culture where nothing was certain and the future was of modest comfort.
Nature was not the only source of gloom. During the centuries, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Parthians, Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols, Ottomans, Britons, and Americans have all plagued, overwhelmed, and then, in a fashion, ruled, but never totally tamed Mesopotamia.
Take a jump in time and soar ahead ---
Following the First World War and the cave in of the Ottoman Empire (1922), which then extended over much of the Middle East, the borders of the region had been fully redrawn, in keeping with the interests of the triumphant Western powers, namely France and Britain. However, throughout the 20th century, this simulated division underwent widespread questioning.
In the Gulf, the agreement of Algiers from 1975 – in which Iran continued to provide military support to Iraqi Kurds in exchange for acknowledgment of the Iraq border of the Shatt al-Arab River – was supposed to finish territorial strains that animated the two countries. Nonetheless, the stakes were high with regards to the Shatt al-Arab, accurately the “Rivers of the Arabs”, since it connected the oil areas of both countries.
Thus, regardless of the accord between the two neighbours, the tactical significance of this area did not fail to cause many aggravations and altercations until the refusal of the treaty by Saddam Hussein on 17th September 1980, and the conquest of the dubious territories five days later.
That Iraq made the battlefield even more grisly by introducing poison gas – not used expansively in a major war since Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 19354 – indicated the extreme anxiety and abhorrence that pervaded the conflict. And once the taboo was broken, the Iraqi regime would later employ such weapons against elements of its own population.
Similarly merciless, the Iranians adroitly merged notions of religious martyrdom to include symbolic “keys to heaven” with patriotic fervor to send 12 to 17-year-old boys to clear minefields.
As though no one had learned anything from World War I, a preferred tactic of the Pasdaran and Basij, Iran’s revolutionary militias, was to launch human-wave assaults into the face of prepared Iraqi defenses. Both sides left few laws of humanity unbroken.
Perhaps the most excellent elucidation for the war’s spirit was that, it was about wrangles ancient and modern, political and religious. By the time the war ended, both sides had fired ballistic missiles – with only somewhat better precision than the V-2s the Nazis fired during World War II – at cities of the opposing side.
One suspects that, had one or both sides possessed nuclear weapons, they would likely have used them.
In military terms, there were no crucial victories. At the commencement, neither side was capable of applying coherent tactics to the battlefield, much less effective operational concepts or strategic thinking. At the start, fervent political and religious amateurs determined the disposition of forces and conduct of operations.
During the war’s course, military efficiency at the tactical level improved somewhat, particularly on the Iraqi side. While military professionalism gradually crept into the picture in Baghdad, it never completely replaced Saddam’s unprofessional decision making, because he alone made the important military decisions.
On the other side of the hill, military professionalism was hardly ever apparent. Until the end of the war in July 1988, Saddam and Khomeini both equated some degree of military effectiveness with the casualty rates their own forces suffered.
Nevertheless, the war’s extent, as well its casualties, forced both Iraq and Iran to adjust and learn. How and what they learned suggests much about the difficulties of learning in the midst of a war, particularly a war for which neither side was intellectually prepared.
Once again, the clash underlined that cognitive factors, such as initiative and military professionalism, are of greater effect on the battlefield than mere muscle and technology. Iran’s performance during the war also suggests the lengths to which human beings are willing to go to continue a quarrel for a cause in which they obsessively trust.
When the fighting ceased in 1988, Iraq was economically devastated. Faced with its debts, Saddam Hussein asked Kuwait to cancel Iraq’s debt amounting to several billion dollars. When Kuwait refused, Saddam Hussein took a gamble: invading its prosperous neighbor and getting hold of its many oil resources, right under the nose of the international community, which had been mainly accommodating towards him until then.
However, after the invasion, the international community, to which Iraq was also heavily indebted, did not remain inactive and voted for the introduction of stringent economic sanctions to try to bring Saddam Hussein to reason. Nonetheless, this blockade which could strengthen the financial distress of Iraq did not have the desired effect.
Radicalized, Saddam Hussein refused the ultimatum and continued his invasion.
On 17th January 1991, deciding to react, the American President George Herbert Walker Bush took the lead of a coalition of 34 countries and attacked the Iraqi forces.
Faced with the international fire power, Saddam Hussein’s attempt turned into a disaster. Within days, his army was swept up and had to withdraw from Kuwait. The consequences for him would be dramatic. The operation caused a complete disavowal of Iraq by the international community, while economic sanctions introduced by the latter prompted a catastrophic fall in the living conditions of the Iraqis.
Saddam Hussein went from an enlightened despot to a tyrant in the eyes of the world, eventually being overthrown and executed on 30th December 2006, following the attack on Iraq by the United States of George W. Bush Jr. and his allies.
To conclude, we are left with the following bullet points:
**Stripped of its larger milieu, the skirmish may have little to offer in the way of tactical messages or battlefield accomplishments. Even so, the reading of political and military malfunction, as much as success, develops a deeper appreciation of the past, which sequentially drops light on the future and on the nature and disposition, in addition to cultural tempers, of potential opponents.
**As Thucydides suggested, his history, indeed all history, should be “useful [for] those who want to understand evidently the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.”
**The availability of Iraqi texts and media captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom presents an exclusive chance to investigate this conflict from within Iraq’s decision-making processes. It is on the strength of a distinctive set of principal sources that this book inspects Iraq’s decision-making processes.
**This book provides insight into the thinking of Saddam Hussein and his senior leadership in the historical milieu of the war, offering outlooks on past and future autocrats.
**This book further explores the rationale and decision-making processes that drove the Iraqis as they grappled with challenges that, at times, threatened their existence.
**Where possible, this book also aims to present a sense of Iran’s actions and perceptions, although without access to the records of the Khomeini regime, this account has less to offer regarding Iran’s decision making.
Give it a try.
1) Introduction
2) A context of “bitterness and anger”
3) The opponents
4) 1980: The Iraqi invasion begins
5) 1981–1982: Stalemate
6) Defeat and recovery
7) 1983–1984: A war of attrition
8) 1985–1986: Dog days of a long war
9) 1987–1988: An end in sight?
10) Conclusion
The sources of the Iran–Iraq War lie deep in history. In effect, until the early 20th century, when the British stitched together incongruent provinces of the Ottoman Empire that they had acquired in the political fallout from that empire’s crumple, there was no such political entity as Iraq.
Yet, the territory from which modern Iraq emerged has been at the midpoint of world events since the sunrise of history. Along with Egypt and China, the Mesopotamian Valley gave birth to the earliest of human civilizations.
Beginning in the 3rd millennium BC, small Semitic tribes combined with the Akkadians and Sumerians to build an affluent city-state culture around Ur and Babylon. Theirs were societies born in the unsympathetic conditions of subsistence agriculture, which forced them to continually poise their actions in a world caught between adversity and affluence.
Change in Mesopotamia was often speedy and aggressive. The life-giving rivers represented an impulsive reserve, often failing to flood or flooding too much. This gave rise to a particular fatalism – so-called Babylonian “pessimism” – within a culture where nothing was certain and the future was of modest comfort.
Nature was not the only source of gloom. During the centuries, Hittites, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Parthians, Byzantines, Arabs, Mongols, Ottomans, Britons, and Americans have all plagued, overwhelmed, and then, in a fashion, ruled, but never totally tamed Mesopotamia.
Take a jump in time and soar ahead ---
Following the First World War and the cave in of the Ottoman Empire (1922), which then extended over much of the Middle East, the borders of the region had been fully redrawn, in keeping with the interests of the triumphant Western powers, namely France and Britain. However, throughout the 20th century, this simulated division underwent widespread questioning.
In the Gulf, the agreement of Algiers from 1975 – in which Iran continued to provide military support to Iraqi Kurds in exchange for acknowledgment of the Iraq border of the Shatt al-Arab River – was supposed to finish territorial strains that animated the two countries. Nonetheless, the stakes were high with regards to the Shatt al-Arab, accurately the “Rivers of the Arabs”, since it connected the oil areas of both countries.
Thus, regardless of the accord between the two neighbours, the tactical significance of this area did not fail to cause many aggravations and altercations until the refusal of the treaty by Saddam Hussein on 17th September 1980, and the conquest of the dubious territories five days later.
That Iraq made the battlefield even more grisly by introducing poison gas – not used expansively in a major war since Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in 19354 – indicated the extreme anxiety and abhorrence that pervaded the conflict. And once the taboo was broken, the Iraqi regime would later employ such weapons against elements of its own population.
Similarly merciless, the Iranians adroitly merged notions of religious martyrdom to include symbolic “keys to heaven” with patriotic fervor to send 12 to 17-year-old boys to clear minefields.
As though no one had learned anything from World War I, a preferred tactic of the Pasdaran and Basij, Iran’s revolutionary militias, was to launch human-wave assaults into the face of prepared Iraqi defenses. Both sides left few laws of humanity unbroken.
Perhaps the most excellent elucidation for the war’s spirit was that, it was about wrangles ancient and modern, political and religious. By the time the war ended, both sides had fired ballistic missiles – with only somewhat better precision than the V-2s the Nazis fired during World War II – at cities of the opposing side.
One suspects that, had one or both sides possessed nuclear weapons, they would likely have used them.
In military terms, there were no crucial victories. At the commencement, neither side was capable of applying coherent tactics to the battlefield, much less effective operational concepts or strategic thinking. At the start, fervent political and religious amateurs determined the disposition of forces and conduct of operations.
During the war’s course, military efficiency at the tactical level improved somewhat, particularly on the Iraqi side. While military professionalism gradually crept into the picture in Baghdad, it never completely replaced Saddam’s unprofessional decision making, because he alone made the important military decisions.
On the other side of the hill, military professionalism was hardly ever apparent. Until the end of the war in July 1988, Saddam and Khomeini both equated some degree of military effectiveness with the casualty rates their own forces suffered.
Nevertheless, the war’s extent, as well its casualties, forced both Iraq and Iran to adjust and learn. How and what they learned suggests much about the difficulties of learning in the midst of a war, particularly a war for which neither side was intellectually prepared.
Once again, the clash underlined that cognitive factors, such as initiative and military professionalism, are of greater effect on the battlefield than mere muscle and technology. Iran’s performance during the war also suggests the lengths to which human beings are willing to go to continue a quarrel for a cause in which they obsessively trust.
When the fighting ceased in 1988, Iraq was economically devastated. Faced with its debts, Saddam Hussein asked Kuwait to cancel Iraq’s debt amounting to several billion dollars. When Kuwait refused, Saddam Hussein took a gamble: invading its prosperous neighbor and getting hold of its many oil resources, right under the nose of the international community, which had been mainly accommodating towards him until then.
However, after the invasion, the international community, to which Iraq was also heavily indebted, did not remain inactive and voted for the introduction of stringent economic sanctions to try to bring Saddam Hussein to reason. Nonetheless, this blockade which could strengthen the financial distress of Iraq did not have the desired effect.
Radicalized, Saddam Hussein refused the ultimatum and continued his invasion.
On 17th January 1991, deciding to react, the American President George Herbert Walker Bush took the lead of a coalition of 34 countries and attacked the Iraqi forces.
Faced with the international fire power, Saddam Hussein’s attempt turned into a disaster. Within days, his army was swept up and had to withdraw from Kuwait. The consequences for him would be dramatic. The operation caused a complete disavowal of Iraq by the international community, while economic sanctions introduced by the latter prompted a catastrophic fall in the living conditions of the Iraqis.
Saddam Hussein went from an enlightened despot to a tyrant in the eyes of the world, eventually being overthrown and executed on 30th December 2006, following the attack on Iraq by the United States of George W. Bush Jr. and his allies.
To conclude, we are left with the following bullet points:
**Stripped of its larger milieu, the skirmish may have little to offer in the way of tactical messages or battlefield accomplishments. Even so, the reading of political and military malfunction, as much as success, develops a deeper appreciation of the past, which sequentially drops light on the future and on the nature and disposition, in addition to cultural tempers, of potential opponents.
**As Thucydides suggested, his history, indeed all history, should be “useful [for] those who want to understand evidently the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.”
**The availability of Iraqi texts and media captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom presents an exclusive chance to investigate this conflict from within Iraq’s decision-making processes. It is on the strength of a distinctive set of principal sources that this book inspects Iraq’s decision-making processes.
**This book provides insight into the thinking of Saddam Hussein and his senior leadership in the historical milieu of the war, offering outlooks on past and future autocrats.
**This book further explores the rationale and decision-making processes that drove the Iraqis as they grappled with challenges that, at times, threatened their existence.
**Where possible, this book also aims to present a sense of Iran’s actions and perceptions, although without access to the records of the Khomeini regime, this account has less to offer regarding Iran’s decision making.
Give it a try.
October 7, 2022
Good book on military history of The Iran Iraq war. I read this after the Ukraine Russia war started so I could get more insight on to how wars are fought. Its interesting to think how important logistics, leadership, and military organization is. It's what makes or breaks a country during a war.
This book gave me a good insight into why Russia is struggling so much right now to take over a much smaller and weaker Ukraine. Because they have weak military organization, poor logistics, and poor leader ship where people are promoted on the bases of loyalty and nepotism over their actual skill to command soldiers.
This book gave me a good insight into why Russia is struggling so much right now to take over a much smaller and weaker Ukraine. Because they have weak military organization, poor logistics, and poor leader ship where people are promoted on the bases of loyalty and nepotism over their actual skill to command soldiers.
April 12, 2008
Historian Victor Davis Hanson has remarked that the United States has fought four Iraq Wars, the Gulf War of 1991, the 12 year armistice enforcement from 1991 - 2003, the Iraq War of the Spring of 2003 and the Insurgency War of 2003 - . Historian Williamson Murray and Gen. Robert Scales (ret.) have collaborated on this late 2003 volume about the third US v. Iraq War that ended with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime. Their intent was to write a straightforward account of the lead-up to the conflict in context, a description of the actual US/British led invasion and an analysis of why the conflict ended the way it did and what the results mean for future United States and British military strategy and policy.
Previously, Murray had written the military account of the US air war during the 1991 Gulf War and Maj. Gen. Scales had written the official postwar analysis of that six week conflict. Both are experts in the US military's strategy and weaponry. And more importantly for how they wrote this work, both are knowledgeable in how the United States changed its approach to manpower and tactics between the first and third Iraq Wars.
The significance of this volume is to concisely describe how the US military approached its third Iraq War, what the differences were on the operational level between this conflict and previous ones and likely lessons to learn and apply for future military operations. The Iraq War was written in late 2003, after the end of the operation to overthrow the Baathist regime and before the insurgency and founding of the new Iraqi government took hold. So the authors' comments about the continued need for initiative, change and operational awareness in future conflicts is almost prophetic in light of the last two years.
The change in tactics in the 12 years between the wars was near revolutionary. For decades, the military had attempted, with sometimes great failures, to integrate the various services, to have a more networked approach to battle and to place much more decision making authority at the junior officer level.
The authors description of the origins of the present conflict, especially in regards to the period from 1998 to 2003 have to be some of the best summary descriptions of how the United States and Britain went from a soft conflict in enforcing the no-fly zone to a hot war with invasion in print. The 30 page summary of this time period should stand the test of time in its description of this time period.
The authors spend considerable time in this short volume, 258 pages, in contrasting the evolving nature of the US military and the static, fearful state of the Iraqi military and its totalitarian regime. What makes this book especially useful is how it places this war in context of US military operations from the Korean War to the present. In what could have been a standard 'setting of the board' before a war piece of writing, the authors instead write a near case study on the modern, revolutionary applications of synergy of forces, networked operations, rapid intelligence and useful training to a type of warfare so traditional that a Clausewitz or Thucydides would recognize.
The book does break down operations by time and emphasis, like the initial ground campaign or the British war near Basra; but the more one reads of this volume, the necessity of the joint nature of operations ends traditional ways of dividing chapters and sections. When the military operations become so seamless, that American units can blend in with British commanders for a day or so without a loss in communications or mission ability, then the reader can begin to understand why this war was conducted so differently from other conflicts.
As this book describes actions on the operational rather than command level, mistakes are usually listed as failures to plan for supply services, or the rate of speed or lack of, that forces had to contend with due to failures in joint planning or operations. The actual combat against Iraqi forces is largely described as mismatch between a highly mobile force with decisions made at the junior level vs. an Iraqi force that could have dug in to make a short fight a lot harder had it communicated and coordinated effectively.
The ultimate lessons from this book include future benchmarks such as independent forces that are capable to move as ad hoc units, with precision. There are warnings from the authors about an over-reliance on technology and the "white noise of information" overload. Their warnings about the best ways to fight a highly technological force such as the US or the British through guerrilla insurgency are sadly true 3 years later. The authors recommendation that civilian leaders need to handle the problems that come through victory are just as important as the need for the military to adjust to changing battlefield environments continues to ring true on a daily basis.
The reader will not find detailed descriptions about the political or cultural implications or machinations before, during or after the Iraq War of 2003, as this is strictly a military account. What the volume is essentially about "how military force has the capacity and will to defeat rogue states that threaten the vital interests of the American people ( pg. 252)." The maps and pictures are excellent and relevant. For its purposes, this book is highly recommend.
Previously, Murray had written the military account of the US air war during the 1991 Gulf War and Maj. Gen. Scales had written the official postwar analysis of that six week conflict. Both are experts in the US military's strategy and weaponry. And more importantly for how they wrote this work, both are knowledgeable in how the United States changed its approach to manpower and tactics between the first and third Iraq Wars.
The significance of this volume is to concisely describe how the US military approached its third Iraq War, what the differences were on the operational level between this conflict and previous ones and likely lessons to learn and apply for future military operations. The Iraq War was written in late 2003, after the end of the operation to overthrow the Baathist regime and before the insurgency and founding of the new Iraqi government took hold. So the authors' comments about the continued need for initiative, change and operational awareness in future conflicts is almost prophetic in light of the last two years.
The change in tactics in the 12 years between the wars was near revolutionary. For decades, the military had attempted, with sometimes great failures, to integrate the various services, to have a more networked approach to battle and to place much more decision making authority at the junior officer level.
The authors description of the origins of the present conflict, especially in regards to the period from 1998 to 2003 have to be some of the best summary descriptions of how the United States and Britain went from a soft conflict in enforcing the no-fly zone to a hot war with invasion in print. The 30 page summary of this time period should stand the test of time in its description of this time period.
The authors spend considerable time in this short volume, 258 pages, in contrasting the evolving nature of the US military and the static, fearful state of the Iraqi military and its totalitarian regime. What makes this book especially useful is how it places this war in context of US military operations from the Korean War to the present. In what could have been a standard 'setting of the board' before a war piece of writing, the authors instead write a near case study on the modern, revolutionary applications of synergy of forces, networked operations, rapid intelligence and useful training to a type of warfare so traditional that a Clausewitz or Thucydides would recognize.
The book does break down operations by time and emphasis, like the initial ground campaign or the British war near Basra; but the more one reads of this volume, the necessity of the joint nature of operations ends traditional ways of dividing chapters and sections. When the military operations become so seamless, that American units can blend in with British commanders for a day or so without a loss in communications or mission ability, then the reader can begin to understand why this war was conducted so differently from other conflicts.
As this book describes actions on the operational rather than command level, mistakes are usually listed as failures to plan for supply services, or the rate of speed or lack of, that forces had to contend with due to failures in joint planning or operations. The actual combat against Iraqi forces is largely described as mismatch between a highly mobile force with decisions made at the junior level vs. an Iraqi force that could have dug in to make a short fight a lot harder had it communicated and coordinated effectively.
The ultimate lessons from this book include future benchmarks such as independent forces that are capable to move as ad hoc units, with precision. There are warnings from the authors about an over-reliance on technology and the "white noise of information" overload. Their warnings about the best ways to fight a highly technological force such as the US or the British through guerrilla insurgency are sadly true 3 years later. The authors recommendation that civilian leaders need to handle the problems that come through victory are just as important as the need for the military to adjust to changing battlefield environments continues to ring true on a daily basis.
The reader will not find detailed descriptions about the political or cultural implications or machinations before, during or after the Iraq War of 2003, as this is strictly a military account. What the volume is essentially about "how military force has the capacity and will to defeat rogue states that threaten the vital interests of the American people ( pg. 252)." The maps and pictures are excellent and relevant. For its purposes, this book is highly recommend.
October 13, 2017
Interesting book that covers the military aspects of the Iran-Iraq War, most as seen by the Iraqis as it relies heavily on captured Iraqi after the collapse of their government to US forces in 2003. Each chapter covers a specific time frame and covers all of the aspects of the military operations for that period of time. It does cover some of the political aspects, but not that heavily.
April 5, 2019
This book has some excellent primary sources from the Iraqi side. The downside to this is that there are plenty passages of the paranoid ramblings of Saddam Hussein. There's a lot of good information here, but the book's main appeal will be to intelligence analysts, diplomats, and military historians.
October 31, 2017
This might be better renamed "A Book Too Soon". Written in 2003, in the rosy afterglow of the Iraq War land campaign, this book is great when it comes to the lowest levels of military history, weapons and tactics, even grand tactics. But the Geo-political, political and Socio-Economic elements are sheerest drivel- triumphalist jingoist wishful thinking at their worst. I gave the book three stars, I wanted to give it 2.5, as its really just half a book. On any topic outside of firepower, this is a pathetic joke of a book. The "Origins of War' chapter drinks deeply of the "WMD" koolaid, not questioning the really insufficient "grounds for War" that the US tried to sell- with no takers - at the UN. The very strong arguments of the anti-war factions are swept aside with patriotic mumbo-jumbo in place of real talking points. No mention of the myriad of political voices saying attention was taken from Afghanistan too early. No mention of the glaring weakness of the WMD "evidence". Once the ground war begins, the authors are in their element, telling the story of the maneuvers in the best "Boys Own" tradition. Everywhere the omnipotent allies outwit and outfight the bumbling Baathists. The book ends with the ominous development of the Insurgency being acknowledged, but dismissed as "dead-enders", not the nationwide skillful political and military opposition that would require a "surge" and then spawn AQII and ISIS. The tin ear for the actual mood of the populace is another recurring theme. For Military Enthusiasts/Gamers/modellers this is a treasure trove, not just for the after action reports and descriptions of various maneuvers, but also for its good maps and excellent action colour pictures. Any other reader, however will not be better informed after reading this book, and should make better choices.
April 7, 2011
Written in 2003 after the most recent invasion of Iraq, this book focuses instead on the 1991 war and the inter-war period of sanctions and no-fly zones, positing the inevitability of additional conflict created by the failure to resolve the fundamental issues between the US and Saddam. Almost romantic in its affection for soldiers at war, the book liberally includes quotes from Clausewitz and Thucydides that demonstrate how little the nature of war has changed, and which the authors present as a way of warning American leaders in 2003 that they cannot be sanguine about the easy victory of March. Read this book first, followed by Tom Ricks’ two volumes, and you’ll have a handy history of the US in Iraq from 1990-2008.
February 3, 2015
nice that an author covered a War from the Strategic and Operational level of conflict. Two nations slugged it out over 8 years, Iran thought religious zeal and revolutionary fervor could replace sound tactics and strategy, from alienating the west which limited the ability to import arms and repair parts to refusing to make soldiers shave limiting the effectiveness of gas masks. For his part, Saddam Hussein did everything he could to cost hi nation the war, a great example of another dictator who understood nothing of warfare, and purged his best officers in fear of a strong army while at war.
October 7, 2015
A stunning description of incompetence in war and intelligence - neither side showing any awareness of the other's capabilities or intentions even. Granted the book is written from rescued Iraqi archives and not Iranian ones but the prisoner transcripts and defector memoirs paint a damning picture.
December 11, 2015
A really good depiction of The Iraq War. This military history offers a rare and unseen look into the strategy behind the short offensive to storm Baghdad, Iraq and overthrow the Saddam regime. You'll enjoy a behind the scenes view of the marines, army, and coalition forces ground battles that took them into the heart of Iraq.
Read
January 17, 2023Excellent accounting of the Iraq War. Written so that you don't have to have military background to understand what the authors are talking about. Excellent charts at the end of the book comparing U.S. and Iraqi weapons platforms.
April 7, 2019
Good book
Displaying 1 - 18 of 18 reviews