The Minute Men: The First Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution

by John R. Galvin

The concept of the farmer and shopkeeper pulling rifles off pegs on the wall to fight the British has been the typical image of the American minuteman. The fact that he may have had military training and drilled―and that April 19, 1775 was not his first battle―usually goes unmentioned. Winner of the American Revolution Round Table Award, The Minute Men will be of keen interest to those curious about the true history of some of America’s first soldiers.

Genres: History, American Revolutionary War, American Revolution, Nonfiction, American History, Military Fiction, American

294 pages, Mass Market Paperback

First published January 1, 1967

About the author

General John Rogers Galvin was an American military officer and academic administrator. After retiring from the U.S. Army in 1992, he served as the sixth dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, and as a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century.

Reviews

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

Almost missed the 250th anniversary of this first battle for our freedom. Galvin is an excellent author, his military experience informs his recounting of the battles and he also covers the history leading to the day. His purpose for the book is to cut through the myths and legends that have clouded the telling of this story. His first clarification is the organization of the militia, and who the minute men were:
The battle can better be seen as the final clash of arms of the old Massachusetts militia, in which forty-seven regiments, containing over 14,000 men, marched against the British regulars (over 4,000 men from fourteen of the regiments actually struck the column) and employed concepts of organization and methods of command and control that had been forged during a century and a half of nearly constant warfare.

One of the first myths dispelled is the chaotic nature of the minute men…they were more organized than I realized:
The concept becomes easy to trace once the essence of the minute men—what it is that makes them different from other units—is brought to light. The minute man was a member of a unit drawn from the regular militia and comprising a set percentage of that militia, specially trained, specially equipped, and required to assemble very rapidly and to be prepared at all times to march immediately into combat. A system of decentralized tactical control allowed officers at very low levels, usually company commanders, to exercise extraordinary authority, being permitted to assemble and march their men in time of danger without any orders from a higher command. The instant readiness of the units was supplemented by a wide net of inter-town alarm signals and messengers.

Galvin gives an excellent appraisal of the British contingent. Major General Gage, new Governor of Massachusetts, had plenty of combat experience. Significantly, he knew how to fight in both Europe and in the colonies:
On the Continent, then in the defeat of the Scots on Culloden Moor and in the Low Countries campaigns of 1747-1748. He rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the 44th Regiment and served in America under Braddock in the march against Fort Duquesne, where he commanded the advance guard at the Monongahela River and was the first to be struck by the attacking French and Indians. As the unseen enemy poured a relentless fire into his ranks, Gage displayed the cool courage which was to become one of his trademarks, and though twice wounded he formed and re-formed his men, vainly slamming volley after volley into the deadly green forests. Such fire was ineffective, and his own unit and many of those reinforcing it were completely cut to pieces. When the remnants fell back to the river, Gage managed to build up a rear guard of eighty stragglers to cover the retreat of the mortally wounded Braddock and the rest of the command. Gage has not been held responsible for the fiasco at the Monongahela, nor has he been credited with any overabundance of imagination in his deployment of the advance guard or in his tactics during the fight.
Shortly after the Monongahela, Gage convinced General Loudoun to create the first regiment of light infantry raised by the Crown in America. This was the 80th Regiment, a unit composed of provincial soldiers, led by regular officers, and trained to fight in the wilderness. Gage saw to it that he was chosen to command the 80th, which meant a promotion to colonel, and he led it into battle in Abercromby’s ill-advised frontal attack against Montcalm at Ticonderoga, where he was again wounded. Gage’s connection with the light infantry reveals a great deal about him as a soldier. He was intelligent enough to recognize the need for a unit of wilderness fighters who abandoned formal fighting ranks in favor of guerrilla tactics and he was brave enough to lead it well. But his rigid orthodoxy made him dislike the whole idea. If there was one man he could not stand, it was Robert Rogers, who he felt lacked the qualities of an officer and a gentleman, regardless of his success in the field.

The march to capture rebel powder and guns at Concord was not the first try. We might be celebrating Quarry Hill instead of Bunker Hill. Gage captured the armory at Charlestown in Sep 1774, securing the king's powder with a surprise raid. The colonies had withdrawn their allocation of powder from that location and Gage needed to prevent them from taking the rest. Another raid to secure the cannons at Charlestown was not successful as the provincials were warned and carried the cannon away before the British troops arrived.

Throughout the fall, winter and spring of 1774-1775, Gage marched his troops all over the colony. To keep them in shape, out of trouble, to get familiar with the area and to "desensitize" the provincials. Unfortunately, the many marches helped the rebels improve their communications, warning procedures and how to assemble quickly. Gage effectively trained the Minute Men as well as his own.

During all the marches, the two sides took away different lessons. The British felt they had the upper hand because they could march anywhere and the colonials would not stop or fire on them. The Provincials thought they were stopping any significant troop movements and that the British troops did not have orders to fire on the rebels without provocation.

At the first fight at Lexington, the provincials were in parade formation on the town green - in musket range of but not blocking the road to Concord. They were not in an ambush formation. Capt Parker may have thought he could talk with the British commander, or he could withdraw gracefully. Up to this point the provincials and the British troops had not fired "ball" at each other. Sometimes a powder charge was fired during the previous marches, nothing to cause injury. Not today.

The 76 colonials were facing a large force of redcoats. Throughout the day, at initial contact the provincials hesitated to fire at the Brits. The penalty for rebellion was death but there was also the reticence to take the final step.

The battle took a turn for the worse at Concord. The British regulars took a bridge at the end of the town. The soldiers set fire to a building (their officers made them extinguish it) but the provincials on the hills overlooking the town were enraged, thinking the town was to be burned. When the colonials took the bridge back to prevent more burning, several redcoats were killed and one redcoat was hit in the head with a hatchet. Other passing British soldiers thought the rebels were scalping their comrades. Later the British soldiers starting torching houses and looting. Each side was out for vengeance after that. Here is one old rebel:

It was also in Menotomy that the British met their most formidable individual opponent, the aged Sam Whittemore, an old soldier who was out to stop the British even if he had to do it all by himself. Whittemore, who in his younger days had commanded a troop of dragoons for the Crown, was a tough customer, and always had been.

Now eighty years old, Whittemore was not the kind of man to be cowed by a mere 1,500 redcoats. Having heard that the British had marched through town, he spent the day preparing his own private arsenal, which included a brace of pistols, a saber, and a musket. Then he loaded himself with his gear and told his wife he was going up town to meet the regulars.

He joined the men going into position near Cooper’s Tavern, where the road to Medford branches off to the north, and stationed himself 150 yards off the road, behind a stone wall that offered him a good view of the route to Boston. This location put him directly in the path of the flanking companies of Colonel Nesbitt’s 47th Regiment, as well as in the way of the main body.

When the heavy firing began, Whittemore waited until the flankers were almost upon him, then fired his musket and dropped a regular in his tracks. He jumped up and fired off both pistols, killing at least one and possibly two more redcoats before a round hit him in the face and knocked him down. The men around him were driven back and the regulars, who lost several men getting across the Medford Road, leaped over the wall as Whittemore fell and bayonetted him again and again.
Then they moved on, satisfied that they had killed at least one of their elusive tormentors. But with his face half shot away and thirteen bayonet wounds in him, Sam Whittemore survived and lived to be almost a hundred years old, always insisting that if he had to live that day over, he would do the same thing again.

The fighting was grim as the fight progressed and with little mercy given by either side:
The repeated bayoneting of Russell and Whittemore is one indication of the fierceness that characterized the fighting at that point. To the British, the rebels were cowardly snipers who fired from hiding and who lurked along the edges of the column like wolves, ready to kill and scalp wounded men who had to be left behind; while to the minute men and militia the regulars were brutal ravagers who burned and looted their way across the countryside.

If the average British soldier still felt that the provincials were cowards and poor fighters—or at least was not willing to give them credit as soldiers—their commander was quite ready to concede that he had been wrong about the caliber of man that Massachusetts could put into the field. Writing a report the day after the battle Percy said,

During the whole affair the Rebels attacked us in a very scattered, irregular manner, but with perseverance & resolution, nor did they ever dare to form into any regular body. Indeed, they knew too well what was proper, to do so.

Whoever looks upon them as an irregular mob, will find himself much mistaken. They have men amongst them who know very well what they are about, having been employed as Rangers against the Indians & Canadians, & this country being much covered with wood, and hilly, is very advantageous for their method of fighting.

Nor are several of their men void of a spirit of enthusiasm, as we experienced yesterday, for many of them concealed themselves in houses, & advanced within 10 yds. to fire at me & other officers, tho’ they were morally certain of being put to death themselves in an instant.

You may depend upon it, that as the Rebels have now had time to prepare, they are determined to go thro’ with it, nor will the insurrection here turn out so despicable as it is perhaps imagined at home. For my part, I never believed, I confess, that they would have attacked the King’s troops, or have had the perseverance I found in them yesterday.

Imagine how confusing the battle must have seemed as companies of colonials arrived along the line of retreat and engaged the redcoats at every advantageous spot. The tired regulars kept having to face fresh attackers along the road. Had Lord Percy not arrived with reinforcements just short of Lexington, the entire British raiding force would have been killed, wounded and/or captured.

When the 23rd Regiment was finally back in Boston after the ordeal of April 19, adjutant Frederick Mackenzie wrote in his diary, “I believe the fact is, that General Gage was not only much deceived with respect to the quantity of military stores said to be collected in Concord, but had no conception the rebels would have opposed the King’s troops in the manner they did.” Another officer mentions his surprise at “incredible numbers of the people of the country in arms,” and Colonel Smith is convinced of a widespread plot; “Otherwise,” he says, “I think they could not, in so short a time as from our marching out, have raised such a numerous body, and for so great a space of ground.” It is not at all surprising that the British officers in Boston, even though they knew of militia musters and of the existence of the minute men, were quite unaware that an army of nearly fifty regiments was near completion at the time of the march to Concord; even today, this organization of the provincial forces is not generally known.

The assertion that the minute men and militia were not an armed rabble but a well-organized, well-equipped, and relatively well-trained army of 14,000 men might provoke the same kind of smile now as it did on the eve of the British march, so many years ago. We have been content with the legend of the spontaneous rise and the one-day life of the minute men, a story pleasing to our sense of myth, and there are still many who, like Gage’s regulars, will have to be convinced at musket-point that there is more to the minute men than first meets the eye. It is ironic that the militia and the minute men, who together wrested their army from the control of the Crown, doubled it in size, equipped it with 20,000 muskets and 10,000 bayonets, and trained it secretly all one winter, are praised as an example of soldiers who fought well with no organization, no equipment, no training, and no planning.

Though part of the misinterpretation is a result of the myth and its influence, much is also inattention to the facts of the battle: we stress the disorganization of the April 19 battle, which was in effect a twenty-mile running ambush, and conclude that the whole thing was a bit untidy, and that the embattled farmers had spirit, but little else. One can only wonder what a minute man might comment if he could come back to see what we have said of his achievement.

An excellent account of the battle, worthy of a movie script. 5 Stars

[Christopher G. Egg · Rating 4 out of 5]

I rate this book a 4.5, a great book it just needs a few more good maps to solidify a clear understanding of the very well written, detailed account.

[Sharon · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Minute Men describes the battle of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775 in detail from both the British and American perspective. His thesis is that contrary to generally accepted myths, "the minute men were not the exception to the rule; on the contrary, they are among the best examples of the importance of military preparedness that the country has provided."

Galvin clearly shows the Americans in April of 1775 were prepared for war. They had trained, formed into companies and regiments, chosen their leaders, and followed those leaders into battle. They weren't farmers who happened to pick up a weapon and fight the military might of the British.

If one loves American history, this is a book that should be read thoroughly.

[Fred · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very good account of the origin of Massachusetts’ militia institutions at the time of Lexington and Concord and of the battle itself. Does a good job emphasizing the change in militia leadership in the year prior to the battle, the growth of sympathy for the Sons of Liberty’s cause, the influence of the French and Indian War in providing veterans for the militia, and the British mistakes and successes in the battle.

[Kevin Barnes · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well written history about a people no one knows almost nothing about. They did not just spring up from the farm, they had been training and organizing for almost a 1/2 a year. I would have loved to see a map or two of the general townships in the area at the time. Some of the towns that provided men are not easy to locate on current maps. Recommend this book to all.

[Eric · Rating 3 out of 5]

A small, scholarly work about many fascinating details the author uncovered which dispel the popular myth the colonials who attached the British on their march from Concord and Lexington. The minute men, and the militia they were drawn from, were well organized, well equipped and well trained. In fact, they continued to drill once or twice a week, even in winter ( In barns and kitchens if necessary) with the main emphasis on markmanship. In fact, research shows, they practiced shooting far more often than the British regulars did. They were part of a 400 year tradition that developed to defend their towns and farms from Indian raids and during the French and Indian War. The removal if the Indian threat further west and the end of the French and Indian war did not disband the volunteer militia, who continued to evolve and train over the next couple of decades. Their experiences let to a sense of larger community and interdependancy between the towns of Massachusetts and between colonies as well.

The reason the colonials could muster upwards of 10000 men to the area of fighting by the end of April 19th was due to the organization, communication system and eagerness to fulfill their duty. After April 19th, these units were reorganized over the next weeks into the Provincial army of Massachusetts.

Another nice point of the book, is the constant emphasis on the individuals on both side, most whom we have heard of because no one has done the detail research into the events and those involved. Most memorable to me were the old men who fought the British, some of whom couldn't even walk well.

[Martin Koenigsberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

The myth is that the American War of Independence was started when a horrible band of trained British Regulars marched out and bullied some American Militia at Lexington and Concord. On the spot, American decided to stand up to British tyranny- and the war was on. This book goes to show that the real story is of a carefully laid trap. Far from seeking a peaceful solution up until the last dastardly act by the crown, the Mass. Patriots had been spoiling for a fight and changing the nature and efficiency of their Militias in order to create a militia that could take on the British. The author traces the whole history of the Militia of New England back from the beginnings of the colony, showing that the Minuteman concept develop as an subgroup and then an adjunct group. Interestingly the author never questions the pattern of a small group of people who sought confrontation with England driving out their loyalist neighbours by the worst mob rule means(all gleefully noted in the narrative), the purging of the majority of the officers in the Militia for their Tory views, and the spreading of largely fictional anti-British propaganda. All is chronicled -through an American Triumphalist tone. A good read- fine for Military enthusiasts or history buffs- the detail may get too much for lighter readers. And a few will see the chilling implications for our national creation myth.....

[John Mccullough · Rating 5 out of 5]

An extremely detailed account of the march of the British army from Boston to Lexington and Concord and back to Boston. The geography and timelines are carefully noted. While I would like to see an English version of the events, I found this book a credible account of the events. If you want detailed history (which makes it more interesting for me) I would recommend this book. I might add that I am not a military expert so my opinion of the book should be tempered by this fact.

[Jim Good · Rating 3 out of 5]

Detailed history of the start of the revolutionary war and the battles of Concord and Lexington. Starts with a history of the devlopment of the minutemen and how it was a natural outgrowth given the nature of the “New World” development. Argues that the minutemen were well trained and equipped despite what the subsequent mythology said.

[Alan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Read this in advance of taking the kids to Lexington/Concord for the Patriots Day weekend. Very good overview of the development of the Minute Man system (and how it differed from the militia) and an excellent narrative history of the April 19 battles.

[Neil Wagoner · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent overview of the military history of the minute men. The detail of their involvement in the battles of Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, is outstanding.

[Shawn · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book and David Hackett Fischer's book, Paul Revere's Ride, compliment one another nicely. Very good read.