I guess it can be considered as a contemporary handbook for the theoretical aspects in aerial combat. One of the main problems I had with this book is the author's insistence that battlefield air superiority is one of the key prerequisites for victory on a battlefield. I would beg to differ and give the example of UN air power in the Korean War. During the war's stalemate period in the early 1950's, UN air power was not decisive in swaying the outcome of the war despite achieving near total air superiority.
Apart from this and a few minor conjectural concepts here and there, it is a solid book and I would recommend it for people who enjoy reading about military strategy in general. There are a lot of things you can learn from this book.
Great book that provides general principles for the operational art of executing an air campaign. It goes over target selection, the relationship between air and the various instruments of military power at the theater level, and various historical examples that illustrate the principles.
'The Air Campaign' was written by John Warden as part of his studies at the National War College in 1986. It is one of the latest pieces on airpower theory and was the conceptual basis for both the Gulf War (1991) and Kosovo (1999). As such it is a key piece of literature in airpower theory.
the intent of the book is very clear and is kept to throughout. It is intended to be a theoretical and philosophical discussion, and does not delve into either tactics or technicalities. It is well written, with jargon and acronyms defined and discussed when used in a way which promotes understanding and does not obfuscate.
Despite these advantages and its theoretical basis, there are two issues I have with the text. Firstly, Warden posits that air superiority is the primary mission and all others should not be considered if they would interfere with this. I doubt that we have had any conflicts which agree with his definition of air superiority. Secondly, against the tradition of Sun Tzu, Warden discusses limited elements of joint operations and continually promotes airpower as the key reason for victory in conflicts. Whilst this might be the case for individual battles, this does not hold true when looking at the outcome of conflicts as the defeat of the enemy.
Overall, despite my concerns, 'The Air Campaign' is a very interesting book and a must read for anyone interested in military strategy, airpower or the Gulf War. Despite its age there are still concepts which are relevant and applicable in the modern age.