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Civil War America
Lincoln and the Decision for War: The Northern Response to Secession
When Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 prompted several Southern states to secede, the North was sharply divided over how to respond. In this groundbreaking book, the first major study in over fifty years of how the North handled the secession crisis, Russell McClintock follows the decision-making process from bitter partisan rancor to consensus.From small towns to big cities and from state capitals to Washington, D.C., McClintock highlights individuals both powerful and obscure to demonstrate the ways ordinary citizens, party activists, state officials, and national leaders interacted to influence the Northern response to what was essentially a political crisis. He argues that although Northerners' reactions to Southern secession were understood and expressed through partisan newspapers and officials, the decision fell into the hands of an ever-smaller handful of people until finally it was Abraham Lincoln alone who would choose whether the future of the American republic was to b
400 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 2008
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
July 18, 2023
A straightforward, perceptive, and well-researched history of the period between Lincoln’s election to shortly after the outbreak of war at Fort Sumter, with a focus on the northern states and the presidents’ decisionmaking.
McClintock looks at the response of both the Buchanan and Lincoln administrations (which the author argues were pretty similar) and the Republican and Democratic parties. He argues that Lincoln’s policies vacillated between compromise and steadfastness, often depending on which audience he was trying to reach. McClintock also notes that, during the crisis, Lincoln was often occupied with issues of patronage, trying to appease those supporters of his who were seeking political favors and offices. He also notes the symbolic importance of Fort Sumter, which at this point in time served no useful military purpose to the nation.
The narrative is engaging and thoughtful, if a bit dry at times. McClintock’s portraits of Lincoln, Seward, and Douglas are good. His rendition of the national mood is vivid, and he does a good job portraying the personalities and politics of the time.
I understand what the title promises the reader, but some readers might wish for more background on the southern states’ decisions regarding secession. Also, McClintock doesn’t discuss the western states much, and the picture of Republican inter-party differences isn’t always very clear. McClintock also argues that Lincoln didn’t understand the southern states, and didn’t understand how important slavery was to the them, but this isn’t very convincing. The narrative also includes many lesser figures who don’t always seem that important.
Still, a rich, informative and readable work.
McClintock looks at the response of both the Buchanan and Lincoln administrations (which the author argues were pretty similar) and the Republican and Democratic parties. He argues that Lincoln’s policies vacillated between compromise and steadfastness, often depending on which audience he was trying to reach. McClintock also notes that, during the crisis, Lincoln was often occupied with issues of patronage, trying to appease those supporters of his who were seeking political favors and offices. He also notes the symbolic importance of Fort Sumter, which at this point in time served no useful military purpose to the nation.
The narrative is engaging and thoughtful, if a bit dry at times. McClintock’s portraits of Lincoln, Seward, and Douglas are good. His rendition of the national mood is vivid, and he does a good job portraying the personalities and politics of the time.
I understand what the title promises the reader, but some readers might wish for more background on the southern states’ decisions regarding secession. Also, McClintock doesn’t discuss the western states much, and the picture of Republican inter-party differences isn’t always very clear. McClintock also argues that Lincoln didn’t understand the southern states, and didn’t understand how important slavery was to the them, but this isn’t very convincing. The narrative also includes many lesser figures who don’t always seem that important.
Still, a rich, informative and readable work.
December 3, 2018
Eric Foner once said that in order to understand the Civil War, one must understand two principle questions:
1) Why did the South Seceded?
2) Why did the North respond the way it did?
I have read several books that attempt to tackle the issue of Disunion or the Path to the Civil War, but I have recently finished two books that compliment each other on these two questions.
1) Why did the South secede? Egerton’s “Year of Meteors” is an excellent treatise on the issue of secession. That book focuses on how, by 1860, secessionist had created an environment that ensured the South would secede. While Egerton’s book does not ignore the North, the focus is on the secession.
2) Why did the North respond the way it did? “Lincoln and the Decision for War” provides a very clear compliment to Egerton’s work. By itself, McClintock’s book probably does not deserve five stars. It leaves too many questions and rarely discusses events or reactions in the South. As a continuation of Egerton’s work, however, this book excels.
Many history books gloss over the period between the election of Lincoln and in Inauguration. They might trace the secession of the South and provide some information on the Buchanan’s inaction, the Star of the West fiasco, and Lincoln’s stump speeches as he travelled to Washington, but rarely do they analyze how the events in the north were shaped by what was going on elsewhere or how they lead to war.
McClintock discusses Buchanan and his inactivity. He presents the issues that Buchanan faced and how/why, he responded to secession the way he did. He presents the actions that Lincoln took---both publically and privately. Reading this book you realize that Lincoln was not as inactive as some authors portray, still he was not president and did not want to destroy his fragile coalition before he came to power.
The book discusses efforts in the House of Representatives, Congress, and by specific party leaders to attempt to hold the Union together. What debates raged in Congress? What compromises were floated in the attempt to preserve the Union? Who made those overtures? Why would Congress pass the (original) 13th amendment guaranteeing slavery and offer to admit New Mexico as a Slave State? Why were Northerners afraid of the Missouri Compromise guaranteeing slavery would be allowed in the bottom third of the country (hint---they predicted the annexation of Cuba, Mexico, and various Caribbean Islands).
Why the repulse of the “Star of the West” is not considered the first shots of the Civil War? Why didn’t that trigger an armed conflict? What forces were at play that prompted/forced Lincoln to create his ”team of rivals” as a Cabinet? Why did Seward famously exceed his authority in attempting to reconcile with the South before Sumter? Why didn’t Lincoln punish him? What role did Lincoln’s rival Stephen Douglas play when the South started to secede?
How and why did the North shift the focus away from the issue of slavery and on to that of preserving the Union? Who was the main advocate of that stance? How did anti-slavery Republicans and pro-southern Democrats forge an alliance to engage the South?
These questions are addressed in this book.
This book is NOT about the South or why the South seceded. The history is told almost entirely from the point of view of the North and if I had not just finished “Year of Meteors” I probably would have considered that a serious deficiency. As I immediately saw this book as a continuation of that book, I loved this one.
My other criticism is that while it is called “Lincoln and the Decision for War”, it really is not about Lincoln. Lincoln plays a minor role in the first 80% of the book. If you are looking for a biographical work on Lincoln, this book may disappoint you.
1) Why did the South Seceded?
2) Why did the North respond the way it did?
I have read several books that attempt to tackle the issue of Disunion or the Path to the Civil War, but I have recently finished two books that compliment each other on these two questions.
1) Why did the South secede? Egerton’s “Year of Meteors” is an excellent treatise on the issue of secession. That book focuses on how, by 1860, secessionist had created an environment that ensured the South would secede. While Egerton’s book does not ignore the North, the focus is on the secession.
2) Why did the North respond the way it did? “Lincoln and the Decision for War” provides a very clear compliment to Egerton’s work. By itself, McClintock’s book probably does not deserve five stars. It leaves too many questions and rarely discusses events or reactions in the South. As a continuation of Egerton’s work, however, this book excels.
Many history books gloss over the period between the election of Lincoln and in Inauguration. They might trace the secession of the South and provide some information on the Buchanan’s inaction, the Star of the West fiasco, and Lincoln’s stump speeches as he travelled to Washington, but rarely do they analyze how the events in the north were shaped by what was going on elsewhere or how they lead to war.
McClintock discusses Buchanan and his inactivity. He presents the issues that Buchanan faced and how/why, he responded to secession the way he did. He presents the actions that Lincoln took---both publically and privately. Reading this book you realize that Lincoln was not as inactive as some authors portray, still he was not president and did not want to destroy his fragile coalition before he came to power.
The book discusses efforts in the House of Representatives, Congress, and by specific party leaders to attempt to hold the Union together. What debates raged in Congress? What compromises were floated in the attempt to preserve the Union? Who made those overtures? Why would Congress pass the (original) 13th amendment guaranteeing slavery and offer to admit New Mexico as a Slave State? Why were Northerners afraid of the Missouri Compromise guaranteeing slavery would be allowed in the bottom third of the country (hint---they predicted the annexation of Cuba, Mexico, and various Caribbean Islands).
Why the repulse of the “Star of the West” is not considered the first shots of the Civil War? Why didn’t that trigger an armed conflict? What forces were at play that prompted/forced Lincoln to create his ”team of rivals” as a Cabinet? Why did Seward famously exceed his authority in attempting to reconcile with the South before Sumter? Why didn’t Lincoln punish him? What role did Lincoln’s rival Stephen Douglas play when the South started to secede?
How and why did the North shift the focus away from the issue of slavery and on to that of preserving the Union? Who was the main advocate of that stance? How did anti-slavery Republicans and pro-southern Democrats forge an alliance to engage the South?
These questions are addressed in this book.
This book is NOT about the South or why the South seceded. The history is told almost entirely from the point of view of the North and if I had not just finished “Year of Meteors” I probably would have considered that a serious deficiency. As I immediately saw this book as a continuation of that book, I loved this one.
My other criticism is that while it is called “Lincoln and the Decision for War”, it really is not about Lincoln. Lincoln plays a minor role in the first 80% of the book. If you are looking for a biographical work on Lincoln, this book may disappoint you.
July 19, 2020
Unique perspective, scholarly and well researched. Wonderful!
April 6, 2018
The period between the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860 and the bombardment of Fort Sumter in April 1861 is one of the most heavily covered in American history. Those five months represent a decisive turning point that led to the bloodiest war that the nation ever fought, followed by the abolition of slavery and Reconstruction. Yet as Russell McClintock notes in the introduction to this book, most of the attention on this period has focused on the attitudes and developments in the South. By contrast, the events and decisions made in the North have received little attention, with Kenneth M. Stampp’s dated And the War Came dominating the short list of works focused on the secession crisis as it developed there. McClintock’s book is an effort to redress this by showing how the North reacted to the secession movement and how the decisions they made ultimately led to war.
To do this McClintock focuses on politicians and public opinion in four geographic areas: Washington, D.C., and the states of Illinois, New York, and Massachusetts. These areas open up a range of reactions to Southern declarations, as well as proposals for how to respond. He finds that while determination to maintain the Union was widespread, opinions as to how to do this varied widely, with many people supporting some sort of compromise. These attitudes were strongest in the nation’s capital, where Northern politicians had to address the concerns of Southern unionists working to maintain as many Southern states in the Union as they could. Yet there was a real vacuum of leadership in these months, with James Buchanan hobbled by a narrow view of his range of action as president and Abraham Lincoln endeavoring to keep his fragile political party together on the cusp of taking power. In the end, the range of options steadily narrowed, to the point that by April Lincoln faced the choice of resupplying the remaining outposts in federal hands or abandoning them in a further effort at conciliation. His decision to resupply the forts, and the Southern attack on them, helped to erase temporarily the divisions over secession, uniting the North against Southern disunion and bringing about war.
McClintock’s book is a fine study of how the North reacted to secession. It is primarily a study of the political response, which is understandable given the extent to which secession in those months was predominantly a political issue. His depiction of the major political actors is often surprising, with the moderate Lincoln steadfastly opposed to key concessions and the supposedly hard-line William H. Seward at the forefront of compromise. Yet the book suffers somewhat from the author’s focus on the controversy over Fort Sumter, which predominates here to the extent of overshadowing events elsewhere in the South that were contributing to the crisis. This is a minor issue, though, and one that does not detract from McClintock’s overall achievement in providing readers with an examination of an often overlooked aspect of the secession crisis.
To do this McClintock focuses on politicians and public opinion in four geographic areas: Washington, D.C., and the states of Illinois, New York, and Massachusetts. These areas open up a range of reactions to Southern declarations, as well as proposals for how to respond. He finds that while determination to maintain the Union was widespread, opinions as to how to do this varied widely, with many people supporting some sort of compromise. These attitudes were strongest in the nation’s capital, where Northern politicians had to address the concerns of Southern unionists working to maintain as many Southern states in the Union as they could. Yet there was a real vacuum of leadership in these months, with James Buchanan hobbled by a narrow view of his range of action as president and Abraham Lincoln endeavoring to keep his fragile political party together on the cusp of taking power. In the end, the range of options steadily narrowed, to the point that by April Lincoln faced the choice of resupplying the remaining outposts in federal hands or abandoning them in a further effort at conciliation. His decision to resupply the forts, and the Southern attack on them, helped to erase temporarily the divisions over secession, uniting the North against Southern disunion and bringing about war.
McClintock’s book is a fine study of how the North reacted to secession. It is primarily a study of the political response, which is understandable given the extent to which secession in those months was predominantly a political issue. His depiction of the major political actors is often surprising, with the moderate Lincoln steadfastly opposed to key concessions and the supposedly hard-line William H. Seward at the forefront of compromise. Yet the book suffers somewhat from the author’s focus on the controversy over Fort Sumter, which predominates here to the extent of overshadowing events elsewhere in the South that were contributing to the crisis. This is a minor issue, though, and one that does not detract from McClintock’s overall achievement in providing readers with an examination of an often overlooked aspect of the secession crisis.
July 26, 2009
The normal historical point of view for November 1860 to April 1861 is Southern. Lincoln and the efforts to find a comprise are noted but the main story is what the South is doing. This book changes that by concentrating on Northern politics and reactions. Secession and all the maneuvering for and against it, take place off stage. Except for South Carolina, leaving the Union was a wrenching process. Many Southern states resisted secession until the very end. Kentucky was not able to make a choice and Maryland may not have been able to choose. Their stories are the subject of most histories about this period.
What about the North? How did the political, personal and public opinion shape a response to the crisis? This book tells that story and what a story it is. The Democrats, badly damaged by the events 1860, try to blame everything on the Republicans. While they work to construct a comprise to save the Union one more time. The Republicans are not united nor are they sure how to proceed. A substantial part of the party sides with the Democrats in trying to find a comprise. Another large faction is ready to allow the South to leave the Union. Large numbers feel that secession is wrong but that the Federal government lacks the authority to force states back into the Union. Many question if it is desirable to use force to maintain the Union and if doing so would not destroy the Union. Added is the plea of Southern Unionists for something to stop secession.
Lincoln, Douglas, Seward stride across these pages. Each man with multiple agendas that create and destroy alliances. Each man trying to lead his political party, maintain the Union and do what he feels is best for the nation. Shifting priorities, new developments, regional pride and abrupt changes of position make this a rollercoaster ride even if we know the story.
Russell McClintock is an excellent author. He tells this story in a straightforward manner with minimum back tracking. This allows each event to be placed in the proper perspective of the time and almost makes the reader forget we know the story. While moving from Washington to Springfield to New York, we never lose the story line nor the reason for the trip.
The decisions made during this time were difficult ones. The issues were complex and the correct response unclear. This book captures that and explains it to the reader in an informative and enjoyable way.
What about the North? How did the political, personal and public opinion shape a response to the crisis? This book tells that story and what a story it is. The Democrats, badly damaged by the events 1860, try to blame everything on the Republicans. While they work to construct a comprise to save the Union one more time. The Republicans are not united nor are they sure how to proceed. A substantial part of the party sides with the Democrats in trying to find a comprise. Another large faction is ready to allow the South to leave the Union. Large numbers feel that secession is wrong but that the Federal government lacks the authority to force states back into the Union. Many question if it is desirable to use force to maintain the Union and if doing so would not destroy the Union. Added is the plea of Southern Unionists for something to stop secession.
Lincoln, Douglas, Seward stride across these pages. Each man with multiple agendas that create and destroy alliances. Each man trying to lead his political party, maintain the Union and do what he feels is best for the nation. Shifting priorities, new developments, regional pride and abrupt changes of position make this a rollercoaster ride even if we know the story.
Russell McClintock is an excellent author. He tells this story in a straightforward manner with minimum back tracking. This allows each event to be placed in the proper perspective of the time and almost makes the reader forget we know the story. While moving from Washington to Springfield to New York, we never lose the story line nor the reason for the trip.
The decisions made during this time were difficult ones. The issues were complex and the correct response unclear. This book captures that and explains it to the reader in an informative and enjoyable way.
February 12, 2008
This is a great book, no biases of course! The book will be released in April, but is being sold by Amazon, with a good rank in sales for this type of book.
January 6, 2016
A superb recounting and analysis of the Federal response to the secession of Southern states that touched off the Civil War. Typically, studies of secession focus on the action in Southern states. In LINCOLN AND THE DECISION FOR WAR, Russell McClintock instead examines the momentous events of the "secession winter" in the North.
The trajectory of the story, both in the number of issues debated and in the range of individual involved, starts broad and inevitably narrows as options are foreclosed. The events begin with Lincoln's election in November 1860s and Northern skepticism of Southern threats to seceded, moving on to the chaos and disbelief in December as the first deep-South states began leaving, to the fear and incompetence of the Buchanan administration's missteps in January and February 1861, the frenetic attempts to keep the upper South in the Union in February and March, and finally, to March and April, when the questions narrowed down to two--let the South go peaceably or stand firm to uphold the law and Constitution--and the decision-makers narrowed down to one: Abraham Lincoln.
One interesting and rarely observed point, which McClintock repeatedly emphasizes, is that it wasn't technically secession per se that led to Civil War. Secession was only the second-last step in a chain of events leading to war. Conceivably, the Federal government could have determined that secession was constitutionally permissible, and simply let the South depart in peace. Instead, the North's political culture, and the (justified) unwillingness of Lincoln to cede his right to take office as president of the nation after a lawful election to a bunch of renegades threatening to hold the nation hostage, ensured that there could be no peaceable departure from the Union. The North, and ultimately Lincoln, decided that secession was both a treasonous act and not constitutionally recognizable, and that therefore the Federal government was compelled to act to preserve its authority in the seceding states.
McClintock summarizes the North's view of secession quite well: To most Northerners, "the idea of compromising in the face of armed rebellion was outrageous... Northerners believed that only the rule of law protected individual liberty and equality of opportunity from the dangers of government tyranny on the one side and social anarchy on the other... Given the centrality of the principle of law and order, it stood to reason that no matter how one felt about the legitimacy of Southern grievances or the need for Northern concessions, secession--especially when accompanied by the seizure of federal property [e.g., Fort Sumter]--represented a shocking violation of the law."
A representative sampling of quotes provides insight into the thinking of Northern political leaders, such as Edward Baker, who argued, like Lincoln, that by threatening secession if their demands aren't met, Southerners were attacking "the fundamental principles of republican [i.e., representative democracy] liberty. It is not the Union only which is in danger; deeper down than that lies the great principle of Constitutional Government, upon which this Union is founded and without which the Union cannot endure... the assumption of power by a constitutional majority." Essentially, a democracy doesn't function if large group who lost a lawful election can ignore the results and law pursuant to that election. In effect, the precipitating event for Southern secession was the election of a president dedicated merely to preventing the extension of Southern slavery, and the Southern realization that they would no longer control the full apparatus of the Federal government after decades of doing so. The North believed that, simply because one's party (or region) lost an election does not provide a legitimate justification for "blowing everything up."
A compelling argument, I think, but made difficult because of its inherent abstraction. Political theories, however vital to democracy, are certainly less emotionally compelling to the average citizen than the "Them damn Yankees are comin' to take our homes and women" argument used by the Confederacy. Hence, Lincoln's task necessarily was to couch the abstract case for representative democracy in more universal language, by pulling the heartstrings of "Union."
It's also interesting to note how much the new Confederacy attempted to use political theory, justifying secession as the inheritance of the spirit of 1776. That is, secessionists argued they were throwing off a tyrannical government just as American colonists did to the British in the American Revolution. That argument was particularly galling to northerners, especially to those from Massachusetts, as state that gave so much to the Revolution. Congressman Charles Francis Adams, grandson of one of the leading lights of the Revolution, John Adams (and son of John Quincy Adams), took pains to differentiate between the Revolution and secession.
Adams pointed out that, in the Revolution, the colonists suffered for years under a tyrannical British government, in which the colonists had no representation, and took pains to petition that government for a redress of those grievances, and after repeated failed formal attempts to be heard, formally initiated a separation while providing a full notice of intent (the Declaration of Independence). In contrast, South Carolina's secession, for example, took place on the heels of a lawful national election, in which South Carolina had full (actually, under the 3/5ths clause, excess) representation, without bothering to issue any formal grievances, without waiting to see if the North would assuage its concerns, without formally consulting with its own people, and which was followed immediately by the preemptive confiscation of Federal property and the use of armed force against Federal property and officials--and all this was prior to any alleged tyranny actually occurring (as Lincoln had not yet taken office in when SC seceded). Any comparison between 1776 and 1860 was, in Adams's words, beyond an "empty paper declaration" and was instead, a commission of treason.
Thus, the North felt compelled to respond to secession by meeting it with force rather than acquiescence. How the force came to be applied ultimately came down to Lincoln. Virtually the first item on his desk--in what has to be the worst first day of any president's term in history--was the news that Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor was about to run short of provisions. Lincoln faced a dilemma between re-provisioning the Fort, when doing so would certainly provoke an unwanted war, and the need to maintain the fort and uphold Federal authority.
McClintock writes, "Lincoln delayed for a month before finally committing to the relief of Sumter. In the end, he made a decision only when he was forced to when incoming intelligence and the course of events had stripped all other options away and left him a stark choice between sending supplies and vacating the fort... [I]f the rebel defenses were determined to attack any relief effort, then even a successful mission would provoke the fight Lincoln wanted desperately to avoid... By April 6, Lincoln could either pull out of Charleston... or he could uphold federal authority by sending an expedition to Sumter that was predestined to fail and ignite hostilities. At that point the only real question was how to organize the Sumter mission in such a way as to minimize the fallout [i.e., keeping as many border states as possible in the Union] and maximize the government's chances of winning the war." And that, in a nutshell, is how the North decided for war.
All in all, a solid work. Aside from the deep analysis, this work was particularly enjoyable because I found it enthralling to watch these many fallible individuals (aren't we all?) grapple with great, unimaginably questions with imperfect information against unknowable outcomes. A fascinating study in crisis management, and worth a read.
The trajectory of the story, both in the number of issues debated and in the range of individual involved, starts broad and inevitably narrows as options are foreclosed. The events begin with Lincoln's election in November 1860s and Northern skepticism of Southern threats to seceded, moving on to the chaos and disbelief in December as the first deep-South states began leaving, to the fear and incompetence of the Buchanan administration's missteps in January and February 1861, the frenetic attempts to keep the upper South in the Union in February and March, and finally, to March and April, when the questions narrowed down to two--let the South go peaceably or stand firm to uphold the law and Constitution--and the decision-makers narrowed down to one: Abraham Lincoln.
One interesting and rarely observed point, which McClintock repeatedly emphasizes, is that it wasn't technically secession per se that led to Civil War. Secession was only the second-last step in a chain of events leading to war. Conceivably, the Federal government could have determined that secession was constitutionally permissible, and simply let the South depart in peace. Instead, the North's political culture, and the (justified) unwillingness of Lincoln to cede his right to take office as president of the nation after a lawful election to a bunch of renegades threatening to hold the nation hostage, ensured that there could be no peaceable departure from the Union. The North, and ultimately Lincoln, decided that secession was both a treasonous act and not constitutionally recognizable, and that therefore the Federal government was compelled to act to preserve its authority in the seceding states.
McClintock summarizes the North's view of secession quite well: To most Northerners, "the idea of compromising in the face of armed rebellion was outrageous... Northerners believed that only the rule of law protected individual liberty and equality of opportunity from the dangers of government tyranny on the one side and social anarchy on the other... Given the centrality of the principle of law and order, it stood to reason that no matter how one felt about the legitimacy of Southern grievances or the need for Northern concessions, secession--especially when accompanied by the seizure of federal property [e.g., Fort Sumter]--represented a shocking violation of the law."
A representative sampling of quotes provides insight into the thinking of Northern political leaders, such as Edward Baker, who argued, like Lincoln, that by threatening secession if their demands aren't met, Southerners were attacking "the fundamental principles of republican [i.e., representative democracy] liberty. It is not the Union only which is in danger; deeper down than that lies the great principle of Constitutional Government, upon which this Union is founded and without which the Union cannot endure... the assumption of power by a constitutional majority." Essentially, a democracy doesn't function if large group who lost a lawful election can ignore the results and law pursuant to that election. In effect, the precipitating event for Southern secession was the election of a president dedicated merely to preventing the extension of Southern slavery, and the Southern realization that they would no longer control the full apparatus of the Federal government after decades of doing so. The North believed that, simply because one's party (or region) lost an election does not provide a legitimate justification for "blowing everything up."
A compelling argument, I think, but made difficult because of its inherent abstraction. Political theories, however vital to democracy, are certainly less emotionally compelling to the average citizen than the "Them damn Yankees are comin' to take our homes and women" argument used by the Confederacy. Hence, Lincoln's task necessarily was to couch the abstract case for representative democracy in more universal language, by pulling the heartstrings of "Union."
It's also interesting to note how much the new Confederacy attempted to use political theory, justifying secession as the inheritance of the spirit of 1776. That is, secessionists argued they were throwing off a tyrannical government just as American colonists did to the British in the American Revolution. That argument was particularly galling to northerners, especially to those from Massachusetts, as state that gave so much to the Revolution. Congressman Charles Francis Adams, grandson of one of the leading lights of the Revolution, John Adams (and son of John Quincy Adams), took pains to differentiate between the Revolution and secession.
Adams pointed out that, in the Revolution, the colonists suffered for years under a tyrannical British government, in which the colonists had no representation, and took pains to petition that government for a redress of those grievances, and after repeated failed formal attempts to be heard, formally initiated a separation while providing a full notice of intent (the Declaration of Independence). In contrast, South Carolina's secession, for example, took place on the heels of a lawful national election, in which South Carolina had full (actually, under the 3/5ths clause, excess) representation, without bothering to issue any formal grievances, without waiting to see if the North would assuage its concerns, without formally consulting with its own people, and which was followed immediately by the preemptive confiscation of Federal property and the use of armed force against Federal property and officials--and all this was prior to any alleged tyranny actually occurring (as Lincoln had not yet taken office in when SC seceded). Any comparison between 1776 and 1860 was, in Adams's words, beyond an "empty paper declaration" and was instead, a commission of treason.
Thus, the North felt compelled to respond to secession by meeting it with force rather than acquiescence. How the force came to be applied ultimately came down to Lincoln. Virtually the first item on his desk--in what has to be the worst first day of any president's term in history--was the news that Fort Sumter in Charleston harbor was about to run short of provisions. Lincoln faced a dilemma between re-provisioning the Fort, when doing so would certainly provoke an unwanted war, and the need to maintain the fort and uphold Federal authority.
McClintock writes, "Lincoln delayed for a month before finally committing to the relief of Sumter. In the end, he made a decision only when he was forced to when incoming intelligence and the course of events had stripped all other options away and left him a stark choice between sending supplies and vacating the fort... [I]f the rebel defenses were determined to attack any relief effort, then even a successful mission would provoke the fight Lincoln wanted desperately to avoid... By April 6, Lincoln could either pull out of Charleston... or he could uphold federal authority by sending an expedition to Sumter that was predestined to fail and ignite hostilities. At that point the only real question was how to organize the Sumter mission in such a way as to minimize the fallout [i.e., keeping as many border states as possible in the Union] and maximize the government's chances of winning the war." And that, in a nutshell, is how the North decided for war.
All in all, a solid work. Aside from the deep analysis, this work was particularly enjoyable because I found it enthralling to watch these many fallible individuals (aren't we all?) grapple with great, unimaginably questions with imperfect information against unknowable outcomes. A fascinating study in crisis management, and worth a read.
July 16, 2019
Excellent! A mix of political culture and old fashioned high politics. The overwhelming historiographical focus has been on the south and explaining secession with little attention given to why the northerners resisted it. What McClintock shows is that northern opinion was divided and confused. Northerners were critical of inaction either by President James Buchanan and his successor Abraham Lincoln. Moreover, northerners wanted their politicians to attempt a compromise and maintain peace. However, they were united against any southern agression. After a gruelling election, months of agonizing back and fourth, more partisan discontent, and uncertainty, it is no wonder that there was such a groundswell of patriotism when the Confederate forces fired on Fort Sumter. This book does excellent work charting the changes in northern attitudes as well as how the actions and deeds of the politicians compared to the wants of the public.
September 11, 2023
McClintock's book is a detailed expose primarily concentrating on the time period from Lincoln's election in 1860 to the attack on Fort Sumter in April 1861. He does venture back into the early 1800's in a few areas to add context to the narrative.
I have studied various battles of the Civil War, in particular the Gettysburg Campaign, and McClintock's work provided information that I had not known about. The detail in the book can be compared to play-by-play action on the part of Lincoln, Congress, Senate, and newspaper editors. However, there were times that I was bogged down with the political infighting between the various parties, and I found it somewhat difficult to keep up with who was who and what they were doing.
Overall, it is an interesting work and added to a segment of my Civil War library that I have not previously had.
I have studied various battles of the Civil War, in particular the Gettysburg Campaign, and McClintock's work provided information that I had not known about. The detail in the book can be compared to play-by-play action on the part of Lincoln, Congress, Senate, and newspaper editors. However, there were times that I was bogged down with the political infighting between the various parties, and I found it somewhat difficult to keep up with who was who and what they were doing.
Overall, it is an interesting work and added to a segment of my Civil War library that I have not previously had.
July 27, 2016
I picked up Russell McClintock’s book Lincoln and the Decision for War completely on a whim while browsing my local library. The book focuses on the North’s response to the secession crisis of 1860-1861. It was interesting to hear the historical point of view from the North. Most books and popular media focus on the Southern reaction to Lincoln winning the presidency and the decisions they made starting with South Carolina’s temper tantrum at losing an election. The North was hardly united before the firing on Fort Sumter. There was a long, drawn out period of debate and politicking between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party’s radical, moderate, and conservative wings. Weighing the political costs of compromise and coercion, arguing in peace committees, and receiving southern delegations right up until April of 1861. Lincoln bides his time, kept his party from fracturing, and made sure South Carolina fired the first shot. Overall, the book was fairly dry. I found myself able to read only ten minutes at a time before I had to put it down and do literally anything else. I can’t seem to find anything else by this author. If he continues to write, perhaps he will find a more compelling narrative voice. Until then, I think I’ll keep with more seasoned history authors.
May 5, 2013
McClintock's book is a thorough account of the events and politics leading up to the Civil War. I especially liked the 6-page "Conclusion: Shall It Be Peace, or a Sword" which follows Chapter 10.
On the negative side, it's a bit long and the style of writing is sometimes dense and uninviting. For an alternative and highly readable view I highly recommend the 33-page account written by Henry Adams "The Great Secession Winter of 1860-1861", available here: http://archive.org/details/greatseces....
Henry Adams, then not quite twenty-three, accompanied his father, Massachusetts Congressman Charles Francis Adams, to Washington as his private secretary. During much of the subsequent winter, in addition to his regular duties, Henry acted as Washington correspondent for the Boston Advertiser. Writing anonymously in order not to compromise his father, he tried to explain and muster support for the policies of the moderate Republicans under the leadership of William H. Seward of New York and Charles Francis Adams. The correspondence ended in February, 1861, when the editor of the Advertiser came to Washington and assumed Henry's function himself.
On the negative side, it's a bit long and the style of writing is sometimes dense and uninviting. For an alternative and highly readable view I highly recommend the 33-page account written by Henry Adams "The Great Secession Winter of 1860-1861", available here: http://archive.org/details/greatseces....
Henry Adams, then not quite twenty-three, accompanied his father, Massachusetts Congressman Charles Francis Adams, to Washington as his private secretary. During much of the subsequent winter, in addition to his regular duties, Henry acted as Washington correspondent for the Boston Advertiser. Writing anonymously in order not to compromise his father, he tried to explain and muster support for the policies of the moderate Republicans under the leadership of William H. Seward of New York and Charles Francis Adams. The correspondence ended in February, 1861, when the editor of the Advertiser came to Washington and assumed Henry's function himself.
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March 18, 2010Fascinating account of the months between the election of 1860 and Fort Sumter. Made me realize the extremist in The Republican Party haven't changed in 150 years.
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