Ten Days in August: The Siege of Liège 1914

by Terence Zuber

A complete and accurate picture of the seige of Liège, using both Belgian and German sources In August 1914 the German main attack was conducted by the 2nd Army. It had the missions of taking the vital fortresses of Liège and Namur, and then defeating the Anglo-French-Belgian forces in the open plains of northern Belgium. The German attack on the Belgian fortress at Liège had tremendous political and military importance. Nevertheless, there has never been a complete account of the siege. The German and Belgian sources are fragmentary and biased. The short descriptions in English are general, use a few Belgian sources, and are filled with inaccuracies. Making use of both German and Belgian sources, this book for the first time describes and evaluates the construction of the fortress, its military purpose, the German plan, and the conduct of the German attack. Previous accounts emphasize the importance of the huge German "Big Bertha" cannon, to the virtual exclusion of everything the Siege of Liège shows that the effect of this gun was a myth, and shows how the Germans really took the fortress.

Genres: World War I

272 pages, Hardcover

First published August 15, 2014

About the author

Dr. Terence Zuber is an American retired army officer and military historian whose primary field of study is the First World War. He received his BA (History) in 1970 from the University of Minnesota, and entered the U.S. Army that same year. He served primarily in infantry units, and also as VII (US) Corps liaison officer to the 12. Panzerdivision of the West German Bundeswehr. He retired as a Major in 1990. He earned both his MA (History) in 1996, and his PhD summa cum laude in 2001, from the Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg.

Reviews

[Amanda Borys · Rating 1 out of 5]

I did not read this book cover to cover. I set out with the best intentions but it was just way too boring. To paraphrase a good friend, the author is a mega rivet counter. I can see how that level of detail might be important for some aspect of the invasion of Belgium and Liege's hold out. But not for this book. It is hard to keep track of what unit belongs to what army and who is who. The battle scenes are about as exciting as someone moving piece on a map.

Apparently the author had points to make other than just dullifying the invasion to the point of sleep. But I only know this because I read a review from someone who pointed them out. Otherwise, I wouldn't have had a clue.

My final point, which is the biggest bone of contention, is that the author is very clearly biased in favour of the Germans. Siding with the invaders is never a good idea, but to denigrate the smaller, less organized defending army because they weren't as magnificent as their attackers is frankly immoral, especially given what Germany did to Belgium during the years of occupation. And it's not even like the author could hide the fact the Germans themselves were not that competent. And, let's face it, what kind of person admires the losing side. They couldn't have been that good.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 3 out of 5]

An insightful military history of the siege.

The book is pretty detailed, down to platoon-size units and their actions, and seems to be based mostly on German regimental histories. The book includes firsthand accounts, though some readers will wish for more context. Zuber argues that the importance of the big German guns is overstated, and attributes the Belgian defeat to bad tactics and the bad design of the forts.

There’s some black and white maps, which may not suit every reader. The narrative can be tough to follow; I know a lot of works of military history can be dry, but this one seems drier than most. And for some reason, Zuber never really lays out a clear explanation of the operation’s purpose.

A well-researched if somewhat tedious work.

[Don · Rating 1 out of 5]

interesting topic, but written in a way that I found tedious and dry.

[Martin Samuels · Rating 2 out of 5]

To say that Terence Zuber is a controversial historian is something of an understatement. In the early 2000s, he prompted a lively debate in academic circles by arguing that the famous Schlieffen Plan was a myth, based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the intentions of successive German chiefs of the general staff. It is to be expected that this book would take a novel stance.

The siege and rapid fall of Liege in August 1914 is one of those turning points of war that so often feature in the 'common knowledge' of history. In fact, it comes as something of a surprise to realsie that this crucuial event has had no modern academic study devoted to it. Basing his account largely on the various regimental histories and the personal accounts left by a number of the participants, Zuber seeks to unpick the battle stage by stage.

On the negative side, his account often veers between being almost unreadable and being unintentionally amusing. For some reason, Zuber relies heavily on abbreviations. When refering to unit strengths or casualties, he always uses the terms OFF and EM, in place of officers and other ranks (enlisted men). His abbreviations of units, while generally following standard conventions, often leave the reader uncertain what sort of unit 32 L is, or whether the unit just referred to is German or Belgian. In addition, though there are many maps, they are frequently quite difficult to dicipher. At the same time, since Zuber is not shy about expressing his view of the participants, the reader often has to smile when this or that commander is sharply criticised for his obvious incompetence in failing to follow established doctrine, or some unit is condemned as disorganised or unmilitary.

More positively, and where this book brings genuine value, Zuber shows that the defence of Liege, believed to be the strongest fortress in Europe, was fatally flawed from the start. A fortress designed to be a large zone of defence, held by significant infantry formations, supported by artillery from a ring of impregnable forts, the Belgians never fielded an army large enough to provide the necessary infantry, the forts lacked effective observation and coordination, and were themselves obsolescent both in their own black powder guns and their ability to withstand modern siege guns. As a result, the Germans were able to smash the defending infantry in a single night, march between the forst unchallenged, and destroy them one by one at almost no loss. To cap it all, Zuber demonstrates that the fortress did not delay the German advance by a single day.

This book, for all its flaws, offers a very valuable contribution to the understanding of both the state of the German and Belgian Armies at the very start of the First World War and of the nature of siege warfare at that time. It is to be hoped that it might spur a further volume, comparing and contrasting the performance of the various fortresses during the early part of the war. In turn, this might shed light on the postwar understanding of fortresses, especially the logic that led to the equally doomed focus of the French Army on the Maginot Line.