After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy

by Christopher J. Coyne

Why does liberal democracy take hold in some countries but not in others? Why do we observe such different outcomes in military interventions, from Germany and Japan to Afghanistan and Iraq? Do efforts to export democracy help as much as they hurt? These are some of the most enduring questions of our time. Historically, the United States has attempted to generate change in foreign countries by exporting liberal democratic institutions through military occupation and reconstruction. Despite these efforts, the record of U.S.-led reconstructions has been mixed, at best. For every West Germany or Japan, there is a Cuba, Haiti, Somalia, or Vietnam. After War seeks to answer these critical foreign policy questions by bringing an economic mindset to a topic that has been traditionally tackled by historians, policymakers, and political scientists. Economics focuses on how incentives influence human action. Therefore, within an economic context, a successful reconstruction entails finding and establishing a set of incentives that makes citizens prefer a liberal democratic order. Coyne examines the mechanisms and institutions that contribute to the success of reconstruction programs by creating incentives for sustained cooperation. Coyne emphasizes that the main threat to Western nations in the post-Cold War period will not come from a superpower, but rather from weak, failed, and conflict-torn states―and rogue groups within them. It is also critical to recognize that the dynamics at work―cultural, historical, and social―in these modern states are fundamentally different from those that the United States faced in the reconstructions of West Germany and Japan. As such, these historical cases of successful reconstruction are poor models for todays challenges. In Coynes view, policymakers and occupiers face an array of internal and external constraints in dealing with rogue states. These constraints are often greatest in the countries most in need of the political, economic, and social change. The irony is that these projects are least likely to succeed precisely where they are most needed. Coyne offers two bold alternatives to reconstruction programs that could serve as catalysts for social principled non-intervention and unilateral free trade. Coyne points to major differences in these preferred approaches; whereas reconstruction projects involve a period of coerced military occupation, free trade-led reforms are voluntary. The book goes on to highlight the economic and cultural benefits of free trade. While Coyne contends that a commitment to non-intervention and free trade may not lead to Western-style liberal democracies in conflict-torn countries, such a strategy could lay the groundwork for global peace.

Genres: Economics, Politics, Nonfiction, History, Political Science

248 pages, Paperback

First published November 7, 2007

About the author

Christopher J. Coyne is Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University and Associate Director of the F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center. He is the author of Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Action Fails (Stanford, 2013) and After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy (Stanford, 2008).

Reviews

[Carlos · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an interesting book that uses principles from economics (mainly game theory) to show that it is very difficult for an occupying power to extend democratic institutions to another country in the aftermath of a war. The author presents the case in the first parts of the book, which are very good. But the final part, where he proposes a solution based on free trade instead of occupation seemed naive at best.

[Eugene Kernes · Rating 5 out of 5]

The U.S. has been involved in many reconstruction efforts in weak, failed, and illiberal states. The major reason for these interventions is the war on terror which should make the world safe for democracy. These efforts had some success, but the author finds that the majority of cases, the efforts were either inconsequential or counterproductive. In many cases the efforts created conflict rather than helping spread democracy. The purpose of this book is to examine why some intervention efforts succeeded, why some efforts failed, and whether intervention is necessary at all.

For reconstruction efforts to be successful, the rules of the games set by the occupiers have to be maintained after the occupiers leave. To do this, the occupier needs to rebuild formal and informal institutions. As part of the effort deals with creating a democratic preference, that means that there are institutions in which individuals express their preferences, having institutionalized constraints on the executive, and civil liberties for everyone during daily and political life. What is known is what is needed for functioning democracy. What is not known is the tacit knowledge in how to bring functioning democracy about.

Expanding the same resources on different intervention efforts will not yield the same results. The same resources will create different outcomes in different places and at different time due to a host of factors primarily known as culture. Culture is defined by informal institutions which constrains human interaction. Values and belief systems passed down from generations before. Any resource use will have a variety of cultural constrains which may become less effective or counterproductive.

Part of what makes reconstruction efforts successful is aligning behaviors with broader aims. If there are or were institutional norms which helped people coordinate before the state failed, utilizing those norms reduces transactions costs and enables coordination. Views of what is expected to happen and that which actually happens can shape the way the occupying force is seen, as those expectation make a set of actions appear to be liberating in a given situation or in the same situation be seen as hypocritic and opposed to what the people need. The aims of the occupying force may be vastly different from what the people want. An unwillingness of the people to part from their prior institutional experience.

This book utilizes economic concepts to explain the politics of reconstruction efforts. Game theory and public choice theory are used to show how cooperation can be brought about or how conflict can become perpetuated. This book is split between a few chapters of theory base explanations and then chapters using examples of when reconstruction efforts succeeded and failed. It can sometimes be a tedious read. Blending the theory within the historical explanations potentially would have made this a more fluid read. The book is a bit limiting in explaining the historical examples, although short reviews of the situations are made. Providing more detail about the historical situation would have provided more credibility to the claims being made.

Weak, failed, and illiberal government may not be conducive to the people and foreign nations, but that does not mean that foreign government intervention will solve their problems. Each government is constrained by public choice and other factors that can bring about inappropriate outcomes such as making the situation worse. Coyne suggests that nonintervention methods should be experimented with given the failure rate of interventions. The US can reduce market barrier to foreign countries who will then be able to experience democracy and seek to emulate democratic governments. Rather than claiming liberalism by using illiberal means, the US can create wealth in poor countries which exposing them to Western institutions.

[Trey Malone · Rating 4 out of 5]

There was a lot to like in this book. I learned quite a bit about critical issues inherent nation-building. Coyne does a great job of setting up his theoretical arguments at the beginning of the book, and then, in each chapter, providing examples that support his perspective. I really enjoyed reading this, and believe it is a great example of an economist using the historical narrative to discuss his position. Worth the short read.

[Robert Clarke · Rating 5 out of 5]

Chris Coyne's "After War," published in 2008, is an excellent examination of America's often failed attempts to build stable, liberal democracies through military force and reconstruction. It examines in some depth economic theory around attempted reconstruction, compares successes like German and Japan to failures like Somalia, Haiti, & Afghanistan, and makes a compelling case - 16 years ago - that we need to change course.

[Pedro Benitez · Rating 4 out of 5]

I should probably be writing an essay right now, so this review might not be all that ground-breaking. Regardless, I felt the need to discuss the book. To do so, I've decided to do so on three ways. The economics of the book, the quality of the information and cases, and the overall style and delivery. To briefly summarize, Coyne presents information regarding the effectiveness of government reconstruction efforts by foreign donors and occupiers, particularly those cases with strong military presence.

The economics-Personally, I am a big fan of Coyne's free market approach and criticism of exporting democracy. A combination of various schools of thought, from the Austrian knowledge-problem approach, the public-choice approach to understanding conflicts in decision making and special interest groups, and the overall idea that economic liberalism promote cultural exchange define the book. Certainly, one might want to have some background on these schools in order to understand what is being discussed more fully, although the presentation makes it straightforward enough that a layman will appreciate it. Very good, in my opinion.

The cases- There is a wide selection of cases presented, with many contrasts drawn between successful nations, such as Japan and Germany, and unsuccessful reconstructions like Cuba and Haiti. Coyne applies the various economic ideas he introduces in his book, particularly game theory, to break down each particular case. The comparisons make very clear distinctions between both type of post-reconstruction states, furthering the notion that non-intervention is preferable.

The delivery- Clear. Concise. Very informative, and approachable by anybody, really. The only criticism is that, at times, the book reads a little repetitive, as the same ideas get repeated over and over during each case. This is merely aesthetic, however, as cutting out explanations may rob the book on clarity.

Overall, the book was a satisfying and informative read on alternative approaches to reconstruction, asking all the right questions, providing few answers and more criteria to consider when thinking about the issue (which I believe is a good thing).

I recommend. Especially for anybody else taking a course on country reconstruction. All 2 of you out there.

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

Coyne does a great job elucidating the many complex meta and nested issues that come into play when dealing with sociological structures in foreign nations. Tactfully addressing normative and positive issues, After War: The Political Economy of Exporting Democracy does an excellent job at advocating an imperfect solution, free trade over military intervention. Overall, I have to say Coyne's scholarship is something I thoroughly enjoyed.

[Major Doug · Rating 2 out of 5]

Somewhat whiney and blaming, and the conclusion wasn't all that amazing.