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336 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2014
The terror war’s policy makers, scholars, ideologists, and political activists have developed two broad approaches to making sense of “Islamic extremism.” In the first one, Muslim communities are seen as failing to adapt to modernity as a result of their Islamic culture. Islam, they say, fails to separate religion from the state, and to render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s. Because its founder was a statesman as well as a prophet, they hold, Islamic culture is inherently antithetical to a modern, secular containment of its aspiration to impose itself on society. Further, because the teachings of Islam fail to separate it from the political sphere, the atavisms of religious fanaticism are dangerously introduced into the public realm. This approach to analyzing extremism, which emphasizes what adherents regard as inherent features of Islamic culture, I refer to as “culturalism.”The result of these views was government intervention, both aboard and at home. Muslim-majority nations were seen as potential enemies, and Muslims in the West, unless they totally eschewed their religion, were seen as potential extremists. So the "war against terror" abroad, and the surveillance and restriction of citizens' rights for Muslims at home, were justified. Guantanamo Bay was the natural successor to Abu Ghraib, and Muslims were the new Jews in the West.
In the second approach, extremism is viewed as a perversion of Islam’s message. Rather than the legacy of a premodern, Oriental religion, extremism is the result of twentieth-century ideologues who transformed Islam’s essentially benign teachings into an antimodern, totalitarian, political ideology. In this view, the classical religious texts themselves are not the basis for terrorism. Instead, ideologues who reinterpreted Islam based on the models of communism and fascism lie at the root of al-Qaeda’s violence. The war on terror is not, then, a clash of civilizations between the West’s modern values and Islam’s fanaticism; the clash is instead between a traditional, apolitical Islam that is compatible with Western values and a totalitarian appropriation of Islam’s meaning that has transformed it into a violent political ideology. I refer to this view as “reformism,” both because it seeks to reform what it regards as the counterproductive stereotyping of the early war on terror and because its project is to, in effect, reform Islamic culture itself.
The concept of ideology is central to both the culturalist and reformist accounts. They both find terrorism’s origins in the content of an ideology that is rooted in an alien culture, whether that ideology is thought of as Islam itself or as Islamist extremism. This concept of ideology is ultimately derived from cold war views of totalitarianism, in which theorists assume a direct causal connection between holding a certain ideology and committing acts of political violence. The role of Western states in coproducing the terror war is thereby obscured. Rather than seeing terrorism as the product of an interaction between state and nonstate actors, who together constitute themselves in a relationship of conflict between the West and radical Islam, both culturalists and reformists take the content of an alien ideology as sufficient explanation for the conflict’s existence; they eschew the role of social and political circumstances in shaping how people make sense of the world and then act upon it.
Look at that green-haired man hitting a child.If we look closely, this is what is happening in the West. Government intervention creates fear and distrust among Muslims: unprovoked attacks by right-wingers create fear. Ultimately, with their backs to the wall, more and more Muslim youth join the extremists because they feel that that is their only refuge.
That green-haired man is vicious.
All green-haired men are vicious.
Green-haired men will attack anyone.
There’s another green-haired man—hit him before he hits you. (The green-haired man, who has done nothing to provoke aggression, hits back to defend himself.)
There you are—that proves it: green-haired men are vicious.
Hit all green-haired men.
This progression of violence sounds ridiculous when expressed in such an elementary manner. It is, of course, ridiculous, but nevertheless it represents a very real way of thinking. Even a dimwit can spot the fallacies in the seven deadly stages of mounting group prejudice that I have listed, but this does not stop them becoming a reality.
After the green-haired men have been hit for no reason for long enough, they do, rather naturally, become vicious. The original false prophecy has fulfilled itself and become a true prophecy.


“The US government is killing our innocent civilians… I can’t stand to see evil go unpunished… we Muslims are one body, you hurt one, you hurt all of us… stop killing our people and we will stop”.
“The only reason we killed this man is because Muslims are dying by British soldiers and this soldier is one of them… and we will never stop fighting until you leave us alone”.
“it’s so weird. Before 9/11, I am just a white (Arab) guy, living a typical white guy’s life, all my friends had names like Monica, Chandler, Joey and Ross… I go to bed on September 10th, wake up on the 11th, I am an Arab”.
