Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law

by Seana Valentine Shiffrin

To understand one another as individuals and to fulfill the moral duties that require such understanding, we must communicate with each other. We must also maintain protected channels that render reliable communication possible, a demand that, Seana Shiffrin argues, yields a prohibition against lying and requires protection for free speech. This book makes a distinctive philosophical argument for the wrong of the lie and provides an original account of its difference from the wrong of deception.

Drawing on legal as well as philosophical arguments, the book defends a series of notable claims―that you may not lie about everything to the "murderer at the door," that you have reasons to keep promises offered under duress, that lies are not protected by free speech, that police subvert their mission when they lie to suspects, and that scholars undermine their goals when they lie to research subjects.

Many philosophers start to craft moral exceptions to demands for sincerity and fidelity when they confront wrongdoers, the pressures of non-ideal circumstances, or the achievement of morally substantial ends. But Shiffrin consistently resists this sort of exceptionalism, arguing that maintaining a strong basis for trust and reliable communication through practices of sincerity, fidelity, and respecting free speech is an essential aspect of ensuring the conditions for moral progress, including our rehabilitation of and moral reconciliation with wrongdoers.

Genres: Philosophy, Politics

248 pages, Hardcover

First published December 21, 2014

Reviews

[Nick Geiser · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is really a model of how to do political theory: take a plausible, elegant thesis and apply it productively to a number of questions. For Shiffrin, the core thesis is a view about the role and value of speech. Shiffin claims that speech is really about accessing other minds. This basic insight yields a new account of what's wrong with lying (as well as a plausible analysis of Kant's famous case of lying to the murderer at the door), contracts made under duress, and the value of free speech. One of the most interesting parts of the book is Shifrin's discussion of what's wrong with "institutional" lying as practiced by law enforcement and experimental researchers. Shifrin claims that some social authorities like the police and universities should not engage in lying in the course of their work, even if it produces good consequences.

[Daria Anisimova · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thought this was a great explanation of concepts I had difficulty understanding before. The writing is elegant and precise.

[laura · Rating 5 out of 5]

The canonical works on speech rights have often struck me as too limited. They tend to take as central, e.g., general interest that we have as a society in figuring out what is true, and securing warrant; or the sort of fundamental human interest we have as individuals in exercising our capacity for a sense of justice and/or conception of the good-- the necessary preconditions for holding, sharing, and revising a system of broad normative convictions about how to live. When we talk about fundamental speech interests, science and religion always seem to be in the vicinity.

I've always found a lot missing here. What about the value of thinking and of speaking to others about what has happened to me, or about what my experience has been? What about the human need to tell the stories of ourselves, both to ourselves and to others? The human interest in retaining control over what we are and are not entitled to share about own experiences, and how this connects or isolates us?

In SPEECH MATTERS, SVS does more than I could easily describe here. But among the things she does is to extend our sense of the basis of speech interests beyond what's necessary for doing good science and expressing religious conviction or lack thereof. She writes of the speaker’s fundamental interests in, e.g., "revealing, sharing, and considering [the contents of her own mind] largely at [her] discretion” and in “being recognized by other agents for the person she is” (88).

It's also, I should mention, a pleasure to read. You don't need a doctorate in philosophy to get a lot out of it.