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German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the Development of Attrition, 1870-1916
The term "Battle of Verdun" has become synonymous with senseless slaughter. This book offers a new perspective on one of the twentieth century's bloodiest battles by examining the development of German military ideas from the end of the Franco-German War in 1871 to the First World War. Its use of recently released German sources held in the Soviet Union since the Second World War sheds new light on German ideas about attrition before and during the First World War.
316 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2005
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About the author
Robert T. Foley
11 books2 followersDr. Robert Foley taught for five years at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. He is currently a lecturer in modern European history at the School of History, University of Liverpool.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
August 9, 2025
ave you read what they read ? It's a popular question to introduce any questionably 'smart' reading list, but with this book it fits like a glove. EVERY book since 2005 that even remotely deals with Verdun or German strategy in WWI has this book listed in the bibliography. Why ?
Because it kicks the gospel out of the church. The Schlieffen Plan wasn't inevitable (thank you, Terence Zuber, for pointing that out ad nauseam) and Von Falkenhayn's plan to bleed the French Army to death was less innovative than posterity assumed.
Foley looks at the genesis of German strategy in 1916. As with most armies who put on their thinking cap in peacetime, this goes back to its previous war experience, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. A bold Auftragungstaktik coupled with superior numbers from conscription and hastiliy massed artillery fire had carried the day against the cautious defensive strategy of the French regular Army, anchored on the deadly accurate long-range fire of the Chassepot rifles. Yet at great cost. The war had evolved into a franc-tireur -infested protraction by the popular government and a costly investment of Paris, instead of a Napoleonesque triumphal entry into la ville lumière following the swift collapse of the Imperial government. Also, the senior officers at the Grossgeneralstab had not forgotten what "grabbing a corner of the towel, then see how big it is" meant to them, when as young officers they crouched on the ground in a desperate attempt to close in on the French grumblers, whose mitrailleuses turned men into pulp while their marksmen skythed bloody holes in the ranks until the Krupp guns silenced the lot.
Because it kicks the gospel out of the church. The Schlieffen Plan wasn't inevitable (thank you, Terence Zuber, for pointing that out ad nauseam) and Von Falkenhayn's plan to bleed the French Army to death was less innovative than posterity assumed.
Foley looks at the genesis of German strategy in 1916. As with most armies who put on their thinking cap in peacetime, this goes back to its previous war experience, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. A bold Auftragungstaktik coupled with superior numbers from conscription and hastiliy massed artillery fire had carried the day against the cautious defensive strategy of the French regular Army, anchored on the deadly accurate long-range fire of the Chassepot rifles. Yet at great cost. The war had evolved into a franc-tireur -infested protraction by the popular government and a costly investment of Paris, instead of a Napoleonesque triumphal entry into la ville lumière following the swift collapse of the Imperial government. Also, the senior officers at the Grossgeneralstab had not forgotten what "grabbing a corner of the towel, then see how big it is" meant to them, when as young officers they crouched on the ground in a desperate attempt to close in on the French grumblers, whose mitrailleuses turned men into pulp while their marksmen skythed bloody holes in the ranks until the Krupp guns silenced the lot.
November 6, 2016
Really fascinating revisionist history that challenges the standard interpretations of Falkenhayn and Verdun - that, essentially, Falkenhayn was a weak, vascillating leader and never intended Verdun to be a limited attritional offensive. Foley traces the evolution of attritional approaches in German strategic thought from 1870, sparked largely by the continued French "people's war" resistance at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, when the great battles of annihilation at Sedan and Metz failed to secure the surrender of the French people (as opposed to the government of Louis Napoleon, who was captured at Sedan). This school of strategic thought, at odds with the Prussian/German mainstream, continued to develop in parallel to annihilation-focused strategies through the periods of Moltke the Elder, von Schlieffen, and finally the younger Moltke, meaning that when Falkenhayn took command, there was a tradition of thought about attritional strategies for him to draw on.
Foley traces the development of the Verdun strategy very effectively, and concludes that Falkenhayn truly meant the limited offensive and attritional strategy - that a limited attack threatening such a viscerally important landmark as Verdun would draw massive French efforts to defend it - as well as a counteroffensive somewhere else to draw off the pressure. Falkenhayn believed from the results of 1915's battles at Artois, Loos, and Champagne that the German Army could resist that offensive and bleed its enemies white. It's interesting to consider that if the German defensive tactics of 1917-18 (defense-in-depth) had existed in 1916, it is likely that the Somme bloodletting could have ended up being exactly that battle that Falkenhayn envisioned. (Instead, the German focus on holding the front line maximized British casualties, but also ended up causing horrific German losses to artillery fire).
Instead, however, the devil was in the details - no defense-in-depth doctrine existed in 1916; Falkenhayn communicated his limited-offensive intention at Verdun poorly, so Crown Prince Wilhelm and his army did not utilize limited offensive tactics; the weather forced a postponement that ruined surprise; the initial attack was not big enough to secure both banks of the Meuse, leaving German troops vulnerable to enfilading artillery fire from Cote 304 and Mort-Homme on the left bank; and rather than keeping forces in the Verdun meat-grinder indefinitely to allow a French counterattack elsewhere, Petain convinced Joffre to institute the noria rotation system, and left the counteroffensives to the British at the Somme and the Russians (Brusilov offensive). Eventually, Verdun (like Stalingrad in World War II) assumed a logic all its own, driven by emotional and political considerations that subverted the strategic logic. All of this raises the question of how one can pursue limited war strategies in an "unlimited" war - see also Japanese strategy in the Pacific in World War II. . .
Foley traces the development of the Verdun strategy very effectively, and concludes that Falkenhayn truly meant the limited offensive and attritional strategy - that a limited attack threatening such a viscerally important landmark as Verdun would draw massive French efforts to defend it - as well as a counteroffensive somewhere else to draw off the pressure. Falkenhayn believed from the results of 1915's battles at Artois, Loos, and Champagne that the German Army could resist that offensive and bleed its enemies white. It's interesting to consider that if the German defensive tactics of 1917-18 (defense-in-depth) had existed in 1916, it is likely that the Somme bloodletting could have ended up being exactly that battle that Falkenhayn envisioned. (Instead, the German focus on holding the front line maximized British casualties, but also ended up causing horrific German losses to artillery fire).
Instead, however, the devil was in the details - no defense-in-depth doctrine existed in 1916; Falkenhayn communicated his limited-offensive intention at Verdun poorly, so Crown Prince Wilhelm and his army did not utilize limited offensive tactics; the weather forced a postponement that ruined surprise; the initial attack was not big enough to secure both banks of the Meuse, leaving German troops vulnerable to enfilading artillery fire from Cote 304 and Mort-Homme on the left bank; and rather than keeping forces in the Verdun meat-grinder indefinitely to allow a French counterattack elsewhere, Petain convinced Joffre to institute the noria rotation system, and left the counteroffensives to the British at the Somme and the Russians (Brusilov offensive). Eventually, Verdun (like Stalingrad in World War II) assumed a logic all its own, driven by emotional and political considerations that subverted the strategic logic. All of this raises the question of how one can pursue limited war strategies in an "unlimited" war - see also Japanese strategy in the Pacific in World War II. . .
December 16, 2012
Robert T. Foley's book, "German Strategy.." is an examination of German military ideas from the end of the Franco-German War to the First World War. It culminates in an in-depth investigation of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916, including the role of the Verdun battle in his overall plan.
The book is extremely well researched, and a look at the book's
bibliography shows the hard work, and amount of research the author put into his study. Sources include many unpublished documents from various archives in multiple countries.
On the salient point of Verdun, and Falkenhayn's true intentions, the author weaves a larger picture of German strategy for 1916, with the Verdun battle being but a piece of an overall larger plan. Foley himself admits that reconstructing Falkenhayn's true plan is difficult, due to the amount of secrecy and disinformation involved-that being said he does an admirable job.
Most interestingly Foley does not include Falkenhayn's famous "Christmas Memorandum," of 1915 as one of the pieces in reconstructing the Verdun puzzle. He states that because the authenticity of the Memorandum has never been established, and in fact, has been disputed, he does not include it. Instead, he relies on first hand accounts of conversations with Falkenhayn, and plans requested from, and submitted by, various German armies along the Western front.
He builds a picture of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916 which is compelling. Verdun was to be the means to draw the French reserves into battle, inflict casualties on them, and weaken other areas of the French front by drawing troops to the Verdun battle. The Verdun battle was also to provoke a premature Allied counter-attack, which would be bled white by German forces on the defensive. Once these aims had been achieved Falkenhayn would use his own reserve forces to launch attacks at other points along the front. Foley also gives a detailed description of the execution of the Verdun battle and how it went wrong.
His book ends by explaining how the failure of Falkenhayn's strategy led the German military to abandon its attempt at a strategy of attrition, and return to the strategy of annihilation.
Foley's book it well written, with copious notes on sources, and well balanced. He even includes footnotes such as, "For a differing view see."
By presenting a comprehensive view of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916, with Verdun as only one aspect of that strategy, the author goes a long way towards removing the shroud of mystery that has surrounded Falkenhayn and objectives for Verdun.
The book is extremely well researched, and a look at the book's
bibliography shows the hard work, and amount of research the author put into his study. Sources include many unpublished documents from various archives in multiple countries.
On the salient point of Verdun, and Falkenhayn's true intentions, the author weaves a larger picture of German strategy for 1916, with the Verdun battle being but a piece of an overall larger plan. Foley himself admits that reconstructing Falkenhayn's true plan is difficult, due to the amount of secrecy and disinformation involved-that being said he does an admirable job.
Most interestingly Foley does not include Falkenhayn's famous "Christmas Memorandum," of 1915 as one of the pieces in reconstructing the Verdun puzzle. He states that because the authenticity of the Memorandum has never been established, and in fact, has been disputed, he does not include it. Instead, he relies on first hand accounts of conversations with Falkenhayn, and plans requested from, and submitted by, various German armies along the Western front.
He builds a picture of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916 which is compelling. Verdun was to be the means to draw the French reserves into battle, inflict casualties on them, and weaken other areas of the French front by drawing troops to the Verdun battle. The Verdun battle was also to provoke a premature Allied counter-attack, which would be bled white by German forces on the defensive. Once these aims had been achieved Falkenhayn would use his own reserve forces to launch attacks at other points along the front. Foley also gives a detailed description of the execution of the Verdun battle and how it went wrong.
His book ends by explaining how the failure of Falkenhayn's strategy led the German military to abandon its attempt at a strategy of attrition, and return to the strategy of annihilation.
Foley's book it well written, with copious notes on sources, and well balanced. He even includes footnotes such as, "For a differing view see."
By presenting a comprehensive view of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916, with Verdun as only one aspect of that strategy, the author goes a long way towards removing the shroud of mystery that has surrounded Falkenhayn and objectives for Verdun.
July 26, 2021
Firstly, let me say that I have purchased several publications from the Cambridge military catalogue and I have enjoyed them all. They are by no means easy reads or simple narrative retellings. They are in-depth works of scholarship and as such should be read with a open and clear mind.
This book is, perhaps, the go to work on the development of German (let's be honest Prussian) strategic thought after the foundation of the German Empire in the Franco-Prussian war. The evolution different schools of strategic thought. Annihilation (popular and the commonly held strategy of a decisive victory) versus the unpopular concept of wearing down ( attrition, total war, mass mobilisation)
This book is a work of scholarship. Foley uses a wide variety of primary sources to support and to develop his thesis and to come to sound conclusions about the development of what would be called attritional warfare. This is a sound and thorough assessment.
I highly recommend this book, if you have some background knowledge on the German Empire and the great war. If not I would probably absorb a few narrative type works first, Such as Iron Kingdom by Christopher Clarke, to give you some context and flavour
Thanks for reading
Disclaimer: I was excited to read this book.
This book is, perhaps, the go to work on the development of German (let's be honest Prussian) strategic thought after the foundation of the German Empire in the Franco-Prussian war. The evolution different schools of strategic thought. Annihilation (popular and the commonly held strategy of a decisive victory) versus the unpopular concept of wearing down ( attrition, total war, mass mobilisation)
This book is a work of scholarship. Foley uses a wide variety of primary sources to support and to develop his thesis and to come to sound conclusions about the development of what would be called attritional warfare. This is a sound and thorough assessment.
I highly recommend this book, if you have some background knowledge on the German Empire and the great war. If not I would probably absorb a few narrative type works first, Such as Iron Kingdom by Christopher Clarke, to give you some context and flavour
Thanks for reading
Disclaimer: I was excited to read this book.
June 14, 2025
very well written and good to understand, maybe sometimes a tad uncronological and jumpy, so you might have to turn a few pages multiple times
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews