A Gödelesque argument against being a pure consequentialist

by Magnus Vinding

This essay presents a case against being a pure consequentialist. Being a pure consequentialist is implausible because it is either an inconsistent position, or it implies an implausibly dogmatic stance toward pure consequentialism itself. Moreover, the case against being a pure consequentialist finds added support from consequentialist considerations, suggesting that we can also create better outcomes by not being pure consequentialists.

15 pages, Kindle Edition

Published October 1, 2024

About the author

Magnus Vinding is the author of Speciesism: Why It Is Wrong and the Implications of Rejecting It (2015), Reflections on Intelligence (2016), You Are Them (2017), Effective Altruism: How Can We Best Help Others? (2018), Suffering-Focused Ethics: Defense and Implications (2020), Reasoned Politics (2022), Essays on Suffering-Focused Ethics (2022), and Essays on UFOs and Related Conjectures (2024).

His next book will be Compassionate Purpose: Personal Inspiration for a Better World.