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Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces
Undeniably, the 1990s were a period of crisis for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Drastic budget reductions and a series of endless scandals all collided to form the perfect storm. The outcome of this was nothing short of the implosion of the Canadian Armed Forces Officer Corps.
Stripped by the government of the right to regulate itself, the Officer Corps, which represented the nation’s stewards of the profession of arms, was forced to reform itself. Key to this transformation was education. However, the road was not easy, as cultural change rarely is.
Forced to Change tells the story of how the Canadian Armed Forces found itself at its lowest point in history and how it managed to reform itself. The question is whether it was a fundamental transformation or just a temporary adjustment to weather the storm.
Stripped by the government of the right to regulate itself, the Officer Corps, which represented the nation’s stewards of the profession of arms, was forced to reform itself. Key to this transformation was education. However, the road was not easy, as cultural change rarely is.
Forced to Change tells the story of how the Canadian Armed Forces found itself at its lowest point in history and how it managed to reform itself. The question is whether it was a fundamental transformation or just a temporary adjustment to weather the storm.
168 pages, Paperback
First published March 28, 2015
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
March 20, 2016
I don't think I've ever read anything where there was so obviously a word count imposed on the authors and not enough material to hit that count without relying on an absurd amount of repetition. I think the arguments in this book would have much more effectively been articulated in a 5 to max 10 page report instead.
October 8, 2020
Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces by Bernrd Horn is a look at the post-Cold War Canadain military. Colonel Horn is an experienced Canadian Forces infantry officer and military educator. He has authored or edited more than 35 books, including No Easy Task: Fighting in Afghanistan and No Lack of Courage: Operation Medusa, Afghanistan.
The Canadian military had a problem. After decades of preparing for war in Central Europe, its enemy was gone. This would seem like a good problem but what happened instead was that it exposed several problems that had been lying dormant.
Prime Minister Mulroney wanted Canada to be part of the post-Cold War international community bring humanitarian relief and humanitarian aid to the world. He wanted Canada to be part of the peacekeeping force in the new world, and Canada came to Somali.
Not everything went as planned and during the humanitarian mission to Somalia two soldiers brutally beat to death a Somali teen. Gruesome photographs were published and the CBC reporter received altered documents and evidence of a cover up. This act lead to the disbanding of the soldier's unit the elite Canadian Airborne Regiment. Canadian public opinion of the military fell to an all-time low of 28% favorable rating. Horn tells the reader that it is more than simply the act of two soldiers. It is a deeply rooted problem in the military.
The Cold War set up a system of complacency for the military, especially the officers. Canada had a set role in the Cold War and Cold War exercises. It became routine. It became so routine that it had its own acronym "SALY" -- Same As Last Year. There was no need for thinking. Military exercises simply became doing the same thing as you did last year. Once the scripted was written, all that was needed was to follow instructions.
SALY also created another problem. Since all one had to do is follow the same instructions over and over again, mistakes were not tolerated. Officers developed a "cover your ass policy." If mistakes were made, make sure you are not responsible. Although this may save the officer, troops lost their confidence that their officers would stand up for them. Counter to this in my time as a Marine, I made plenty of mistakes and the culture there was different. When something went wrong, I needed to explain to senior NCOs or my officers what happened. If I acted in good faith, I would be told " Good initiative, but poor judgement. Don't let that happen again. Carry on." It might sound a bit demeaning, but it was better than getting burned for making a mistake. The culture here was "if you can think of a better way try it." Granted, if you did something stupid or outright dangerous you could expect a much harsher response.
Horn identifies the problems in the old system and explains the actions taken to fix them. The military is difficult to change since the senior people are the most entrenched and least likely to invite or accept change. Horn covers the proposed solutions and what he feels would best help the system. This is a detailed book in the area of real life problem-solving and the military system. As an American, I needed to look up the Somali Affair and a few other events such as the consolidation of the Canadian Armed Forces. There is not much for the average American reader, but American military figures are used and quoted in this book. A timely book for Canadians and those interested in the policies of other countries' militaries.
The Canadian military had a problem. After decades of preparing for war in Central Europe, its enemy was gone. This would seem like a good problem but what happened instead was that it exposed several problems that had been lying dormant.
Prime Minister Mulroney wanted Canada to be part of the post-Cold War international community bring humanitarian relief and humanitarian aid to the world. He wanted Canada to be part of the peacekeeping force in the new world, and Canada came to Somali.
Not everything went as planned and during the humanitarian mission to Somalia two soldiers brutally beat to death a Somali teen. Gruesome photographs were published and the CBC reporter received altered documents and evidence of a cover up. This act lead to the disbanding of the soldier's unit the elite Canadian Airborne Regiment. Canadian public opinion of the military fell to an all-time low of 28% favorable rating. Horn tells the reader that it is more than simply the act of two soldiers. It is a deeply rooted problem in the military.
The Cold War set up a system of complacency for the military, especially the officers. Canada had a set role in the Cold War and Cold War exercises. It became routine. It became so routine that it had its own acronym "SALY" -- Same As Last Year. There was no need for thinking. Military exercises simply became doing the same thing as you did last year. Once the scripted was written, all that was needed was to follow instructions.
SALY also created another problem. Since all one had to do is follow the same instructions over and over again, mistakes were not tolerated. Officers developed a "cover your ass policy." If mistakes were made, make sure you are not responsible. Although this may save the officer, troops lost their confidence that their officers would stand up for them. Counter to this in my time as a Marine, I made plenty of mistakes and the culture there was different. When something went wrong, I needed to explain to senior NCOs or my officers what happened. If I acted in good faith, I would be told " Good initiative, but poor judgement. Don't let that happen again. Carry on." It might sound a bit demeaning, but it was better than getting burned for making a mistake. The culture here was "if you can think of a better way try it." Granted, if you did something stupid or outright dangerous you could expect a much harsher response.
Horn identifies the problems in the old system and explains the actions taken to fix them. The military is difficult to change since the senior people are the most entrenched and least likely to invite or accept change. Horn covers the proposed solutions and what he feels would best help the system. This is a detailed book in the area of real life problem-solving and the military system. As an American, I needed to look up the Somali Affair and a few other events such as the consolidation of the Canadian Armed Forces. There is not much for the average American reader, but American military figures are used and quoted in this book. A timely book for Canadians and those interested in the policies of other countries' militaries.
October 16, 2019
If you are looking for fresh insights into a western military who struggled to adapt doctrine from The Cold War to asymmetrical warfare, look elsewhere. When The Soviet Union fell, its opponents were slow to change (wait for the irony). Then there were a series of conflicts where ‘shock and awe’ would not work.
Fast forward to today, and we (Canadians) find ourselves facing off with Russia again... in Ukraine, the Baltics, and in cyber land. I will state it plainly, Putin and Russia remain our biggest threat.
The book starts poorly...with the Foreword by Romeo Dallaire. The former officer served in Rwanda and forever has been affected by his actions and results in field. My empathy for him are unreserved but this bit of writing and reasoning is poor...where were the editors?
The book covers doctrine and training in the Canadian military. There is something interesting here. That is, the lack of transparency, slow to change leadership, and blind adherence to all things NATO. This happened with other western nations but Canada was driven by one difference, we were smitten with our homegrown strategy of peacekeeping. To be more blunt, we believed our own press. Peacekeeping has now largely been discounted. It turns down the temperature but the pot will eventually boil over.
The unchanging bureaucracy of the military squeezed out the much-needed mavericks, those who challenge the status quo. The quotes from Rear-Admiral David Morse are priceless on this point. The authors suggest that a better educated officer corps would have helped. Perhaps. Or they may have been more starchy and equally slow to change or innovate.
Sadly, the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Haiti, and Somalia exposed all shortcomings and illuminated even worse things. Scandals abounded. Questionable shootings, disciplinary infractions, misappropriation of funds, black marketeering, and more took place. This attracted media attention (the Canadian military has never worked well with media) and then Canadians began to bash the military (Canadians have never truly accepted our standing forces). In 1996, just 26% of Canadians said the Canadian Armed Forces were relevant.
For the entire 1990’s, the military’s leadership was not only slow to change, it was resistant. The culture loved it’s comfort zone. During WW2, Major-General Harry Crerar, was the commander of Canadian forces in Europe. He often spoke of the “mental equipment” needed by officers. Which is true, but the authors are fixated on the solution being higher education for officers.
The book references Officership 2020, a strategic document for governance within the officer corps. It has 8 objectives...Innovative Path, Decisive Leaders, Modernize, Globally Deployable, Interoperable, Career of Choice, Strategic Partnerships, and Resource Stewardship. I know from personal experience, that these strategies are a dime a dozen. Easily spun out, poorly adhered to.
What this book and the Canadian military have missed and sorely need is rapid adaptability.
Fast forward to today, and we (Canadians) find ourselves facing off with Russia again... in Ukraine, the Baltics, and in cyber land. I will state it plainly, Putin and Russia remain our biggest threat.
The book starts poorly...with the Foreword by Romeo Dallaire. The former officer served in Rwanda and forever has been affected by his actions and results in field. My empathy for him are unreserved but this bit of writing and reasoning is poor...where were the editors?
The book covers doctrine and training in the Canadian military. There is something interesting here. That is, the lack of transparency, slow to change leadership, and blind adherence to all things NATO. This happened with other western nations but Canada was driven by one difference, we were smitten with our homegrown strategy of peacekeeping. To be more blunt, we believed our own press. Peacekeeping has now largely been discounted. It turns down the temperature but the pot will eventually boil over.
The unchanging bureaucracy of the military squeezed out the much-needed mavericks, those who challenge the status quo. The quotes from Rear-Admiral David Morse are priceless on this point. The authors suggest that a better educated officer corps would have helped. Perhaps. Or they may have been more starchy and equally slow to change or innovate.
Sadly, the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, Haiti, and Somalia exposed all shortcomings and illuminated even worse things. Scandals abounded. Questionable shootings, disciplinary infractions, misappropriation of funds, black marketeering, and more took place. This attracted media attention (the Canadian military has never worked well with media) and then Canadians began to bash the military (Canadians have never truly accepted our standing forces). In 1996, just 26% of Canadians said the Canadian Armed Forces were relevant.
For the entire 1990’s, the military’s leadership was not only slow to change, it was resistant. The culture loved it’s comfort zone. During WW2, Major-General Harry Crerar, was the commander of Canadian forces in Europe. He often spoke of the “mental equipment” needed by officers. Which is true, but the authors are fixated on the solution being higher education for officers.
The book references Officership 2020, a strategic document for governance within the officer corps. It has 8 objectives...Innovative Path, Decisive Leaders, Modernize, Globally Deployable, Interoperable, Career of Choice, Strategic Partnerships, and Resource Stewardship. I know from personal experience, that these strategies are a dime a dozen. Easily spun out, poorly adhered to.
What this book and the Canadian military have missed and sorely need is rapid adaptability.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews