After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency

by Quentin Meillassoux, Ray Brassier (Translator)

It is no exaggeration to say that Quentin Meillassoux has opened up a new path in the history of philosophy, understood here as the history of what it is to know ... This remarkable "critique of critique" is introduced here without embellishment, cutting straight to the heart of the matter in a particularly clear and logical manner. It allows the destiny of thought to be the absolute once more.

"This work is one of the most important to appear in continental philosophy in recent years and deserves a wide readership at the earliest possible date ... Après la finitude is an important book of philosophy by an authnted emerging voices in continental thought. Quentin Meillassoux deserves our close attention in the years to come and his book deserves rapid translation and widespread discussion in the English-speaking world. There is nothing like it."

—Graham Harman in Philosophy Today

The exceptional lucidity and the centrality of argument in Meillassoux's writing should appeal to analytic as well as continental philosophers, while his critique of fideism will be of interest to anyone preoccupied by the relation between philosophy, theology and religion. Meillassoux introduces a startlingly novel philosophical alternative to the forced choice between dogmatism and critique. After Finitude proposes a new alliance between philosophy and science and calls for an unequivocal halt to the creeping return of religiosity in contemporary philosophical discourse.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Theory, Science, Metaphysics, France, Contemporary

160 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2006

About the author

Quentin Meillassoux is a French philosopher. He teaches at the Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, and is the son of the anthropologist Claude Meillassoux.

Meillassoux is a former student of the philosophers Bernard Bourgeois and Alain Badiou. Badiou, who wrote the foreword for Meillassoux's first book After Finitude (Après la finitude, 2006), describes the work as introducing an entirely new option into modern philosophy, one that differs from Immanuel Kant's three alternatives of criticism, skepticism, and dogmatism. The book was translated into English by philosopher Ray Brassier. Meillassoux is associated with the speculative realism movement.

Reviews

[Jonathan Norton · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is mainly interesting for what it reveals about the state of French philosophy at the time it was written, rather than breaking any new ground for philosophy in general. Apparently the author and his colleagues are completely unaware of any analytic philosophy since about 1950, and think that it can be covered with brief references to "positivism" and a short discussion of one remark from the Tractatus.

Meillasoux starts with 2 key propositions: first, that "modern philosophy" is committed to varying forms of what he calls "correlationism". Secondly, he says that correlationism cannot accommodate "ancestrality", which is the problem that modern science posits events and entities that existed before any sentient beings existed to observe them. With regard to "correlationism", the first thing to note is that it is simply not true that modern Anglophone philosophy is in any way committed to it, in fact plenty of its practitioners would find nothing problematic about ancestrality. Only on the assumption that some form of logical positivism still reigns would that be the case.

But never mind about that. Meillasoux does not seem to have a consistent characterisation of what "correlationism" is, at least not one that has a *specific* problem with ancestrality. If we are to read it as a form of what Kant dubbed "empirical idealism", then it has to declare ancestral statements meaningless; but it has to do the same for objects that lack present observers. QM portrays the correlationist as rejecting such a view, and instead claiming something more like Kant's transcendental idealism, capable of appealing to counterfactuals about possible-but-not-actual observers. In which case the correlationist has no problem with ancestrality, and they would also be quite correct to rebut QM as mistaking transcendental conditions for physical ones, which is the next reply he considers. But QM thinks this strategy fails due to the requirement for *actual observers* to exist at a time. In that case correlationism fails, but it fails because it is in fact empirical idealism over again (a charge QM also suggests against it, at various places), and again, there is no *special* problem about ancestrality.

It strikes me the author simply doesn't have a consistent target in "correlationism" and is conflating together quite distinct positions; in any case the question he doesn't ask (which a genuine positivist like Ayer would do) is in what sense "correlationism" differs from realism, if it can avail itself about counterfactuals about unobserved things. What makes those counterfactuals true?

But never mind: if it were true that science and correlationism conflict, what of it? Who has the higher authority? Why not take the stand of philosophy against mere "scientism"? The accusation usually made against post-Quinean naturalist Anglophone philosophy is that it cedes all to the scientists and leaves out all the human-centred insights that only the continentals still care about. Meillasoux seems quite uncritical with regard to statements about "arche-fossils", and the nearest we get to an argument for their acceptance is that rejecting ancestrality would be tantamount to agreeing with Young Earth Creationists. I suppose YECism is a genuine case of correlationism (God, being eternal, always observes all that exists), but merely agreeing about that detail doesn't make one a reactionary. It seems that QM is drawing his metaphysics to suit his politically-charged outlook, and being quite "scientistic" about it.

He also has a line that correlationism has encouraged attitudes of cultural relativism in the West and prevents intellectuals challenging the rise of new religious attitudes; all that sounds jolly good but it is simply recapping the anti-postmodernist polemics of the 90s. This is all right, but it isn't new.

The middle section of the book is taken up with the attempt to break "the correlationist circle", by demonstrating that the law of non-contradiction applies to statements about the noumenal world. The trouble with this demonstration is that it depends on treating the "contradictory object" as if it were contradictory in ALL respects; but only 1 aspect would be needed for a contradictory object. Surprisingly, QM immediately acknowledges to problem, and that his demonstration is treating of *inconsistent* rather than contradictory objects. Unfortunately he simply brackets the problem for later resolution, which means the book doesn't exactly live up to the billing Alain Badiou gives it in the introduction.

The final section of the book is QM's attempt to sketch how he relates science at the phenomenal level to the "absolutist" basis he tried to establish earlier. The argument depended on the denial of any necessary beings or connections in the universe; so we need an explanation of how science could be possible in such a realm. It's here that QM really could do with having read some analytic metaphysics from the past 40 years, since the view he is trying to ground seems not very far away from the one David Lewis worked on and published so much about. Non-necessitarian theories of laws are not new, they were the prevailing view in Anglo departments, at least up to the 90s.

Altogether none of this seems to me as wrong or definitely misguided, though the central argument about contradiction and necessity is inadequate (as admitted), and I am not convinced about exactly what "correlationism" is, or whether it has a crucial problem with ancestrality. I think Meillasoux and the rest of the "speculative realists" could gain a lot from engaging with Theodore Sider and at least a dozen other writers writing about metaphyics and epistemology in English; I'm not sure they have anything startlingly different to offer in exchange. This seems to mark the end of "continental philosophy" as an antithetical project to the analytical one.

[Szplug · Rating 4 out of 5]

Incredibly interesting and, in all likelihood, philosophically important, but not something I'd call a whole whackadoodle of fun. For the second time in a row, a French philosopher has—at least via translation—composed his thought in a way that strives for clarity and readability, which has so impressed me that I shall no longer sub in the words Benelux(er*) Bay when I'm singing along to Ænema.

And as for Meillassoux's contention?** More or less, as far as I can determine it, a hearty Hey, you Post-critical Correlationists, Ancestrality has fucked you up, big time, such that you're either retrojecting or dogmatizing. Deal. Plus, something about math—All those aspects of the object that can be formulated in mathematical terms can be meaningfully conceived as properties of the object in-itself. What really tugged on my lederhosen was Meillassoux's meticulously-drawn contention that the current prevalence of what he calls strong correlationism—the offshots of Wittgenstein and Heidegger—have beaten back the weak correlationism held by the Kantians such that the absolute and the in-itself have been released from unthinkability beyond that of the rationally knowable, to the degree that Fideism has become the obverse of Correlationism. The death of metaphysics means that every religion has been freed to abandon (sufficient) reason and embrace faith as its sole source, consequently leaving philosophy incapable of challenging its determined belief on anything other than the moral/ethical plane; so it is that the waning of dogmatism has seen a waxing of fundamentalism, fideism making claims about an Absolute unknowable and unthinkable through reason but unchallengeable by the same against faith due to the very constraints of strong for-ourself correlationism. It's yet another Post-Enlightenment Festivus miracle!

And while I'm not tooting my own horn, I have to cop to having pondered, back in my Cyclonopedia days, how philosophy would account for the cosmos during those several billions of years pre-conscious beings; or, to be more precise, back in the period of inflation and/or the Big Bang, considering that the latter would have consisted of a singularity, unimpeded by the physical laws of spacetime, and, un-as an absolute thing-in-itself plus every conceivable future thing-in-itself and subjectivity compressed into an infinitely massive null point in an unformed space fully potential with forthcoming extension and manifestation, I pondered How would one account for this wombed universal pre-ejaculate? Unfortunately, contra Meillassoux, my considered conjecture ended up being, as often has proved the case, I have absolutely no idea whatsoever. Yet it remains so intriguing, particularly in the light of the quantum indeterminacies that were such a revelatory part of twentieth century science; in a universe sans any manner of sentient being, does the lack of observer mean that the universe, notwithstanding its more primordial, hotter composition, would not be progressing/expanding/cohering in a manner that would be logically and chronologically consistent to our own mental processing of spacetime? Impossible to calculate, because any intervention by thought, even retrojected from our current cosmo-temporal position, would bring to bear all of the formational properties of an observing eye; but does its unthinkability necessitate that it was a universe of unbeing? Could it, more or less, be stated to have not properly existed, as we understand the meaning of that word, ere sentient witnesses? But how, then, to account for the rise of those sentient beings in the first place? This is the realm into which Meillassoux attempts to bring philosophy, through his conception of Ancestrality, roughly the first 4.5 billion years of the universe; and I found it rewarding, even though yet quite confusing in its multiplicity of specific terminologies and meticulous reasoning, whose important positions within Meillassoux's argumentative chain I frequently (and unfortunately) had to implicitly accept in order to proceed with the whole. The bottom line is that this, as with most every philosophical work I have encountered, requires multiple readings if all of its speculative potentialities are to be realized in an effective manner by the reader—most especially this reader. What's wonderful about it is that Meillassoux writes so lucidly and agreeably that doing so will prove an anticipated pleasure, not a chore. I hold that to be a significant accomplishment within the world of modern philosophy.

*This admittedly awkward -er was appended purely to maintain the syllable meter.

**I hope to flesh this out more in the manner that Meillassoux's hard work deserves. It's just that it's too nice outside to be slipping into the critical form required to wend a non-return to Cartesian primary and secondary qualities to take account of mathematics as an entity-less Absolute since Ancestrality and its Arche-Fossil have forced Post-critical philosophy to contemplate the Great Outdoors of an absolutely contingent Speculative Realism such that a resurgent Fideism may be challengeable, via the non-Entity, Un-Givenness Absolute derived from Correlational Facticity, on its own faith-limned grounds and beyond the merely moral/ethical.

[Michal Lipták · Rating 2 out of 5]

I’ve been trained in phenomenology but I’m open to criticism. And Meillassoux does provide a criticism – o boy, is he fed up with phenomenology. The problem is, tho, that his criticism is quite straw-man-y.

To be more precise, Meillassoux’s beef is with what he calls “correlationism”, a mixture which includes Kant as original sinner and then various folks from Nietzsche to Deleuze to Wittgenstein. But also phenomenology, of course. So let me assume he means phenomenology: I’ll say “phenomenology” where he says “correlationism” from now on.

Meillassoux somehow thinks that since phenomenology is so focused on consciousness – and its constituting power –, it can’t make sense of “ancestral” statements – statements about the being of the universe before the conscious life came to be. OK, I never stumbled on this being a particular problem in my years of studying Husserl (it is a problem, sure, but so are many other things, see below), but I’m curious what M. has to offer. The things are not to a good start when M. thinks that this is somehow a gotcha question (p. 16):

“Now, why is this interpretation of ancestrality obviously insupportable? Well, to understand why, all we have to do is ask the correlationist [phenomenologist] the following question: what is it that happened 4.56 billion years ago? Did the accretion of the earth happen, yes or no?

In one sense, yes, the correlationist [phenomenologist] will reply, because the scientific statements pointing to such an event are objective, in other words, intersubjectively verifiable. But in another sense, no, she will go on, because the referent of such statements cannot have existed in the way in which it is naïvely described, i.e. as non-correlated with a consciousness.”

Eh, false. Phenomenologist will simply say “yes” to that question. The question is posed within what Husserlians call “natural attitude” – an attitude which considers the worldly being as existing – and any phenomenologist would therefore respond with the same attitude according to his best knowledge – yes, accretion of the earth is most probably what happened 4.56 billion years ago, so scientists teach us, and they know best. The question is actually not much different in this matter than “did you have a coffee in the morning?”

Then there is “philosophical” or phenomenological attitude. That’s that famous bracketing [Einklammerung] of natural attitude, or phenomenological/transcendental reduction, or epoché – as you wish. In this attitude, the thesis of the natural world is not posed – translated: no position with regarding to actual existence of the given is taken. Again, the question “what happened 4.56 billion years ago?” does not differ here from the question “did you have coffee in the morning?” If phenomenologist is in phenomenological attitude, she will remain mute – she will not answer such ontologically-loaded questions.

Phenomenologist has no particular motivation to doubt the scientific consensus about the accretion of earth, creation of universe, and so on. Meillassoux, nonetheless, falsely claims she does. And he then proceeds wantonly to accuse phenomenologists of terrible things: you see, the support all this sort of relativism. They undermine science. They don’t allow scientists to say that “what comes before comes before” (p. 123). According to them, Young Earthers are as valid as scientists. They undermine reason, re-legitimize all kinds of wacky religions and even religious fanaticism! Somehow, throughout the middle of the book, Meillassoux’s straw-phenomenologist turns into an agnostic.

In the end, M. is outright malevolent. He accuses Husserl of “eternalization of the transcendental ego, which supposedly survives the death of every empirical ego” (p. 122). Wow, I thought, how could I missed such wacky claim in those thousands of pages I’ve read?

M. refers to one of the late unpublished manuscripts (the only work of Husserl in the bibliography, btw) – one of those thousands pages of scribbled messy thoughts that every student of Husserl dreads:

“What sense could the collapsing masses in space, in one space constructed a priori as absolutely homogenous, have, if the constituting life were eliminated? Indeed, does that elimination itself have the sense, if it has any at all, of an elimination of and in the constituting subjectivity? The ego lives and precedes all actual and possible beings [, and anything existent whether in a real or irreal sense.]”

Admittedly, this may be kind of confusing – this being the personal note not intended for publication anyway. But Husserl doesn’t claim there what M. assigns to him. At all, Meillassoux’s reformulation amounts to imbecile claim. What is there is this: in Husserlian terminology, ego is sense-giving [Sinngebung], so without ego it is meaningless to speak of sense [Sinn]. Ego precedes beings insofar their sense is concerned. M. gets sure to cut out the part in brackets, though, to make Husserl appear more crazee.

But let’s get back. Phenomenologists allegedly cannot make sense of statements about events “prior to givenness in its entirety” (p. 21). Which means – before people. This allegation is based on complete misinterpretation of the term “givenness” in phenomenological philosophy. It’s actually a trivial mistake: what is analyzed as transcendental relationship is interpreted by Meillassoux as relationship partes extra partes, relationship between objects. So there is, I dunno, a rock, just like, laying there, quietly for thousands years, until some Homo sapiens came to be and transforms the rock by his mental power into “given”. “Givenness” is here considered a property of object. But it’s not.

Meillasoux tries to anticipate this objection – oh, you’re going to accuse me of mixing transcendental and empirical! – and his prepared retort is this (p. 25): any transcendental ego “remains indissociable from its incarnation in a body”. “That the transcendental subject has this or that body is an empirical matter, but that it has a body is a non-empirical condition of its taking place – the body, one could say, is the ‘retro-transcendental’ condition for the subject of knowledge.” Wow, I mean, man! Actually, you know, phenomenologists are aware of it, and call it not “retro-transcendental” condition, but… well… “transcendental” condition. Husserl quite famously distinguished between body-as-object [Körper] (let’s say body in empirical sense) and lived-body [Leib], in transcendental sense. He does so actually already in that very short manuscript Meillasoux decided to include in bibliography. And, you know, there’s this French guy called Merleau-Ponty who wrote a fucking book on the topic of incarnation of ego and it’s kind of famous.

Whatever. Let’s get back to those horrible things phenomenologists are allegedly guilty of – all the relativism, anti-science, agnosticism, and so on…. and to Meillasoux’s misunderstanding of the term “givenness” – more specifically, of the kind of problem it poses in phenomenology, because “givenness” is ultimately a problem there.

Let’s start with the fact that none of the sins Meillassoux assigns to phenomenology are true. Phenomenologist analyze the given without taking position on the existence of the given, but that doesn’t mean there’s no distinguishing. Let us quote Husserl’s quite famous principle of all principles, which one finds in Ideen I. but also e.g. on IEP:

“Every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there.”

OK, Husserl isn't the most thrilling writer – but what this means is that you try to describe the given as it is given. Meillassoux will make you think that faith in Holy Trinity is for phenomenologist the same as perception of a coffee mug or conviction about the age of Earth. That’s not true, simply because these experiences are not given in the same way. Phenomenologists constructing these experiences as identical would immediately infringe the most central principle of phenomenological investigations. Given is not construed.

But as I said, given and givenness are problems. E.g., when delving to analysis of time-consciousness, given crumbles to infinitesimal now-occurrences which are already passively synthesizing. Given is determined as always structured. Merleau-Ponty tries to analyze perception in greater detail and gets stuck with depth-perception. It’s almost impossible to actually describe what’s given. In years, Merleau-Ponty will experiment with separation [l’écart] of time and consciousness. In one word – important in context of Meillassoux’s book – what is stumbled upon here as a kind of limit of phenomenological investigation is “facticity” of the given – yes, its ultimate contigency. This is not due to our necessary “ignorance”, as M. alleges, it is really the nature of any given that it’s rooted in facticity.

The goal of all these laborous inquiries is not to undermine science, but to provide grounding for the science. And the fact that science provides actual knowledge is never really in doubt – in The Idea of Phenomenology Husserl stresses that we could not do critical philosophy if there were not some scientific knowledge ready-at-hand. It’s true that phenomenological solution involves a return to intersubjectivity – a scientific community – as ground for scientific knowledge, but this in no way interferes with the ways science is done. Phenomenology only tries to teach us that similar grounding can be found in ethics, aesthetics, politics, and so on. Its stance is actually completely opposite to agnosticism or relativism.

M. is, however, dismissive of this intersubjectivity-led explanation. Surely, scientist don’t need such backing – but they can live without Meillassoux’s backing, too. Anyway, what M. offers us after this hatched job, what glorious philosophical advance? It’s “speculative realism”, which is realism that’s not naïve, and which is speculation that’s not metaphysical. In it, he transfers the “facticity” from the given to the resurrected Kantian thing-in-itself. This “facticity” is unreason – the wholly-other of consciousness. Being unreasonable, unthinkable, this facticity is ominous, it’s hyper-Chaos (p. 64; I’m not shocked by this stuff after Merleau-Ponty’s hyperdialectics, la chair etc.). Two ontological statements can be made about this unreason (p. 67):

“1. A necessary entity is impossible;
2. The contingency of the entity is necessary.”

After some speculation, we can resurrect two Kant’s statements about thing-in-itself, although now on firm ontological ground:

“1. The thing-in-itself is non-contradictory;
2. There is a thing-in-itself.”

How does hyper-Chaotic contigency of the thing-in-itself help to boost scientific ancestral claims against phenomenologist hordes? Things get tricky now. Meillassoux goes on to say that he faces basically Hume’s problem of (lack of) causality. Here things get a bit muddy, but what I got from this was this: M. considers metaphysical realist, skeptical and Kantian-transcendental responses to Hume’s problem, proceeds to reject them all and as speculative realist maintains Hume’s problem as unsolvable – there’s actually no reason the things are the way they are. But (!) he is able to maintain this position only by help of mathematics! Namely with help of Cantor and his notion of “transfinite”. And if it's math that helps us finally understand the truth of necessity of hyper-Chaos, there’s no reason not to confine to mathematics and mathematics only (p. 108):

“the most powerful conception of the incalculable and unpredictable event is provided by a thinking that continues to be mathematical – rather than one which is artistic, poetic, or religious. It is by way of mathematics that we will finally succeed in thinking that which, through its power and beauty, vanquishes quantities and sounds the end of play.”

Mathematics are the way. And since science now proceeds by way of mathematics, it can ultimately make ancestral statements that are objective statements about distant past (p. 114-5):

“Once again, the fundamental point at issue is not the fact that science is spontaneously realist, since the same could be said of every discourse, but rather the fact that science deploys a process whereby we are able to know what may be while we are not, and that this process is linked to what sets science apart: the mathematization of nature.”

It’s difficult to follow this last line of argument. Alas, the last pages are only filled with kind of rant against modern “correlationist” philosophy. You see, as Galileo came with mathematization of physics, and Copernicus decentered the man with his heliocentric model, philosophy underwent its Ptolemian counter-revolution (which Kant ironically called “Copernican revolution”), abandoned pre-critical metaphysics and put the man into the center – thus undermining sciences on every step, increasing jealously their counter-revolutionary verve with every scientific progress.

So, what do we get in return for this thorough misrepresentation of phenomenology and the amount of strawmanship? We get “facticity” taken from phenomenological inquiries, hypostatized as Kantian thing-in-itself, redefined as hyper-Chaos – but stripped of links to rich phenomenological tradition because we are now on ground zero, in new philosophical school, supposedly. Then, by some kind of homologous poetic device, mathematics become a skeleton key to this hyper-Chaos. And thus mathematical physics – which were always doing quite well – are saved. And straw-phenomenologists with their anti-science, relativism and agnosticism are demolished.

Sounds familiar? In the end it’s actually every fucking naturalist, reductionist and whatever shouting “Science works, and it gives us stuff, while you talk gibberish!” And sure, when you point to problems of politics, ethics, aesthetics you’re always referred to infinite scientific to-do list which may be completed sometimes, or not, but no one can do it other but Science™. Been there, done that, fuck that. Meillassoux is not naturalist – actually, to a naturalist he would sound like the very same “gibberish” he criticizes. That’s kind of brave move, sure. But it doesn’t make the book good.

Check out Dan Zahavi’s dissection of SR.

[Jonfaith · Rating 3 out of 5]

There is no longer a mystery, not because there is no longer a problem, but because there is no longer a reason.

This was a struggle, a text deserving a week of holiday rather than the first days of the month at work. After Finitude required extensive rereading in order to convince this addled wastrel. Kant's Transcendental Idealism is limited to what the author deigns correlationism: the relationship between subject and object and as such doesn't allow matters outside this dynamic, all the while announcing the end of Absolutes and other metaphysical suppositions.

Meillassoux announces that mathematics as an underpinning of science i.e. repeatability is the longed for triumph, a lodestar on the quest for a speculative realism. There's a certain darkness in this explanation. I did appreciate despite my being an idiot that this text wasn't a polemic but rather an effort at a secular however abysmal illumination. That's me, still searching for a metanarrative.

[Maddy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reading Meillassoux is like watching someone skin a hare.

[Ronald Morton · Rating 4 out of 5]

Every once in a while it's nice to let a philosophy book kick the shit out of me. This was quite good, but sadly fragmentary (by the author's own admission). I guess I need to figure out if he's written more on this, because what he's proposing here is pretty damn great and sits at the intersection if philosophy and science (though it leans heavily towards philosophy).

I probably also need to read a lot more philosophy so I don't struggle so much with the more modern stuff. I always feel like I'm missing some critical links - because I am - and the same holds true here. The author does a pretty good job of providing clarifying information for a lot of this, but some of the basics of phenomenology escape me, and Meillassoux isn't slowing this thing down for me to catch up. (Gotta love the Internet or filling in gaps though)

[Goatboy]

I tried and tried and tried to continue enjoying this book but in the end I just couldn't. At some point his argumentation between himself and the perceived voices of his antagonists just felt like too much circling round and round a point I lost interest in. If you have to argue this meticulously around and about something it is probably a topic that you will never convince someone of unless they already agree with you. It felt like someone taking hours to try to prove to me the existence of god or something similar. I can see others maybe really getting into something like this, but it's not for me. Oh well...

[Alex Lee · Rating 5 out of 5]

2021 Review
Meillassoux's criticism of correlationism is astounding. While he does not offer a concrete solution about how to discover facticity (the truth in our experience, only so much hinting that mathematics and science is perhaps one way) his real charge is on what we think is out there and what is meaning. I do think the book could be written better if it was not so deep in the philosophical tradition, but someone had to say it.

Combine this book with Barad's agential realism, in particular their idea of the agential cut and we have the beginnings of a revitalization for natural philosophy.

What makes Kant so problematic is that in his attempt to meld empiricism and rationalism, he puts rationalism in a position that allows for it to rule without empiricism. This is beyond Kant's ideal of understanding, which is a balance between the two. Kant warns that rationalism alone, can lead to metaphysics. Meillassoux does not seem to acknowledge that Kant is somewhat aware of the problems of his philosophical structure instead seeming to want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. What we need is in a similar direction as Lakatos noted in his exploration of the analysis-synthesis method, whereby analogous imitation of the synthesis method (prizing Euclid) bringing in the appropriate cuts (rather than assuming that corollary mechanisms can do the trick). That is however, beyond Meillassoux's exploration, and so I will leave this at that.

Still, 5 stars. On a second reading this book still holds up.
---
2014 Review
I haven't read any clearer reading of the philosophical tradition in a while, and that's saying quite a bit. While Meillassoux is mostly interested in the philosophical tradition, and its constraints (extending it somewhat to religion and science) he is able to dance within that tight framework and come up with a clear summation of the larger picture.

Many thinkers tend to fight in the nitty-gritty, and that's most likely because in the process of spending so much time learning what the "greats" have said, they become invested themselves. And because academia encourages people to disagree with one another. How else could they jockey for position?

I agree with most of the comments around; that Meillassoux has managed to say something different. And how he says is intensely fascinating. He sums up the aesthetic goals of so many familiar names: Kant, Hegel, Descartes, Leibniz in so many terms. He brings us around to Badiou and demonstrates in slightly different terms, Badiou's genius and how that enables us to begin to formulate a new beginning, one that does not rely on Being or totalization in order to guarantee meaning. He leaves us then with a new project, one in which to find a new totem to anchor as the absolute reference, one that isn't Kant's old hat.

While I find his book and direction exhilarating, and agree with his reading (especially how he puts many terms) I do believe that there are other ways to put the pieces.

Here is another conception of philosophy: Philosophy isn't so much about truth as it is about managing complexity. Much of the time you do need to have some way of organizing discourse so as to be able to relate to one another. This much is certainly how people interact with one another or how discourses are able to connect. Meillassoux ultimately wants us to find an anchor as to how to arrange understanding... the anchor he finds for us is to match whatever mathematics does, which in itself is very intriguing. I suppose math is a safer bet for legitimacy than any of the traditional absolutes to which philosophy has in the past adhered. The last pages of his book is basically an outline of a non-metaphysical but speculative absolute based off facticity should look like. I'd like to find out how this kind of speculation works too. But I think Meillassoux goes a little too far in his search for Truth and tosses some of the baby out with the bathwater because in a way, he takes too much for granted even though in another way, he takes nothing for granted.

I don't believe that consciousness or causation or non-contradiction are necessary even if I find that the connection of the parts is what is most interesting as to what meaning is. In a way, perhaps that still makes me a correlationist in Meillassoux's book... because I don't adhere to the absoluteness as being external to our experience...that Meillassoux so wishes to determine. Yet if any axiometric is available -- as Meillassoux admits -- then why facticity? Why science? Certainly not the form of science! Science will not permit the asking of questions it cannot answer, because that is bad science. So he must be talking about the content science produces and in what way this kind of dia-chronicity should be found to be meaningful or not...perhaps as meaningfulness can be modifications of how we understand ourselves today, rather than as positions to be justified by where we are now, that reversal of a reversal he calls the counter-revolution of Ptolemy's revenge. It sounds good to speak by naming "where we are" in this way, but then again, I am not so sure we even yet know where we are now. In this way then, I think I don't really even show up on his radar because he takes the productivity of meaning in its mechanics to be beyond question, at least in this inquiry.

Meillassoux also didn't talk about certain other positions contemporary philosophers have taken either. I'd be interested in hearing him on that regard.

All the same this is a highly charged book. It requires a familiarity with the tradition, and a willingness to consider thoughts from another angle, a difficulty many of us have if we are not able to distill this vast amount of information into its more fundamental terms.

[Rhys · Rating 4 out of 5]

A well written exegesis and critique of correlationism. The main motivation for this book, that I had to try to keep in mind while reading it, was the author's effort to curb the new relativism of fanaticism:

"But it is clear to what extent the fundamental decisions that underlie metaphysics invariably reappear, albeit in a caricatural form, in ideologies (what is must be), and to what extent the fundamental decisions that underlie obscurantist belief may find support in the decisions of strong correlationism (it may be that the wholly-other is). Contemporary fanaticism cannot therefore simply be attributed to the resurgence of an archaism that is violently opposed to the achievements of Western critical reason; on the contrary, it is the effect of critical rationality, and this precisely insofar as – this needs to be underlined – this rationality was effectively emancipatory; was effectively, and thankfully, successful in destroying dogmatism. It is thanks to the critical power of correlationism that dogmatism was effectively vanquished in philosophy, and it is because of correlationism that philosophy finds itself incapable of fundamentally distinguishing itself from fanaticism. The victorious critique of ideologies has been transformed into a renewed argument for blind faith." (p.49)

[宗儒 李 · Rating 1 out of 5]

Don't waste your time on this book. Meillassoux claims victory over correlationism, yet the correlationists he discusses do not exist outside of his imaginations. Also it is quite intriguing to see him quote, praise and blindly follow his doctoral advisor's philosophical methods. There are a lot of interesting fields in mathematics that offer alternatives as a foundation of mathematics to set theory, like homotopy type theory and category theory, the former being a field currently under active research. The fact that these philosophers chose to use a theory that is older than 100 years, offered no reinforcement or rectification to it and just treat it as a given starting point for their philosophical research completely baffles me.

[Kate Dots · Rating 5 out of 5]

100% upd:

якщо найвища необхідність кореляційного кола - не те, чим здається, а Лора Палмер - Галілео-коперніканська революція, то вбив її ніхто інший, як Кант, пробудившись від догматизму і озброївшись корреляціонізмом. Все це, говорить Меясу, по суті парадокс (коли наука почала нарешті пояснювати світ, що існує поза людським сприйняттям - філософи зробили таке пояснення безпідставовим), що став джерелом містики й загадок.

цей есей нагадав мені, за що можна любити філософію й зачитуватися нею без значної шкоди для самооцінки, бо Меясу не скупиться на пояснення ледве не усіх ланок у логічному ланцюжку, який вибудовує, й навіть загальновідомих філософських термінів, що значно зекономило час відволікання від книги.

усе ще вважаю зацитований (раніше і нижче) уривок прекрасним. Схоже враження було від міркування про “всесвіт-кості”, що ототожнюється зі “Всесвітом усіх всесвітів, який загалом підкоряється тільки принципу несуперечності, і кожна грань якого є певним всесвітом, керованим визначеною множиною фізичних законів”. Я таки люблю розмашисті метафори, за якими стоїть не лише художня вигадка, а найвищий рівень абстракції.

це не та книга, де буде відповідь на всі питання життя, Всесвіту і взагалі, бо, по-перше, цьому суперечить принцип безпідставовості/контингентності, який Меясу бере за основу, по-друге, навіщо, а по-третє, у Меясу є амбіція цікавіша - поставити спочатку достатньо точне питання про ті абстракції (спекулятивного реалізму), які валідуватимуть те, що людина (і наука, в тісній співпраці з математикою) може пізнавати те, що було до її, людини, появи, і може бути після зникнення (і ширше - будь-що). Тож красиву метафору моделі сильного Хаосу (зацитований раніше і нижче уривок) він наводить для того, щоб показати, що на її основі нам не варто було б сподіватися на закони природи з усіма можливими незатишностями, які з цього [щось довільно і непередбачувано роблять]. Натомість Меясу хоче обґрунтувати слабку модель Хаосу (”Хаос може все, крім немислимого”). Але я не спойлеритиму, що таке “немислиме” = ].

референси на Твін Пікс прокралися через вігвамну шпарину в моїй підсвідомості після перегляду злегка моторошних рілсів про дарквеб, подарункову коробку з квестом, замовлену через дарквеб (в комплекті художній сценарій для його проходження і, звісно, дивні предмети. А ви би пройшли такий?) та робота, замовленого на дарквебному сайті, з вбудованим AI та промовистою назвою The Beast. І хто я така, щоб не згадати про це у першому ліпшому відгуку на книгу, якою б вона не була.


52% upd:

отже, невимушено додам до читацької історії один з найкрасивіших пасажів, бачених мною в літературі за довгий час. не в останню чергу завдяки стилістичному та емоційному ефекту несподіванки. і далеко не в останню завдяки розлогому і доволі переконливому обґрунтуванню, що йому передує.

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Якщо поглянемо крізь шпарину, що таким чином відкрилася до абсолюту, то побачимо там доволі загрозливу силу -- щось нечутливе, здатне нищити як речі, так і світи; здатне породжувати монстрів алогічності; здатне так само ніколи не переходити до дії; здатне напевне породжувати як будь-які приємні видіння, так і будь-які кошмари; здатне на шалені, безладні зміни або, навпаки, породжуати знерухомлений, аж до найменших закутків, усесвіт.
Немов хмара, що приносить жорстокі бурі й лагідні прояснення, даруючи на певний час тривожний спокій. Всемогутність, рівна всемогуттю картезіанського Бога, який здатний на все, навіть на незбагненне. Але Всемогутність ненормована, сліпа, яка порвала з іншими божественними досконалостями і стала автономною. Могуття без добра та мудрості, не здатне гарантувати мисленню істинність чітких ідей. Щось на кшталт Часу, але Часу, немислимого ні для фізики - бо здатний без причини або підстави знищити будь-який фізичний закон, — ні для метафізики — бо здатний знищити будь-яке визначене суще, як-от деякого бога чи єдиного Бога. Не час у розумінні Геракліта, бо це не вічний закон становлення, а вічне можливе становлення, причому без закону, без усякого закону. Це Час, здатний знищити навіть саме становлення, породивши —можливо, на віки вічні — Фіксоване, Статичне, Мертве.

(для дивних of my favourite kind людей, що дочитали сюди і чомусь засмутилися - різні ступені інверсій теж можливі, крім тих, що допускають який-небудь абсолют, крім контингентності)

для тих, хто хоче підтримати видавництво, що видало в перекладі (але не додало на ґудрідз) цю й планує видати інші варті уваги книги - https://kontur.space

[Charles · Rating 2 out of 5]

I had learned about, or rather wandered upon, speculative realism a while ago, but I recently returned to it after a debate I had with two friends, in which, as a proponent of phenomenology, I was forced to conclude, controversially, that humans and the world are co-dependent in order for life to meaningful. Speculative realism arose as a movement precisely to combat the anthropocentrism, idealism, anti-realism, and perceived "solipsism"—which is a straw man—of phenomenology, or what Meillassoux here calls correlationism.

After Finitude is essentially the rallying cry for speculative realism, and in it Meillassoux wants to argue that science and mathematics are capable of describing the world as it is, independent of humans. He does so by appealing to "ancestrality," or the fact that fossils, for example, clearly point to a pre-human or pre-representational world.

What I respect most about the book is Meillassoux's ability to steel man his opponents in order to create his arguments. He always gives the strongest and most thorough counterarguments to his own position so that he can clarify his views or else challenge his opponents'. However, my appreciation ends there, for after reading this book, I remain a phenomenologist/correlationist. Of course, I am biased because I came into reading this already in support thereof.

Ultimately, throughout my reading, I felt as if the whole thing were a work of desperation, because even though I found many of his arguments convincing (purely logically), I did not find them persuasive. Meillassoux wants to vindicate scientific realism, yet he goes about it in the most outlandish and counterintuitive way, and you have to ask: at what cost?

Despite being a staunch atheist and scientific materialist, he posits something called "hyper-chaos," which he describes as "omnipotent" and "fickle" and which, of its own accord, can choose blindly to generate and destroy all things—in short, in hypostasizing "absolute contingency," it feels like he ends up doing exactly what he accuses believers of doing with God and phenomenologists with correlations. Additionally, he says that an essential building block of his philosophical system is the contingency of physical laws, which I find rather funny: in order to prove that science tells us how the world really is, we must accept that scientific laws, like the universal law of gravitation, are not only (1) unnecessary but (2) endangered—by hyper-chaos. In this sense, scientific realism seems to become scientific irrealism: what science describes are ways in which the world "might" and "currently be" but not how it is "in itself"; after all, according to Meillassoux, the world—nature, the Universe—is literally pure chaos. He seems to undermine science's authority and validity rather than the reverse. In my opinion, he also never really escapes the correlationist circle, which, I'll admit, is technically a cheap argument, perhaps a sophism, amounting to the chicken-egg problem: Humans perceive the world, but only if the world is perceivable, but only if humans perceive it as perceivable, but only if... etc., etc. I guess the other two questions that bother me are: (1) Why do correlationism and anthropocentrism annoy him so much? Sure, they might go against science, and at one point he alleges that post-Kantian philosophy fuels religious extremist violence—which I think is quite a stretch—but in themselves, why must they be eradicated as he so forcefully argues? (2) What does he achieve? And why should we care? Suppose science tells us what life will be like after we go extinct—what do we do with this? How does this help or inform us in any way whatsoever? It's pure, pointless information. Sure, science is thereby legitimated, but Meillassoux is so, so, so preoccupied with showing what the world is like independent of humans—but where does that leave us? What do we gain thereby? What do we do with this information? Ok, cool, the Earth preceded us by billions of years... now what? A world independent of humans, ironically, only matters to those very humans from which it is supposedly independent! My two final contentions, then, are as follows: (1) If Meillassoux wants to believe in his scientific realism, then he can do so at the cost of absolute nihilism, as I see it. He wants to remove all meaning, value, and significance whatsoever and nullify the importance of life as such (2) His main goal, of describing the world as it really is, is never even accomplished here. Granted, he might have succeeded in giving a philosophical justification for science, but even with this, he leaves us with little-to-no determinate information: All we are left with is that the world is (1) inherently mathematical—what does this, then, tell us? What do we do with this? (2) literal "hyper-chaos," which seems to contradict any and every claim to "absolute truth," which is what Meillassoux is after.

[Filip Wijnings · Rating 5 out of 5]

Altijd te vinden voor een Franse filosoof die terug naar Descartes wil

[Pedro · Rating 4 out of 5]

li o primeiro capitulo

[Palmattron · Rating 5 out of 5]

Realmente es de agradecer que la sociedad genere el tiempo y los recursos para que alguien escriba movidas TAN pasadas de rosca.

[Marcelo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bueno errr... ¿Es "solo" un esbozo? ¿De algo que si le sale bien podría ser un bombazo de proporciones inusitadas en la historia de la filosofía? Es un libro divertido de cojones, pero ¿da la impresión de que sus demostraciones no son tan sólidas como la extrema confianza de Quentin hace parecer? Es decir, una vez demostrado el principio de irrazón (genial, maravilloso, 10/10, preciosa y muy verdadera cabriola hasta ese momento) se comporta como si las normas lógicas se aplicaran al en-si para, acto seguido, "demostrar" que el principio de no-contradicción se aplica en el en-sí. Hay alguna cosa así que tiene que pulir, porque a partir de ese punto el libro no me lo tomé en serio (después de ese descuido, no demuestra nada porque todo se apoya en algo no demostrado).

[Shulamith Farhi · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first two chapters of this are fantastic, but after he introduces the principle of non-contradiction by fiat, the book takes a sharp turn downhill. Meillassoux's orientation towards chaos is symptomatic of what's wrong with the text.

[Mark Broadhead · Rating 2 out of 5]

What jibber jabbery. He takes everything back to an argument against Kant as if post-structuralism, etc, hadn't already questioned idealism.

[Hind · Rating 4 out of 5]

So interesting. But so incomprehensible. It messes with the brain just a tad bit. Make sure you know your philosophy before you attempt this.

[KeyForLocked · Rating 5 out of 5]

Mortal body, Shoulder the infinity！

[Eduarda · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mto oq pensar…

[Walker · Rating 5 out of 5]

After completing my BA in Philosophy in 2005, I floundered in menial jobs and let my reading mind wander more into literature, comic books and music theory/technology, all things I had not had time to encounter much of during intense philosophical study. As time went on and I continued this philosophical detox, I occasionally lapsed back in but felt a slight lack of the wonderment I once had when studying philosophy. In short, it seemed like philosophy was stuck in two paths (and at the time, the analytic-continental split was probably seen as more or less unbridgeable). The first path being the limited-scope logic/science/math argument papers of analytic philosophy, where relative certainty was seen to be achievable but the big questions that brought me to philosophy were mostly unexplored, and the second path being the more worldly land of continental philosophy, where knowledge is always conditional, certainty is a fabrication at best, and theory consists mostly of jamming on various effects of these conditions. I continued to find the continental side much more interesting and relevant, but also found that almost every reading I made led me to some variation on the open-ended conclusion that it was in fact art, not philosophy, that should be the way forward, at least for me.

Meillasoux’s book is the biggest attempt I have yet encountered to bridge this divide. It speaks to me for several reasons. One of the biggest is that while it spends much of its time grappling with Kant, it also reads very similarly to Kant himself in the way it lays out the problems it is attempting to solve without holding them up as examples of “wrong” thinking that must be smashed. In particular, the sewing up of so much of post-Kantian philosophy under the banner of “correlationism”, the sympathy toward the plight of the philosopher when confronted with these problems, and the rigorous step-by-step journey down the path of attempting to find a way around it.

This journey leads into direct confrontations with chaos, unreason, “contingency” and related notions that had me staring into the abyss more directly than I have since I first started studying philosophy and ingesting psychedelic drugs as a teenager. It was a wild ride full of cliffhangers, and I look forward to a re-read now I have reached the end.

Meillasoux clearly positions this text as if it is to be a major disruption of all that came before, a reboot of everything post-Kant. This is ambitious and probably ultimately misguided, and I love it. For the person like me who is interested and conversant in philosophy, but not steeped in academia, it is good to know that people out there are attempting to be the next in the line of giants whose shoulders we are all standing on, and to grapple with the big questions not only in terms of the many piles of text out there, but directly at the questions' roots.

My only real complaint about this book is that the end comes quite abruptly and I am left wanting to know where to go from here. The speculative realist “school” is said to have “died off” by now, but my understanding is that this text and others have led to a resurgence of attempted metaphysics and ontology in Continental philosophy, and although I am not 100% convinced of Meillasoux’s path into that realm, I nonetheless find it liberating and exciting, and look forward to exploring further.

A note regarding difficulty/accessibility of this text: It had been a long time (probably close to ten years) since I read any primary text in philosophy that I had not previously encountered. Luckily, I had brushed up on Kant several times in the past decade, and that knowledge was enough to get me through this work with only a few sections seeming excessively difficult. I’d say anyone with a passing familiarity with Hume and a slightly more-than-passing familiarity with Kant should be able to get through this with as much excitement as I did.

[Sebastián Báquiro Guerrero · Rating 5 out of 5]

La escritura de Meillassoux es increíblemente accesible, lo cual hace que la lectura de Después de la finitud sea entretenida. En este ensayo, el filósofo francés presenta el problema del acceso al absoluto de manera contrapuesta a la tradición kantiana, con la excusa de la ancestralidad que, por supuesto, puede representar problemas cuando se le opone a la fenomenología de Husserl. Más allá de esto, la idea de correlación y su ruptura de la imposibilidad de conocer el en-sí es útil, pues busca desligar el pensamiento metafísico, el cual dirige a la mera superstición sobre conocimiento de lo que el ente-en-sí es. Esto, sin duda alguna, resulta sumamente útil contra el relativismo que surge cuando la verdad se deja del lado de la piedad, de la religión. El pensamiento supersticioso yace en la búsqueda de la razón, en el principio de razón. Meillassoux, con la factualidad, la irrazón (que no es la sinrazón), busca darle lugar a "por nada" como respuesta a las preguntas metafísicas, lo cual lleva a la reevaluación de ese "por nada" como respuesta efectiva, como poder ser otro, hacia la contingencia como cuestión efectiva y positiva, además de necesaria. Un muy buen ensayo que, si bien escrito hace unos años, es vigente, sobre todo en épocas de posverdad, de conspiracionismo, de imposibilidad aparente de relacionarnos con el mundo en el que vivimos.

[Eric Phetteplace · Rating 4 out of 5]

An essential work for understanding where contemporary philosophy is--or could be--heading. Meillassoux's style of argumentation is unique and refreshing: far from pitting texts against one another as if trying to win the prize for most citations per page, he pits theorems against one another and thoroughly investigates their underlying presumptions. It's clear that concepts are what's at stake and not personae. He anticipates counterarguments and, what's more, explicitly uses them as opportunities to better explicate his contentions rather than merely bash on fools for not being rigorous enough.
If anything the book is a little too mathematical and jargon-filled in its execution: there are a few definitions and technical terms which could've been left out, and the sections which rely on mathematics are not particularly lucid. As a math major, I thought I would enjoy such reasoning, but I actually find someone like Deleuze's use of math more interesting than M and Badiou's applications of set theory to philosophy. Actually, the whole style isn't to my liking (only the section on Fideism in Chapter 2 was really enjoyable) but After Finitude is well-written and important nonetheless.

[R Montague · Rating 5 out of 5]

Meillassoux’s amazing nut-kick aimed square at the last two centuries of Continental Philosophy. Mr. Q intends to loosen the stranglehold of what he terms “correlationism”: the position that world and idea cannot be conceived of independently from the other, and can only be understood in correlation to the other. This pernicious belief forces the advocate of correlationism to commit to the unthinkability of an objective world outside or separate from the existence of subjects -- The world is held as inconceivable if not a World-for-us. To this end, Q-Man deploys some fancy logical judo wherein cosmic background radiation and the Maths proves that Principle of Sufficient Reason is bad and don’t real, and the only Necessary is noncontradictory Contingency... All of which means Ia! Ia! Azathoth! The omnipotent idiot Sultan, gyres and gnaws at the heart of reality!

So yeah, it’s pretty awesome and you should totally read it. 10/10 would eat at again.

[J. Moufawad-Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Read this over a year ago but forgot to add here… Reminded because of other things I read.

In any case, looking back on this read (and in the context of Thacker's first volume of Horror of Philosophy), although I'm not sure if I fully agree with its arguments (or completely remember them) I still think they deserve five stars because of the rigour and precision that Meillassoux brings to his chosen theoretical terrain. If only philosophy produced in the continent, particularly France, provided the same rigour, clarity, and precision. With Meilloussoux we finally are given a thinker who can, regardless of what you think of his project, bridge the gap between analytics and continentals. He speaks with the clarity of the former but with the significance of the latter.

[Michael A. · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fantastic little book to think with and against. The main question this book raises for me is: is correlationism actually a position held by philosophers or is it a strawman? The philosophers he associates with correlationism are Kant, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. I've certainly seen critiques (some on this website!) that his history isn't up to snuff and correlationism isn't really a position held. But still, this book was interesting to think with and a fun read.

[Hagar · Rating 3 out of 5]

Treatise for a 'return to nature' in philosophy. But in a far more literal (empirical, contingent, "absolute outside") sense. I mostly disagreed with his argument. However, this is one of those books that helped sharpen my own position and understanding, so I'm glad I read it.

[Clare · Rating 2 out of 5]

My full review is at http://inputs.wordpress.com/2010/12/05/after-finitude-2008/

[Nalanda · Rating 3 out of 5]

กลับมาทบทวนถึงหนังสือที่เคยอ่าน
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เคยอ่านเล่มนี้เมื่อปี 2017 สิ่งที่พอจำได้จากหนังสือเล่มนี้ คือจำได้ว่าบทแรกมันมีประเด็นปรัชญาเรื่องการรับรู้ของมนุษย์ที่น่าคิดตาม เป็นปัญหาที่เรียบง่ายสิ้นดีทีเดียว เป็นปัญหาอันนั้นเอง ที่คนเขียนเรียกมันว่า 'Correlationism' (แนวคิดแบบสหสัมพันธ์)
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แนวคิดแบบสหสัมพันธ์ก็คือ เวลาเราคิดบางสิ่ง เวลาเราศึกษาบางเรื่อง มันมีเราเป็นผู้กำลังคิดสิ่งนั้นเสมอ เราไม่สามารถแยกตัวเราจากสิ่งที่เรากำลังคิด เราไม่สามารถแยกตัวเรา--ในฐานะผู้ศึกษา--ออกจากสิ่งที่เรากำลังศึกษาได้
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กล่าวคือ วัตถุที่กล่าวถึง คิดถึง ต้องมีคนกล่าวถึง หรือคนที่คิดถึงสิ่งนั้นอยู่เสมอ พูดเชิงเทคนิคคือ เป็นความสัมพันธ์ระหว่าง thinking กับ being (สิ่งต่างๆ) นี่เอง ที่เป็นเงื่อนไขพื้นฐานของการรับรู้และการได้มาซึ่งความรู้ของเรา
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เราไม่สามารถคิดถึงโลกโดยปราศจากมนุษย์ หรือคิดถึงมนุษย์โดยปราศจากโลกได้ (human–world correlate)
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พอถึงตรงนี้ ก็ต้องลงรายละเอียดเกี่ยวกับทฤษฎีความรู้ชุดหนึ่ง ที่ในศตวรรษที่ 17 มีนักคิดคนหนึ่งชื่อ จอห์น ล็อก ได้อธิบายเอาไว้
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ว่าเวลาเราคิดถึงวัตถุภายนอกตัวเรา เราต้องแยกแยะให้ชัด ว่าเรากำลังพูดถึงคุณสมบัติของวัตถุภายนอกที่เป็น 'คุณสมบัติขั้นปฐมภูมิ' (primary qualities) ซึ่งเป็นขนาด รูปร่าง การเคลื่อนที่
.
เป็นสิ่งที่มันเป็นอย่างนั้น
.
หรือเรากำลังพูดถึงวัตถุภายนอก ในฐานะที่เป็นคุณสมบัติขั้นทุติยภูมิ (secondary qualities) เช่น สี กลิ่น รส ที่เรามีและได้รับจากวัตถุที่กล่าวถึง
.
ซึ่งเป็นคุณสมบัติขั้นรองของวัตถุอันนั้น
.
อย่างเช่น เวลาเราเอานิ้วใกล้เปลวเทียน เราจะมีความรู้สึกถูกเผาที่มาจากนิ้วของเรา ไม่ใช่มาจากเทียน ความเจ็บและร้อนไม่ได้มาจากเทียน แต่มันเป็นคุณสมบัติขั้นทุติยภูมิ (secondary qualities) ที่เรามีต่อวัตถุภายนอกอันนั้น
.
เช่นกัน ความงามของเสียงเพลง ความงามของรูปวาด เกิดจากเราไปมีความสัมพันธ์กับวัตถุดังกล่าว ไม่ได้มีอยู่ของมันเอง
.
ถ้าไม่มีเราหรือสิ่งมีชีวิตเข้าไปเกี่ยวข้องเลย สิ่งเหล่านี้จะไม่มีอยู่ เหมือนกับคำถามว่า ต้นไม้ล้มในป่าลึกจะมีเสียงล้มลงหรือไม่ ถ้าไม่มีใครเป็นพยานต่อเหตุการณ์นั้นเลย แล้วใครที่ในที่นี้ ก็คือมูลเหตุของคุณสมบัติขั้นทุติยภูมิ (secondary qualities) อันนั้นนั่นเอง
.
เวลาที่เราคิดถึงวัตถุที่ไม่ได้สัมพันธ์กับตัวเรา คุณสมบัติขั้นทุติยภูมิ (secondary qualities) จะไม่มีอยู่ เหมือนที่เราเอานิ้วออกห่างจากเปลวเทียน ความร้อนก็หายไป คุณสมบัติขั้นทุติยภูมิอันนี้ คือความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างเรากับโลก มันไม่ได้อยู่ในตัวเรา ไม่ได้อยู่ในวัตถุ หากแต่เป็นความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างเรากับสิ่งๆ นั้น
.
ปัญหาของแนวคิดแบบสหสัมพันธ์ก็คือ มันเกิดการให้เหตุผลแบบวนเวียนเป็นสมการว่า: there can be no X without a givenness of X, and no theory about X without a positing of X.
.
เวลาพูดถึงบางสิ่ง มันต้องมีเราที่เป็นคนพูด/คิด ไม่อย่างนั้น เราก็ไม่ได้กำลังพูด/คิดถึงสิ่งนั้น เราไม่สามารถพูดถึง primary qualities โดยที่ไม่มีเรากำลังพูดถึง primary qualities
.
แต่ถ้าเราปฏิเสธวิธีคิดแบบนั้น เราก็กำลังคิดหรือพูดในเชิงปฏิเสธแนวคิดแบบนั้นอยู่ ซึ่ง...ก็วนเข้ามาตามเหตุผลของแนวคิดแบบสหสัมพันธ์นี้อยู่ดี
.
เป็นอะไรที่เถียงยากมากๆ แต่นี่แหละที่ทำให้หนังสือเล่มนี้สนุก เพราะมันกำลังเถียงกับวิธีคิดแบบนี้
.
1.1
.
แนวคิดแบบสหสัมพันธ์มีอยู่ 2 แบบใหญ่ๆ ก็คือ
.
แบบแรกจะคิดว่า มันมีรูปแบบสากลทั่วไปของสิ่งๆ นั้น ที่ทุกคนสามารถเข้าถึงได้
.
(อย่างคานท์บอกว่า เราไม่สามารถรู้ thing in itself ได้ แต่เรา 'คิด' ถึงมันได้โดยผ่าน 12 categories ซึ่งเป็นลักษณะความรู้แบบก่อนประสบการณ์ เช่น เราไม่สามารถรับรู้ความเป็นทั้งหมดของวัตถุนั้นในทุกมิติได้ แต่เราสามารถรู้ได้ว่าวัตถุนั้นอยู่ในพื้นที่และเวลา มีขนาด มีปริมาณของมันอยู่ ซึ่งก็เป็น subjective sensibility and not properties of the in itself อยู่ดี คือไม่รู้ว่ามันคืออะไรทั้งหมด แต่รู้ว่าอะไรที่ไม่ใช่)
.
อย่างสองคือปฎิเสธเลยว่ารูปแบบสากลทั่วไปในแบบแรกที่ว่ามานั้นไม่มีอยู่จริง ไม่สามารถคิดถึงมันได้ เราไม่สามารถรู้มันจริงๆ ได้ เพราะถ้าเรารู้เราต้องรู้ผ่านภาษา วัฒนธรรม สิ่งที่รายรอบเป็นอิทธิต่อการรู้ของเรา
.
แต่ไม่ว่าอย่างไร ทั้งสองแนวคิดล้วนปฏิเสธ absolute knowledge ในที่น���้หมายถึง knowledge ของสิ่งๆ นั้น ที่ไม่ได้ขึ้นอยู่กับเราว่าเป็นคนเข้าถึง ว่ามันมีลักษณะอย่างนี้นะ มีสารัตถะอย่างนั้นนะ คือมีอยู่ของมันเอง แม้ว่าเราจะถูกตัดหัวรับรู้อะไรไม่ได้อีกแล้ว มันก็ยังมีอยู่อย่างนั้นของมัน อิสระจากเรา
แต่ถ้าไล่ตรรกะแบบแนวคิดสหสัมพันธ์แล้ว ก็ไม่เป็นไปไม่ได้ไง เพราะถ้าเราพูดถึง absolute knowledge มันก็มีเรานี่แหละกำลังพูดถึง absolute knowledge อยู่ดี มันก็เลยไม่เป็น absolute knowledge
.
ดังนั้น absolute knowledge เลยไม่มีอยู่จริง เป็นไปไม่ได้เลยที่จะคิดถึงมันหรือพูดถึงมันด้วยซ้ำ
.
เราไม่มีทางรู้ thing in itself เพราะเราไม่สามารถแยกคุณสมบัติที่เป็นของ object และคุณสมบัติที่เป็นของ subjective (อันเป็นตัวเข้าถึง object) อย่างขาดออกจากกันได้นั่นเอง
.
.
2
.
แต่คนเขียนเล่มนี้เสนอ ว่าเราสามารถเข้าถึงความเป็นจริง as it is in itself โดยไม่ต้องขึ้นกับอัตวิสัยได้ เสนอว่า reality ที่แยกขาดจาก subject หรือตัวเราเนี่ย เราสามารถคิดถึง reality ที่แยกขาดจากเราแบบนั้นได้นะ
.
ซึ่งคนเขียนเรียกวิธีนั้นว่า speculative (คาดคะเน)
.
ปัญหาของแนวคิดแบบสหสัมพันธ์ก็คือ แนวคิดนี้จะตอบอย่างไรกับเรื่องฟอสซิลที่อายุ 100 ล้านปี อยู่มาก่อนหน้าประวัติศาสตร์ชีวิตมนุษย์ หรือข้อเสนอทางวิทยาศาสตร์ที่ว่า โลกมีอายุมาแล้วล้านล้านปี จักรวาลอยู่มาแล้ว 14 ล้านล้านปี อยู่มาก่อนอัตวิสัยใดๆ จะเกิดขึ้น
.
แนวคิดสหสัมพันธ์จะยืนยันสิ่งที่เกิดขึ้นมาแล้ว โดยที่ไม่มีพยานหรือมีใครอยู่ตรงนั้นในเวลานั้นอย่างไร
.
เงื่อนไขของ ancestral statements อย่างนี้เป็นไปได้อย่างไรสำหรับแนวคิดสหสัมพันธ์?
.
คำตอบผู้เขียนคือ ข้อเสนอนี้เป็นไปไม่ได้สำหรับแนวคิดแบบสหสัมพันธ์ ไม่แม้จะตอบปัญหาฟอสซิลที่ถูกค้นพบ แล้วยืนยันข้อเสนอทางวิทยาศาสตร์ว่าฟอสซิลมีอยู่มาแล้ว 100 ล้านปีได้
.
เพราะว่าข้อเสนอข้างต้น มันเป็นเวลา (time) ที่อยู่มาก่อน subject, อยู่มาก่อน consciousness, ฯลฯ
.
ถ้า time เป็น correlate ของ subject ดังนั้น มันก็ไม่มีอะไรที่มีมาก่อน subject ได้
.
สรุปตามผู้เขียนก็คือ แนวคิดสหสัมพันธ์จะตอบเราว่า อะไรที่อยู่มาก่อน subject นั้น อยู่มาก่อน subject "for the subject"
.
ฟอซซิลนี้อยู่มาแล้ว 100 ล้านปี for subject
.
จักรวาลนี้อยู่มาแล้ว 14 ล้านล้านปี for subject
.
สิ่งที่อยู่ภายนอกตัวเรา กลายเป็นสิ่ง relative กับเรา ข้อเสนอที่เป็น ancestrality แบบนี้ จึงกลายเป็นเพียง subjective representation ของอดีต ที่ต้องมีปัจจุบันเป็นตัวยืนยันเสมอ อดีตดังกล่าวไม่สามารถมีอยู่โดยตัวมันเอง
.
หรือจะเห็นกรณีที่อาจบอกว่า ข้อเสนอนั้นๆ ได้รับการยอมรับจากชุมชนนักวิทยาศาสตร์ในปัจจุบัน
.
ปัญหาก็คือ แนวคิดแบบสหสัมพันธ์ไม่สามารถยืนยันข้อเสนอแบบ ancestral statements ได้ ไม่สามารยืนยันข้อเสนอที่เกิดก่อนหน้าสิ่งที่มีอยู่/เหตุการณ์ที่เกิดขึ้นก่อนหน้าสิ่งมีชีวิตอื่นๆ ดำรงอยู่ได้เลย
.
มันไม่มี reality ที่มีมาก่อน subjects แต่ reality นั้น ถูกพูดและคิดโดย subject อย่างกับว่ามันมีมาก่อน subject
.
(a reality said and thought by the subject as prior to the subject.)
.
แต่ที่ว่ามานั้น มันก็ไม่ใช่เรื่องง่ายที่จะปฏิเสธ เพราะเราจะจินตนาการถึงการดำรงอยู่ของสีได้อย่างไร ถ้าเราไม่มีตามองเห็น จินตนาการถึงเสียงอย่างไรโดยไม่มีหูมาได้ยิน เราจะคิดถึงความหมายของพื้นที่และเวลาอย่างไร หากปราศจากอัตวิสัยที่มีสำนึกรู้เรื่องอดีต ปัจจุบัน อนาคต หรือปราศจากสำนึกรู้ระหว่างซ้ายและขวา
.
เรารู้ได้อย่างไร ในเมื่อไม่สามารถมองเห็นว่าโลกเป็นยังไงในตอนที่ไม่มีใครรับรู้มันได้?
.
คนเขียนบอกทำได้ แต่เราต้องเข้าใจด้วยหลักการแบบอื่น และหนังสือเล่มนี้ก็เสนอหลักการที่เรียกว่า principle of factiality
.
.
3
.
เป็นหลักการที่ว่า สรรพสิ่งอาจเป็นอื่นอย่างที่มันเป็นอยู่ แล้วเราสามารถคิด reality ด้วยหลักพื้นฐานที่ว่า มันสามารถเป็นอย่างอื่น โดยที่แม้เราจะไม่รู้ถึง reality แบบนั้นเลย
.
facticity คือ reality ที่ไม่มีอยู่ของเหตุผล หรือก็คือ เป็นความเป็นไปไม่ได้ที่จะให้เหตุผลที่เป็น ultimate ground ต่อการดำรงอยู่ของทุกๆ being
.
การที่สิ่งนั้นเป็นของมันอย่างนั้น มากกว่าที่จะไม่เป็นอย่างนั้น เป็นเพียง conditional necessity ไม่ใช่ absolute necessity
.
หากมันมีสาเหตุ (causes) และกฏฟิสิกส์วางอยู่ เราสามารถเคลมเกี่ยวกับผลลัพธ์ (effect) ที่เป็นผลพวงตามมา แต่เราจะไม่สามารถหาเหตุผลที่เป็น ground สำหรับกฏและสาเหตุนั้นเองได้
.
(there is no ultimate cause, nor ultimate law; including the ground of its own existence.)
.
คนเขียนยกเรื่อง Cogito ของเดการ์ตว่า การที่เราคิด เราจึงมีอยู่นั้น มันเป็น conditional necessity คือหากฉันคิด ฉันก็ต้องมีอยู่แน่ๆ แต่มันไม่ใช่ absolute necessity ที่ว่าฉันจะต้องคิด ฉันเลยมีอยู่
.
แล้วภายใน subjective correlation อันนี้เอง ที่ฉันยอมรับ facticity ของตัวเอง เช่นเดียวกับ facticity ของโลกที่สัมพันธ์กับ subjective ของฉันที่เข้าถึงโลกนั้น ฉันบรรลุถึงเรื่องนี้โดยการขาด ultimate reason ที่จะสามารถเป็น ground ของการดำรงอยู่ของฉันเอง
.
ถ้าสหสัมพันธ์เป็นเพียง factual เราก็ไม่สามารถพูดได้อีกว่า subjective เป็นส่วนประกอบอย่างจำเป็น (necessary) ของทุกๆ reality
.
ฉันไม่สามารถจินตนาการถึง subjectivity ที่ไม่-ดำรงอยู่ได้ เพราะว่าการที่จะคิดจินตนาการ ก็จะต้องดำรงอยู่ในฐานะ subject นั้น... ก็สามารถพิสูจน์ว่ามันเป็นไปไม่ได้อยู่ดี อย่างเช่น ฉันไม่สามารถจินตนาการได้ว่ามันจะเป็นอย่างไรหากฉันตาย เพราะถ้าคิดและจินตนาการ ก็หมายความว่าฉันยังอยู่ แต่นี่ก็ไม่ได้พิสูจน์ว่าความตาย (ไม่-ดำรงอยู่) นั้นเป็นไปไม่ได้
.
ไม่ใช่แค่เพียงว่า มีสิ่งต่างๆ ดำรงอยู่ได้โดยไม่ขึ้นอยู่กับเรา แต่เป็นไปได้สำหรับเราเองที่จะ speculation (คาดคะเน) โดยไม่ขึ้นอยู่กับ correlation
.
ไม่มีสิ่งใดที่เกิดหรือเป็นอย่างที่ "จำต้อง" เป็นเช่นนั้น ทุกอย่างเป็น contingency กล่าวคือ ไม่ได้เกิดขึ้นอย่างที่ว่า มันจะต้องเป็นเช่นนั้นอย่างจำเป็น
.
Everything must exist contingently.
.
ดังนั้น มันจึงไม่มีคำตอบสำหรับคำถามที่ว่า ทำไมมันถึงมีอย่างนี้ แทนที่จะไม่มี (why there is something rather than nothing?)
.
ข้อเท็จจริงที่ว่า being (or someting) [ต่างๆ] จะต้องเชื่อมมาสู่การคิดของเรา หรือการคิดของเราจะต้องเชื่อมสู่ being (บางสิ่ง) นั้น เป็นเพียง conditional necessity และที่มันดู necessary ก็เพราะมันได้เกิดขึ้นและเป็น fact ว่าเวลาคิดถึงสิ่งนั้น ก็มีเราที่กำลังคิดถึง
.
แต่ correlation (↔) หรือการสัมพันธ์ของสองอย่าง--โดยตัวมันเอง--ไม่ใช่ necessary
.
(thinking "↔" being, and "↔" by itself is not necessary.
.
It may be that one necessitates the other but nothing necessitates both of them.
.
to be is not to be a correlate, but to be a fact, to be is to be factual, and this is not a fact; it's contingency.