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Zbig: The Life of Zbigniew Brzezinski, America's Great Power Prophet
An intimate and perceptive biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski—President Carter’s National Security Advisor and one of America’s greatest geopolitical thinkers and grandest strategists—from one of the finest columnists and political writers at work today.
Zbigniew Brzezinski was one of the key figures who helped bring about the demise of the Soviet Union. As National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, and counsel to presidents from John F. Kennedy onwards, Brzezinski converted his role as a leading American Sovietologist onto the global stage. George Kennan and Henry Kissinger are often held up as America’s most influential Cold War strategists but Brzezinski’s impact on helping bring about the end of the USSR was greater. As a Polish emigré to America who witnessed the destruction of his family’s home and country at the hands of the Nazis and the Soviets, Brzezinski became one of America’s foremost scholars of totalitarianism. He believed in the importance of understanding the enemy and in speaking their language. His friendship with Pope John Paul II—a Pole and the first non-Italian to hold that role in almost half a millennium—was critical in preventing the Soviet invasion of Poland.
Brzezinski’s lifelong competition—and on-off fraught relationship—with the more loquacious Henry Kissinger was perhaps the most important US rivalry of the Cold War and afterwards. Nixon and Kissinger opened up China to the West in the early 1970s. Brzezinski and Carter normalized US-China relations and decisively tipped the chessboard against Moscow at the end of that decade. Far blunter and more acerbic than Kissinger, Brzezinski was inevitably less of a darling with the global media. But his historic legacy—notably his critical role in bringing Kissinger’s stalled Détente to an end—is arguably greater. Brzezinski’s monumental contributions to American foreign policy have been underreported, leaving a hole in our understanding of Cold War history and its aftermath, notably America’s response to the 9/11 attacks, which he lamented. His role in having armed the Afghan Mujahideen to fight the Soviet invaders in 1980 was also latently controversial. Edward Luce’s biography corrects the underweighting of Brzezinski’s remarkable impact on America’s place in the world, telling the almost cinematic story of a life that spans most of the 20th century and beyond, and in doing so, narrating a new version of the end of the Cold War.
Zbigniew Brzezinski was one of the key figures who helped bring about the demise of the Soviet Union. As National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, and counsel to presidents from John F. Kennedy onwards, Brzezinski converted his role as a leading American Sovietologist onto the global stage. George Kennan and Henry Kissinger are often held up as America’s most influential Cold War strategists but Brzezinski’s impact on helping bring about the end of the USSR was greater. As a Polish emigré to America who witnessed the destruction of his family’s home and country at the hands of the Nazis and the Soviets, Brzezinski became one of America’s foremost scholars of totalitarianism. He believed in the importance of understanding the enemy and in speaking their language. His friendship with Pope John Paul II—a Pole and the first non-Italian to hold that role in almost half a millennium—was critical in preventing the Soviet invasion of Poland.
Brzezinski’s lifelong competition—and on-off fraught relationship—with the more loquacious Henry Kissinger was perhaps the most important US rivalry of the Cold War and afterwards. Nixon and Kissinger opened up China to the West in the early 1970s. Brzezinski and Carter normalized US-China relations and decisively tipped the chessboard against Moscow at the end of that decade. Far blunter and more acerbic than Kissinger, Brzezinski was inevitably less of a darling with the global media. But his historic legacy—notably his critical role in bringing Kissinger’s stalled Détente to an end—is arguably greater. Brzezinski’s monumental contributions to American foreign policy have been underreported, leaving a hole in our understanding of Cold War history and its aftermath, notably America’s response to the 9/11 attacks, which he lamented. His role in having armed the Afghan Mujahideen to fight the Soviet invaders in 1980 was also latently controversial. Edward Luce’s biography corrects the underweighting of Brzezinski’s remarkable impact on America’s place in the world, telling the almost cinematic story of a life that spans most of the 20th century and beyond, and in doing so, narrating a new version of the end of the Cold War.
560 pages, Hardcover
First published May 13, 2025
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June 4, 2025
Luce wrote a long, accurate, interesting biography of my former boss, Zbigniew Brzezinski. It captures the man with his array of idiosyncracies, and with a few minor glitches or simply omissions, the book is remarkably accurate. It also seems to be comprehensive, moving smoothly from his boyhood in a well-connected Polish family via Canada, Harvard and Columbia to the White House. It does an extraordinary job of laying out his relationship to Henry KIssinger and doesn't fall into the simplistic trap of just dismissing it as simple rivalry. The book is exceptional in portraying its protaganist as a complex human being, not just a stereotype or cartoon. Zbig had a deep understanding that the Soviet empire was fragile and vulnerable due to its various nationalities, and that this would be the Achilles heel that destroyed it. That was a profound understanding of the Soviet system and proved to be exactly correct. It is rare that any analyst ever sees his provocative thesis vindicated in its entirety within his own lifetime. But Zbig was no one-trick pony. He was a true friend to Jimmy Carter and a proponent of Carter's human rights agenda, among many other things. Luce captures the whole man. This book is a classic example of superior biographical writing.
November 23, 2025
When I was a graduate student in the early 1970s I was enrolled in a 20th century diplomatic history course. The professor, a Holocaust survivor from Eastern Europe with a wicked sense of sarcasm presented deeply analytical lectures and a challenging reading list. Perhaps the most important book on the list was Zbigniew Brzezinski’s THE SOVIET BLOC: UNITY AND CONFLICT. Brzezinski’s work presented a comprehensive analysis of the relations between communist states through the late 1960s. The author focused on the process by which Eastern European countries were turned into satellites by the Soviet Union, the first signs of trouble following Stalin’s death, and the uproar unleashed by Khrushchev’s efforts to come to terms with Russia’s Stalinist legacy. In the second edition of the book, he goes on to explore the growth of “polycentrism” in Eastern Europe, particularly with the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split.
As I recall Brzezinski’s analysis it is clear he was developing the precursor to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and would be proven correct as he identified the flaws in the Soviet system. After reading Brzezinski’s later works over the years and following his career his impact on American foreign policy is obvious. There have been one major biography of President Jimmy Carter’s former National Security advisor, Justin Vaisse’s ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINKI: AMERICA’S GRAND STRATEGIST but none as well written, incisively analyzed, and researched as the Financial Times’ American correspondent, and frequent guest on MSNBC’s ”Morning Joe,” Edward Luce. The book entitled, ZBIG:THE LIFE OF ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, AMERICA’S GREAT POWER PROFIT. Luce’s monograph portrays a man who predicted the fall of the Soviet Union as an academic, then set in motion the strategy that eventually ensured its collapse. I found Luce’s book to be a fascinating study of his subject’s ideas and career, and how each influenced them in producing an important intellectual and professional biography.
Even as a young man Brzezinski had an innate sense concerning the Soviet Union. As Moscow overran Poland after the Nazis were defeated he knew “all the Poles understand this is not a liberation but simply a change in the form of terror.” Decades later, as a member of the Carter administration his view of Moscow had not changed. He still fervently believed that the Soviet Union was not a monolith and resentment of Russian colonialism would bring about the demise of Moscow’s Eastern Bloc.
Luce immediately gets to the core of Brzezinski’s impact on the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Carter administration waged ideological war against Moscow, and it was Brzezinski who laid the seeds of human rights as a weapon which encouraged hopes for independence in Eastern Europe which provided an impetus for the Solidarity Movement in Poland. Many believe that the Iron Curtain went down on November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. But according to Luce the beginning of the breach in the Soviet Bloc occurred on June 4, 1989, when Solidarity swept Polish elections. Brzezinski played a key role in protecting Lech Walesa’s worker-intellectual alliance and nurturing it to victory. Obviously, Moscow saw him as an arch enemy due to his Polish roots and his actions as NSC head, but one thing is apparent, Brzezinski’s impact on the collapse of the Soviet Union is underappreciated even today.
There is no doubt that Brzezinski was a controversial figure. Some believed his Polish roots curtailed his objectivity and would lead to a war against the Soviet Union. Others believed he was anti-Israel and possibly antisemitic because of his Polish heritage as he argued for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine and was a key player in the Camp David Accords. Democratic foreign policy doves also found him wanting as he supported the Vietnam War and opposed McGovernites. Further his clashes with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resulted in the Secretary of State’s resignation as he lost battles with Brzezinski over normalizing relations with China, holding Moscow to account for treatment of dissidents, arming the Afghani resistance to the Soviet Union, and modernizing America’s nuclear arsenal. As Luce develops his narrative it is clear that his subject was his own man and never could be described as an ideologue as he did not fit any category, did not coddle up to the media like Henry Kissinger, and he was unwilling to play the Washington game which took a toll on his influence.
Luce develops Brzezinski’s intellectual development throughout his narrative. Beginning with his subject’s teen years, we can see that his subject is very concerned with Eastern Europe as he writes in his diary each day. Luce does not scrimp in discussing Brzezinski’s personal development but zeroes in on his thoughts. Key aspects include how his father, Tadeuz, a career diplomat imbued in him the concept of the Polish nation that was inclusive. He stressed the role of Joseph Pilsudski who envisioned a Promethean League with Poland playing the major role as the largest player in a multinational group of smaller East European countries that together would be strong enough to resist the squeeze of Russia and Germany. Brzezinski’s World War II diaries reflect this concern and his obsession with Eastern Europe.
Brzezinski’s master’s thesis written while at McGill University at Montreal continues this fixation as his analysis points to his belief that the Soviet Union would come to an end at some point and he laid out a roadmap for defeating the Stalinist regime. He correctly argues that Soviet ideology should not be mistaken for internationalism, as it was a variant of Russian chauvinism disguised as being a champion of the proletariat. He argues further that Moscow inherited the Czarist map which included numerous ethnic groups and nationalities, he predicted that the loyalty of allies would wither away as they would see that worldwide communism only pretended to foster equality. Russia was made up of 50% non-Russians and Stalin could not dispense with his nationality problem, particularly Ukrainians which led to mass deportations. As Russo-Soviet imperialism spread throughout Eastern Europe it would be seen as worse than European colonialism. For Brzezinski, the west’s blueprint to defeat Moscow was the need to repudiate the idea that Russia had the right to a legitimate “spheres of influence” as the developing Tito-Stalin split highlighted, and the idea that Russia as a civilizing influence in the region belied the actions of Beria and his KGB.
Brzezinski’s Ph. D dissertation which eventually would be published in book form as THE PERMANENT PURGE: POLITICS IN SOVIET AUTHORITARIANISM continues his worldview that purges were endemic to Bolshevik rule and the normal tool of totalitarian states. In the absence of counterbalancing constitutional checks, purges became a substitute for politics under Stalin and the immediate years after his death. Lastly, the Soviet system was doomed because it could not reform itself even as Khruschev tried after his DeStalinization speech in February 1956, and later under Mikhail Gorbachev which set events in motion that gave us Vladimir Putin. Brzezinski would visit Russia in 1956, and he concluded “in addition to the nationalities, authoritarian sterility – not Stalinist terror – was the USSR’s long term, problem.” This view was supported by the Hungarian Revolution in November 1956 as Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, a fate Poland was able to avoid at the last minute. This provoked Brzezinski’s rage at the President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John F. Dulles who preached “roll back” of Soviet communism but were feckless in response to Russian aggression.
The Kissinger-Brzezinski dynamic is an important aspect of Luce’s narrative. The author spends a great deal of time highlighting their relationship discussing their similarities and differences as their careers cross paths. In a sense it began with John F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign. The Massachusetts senator liked to portray himself as an intellectual and advocated bringing intellectuals into government. Brzezinski became one of Kennedy’s foreign policy advisors and wrote a number of campaign speeches and the candidate would mirror his call for greater economic engagement, cultural ties, and scientific exchanges with Eastern Bloc countries as it shifted its entire focus away from Moscow as saber rattling would only drive the Soviet Bloc closer together.
With Kennedy’s assassination Brzezinski lost a leader who had nominally adopted his Cold War strategy. His attitude toward Lyndon Johnson was not as positive as he believed his obsession with Vietnam created a missed opportunity as the Soviet grip over its satellites was looser than most believed, particularly the Sino-Soviet split, along with his belief that China, not Russia was the main sponsor of global revolution. Luce is correct pointing out that Hanoi was paranoid of China, again a missed opportunity.
Once Johnson withdrew from running for reelection in March 1968 he signed on to coordinate Hubert Humphrey’s bid for the White House. Vietnam would be his albatross and Brzezinski’s visit to Saigon reinforced his view that the war was not winnable even if the United States doubled its commitment to 1,000,000 men and any further escalation of the bombing would exacerbate the situation. Brzezinski, who liked Humphrey as a moral person, did not think he would be a good president and advised him to recalculate what victory in Vietnam would look like. He wanted to keep arming South Vietnam to prevent a communist takeover and saw the war as only benefiting Moscow. Brzezinski grew frustrated with Humphrey throughout the campaign as he dithered in his decision making and he saw little daylight with Johnson’s approach. Brzezinski’s disappointment with Humphrey and Johnson increased due to their lack of response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia during the campaign – for him it was a replay of Hungary 1956. Luce reviews the accepted analysis of Humphrey’s inability to stand up to Johnson during the campaign especially over a bombing halt until it was too late to win the election, and the Nixon campaign’s role in interfering with negotiations in Paris which Johnson was aware of but did nothing about because of his doubts concerning his Vice-President.
Vietnam underscored the differences between Kissinger and Brzezinski. For most historians Kissinger was a master manipulator who always seemed to play on both sides. During the 1968 presidential campaign Kissinger was a consultant to the State Department and funneled information concerning the Paris Peace Conference to the Nixon campaign at the same time he was advising Nelson Rockeffeler’s attempt to rest the Republican nomination from Nixon. According to Luce this was the first time the two were on opposite sides, Brzezinski favoring a bombing halt, and Kissinger working to prevent it.
The two men once colleagues at Harvard maintained a somewhat friendly-aversive relationship. As the years melted away the veneer of professionalism fades between the two. Once Kissinger became Secretary of State and National Security Advisor in the Nixon administration, Brzezinski’s criticisms of Nixon-Kissinger realpolitik increased. The issue aside from Vietnam that drove their disagreements centered on “Détente.” Kissinger attacked Brzezinski for abandoning his long-held belief in peaceful engagement and called his latest approach “a right-wing critique.” Brzezinski believed Kissinger was an amoral opportunist, and that the Soviets were exploiting Détente for ideological mischief-making. He would support Détente, but not in a one-sided way. Though their interchange was civil and bordering on friendly in private Kissinger was apoplectic and referred to his former colleague as a “whore.” In public they remained sociable, but behind the scenes as the later declassified documents show Kissinger grew angrier and angrier.
The most important development in Brzezinski’s career was his association with Jimmy Carter. First, he became Carter’s foreign policy advisor during the 1976 presidential campaign and worked on developing the candidate’s policy “chops.” He would focus on Kissinger’s “lone ranger” approach to diplomacy and soon Ford’s Secretary of State became a campaign liability. Further, Kissinger was described as a “false pessimist” based on his forecast that the Soviet Union would probably overtake the United States as a global force in the 1980s. Carter’s speeches reflected Brzezinski’s tutoring as he described a new approach to Détente which would be “reciprocal and comprehensive.”
There was no doubt in Carter’s mind that he wanted Brzezinski as his National Security advisor despite the opposition of Democratic Party elites like Averill Harriman, Clark Clifford, and Richard Holbrook. When Luce describes the new NSC head as having sharp elbows and not caring what others thought of him as long as he was true to his beliefs he is dead on. Carter and Brzezinski would develop a fascinating relationship. It began with Brzezinski as teacher and Carter as pupil and would evolve into a strong partnership. Brzezenski, though at times was frustrated by Carter’s indecisiveness, but admired his character as the President would do what he believed was right for the country no matter the negative political implications for his own popularity. Be it handing back the Panama Canal, aggravating the Jewish lobby over his view of the Palestinians, the need for an energy policy, or appointing Paul Volker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve knowing full well his policies would exacerbate inflation in the short run, Carter did what he believed was best for the country.
Brzezinski finally had his opportunity to be the architect of American Foreign policy. His commitment to human rights and working closely with Karol Wojtyla who would be elected as Pope Paul II in 1978 was brilliant and it sent a message to Moscow as upon assuming the presidency Carter immediately stressed human rights and a new SALT II treaty. In fact, the KGB argued that it was Brzezinski who had fixed the Papal election! Meeting with Soviet dissidents like Andrei Shakarov and Vladimir Bukofsky (in comparison to Ford who refused to meet with Alexander Sohlsenitsyn) angered Leonid Brezhnev who threatened that there would be no SALT treaty unless the US backed off from emphasizing human rights. Brzezinski was unconcerned, stressing the Russians needed a SALT treaty because their economy was in such poor condition.
The other relationship that Luce delves into in detail is that of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Brzezinski. Vance, who was part of Harriman’s brain trust and the last of the Democratic elites, was against stressing human rights, believing that a new SALT treaty was imperative. Luce points to a long list of disagreement between Vance and Brzezinski that included policy disputes over allowing the Shah of Iran to enter the United States for medical treatment after American hostages were seized in 1979; prioritizing Détente instead of a more aggressive approach to Moscow; careful not to antagonize Russia by moving to close to China; and asserting a more aggressive military posture in the world. Their differing worldviews led to a climate of public diplomatic discord which at times left the impression that the administration’s foreign policy lacked coherence. Ultimately, Brzezinski's more hawkish approach often gained prominence during critical moments, contributing to the eventual resignation of Vance in April 1980 after the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran. Luce sums up their relationship perfectly, Vance had Carter’s heart, Brzezinski had his brain!
Despite this bureaucratic infighting Carter achieved a number of diplomatic successes. The Camp David Agreements between Israel and Egypt, the bleeding of Russia by arming the mujahideen in Afghanistan, normalizing relations with China, and the return of the Panama Canal. Luce’s deep dive into these issues is particularly gripping and an important aspect of his book as he provides fascinating commentary. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s relationship with Brzezinski as both were Polish, despised Russia, and their knowledge of Jewish History. Another instance is the relationship between Deng Xiaoping and Brzezinski which translated into the turning point for the Carter administration as the President sided with his NSC advisor over Vance to normalize relations with China. Further, Luce stresses that the Russian invasion of Afghanistan was vindication for Brzezinski over the State Department which had argued repeatedly that the Soviet Union was a status quo power.
Despite these successes the Iranian situation overshadows all of them. Luce lays out the familiar history of the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader in Tehran and the ongoing hostage situation. The Carter national security team was blinded on two fronts. First, they misread the potency of the mullahs and did not take Khomeini’s words seriously. Further, Brzezinski could not accept the concept of a theocratic revolution. Another error was the state of the Shah’s health. Brzezinski repeatedly called for a military crackdown and/or coup, but the Shah was in no condition to effectively deal with the security situation in his country. Luce is correct that the Carter administration’s approach to the Iranian crisis was one of complete chaos highlighted by the inability of the State Department and National Security Council to get along and the fact that there were so many leaks of information to the public. Carter could not make up his mind until it was too late.
In the end according to Tevi Troy in his May 13, 2025, review in the Wall Street Journal that “it was neither the Soviets nor the State Department but an inability to deal with the Iranian hostage crisis that brought about the end of the Carter administration and, apart from some consulting roles, the end of Brzezinski’s time in government. Brzezinski continued to opine on foreign policy. As Mr. Luce points out, however, he did so without being closely affiliated with either political party. Mr. Luce speculates that this independent approach is both why he never returned to government and why he never received “his full due.” There is no doubt that Brzezinski's analysis was correct when he warned us that a Putin like figure could emerge in Russia and threaten Europe and the United States in the future!
As I recall Brzezinski’s analysis it is clear he was developing the precursor to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and would be proven correct as he identified the flaws in the Soviet system. After reading Brzezinski’s later works over the years and following his career his impact on American foreign policy is obvious. There have been one major biography of President Jimmy Carter’s former National Security advisor, Justin Vaisse’s ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINKI: AMERICA’S GRAND STRATEGIST but none as well written, incisively analyzed, and researched as the Financial Times’ American correspondent, and frequent guest on MSNBC’s ”Morning Joe,” Edward Luce. The book entitled, ZBIG:THE LIFE OF ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, AMERICA’S GREAT POWER PROFIT. Luce’s monograph portrays a man who predicted the fall of the Soviet Union as an academic, then set in motion the strategy that eventually ensured its collapse. I found Luce’s book to be a fascinating study of his subject’s ideas and career, and how each influenced them in producing an important intellectual and professional biography.
Even as a young man Brzezinski had an innate sense concerning the Soviet Union. As Moscow overran Poland after the Nazis were defeated he knew “all the Poles understand this is not a liberation but simply a change in the form of terror.” Decades later, as a member of the Carter administration his view of Moscow had not changed. He still fervently believed that the Soviet Union was not a monolith and resentment of Russian colonialism would bring about the demise of Moscow’s Eastern Bloc.
Luce immediately gets to the core of Brzezinski’s impact on the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The Carter administration waged ideological war against Moscow, and it was Brzezinski who laid the seeds of human rights as a weapon which encouraged hopes for independence in Eastern Europe which provided an impetus for the Solidarity Movement in Poland. Many believe that the Iron Curtain went down on November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. But according to Luce the beginning of the breach in the Soviet Bloc occurred on June 4, 1989, when Solidarity swept Polish elections. Brzezinski played a key role in protecting Lech Walesa’s worker-intellectual alliance and nurturing it to victory. Obviously, Moscow saw him as an arch enemy due to his Polish roots and his actions as NSC head, but one thing is apparent, Brzezinski’s impact on the collapse of the Soviet Union is underappreciated even today.
There is no doubt that Brzezinski was a controversial figure. Some believed his Polish roots curtailed his objectivity and would lead to a war against the Soviet Union. Others believed he was anti-Israel and possibly antisemitic because of his Polish heritage as he argued for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine and was a key player in the Camp David Accords. Democratic foreign policy doves also found him wanting as he supported the Vietnam War and opposed McGovernites. Further his clashes with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resulted in the Secretary of State’s resignation as he lost battles with Brzezinski over normalizing relations with China, holding Moscow to account for treatment of dissidents, arming the Afghani resistance to the Soviet Union, and modernizing America’s nuclear arsenal. As Luce develops his narrative it is clear that his subject was his own man and never could be described as an ideologue as he did not fit any category, did not coddle up to the media like Henry Kissinger, and he was unwilling to play the Washington game which took a toll on his influence.
Luce develops Brzezinski’s intellectual development throughout his narrative. Beginning with his subject’s teen years, we can see that his subject is very concerned with Eastern Europe as he writes in his diary each day. Luce does not scrimp in discussing Brzezinski’s personal development but zeroes in on his thoughts. Key aspects include how his father, Tadeuz, a career diplomat imbued in him the concept of the Polish nation that was inclusive. He stressed the role of Joseph Pilsudski who envisioned a Promethean League with Poland playing the major role as the largest player in a multinational group of smaller East European countries that together would be strong enough to resist the squeeze of Russia and Germany. Brzezinski’s World War II diaries reflect this concern and his obsession with Eastern Europe.
Brzezinski’s master’s thesis written while at McGill University at Montreal continues this fixation as his analysis points to his belief that the Soviet Union would come to an end at some point and he laid out a roadmap for defeating the Stalinist regime. He correctly argues that Soviet ideology should not be mistaken for internationalism, as it was a variant of Russian chauvinism disguised as being a champion of the proletariat. He argues further that Moscow inherited the Czarist map which included numerous ethnic groups and nationalities, he predicted that the loyalty of allies would wither away as they would see that worldwide communism only pretended to foster equality. Russia was made up of 50% non-Russians and Stalin could not dispense with his nationality problem, particularly Ukrainians which led to mass deportations. As Russo-Soviet imperialism spread throughout Eastern Europe it would be seen as worse than European colonialism. For Brzezinski, the west’s blueprint to defeat Moscow was the need to repudiate the idea that Russia had the right to a legitimate “spheres of influence” as the developing Tito-Stalin split highlighted, and the idea that Russia as a civilizing influence in the region belied the actions of Beria and his KGB.
Brzezinski’s Ph. D dissertation which eventually would be published in book form as THE PERMANENT PURGE: POLITICS IN SOVIET AUTHORITARIANISM continues his worldview that purges were endemic to Bolshevik rule and the normal tool of totalitarian states. In the absence of counterbalancing constitutional checks, purges became a substitute for politics under Stalin and the immediate years after his death. Lastly, the Soviet system was doomed because it could not reform itself even as Khruschev tried after his DeStalinization speech in February 1956, and later under Mikhail Gorbachev which set events in motion that gave us Vladimir Putin. Brzezinski would visit Russia in 1956, and he concluded “in addition to the nationalities, authoritarian sterility – not Stalinist terror – was the USSR’s long term, problem.” This view was supported by the Hungarian Revolution in November 1956 as Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest, a fate Poland was able to avoid at the last minute. This provoked Brzezinski’s rage at the President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John F. Dulles who preached “roll back” of Soviet communism but were feckless in response to Russian aggression.
The Kissinger-Brzezinski dynamic is an important aspect of Luce’s narrative. The author spends a great deal of time highlighting their relationship discussing their similarities and differences as their careers cross paths. In a sense it began with John F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign. The Massachusetts senator liked to portray himself as an intellectual and advocated bringing intellectuals into government. Brzezinski became one of Kennedy’s foreign policy advisors and wrote a number of campaign speeches and the candidate would mirror his call for greater economic engagement, cultural ties, and scientific exchanges with Eastern Bloc countries as it shifted its entire focus away from Moscow as saber rattling would only drive the Soviet Bloc closer together.
With Kennedy’s assassination Brzezinski lost a leader who had nominally adopted his Cold War strategy. His attitude toward Lyndon Johnson was not as positive as he believed his obsession with Vietnam created a missed opportunity as the Soviet grip over its satellites was looser than most believed, particularly the Sino-Soviet split, along with his belief that China, not Russia was the main sponsor of global revolution. Luce is correct pointing out that Hanoi was paranoid of China, again a missed opportunity.
Once Johnson withdrew from running for reelection in March 1968 he signed on to coordinate Hubert Humphrey’s bid for the White House. Vietnam would be his albatross and Brzezinski’s visit to Saigon reinforced his view that the war was not winnable even if the United States doubled its commitment to 1,000,000 men and any further escalation of the bombing would exacerbate the situation. Brzezinski, who liked Humphrey as a moral person, did not think he would be a good president and advised him to recalculate what victory in Vietnam would look like. He wanted to keep arming South Vietnam to prevent a communist takeover and saw the war as only benefiting Moscow. Brzezinski grew frustrated with Humphrey throughout the campaign as he dithered in his decision making and he saw little daylight with Johnson’s approach. Brzezinski’s disappointment with Humphrey and Johnson increased due to their lack of response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia during the campaign – for him it was a replay of Hungary 1956. Luce reviews the accepted analysis of Humphrey’s inability to stand up to Johnson during the campaign especially over a bombing halt until it was too late to win the election, and the Nixon campaign’s role in interfering with negotiations in Paris which Johnson was aware of but did nothing about because of his doubts concerning his Vice-President.
Vietnam underscored the differences between Kissinger and Brzezinski. For most historians Kissinger was a master manipulator who always seemed to play on both sides. During the 1968 presidential campaign Kissinger was a consultant to the State Department and funneled information concerning the Paris Peace Conference to the Nixon campaign at the same time he was advising Nelson Rockeffeler’s attempt to rest the Republican nomination from Nixon. According to Luce this was the first time the two were on opposite sides, Brzezinski favoring a bombing halt, and Kissinger working to prevent it.
The two men once colleagues at Harvard maintained a somewhat friendly-aversive relationship. As the years melted away the veneer of professionalism fades between the two. Once Kissinger became Secretary of State and National Security Advisor in the Nixon administration, Brzezinski’s criticisms of Nixon-Kissinger realpolitik increased. The issue aside from Vietnam that drove their disagreements centered on “Détente.” Kissinger attacked Brzezinski for abandoning his long-held belief in peaceful engagement and called his latest approach “a right-wing critique.” Brzezinski believed Kissinger was an amoral opportunist, and that the Soviets were exploiting Détente for ideological mischief-making. He would support Détente, but not in a one-sided way. Though their interchange was civil and bordering on friendly in private Kissinger was apoplectic and referred to his former colleague as a “whore.” In public they remained sociable, but behind the scenes as the later declassified documents show Kissinger grew angrier and angrier.
The most important development in Brzezinski’s career was his association with Jimmy Carter. First, he became Carter’s foreign policy advisor during the 1976 presidential campaign and worked on developing the candidate’s policy “chops.” He would focus on Kissinger’s “lone ranger” approach to diplomacy and soon Ford’s Secretary of State became a campaign liability. Further, Kissinger was described as a “false pessimist” based on his forecast that the Soviet Union would probably overtake the United States as a global force in the 1980s. Carter’s speeches reflected Brzezinski’s tutoring as he described a new approach to Détente which would be “reciprocal and comprehensive.”
There was no doubt in Carter’s mind that he wanted Brzezinski as his National Security advisor despite the opposition of Democratic Party elites like Averill Harriman, Clark Clifford, and Richard Holbrook. When Luce describes the new NSC head as having sharp elbows and not caring what others thought of him as long as he was true to his beliefs he is dead on. Carter and Brzezinski would develop a fascinating relationship. It began with Brzezinski as teacher and Carter as pupil and would evolve into a strong partnership. Brzezenski, though at times was frustrated by Carter’s indecisiveness, but admired his character as the President would do what he believed was right for the country no matter the negative political implications for his own popularity. Be it handing back the Panama Canal, aggravating the Jewish lobby over his view of the Palestinians, the need for an energy policy, or appointing Paul Volker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve knowing full well his policies would exacerbate inflation in the short run, Carter did what he believed was best for the country.
Brzezinski finally had his opportunity to be the architect of American Foreign policy. His commitment to human rights and working closely with Karol Wojtyla who would be elected as Pope Paul II in 1978 was brilliant and it sent a message to Moscow as upon assuming the presidency Carter immediately stressed human rights and a new SALT II treaty. In fact, the KGB argued that it was Brzezinski who had fixed the Papal election! Meeting with Soviet dissidents like Andrei Shakarov and Vladimir Bukofsky (in comparison to Ford who refused to meet with Alexander Sohlsenitsyn) angered Leonid Brezhnev who threatened that there would be no SALT treaty unless the US backed off from emphasizing human rights. Brzezinski was unconcerned, stressing the Russians needed a SALT treaty because their economy was in such poor condition.
The other relationship that Luce delves into in detail is that of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Brzezinski. Vance, who was part of Harriman’s brain trust and the last of the Democratic elites, was against stressing human rights, believing that a new SALT treaty was imperative. Luce points to a long list of disagreement between Vance and Brzezinski that included policy disputes over allowing the Shah of Iran to enter the United States for medical treatment after American hostages were seized in 1979; prioritizing Détente instead of a more aggressive approach to Moscow; careful not to antagonize Russia by moving to close to China; and asserting a more aggressive military posture in the world. Their differing worldviews led to a climate of public diplomatic discord which at times left the impression that the administration’s foreign policy lacked coherence. Ultimately, Brzezinski's more hawkish approach often gained prominence during critical moments, contributing to the eventual resignation of Vance in April 1980 after the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran. Luce sums up their relationship perfectly, Vance had Carter’s heart, Brzezinski had his brain!
Despite this bureaucratic infighting Carter achieved a number of diplomatic successes. The Camp David Agreements between Israel and Egypt, the bleeding of Russia by arming the mujahideen in Afghanistan, normalizing relations with China, and the return of the Panama Canal. Luce’s deep dive into these issues is particularly gripping and an important aspect of his book as he provides fascinating commentary. For example, Israeli Prime Minister Begin’s relationship with Brzezinski as both were Polish, despised Russia, and their knowledge of Jewish History. Another instance is the relationship between Deng Xiaoping and Brzezinski which translated into the turning point for the Carter administration as the President sided with his NSC advisor over Vance to normalize relations with China. Further, Luce stresses that the Russian invasion of Afghanistan was vindication for Brzezinski over the State Department which had argued repeatedly that the Soviet Union was a status quo power.
Despite these successes the Iranian situation overshadows all of them. Luce lays out the familiar history of the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader in Tehran and the ongoing hostage situation. The Carter national security team was blinded on two fronts. First, they misread the potency of the mullahs and did not take Khomeini’s words seriously. Further, Brzezinski could not accept the concept of a theocratic revolution. Another error was the state of the Shah’s health. Brzezinski repeatedly called for a military crackdown and/or coup, but the Shah was in no condition to effectively deal with the security situation in his country. Luce is correct that the Carter administration’s approach to the Iranian crisis was one of complete chaos highlighted by the inability of the State Department and National Security Council to get along and the fact that there were so many leaks of information to the public. Carter could not make up his mind until it was too late.
In the end according to Tevi Troy in his May 13, 2025, review in the Wall Street Journal that “it was neither the Soviets nor the State Department but an inability to deal with the Iranian hostage crisis that brought about the end of the Carter administration and, apart from some consulting roles, the end of Brzezinski’s time in government. Brzezinski continued to opine on foreign policy. As Mr. Luce points out, however, he did so without being closely affiliated with either political party. Mr. Luce speculates that this independent approach is both why he never returned to government and why he never received “his full due.” There is no doubt that Brzezinski's analysis was correct when he warned us that a Putin like figure could emerge in Russia and threaten Europe and the United States in the future!
July 9, 2025
I'm surprised how much I enjoyed this biography of a truly amazing man. So much happened during the Carter Administration. I was so impressed by the writing as well. This was a great, informative read that also made me sad about our current US administration and foreign policy.
July 1, 2025
An excellent biography of the life and times of the global strategist, who lived from 1923 to 2017. It was both involving and analytical, and clearly explained that ZB's writings, speeches, and actions showed how prophetic he really was. The generally accepted detente view from the Nixon-Kissinger era until the very late 1980's was that the Soviet Union was a rising competitor to the U.S., and would be so indefinitely. ZB struggled with Vance in the Carter administration, but won most of those disputes in advocating that the Soviet Union was in observable decline, and therefore that the U.S. should take a harder line and hasten its demise. He was right on the Iraq war, a more targeted post-9/11 attack on Al Qaeda vs. ill-defined global terrorism, on Ukraine, and on Russia, China and Iran forming a coalition. Luce renders in full a brilliant, prickly and fascinating person, and the major foreign policy issues of his lengthy career.
September 9, 2025
This is a remarkable book about a remarkable man, and continues the rehabilitation of the Carter presidency … it also reveals Zbig’s competitive rivalry with both Cyrus Vance and Henry Kissinger … the consummate Polish-American, Brzezinski worked tirelessly in conjunction with Pope John Paul II to birth democratic modern Poland … the book also shows how working to defend democracy everywhere enables all of us to live our lives in comparative freedom … absolutely stellar …
June 4, 2025
Well documented, written, etc. a book for scholars.
Too much detail, every person at a meeting and their backgrounds. Every nuance of policy. Not for casual interests,
One serious flaw: totally ignores at times and certainly understates Zbig’s viciousness—his use of leaks and rumors to destroy careers, total ruthlessness in promoting himself.
Too much detail, every person at a meeting and their backgrounds. Every nuance of policy. Not for casual interests,
One serious flaw: totally ignores at times and certainly understates Zbig’s viciousness—his use of leaks and rumors to destroy careers, total ruthlessness in promoting himself.
December 8, 2025
The latest, in-depth full biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former National Security Adviser during Carter's presidency, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who worked with Carter's successors, has been a revelation to me.
This biography of Brzezinski is based on extensive primary source material, including diaries, letter, official paper provided by his family. The author presents Brzezinski’s early displacement from Poland as the root of his lifelong sensitivity to tyranny and instability. Being stateless forged in him both gratitude for American freedom and an almost prophetic vigilance against authoritarianism. As a young scholar in North America, Zbig fused European historical memory with American optimism. This duality — tragic realism joined to belief in progress — shaped his later balance of moral and strategic thinking. His horror at both Nazism and Stalinism convinced him that freedom required not just ideals but power. Luce emphasises that Brzezinski’s realism always carried a moral undertone: power was necessary to protect human dignity.
Luce uses Brzezinski’s tense relationship with Jimmy Carter to dramatise the eternal tension between moral idealism (human rights) and strategic calculation (containment). The book contrasts Brzezinski’s dynamic, chessboard approach with Kissinger’s balance-of-power diplomacy. Zbig believed that the moral vitality of democracy was itself a strategic asset — a faith Kissinger never shared. Iran’s revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the hostage crisis reveal Brzezinski’s brilliance and blindness: he saw long-term patterns but underestimated short-term volatility. Luce portrays him as a thinker haunted by the limits of even the most rigorous strategy.
The book is full of details on many challenges Zbig faced during his role as a national security adviser to president Carter, his rivalry and friendship with Kissinger, his association with Pope John Paul II, former president Nixon, president Johnson, Reagan, Obama and many foreign heads of state. In essence, Zbig isn’t just a biography — it’s a meditation on how personal history shapes strategic vision, and how a moral realist like Brzezinski helps us rethink America’s role in a turbulent century.
For anyone interested in strategic politics at the highest level, this book should be of a great interest. Thoroughly recommended.
The following are a few notes made during my reading of this book.
In Carter's first two years Brzezinski succeeded in nearly doubling the budget of Radio Free Europe. Earlier, Kissinger saw the broadcaster as an irritant to the Soviets. As a result, the service was in decline and needed considerable investment to break through the Warsaw Pact's increasingly jamming systems. Brzezinski secured it. Jan Nowak, the former head of the Polish section, dubbed Brzezinski "the patron saint of RFE". (p.226)
Brzezinski and Schmidt (West German chancellor) clashed over Radio Free Europe, which the West German leader asked Carter to move to another country. Brzezinski replied that the fate of RFE's Munich operation "could not be decided unilaterally or outside the larger security context". Should the radio station have to move, he said, other US assets might follow. (p. 230).
At around 3:00 a.m. on June 3, 1980, Brzezinski was startled awake by his bedside phone. "Sorry, sir, but we are under nuclear attack," reported Bill Odom, Brzezinski's senior military aide. Thirty seconds earlier, the Soviets had fired 220 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles at the United States, he said. Brzezinski had a maximum of seven minutes before he would need to awaken the president. A minute later, Odom called back. He told Brzeinski that there were in fact more than two thousand Soviet missiles heading for America. Brzezinski told Odom to instruct Strategic Air Command to scramble two hundred jets to prepare for US retaliation. He was about to pick up the phone to Carter when it rang a third time. I had been a false alert, said Odom. (p.329).
Reagan's team had known in advance the precise details of Jaruzelski's marshal law plan from CIA mole, Ryszzard Kuklinski. It had chosen not to publicise that knowledge (p.387).
This biography of Brzezinski is based on extensive primary source material, including diaries, letter, official paper provided by his family. The author presents Brzezinski’s early displacement from Poland as the root of his lifelong sensitivity to tyranny and instability. Being stateless forged in him both gratitude for American freedom and an almost prophetic vigilance against authoritarianism. As a young scholar in North America, Zbig fused European historical memory with American optimism. This duality — tragic realism joined to belief in progress — shaped his later balance of moral and strategic thinking. His horror at both Nazism and Stalinism convinced him that freedom required not just ideals but power. Luce emphasises that Brzezinski’s realism always carried a moral undertone: power was necessary to protect human dignity.
Luce uses Brzezinski’s tense relationship with Jimmy Carter to dramatise the eternal tension between moral idealism (human rights) and strategic calculation (containment). The book contrasts Brzezinski’s dynamic, chessboard approach with Kissinger’s balance-of-power diplomacy. Zbig believed that the moral vitality of democracy was itself a strategic asset — a faith Kissinger never shared. Iran’s revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the hostage crisis reveal Brzezinski’s brilliance and blindness: he saw long-term patterns but underestimated short-term volatility. Luce portrays him as a thinker haunted by the limits of even the most rigorous strategy.
The book is full of details on many challenges Zbig faced during his role as a national security adviser to president Carter, his rivalry and friendship with Kissinger, his association with Pope John Paul II, former president Nixon, president Johnson, Reagan, Obama and many foreign heads of state. In essence, Zbig isn’t just a biography — it’s a meditation on how personal history shapes strategic vision, and how a moral realist like Brzezinski helps us rethink America’s role in a turbulent century.
For anyone interested in strategic politics at the highest level, this book should be of a great interest. Thoroughly recommended.
The following are a few notes made during my reading of this book.
In Carter's first two years Brzezinski succeeded in nearly doubling the budget of Radio Free Europe. Earlier, Kissinger saw the broadcaster as an irritant to the Soviets. As a result, the service was in decline and needed considerable investment to break through the Warsaw Pact's increasingly jamming systems. Brzezinski secured it. Jan Nowak, the former head of the Polish section, dubbed Brzezinski "the patron saint of RFE". (p.226)
Brzezinski and Schmidt (West German chancellor) clashed over Radio Free Europe, which the West German leader asked Carter to move to another country. Brzezinski replied that the fate of RFE's Munich operation "could not be decided unilaterally or outside the larger security context". Should the radio station have to move, he said, other US assets might follow. (p. 230).
At around 3:00 a.m. on June 3, 1980, Brzezinski was startled awake by his bedside phone. "Sorry, sir, but we are under nuclear attack," reported Bill Odom, Brzezinski's senior military aide. Thirty seconds earlier, the Soviets had fired 220 ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles at the United States, he said. Brzezinski had a maximum of seven minutes before he would need to awaken the president. A minute later, Odom called back. He told Brzeinski that there were in fact more than two thousand Soviet missiles heading for America. Brzezinski told Odom to instruct Strategic Air Command to scramble two hundred jets to prepare for US retaliation. He was about to pick up the phone to Carter when it rang a third time. I had been a false alert, said Odom. (p.329).
Reagan's team had known in advance the precise details of Jaruzelski's marshal law plan from CIA mole, Ryszzard Kuklinski. It had chosen not to publicise that knowledge (p.387).
Read
September 8, 2025Upon arriving at Harvard in 1953, Zbigniew Brzezinski faced a crucial choice. Should he place himself under the tutelage of the celebrated, self-made Tennessean William Yandell Elliott at the Department of Government, or his rival, German émigré Carl Friedrich? As fate would have it, Elliott had to dash to Washington and redirected the newcomer to his assistant, a ‘youngish, somewhat rotund’ scholar ‘with a strong German accent’, as Brzezinski later recalled. Listening to him expound on high-flown European theory made the decision clear: ‘I rather impolitely rose and left.’ Thus ended his first encounter with Henry Kissinger, the man he would trail for the next half-century.
The similarities between them, and their even greater differences, have long fascinated commentators, including the authors of these two biographies, as contrasting as their protagonists. Journalist Edward Luce’s cradle-to-grave doorstopper is intended to be the definitive Brzezinski biography, and it succeeds in spades. The other, by former EU diplomat Jérémie Gallon, is a slim, thematic volume, cleverly arranged to offer a portrait of Kissinger as a model for present-day Europeans ‘not resigned to slouching off the stage of history’ through ‘morals and idealism … which serves only to isolate and diminish us’. Their subjects were both immigrants who became national security advisers. Kissinger’s journey was harder, arriving in New York in 1938 as the 15-year-old son of a penniless family and returning to Germany as a US army sergeant before joining Harvard. A few years later, Brzezinski, the son of privilege, would drive down to the leafy New England campus from Montreal, where his father served as Poland’s consul general. Kissinger’s path, however, went further, from the White House to Foggy Bottom as America’s first Jewish secretary of state.
Read the rest of the review at https://www.historytoday.com/archive/...
Hazem Kandil is Professor of Historical and Political Sociology at the University of Cambridge.
The similarities between them, and their even greater differences, have long fascinated commentators, including the authors of these two biographies, as contrasting as their protagonists. Journalist Edward Luce’s cradle-to-grave doorstopper is intended to be the definitive Brzezinski biography, and it succeeds in spades. The other, by former EU diplomat Jérémie Gallon, is a slim, thematic volume, cleverly arranged to offer a portrait of Kissinger as a model for present-day Europeans ‘not resigned to slouching off the stage of history’ through ‘morals and idealism … which serves only to isolate and diminish us’. Their subjects were both immigrants who became national security advisers. Kissinger’s journey was harder, arriving in New York in 1938 as the 15-year-old son of a penniless family and returning to Germany as a US army sergeant before joining Harvard. A few years later, Brzezinski, the son of privilege, would drive down to the leafy New England campus from Montreal, where his father served as Poland’s consul general. Kissinger’s path, however, went further, from the White House to Foggy Bottom as America’s first Jewish secretary of state.
Read the rest of the review at https://www.historytoday.com/archive/...
Hazem Kandil is Professor of Historical and Political Sociology at the University of Cambridge.
November 6, 2025
Several interesting nuggets in this book of Zbig:
1. The author really did a good job at the beginning of the book explaining why he did not like the communists. This carries through the book but it also shaped Zbig’s life and career.
2. His hot and cold relationship with Henry Kissinger is fascinating as well since they shared many similarities.
3. How his prognostications came true many years later on a variety of topics.
4. Finally, how relevant he was right up to the end of his life. His official government job ended in 1981 and how for the next 36 years he was being requested to provide guidance from presidents and policy makers.
Glad I picked this one up. Thanks Zbig. It was a pleasure getting to know you.
1. The author really did a good job at the beginning of the book explaining why he did not like the communists. This carries through the book but it also shaped Zbig’s life and career.
2. His hot and cold relationship with Henry Kissinger is fascinating as well since they shared many similarities.
3. How his prognostications came true many years later on a variety of topics.
4. Finally, how relevant he was right up to the end of his life. His official government job ended in 1981 and how for the next 36 years he was being requested to provide guidance from presidents and policy makers.
Glad I picked this one up. Thanks Zbig. It was a pleasure getting to know you.
November 14, 2025
One of the greatest biographies I’ve ever read. Such an eloquently written, and well researched, story about a true foreign policy giant. It captures Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski’s intellect and importance, but doesn’t shy away from his mishaps or mistakes. I wasn’t too aware of Brzezinski’s work and legacy before, therefore, I learned a lot. It’s also an interesting piece in the debate of the Carter presidency, it tries — with some success — to elevate it in comparison to other presidencies. The only negative with the book is the author’s obvious and tiresome disdain for Dr. Henry Kissinger. However, it’s well worth a read.
October 30, 2025
This book is very well written!
Generalists will be able to enjoy it, though the main audience is foreign policy experts and enthusiasts.
Generalists may skip the book and listen to some of the author’s podcast interviews.
Generalists will be able to enjoy it, though the main audience is foreign policy experts and enthusiasts.
Generalists may skip the book and listen to some of the author’s podcast interviews.
October 3, 2025
I was taken aback when I read Ed Luce crowing about the positive reviews of his recent book in the Financial Times. I've read another of his books and am a regular reader of his columns and analysis in the FT. I like the guy and what he has to say. However, it seemed a little too desperate so early after the release for him to be boasting as much as he did. Have to admit, I stand corrected. Luce has great reason to crow about this book.
It's well-researched, and -written. He mined his source material thoroughly and paints a clear picture of a man who was misunderstood, or perhaps mischaracterized, during his lifetime. HIGHLY recommend this to students of American foreign policy, presidential history, great power politics and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
I was in graduate school, studying international relations, when ZB was at his peak. It was interesting to read his thoughts of, and words about, many of his close friends and associates who were giants in the field, and whose work I was studying at the time: Huntington, Aaron, Kissinger, Albright, et al. That side of the story might not be of interest to the general reader but I found those vignettes most interesting and informative.
Luce leaves no doubt this guy was, and remains, a giant in the field of international relations and comparative great power politics. This portrait also shows him to be a decent and honest man, loyal and supportive of those close to him, belying to some degree his reputation as a cold, uncaring, self-obsessed individual.
The narrative about the dynamics of his friendship with his life-long colleague and rival Henry Kissinger was also a fascinating part of this narrative.
Overall, best book I've read in 2025. Highly recommend to those who either lived through the period he was in ascendance, or those who want to read a detailed, even-handed history of his life and work, even if they didn't like his outlook. Luce has written a masterpiece we would all be well-served in reading. .
It's well-researched, and -written. He mined his source material thoroughly and paints a clear picture of a man who was misunderstood, or perhaps mischaracterized, during his lifetime. HIGHLY recommend this to students of American foreign policy, presidential history, great power politics and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
I was in graduate school, studying international relations, when ZB was at his peak. It was interesting to read his thoughts of, and words about, many of his close friends and associates who were giants in the field, and whose work I was studying at the time: Huntington, Aaron, Kissinger, Albright, et al. That side of the story might not be of interest to the general reader but I found those vignettes most interesting and informative.
Luce leaves no doubt this guy was, and remains, a giant in the field of international relations and comparative great power politics. This portrait also shows him to be a decent and honest man, loyal and supportive of those close to him, belying to some degree his reputation as a cold, uncaring, self-obsessed individual.
The narrative about the dynamics of his friendship with his life-long colleague and rival Henry Kissinger was also a fascinating part of this narrative.
Overall, best book I've read in 2025. Highly recommend to those who either lived through the period he was in ascendance, or those who want to read a detailed, even-handed history of his life and work, even if they didn't like his outlook. Luce has written a masterpiece we would all be well-served in reading. .
July 28, 2025
Zbigniew Brzezinski's live was roughly commensurate with the Cold War and he lived the ultimate cold war life - working in US foreign affairs from the Kennedy Administration to the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the peak of his career, he served as the National Security Advisor during for the entirety of the Carter administration, through the Iram hostage crisis, the Camp David Accords and the end of detente. I was age 9-13 during this period and just becoming aware of world events. I loved reading in depth and first hand accounts of things I remember, but not in detail.
Mr. Brzezinski was born in Poland between the wars. His father was a Polish diplomat, assigned to Germany through the early Nazi years and then sent to Canada as an ambassador. After finishing high school in Canada, Mr. Brzezinski attended Harvard as a contemporary of Henry Kissinger. Messrs. Kissinger and Brzezinski, two European refugees, became life long frenemies, with lives that intersected from the early 60s until Brzezinski died in the first Trump administration. Mr. Brzezinski's PhD thesis concerned non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union and the rest of his career focused on separating satellite states from the Russia. He was on the fringes of thinking about Soviet internal dynamics, until he was proved right. Unlike Henry Kissinger, Mr. Brzezinski was brash, aggressive and argumentative. He did not bend to the fashions of the day and therefore he was considered as more eccentric and unreliable than Kissinger. He definitely did not toe party lines and that probably hurt his political career.
Despite his grating manner, he was prescient. After the fall of the Soviet Union, in 1997 he wrote, "Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an ‘anti-hegemonic’ coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower.” The only detail he missed in describing today is the role of North Korea in the anti-USA bloc.
Mr. Luce covers Mr. Brzezinski's life in detail, but he writes in an easy-to-read journalistic style. He had lots of access to Mr. Brzezinski's surviving family, President Carter and prominent members of his administration, heads of the CIA, Secretaries of State, etc. Like a great biography, Mr. Luce conveys both the persona of Mr. Brzezinski and how he was buffeted by grand historical events.
Mr. Brzezinski was and is beloved in Poland, with many squares, streets, etc. named after him. My suspicion is that there are few Americans who know who he is. Nevertheless, he was highly influential in steering the US interactions with the Soviet Union, China and the rest of the world in the beginning of Act IV of Pax Americana. Mr. Luce's book gives us an inside view of how foreign policy is made, how Washington works and reminds us of the all-too human nature of our heroes and our enemnies.
Mr. Brzezinski was born in Poland between the wars. His father was a Polish diplomat, assigned to Germany through the early Nazi years and then sent to Canada as an ambassador. After finishing high school in Canada, Mr. Brzezinski attended Harvard as a contemporary of Henry Kissinger. Messrs. Kissinger and Brzezinski, two European refugees, became life long frenemies, with lives that intersected from the early 60s until Brzezinski died in the first Trump administration. Mr. Brzezinski's PhD thesis concerned non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union and the rest of his career focused on separating satellite states from the Russia. He was on the fringes of thinking about Soviet internal dynamics, until he was proved right. Unlike Henry Kissinger, Mr. Brzezinski was brash, aggressive and argumentative. He did not bend to the fashions of the day and therefore he was considered as more eccentric and unreliable than Kissinger. He definitely did not toe party lines and that probably hurt his political career.
Despite his grating manner, he was prescient. After the fall of the Soviet Union, in 1997 he wrote, "Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an ‘anti-hegemonic’ coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower.” The only detail he missed in describing today is the role of North Korea in the anti-USA bloc.
Mr. Luce covers Mr. Brzezinski's life in detail, but he writes in an easy-to-read journalistic style. He had lots of access to Mr. Brzezinski's surviving family, President Carter and prominent members of his administration, heads of the CIA, Secretaries of State, etc. Like a great biography, Mr. Luce conveys both the persona of Mr. Brzezinski and how he was buffeted by grand historical events.
Mr. Brzezinski was and is beloved in Poland, with many squares, streets, etc. named after him. My suspicion is that there are few Americans who know who he is. Nevertheless, he was highly influential in steering the US interactions with the Soviet Union, China and the rest of the world in the beginning of Act IV of Pax Americana. Mr. Luce's book gives us an inside view of how foreign policy is made, how Washington works and reminds us of the all-too human nature of our heroes and our enemnies.
July 30, 2025
Zbigninew Brzezinski is best known as the long time critic of soviet communism who served as Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor. In this exceptionally well written biography Edward Luce examines the long career of this often overlooked figure who accurately predicted that the Soviet Union would ultimately fail due to its inability to incorporate the various nationalities into its society.
Brzezinski was the son of a Polish diplomat who worked tirelessly for his country before World War II and continued to work for the cause of the Polish people including its Jewish residents during the war while living in Canada. After the communists took over Poland Brzezinski's family suddenly had to adjust to the lifestyle of a lower standing, no longer working for their home country. During this time Zbig and his siblings grew up in Canada before Zbig moving to the U.S. when the U.K. rejected his wish to study there.
Brzezinski then attended Harvard where he earned his Phd and began his academic career. before moving to Columbia University. it was while at Columbia that Brzezinski first became a advisor to presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. Over the next few years Brzezinski would occasionally advise Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Vice President Humphrey on foreign policy.
in the early 1970s Brzezinski would cofound the Trilateral Commission with banker David Rockefeller. It was through this organization that Brzezinski first became acquainted with Jimmy Carter who Brzezinski advised during his 1976 presidential campaign. After his election Carter appointed Brzezinski to be his National Security Advisor. In this capacity Brzezinski helped with the normalization of relations with China, assisted in the Camp David Accords and recommended a harder line towards the Soviet Union and support for the dissidents in communist ruled Eastern Europe. During this time Brzezinski developed close relationships with Pope John Paul II (who the KGB claimed Brzezinski had engineered the election of), Deng Xiaoping & Menachem Begin.
Following the end of the Carter presidency Brzezinski returned to Columbia and focused on writing books and advising politicians on foreign policy. George H. W. Bush was the only president to truly reached out and actively seek Brzezinski's advice as the Cold War ended. Most other Presidents ignored or failed to heed Brzezinski's views.
This is an excellent book on a largely overlooked figure in American History who contributions to political science and American foreign policy was intense and valuable. I highly recommend reading this book.
Brzezinski was the son of a Polish diplomat who worked tirelessly for his country before World War II and continued to work for the cause of the Polish people including its Jewish residents during the war while living in Canada. After the communists took over Poland Brzezinski's family suddenly had to adjust to the lifestyle of a lower standing, no longer working for their home country. During this time Zbig and his siblings grew up in Canada before Zbig moving to the U.S. when the U.K. rejected his wish to study there.
Brzezinski then attended Harvard where he earned his Phd and began his academic career. before moving to Columbia University. it was while at Columbia that Brzezinski first became a advisor to presidential candidate John F. Kennedy. Over the next few years Brzezinski would occasionally advise Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Vice President Humphrey on foreign policy.
in the early 1970s Brzezinski would cofound the Trilateral Commission with banker David Rockefeller. It was through this organization that Brzezinski first became acquainted with Jimmy Carter who Brzezinski advised during his 1976 presidential campaign. After his election Carter appointed Brzezinski to be his National Security Advisor. In this capacity Brzezinski helped with the normalization of relations with China, assisted in the Camp David Accords and recommended a harder line towards the Soviet Union and support for the dissidents in communist ruled Eastern Europe. During this time Brzezinski developed close relationships with Pope John Paul II (who the KGB claimed Brzezinski had engineered the election of), Deng Xiaoping & Menachem Begin.
Following the end of the Carter presidency Brzezinski returned to Columbia and focused on writing books and advising politicians on foreign policy. George H. W. Bush was the only president to truly reached out and actively seek Brzezinski's advice as the Cold War ended. Most other Presidents ignored or failed to heed Brzezinski's views.
This is an excellent book on a largely overlooked figure in American History who contributions to political science and American foreign policy was intense and valuable. I highly recommend reading this book.
July 17, 2025
Luce has written a most readable biography of Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Polish-American political scientist who served as Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor and whose counsel was sought by many US Presidents thereafter, thereby giving the reader - even the older reader - a fresh insight into the geopolitics of America from the late 1970s through to 9/11 (he died in 2017 at age 89). The reader will no doubt better perceive the roots of how we have reached the current global uncooperative mess.
In many ways "Zbig" is typical of an era when immigrants to the US had a greater chance of rising from humble beginnings and becoming assimilated and respected for what they brought to the table, if not universally loved (who is?). Like most intelligent immigrants, he was better prepared to understand "the fragility of societies" -- but remained the "realistic optimist", as Madleine Albright called him in her obituary. The book shows us how Zbig's heart remained anchored in his native Poland: "He had been raised in the unshakable belief that Poland was a civilisational part of the West. Partitioned, betrayed, and sidelined over the centuries, Poland was the West's eternal orphan." But he used that visceral understanding to hone deep insights into EuroAsian politics (and politicians), and had the intellect to apply that understanding to best advance America's global interests.
Zbig was an early and unwavering predictor of the ultimate collapse of the USSR, which he saw as driven by the diverse age-old ethnic and nationalistic cultures inside it -- while pointing out that China had no such fragilities and would likely adapt as it grew. After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, that did not stop Zbig shunning the End-of-History mantra , and instead warning that the self-congratulatory liberal-democratic hubris would likely lead the US to mess up the sequel by obsessing over the one-size-fits-all "Washington Consensus" that assumed historical development is unilinear, and imitation of the West is the only possible option for all countries.
He warned that post-1989, the "intensifying crisis of the Russian spirit" could bring back nationalism, and eventually make the US vulnerable to an "alliance of the aggrieved".
Kissinger - Zbig's lifelong 'frenemy' - wrote in his surprisingly touching obituary letter: "He strove to provide structure to a world ever tempted by chaos and confusing mirages with vision. He was forever challenging his time with concepts of peace and freedom...". In 2012, when Zbig was writing "Time to Start Thinking", his view was that "Acute inequality, deteriorating infrastructure, falling educational standards, congressional gridlock, and a culture of instant gratification were rendering [the US] incapable of thinking seriously about its challenges." One can only imagine, dear reader, what he would be saying 13 years later!
In many ways "Zbig" is typical of an era when immigrants to the US had a greater chance of rising from humble beginnings and becoming assimilated and respected for what they brought to the table, if not universally loved (who is?). Like most intelligent immigrants, he was better prepared to understand "the fragility of societies" -- but remained the "realistic optimist", as Madleine Albright called him in her obituary. The book shows us how Zbig's heart remained anchored in his native Poland: "He had been raised in the unshakable belief that Poland was a civilisational part of the West. Partitioned, betrayed, and sidelined over the centuries, Poland was the West's eternal orphan." But he used that visceral understanding to hone deep insights into EuroAsian politics (and politicians), and had the intellect to apply that understanding to best advance America's global interests.
Zbig was an early and unwavering predictor of the ultimate collapse of the USSR, which he saw as driven by the diverse age-old ethnic and nationalistic cultures inside it -- while pointing out that China had no such fragilities and would likely adapt as it grew. After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, that did not stop Zbig shunning the End-of-History mantra , and instead warning that the self-congratulatory liberal-democratic hubris would likely lead the US to mess up the sequel by obsessing over the one-size-fits-all "Washington Consensus" that assumed historical development is unilinear, and imitation of the West is the only possible option for all countries.
He warned that post-1989, the "intensifying crisis of the Russian spirit" could bring back nationalism, and eventually make the US vulnerable to an "alliance of the aggrieved".
Kissinger - Zbig's lifelong 'frenemy' - wrote in his surprisingly touching obituary letter: "He strove to provide structure to a world ever tempted by chaos and confusing mirages with vision. He was forever challenging his time with concepts of peace and freedom...". In 2012, when Zbig was writing "Time to Start Thinking", his view was that "Acute inequality, deteriorating infrastructure, falling educational standards, congressional gridlock, and a culture of instant gratification were rendering [the US] incapable of thinking seriously about its challenges." One can only imagine, dear reader, what he would be saying 13 years later!
June 26, 2025
I am surprised how much I liked this superb bio of Jimmy Carter’s national security advisor. I also lost track of how much foreign policy stuff happened during Carter’s presidency. At the time, Henry Kissinger had dominated public attention in foreign policy and national security events, so it was easy to not pay attention to a grumpy Polish guy who was not as much of a personal marketer as Kissinger.
Edward Luce’s book is exceptional for clarifying that Brzezinski had an entirely different theory of the USSR and communism than Kissinger did (Congress of Vienna and diplomacy versus center-periphery tensions and captive nations). It turns out that Zbig’s theory was more informative for understanding the fall of communism in 1989-1990 than traditional diplomacy and containment. Luce ties this general idea with Brzezinski’s Polish background, links with the Polish Pope John Paul II, the role of the Helsinki Accords on human rights, and the result is an “eye opener” that forces a reevaluation of Zbig’s accomplishments, stature, and legacy as a public intellectual/foreign policy guru. I have read a lot of political history and seldom get insights like this from a single volume biography.
The book is well written and persuasive. It is just too bad how the Iranian hostage crisis tainted the Carter presidency (and Brzezinski’s legacy) but one comes away with a greatly enhanced view of Zbig.
I highly recommend the book.
Edward Luce’s book is exceptional for clarifying that Brzezinski had an entirely different theory of the USSR and communism than Kissinger did (Congress of Vienna and diplomacy versus center-periphery tensions and captive nations). It turns out that Zbig’s theory was more informative for understanding the fall of communism in 1989-1990 than traditional diplomacy and containment. Luce ties this general idea with Brzezinski’s Polish background, links with the Polish Pope John Paul II, the role of the Helsinki Accords on human rights, and the result is an “eye opener” that forces a reevaluation of Zbig’s accomplishments, stature, and legacy as a public intellectual/foreign policy guru. I have read a lot of political history and seldom get insights like this from a single volume biography.
The book is well written and persuasive. It is just too bad how the Iranian hostage crisis tainted the Carter presidency (and Brzezinski’s legacy) but one comes away with a greatly enhanced view of Zbig.
I highly recommend the book.
June 1, 2025
A very well-written biography of one of the most insightful thinkers and effective foreign policy makers of the twentieth century. The understanding one gains of the man and his times illuminates the transition from the Cold War to a brief attempt in Russia to build a liberal democracy. As with so much history nowadays, the juxtaposition of a giant like Dr. Z with the flawed characters of the current administration reinforces how low we have fallen.
June 9, 2025
Luce has the ability to take the complex and dense and tel a story where both those aspects are woven in gently and clearly. I was so taken by the depth of his reportage and research and the abundance enlightening information. This author the this subject are both compelling. This is like 40 ft from the stage for presidential back-up singers. Super telling of an important story: the strong, and unapologetic narrative a great man.
June 13, 2025
Excellent. Very comprehensive biography but accessible for the foreign policy layperson. One minor quibble: the chapters are soooo long. A little more structure might have helped me, but overall, I enjoyed and learned from this biography. Luce does justice to Brzezinski's amazing and consequential life.
Want to read
June 23, 2025Economist review: Was Zbigniew Brzezinski America’s most important foreign-policy guru?
https://www.economist.com/culture/202...
https://www.economist.com/culture/202...
June 23, 2025
incredible life
A well written biography of an incredible thinker. Brzezinski played a shadow role in all US history from the 60’s into the 21st Century. Some of his conclusions on the Middle East stated in the 80’s and 90’s could be written today and accurate.
A well written biography of an incredible thinker. Brzezinski played a shadow role in all US history from the 60’s into the 21st Century. Some of his conclusions on the Middle East stated in the 80’s and 90’s could be written today and accurate.
July 18, 2025
Long and pretty dense, but ZB played an important role in the 70's and was a respected, consistent intelligent voice about foreign affairs. So the global affairs aspect was very instructive and interesting.
September 1, 2025
Truly one of the best history books I’ve ever read. Extremely informative and well written. What sets this apart from other historical biographies was how incredibly human Zbig was portrayed. Absolutely wonderful.
October 8, 2025
Enjoyable yet bland. He seemed like to be a man that was very lively and that didn't translate well here. I was also expecting more stories of his time in office. Perhaps not enough time has gone by to open the files a bit more.
December 28, 2025
A super interesting life and fascinating to see inside the Carter White House, warts and all. I had a hard time getting past the editing, some really awkward paragraph structure and organization … and in the first paragraph, Montreal is not the capital of Québec!
January 1, 2026
I picked this up on a lark, and was surprised at how much I enjoyed the book. It is extremely well-written and rarely dull. Brzezinski's life story was a mirror to the much of the country's and the world's 20th century history. A fascinating and at times touching read.
May 10, 2025
A good objective review.
June 22, 2025
A well written biography of zbigniew brzezinski.THE national security advisor of president Jimmy Carter.
June 26, 2025
Interesting, fascinating and well written covering an important part of the Cold War and the post world history. Shows starkly how little vision politicians have today.
June 30, 2025
Interesting
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