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Our Dear Friends in Moscow: The Inside Story of a Broken Generation
Two of Russia’s most prominent investigative journalists tell the "gripping" (Foreign Policy) story of how the hopes of their generation of optimistic Russians in the 1990s was replaced by autocracy, fear, and betrayal
A Foreign Affairs Best Book of the Year
Our Dear Friends in Moscow tells the story of a group of young Russians, part of an idealistic generation who came of age in Moscow at the end of the twentieth century, just as the communist era imploded and a future full of potential, and uncertainty, stood in front of them. Initially, the group seized and enjoyed the freedoms of the new era, but quickly the notion that Russia was destined to join the West, and Europe, in a new partnership began to fade. At home the economy crashed, civil war stalked Chechnya, and terrorism came to Moscow. More discreetly, the new Russian government, getting angrier at the West and collecting a list of grievances, began to pull inward. By the time of Vladimir Putin’s second and apparently endless term as president, the country had embraced a kind of ethnonationalism and was heading for war at home and abroad.
The group is torn apart by the shift in Russia. Some flee; others become sinister agents of the ever more aggressive state. The center cannot hold.
A Foreign Affairs Best Book of the Year
Our Dear Friends in Moscow tells the story of a group of young Russians, part of an idealistic generation who came of age in Moscow at the end of the twentieth century, just as the communist era imploded and a future full of potential, and uncertainty, stood in front of them. Initially, the group seized and enjoyed the freedoms of the new era, but quickly the notion that Russia was destined to join the West, and Europe, in a new partnership began to fade. At home the economy crashed, civil war stalked Chechnya, and terrorism came to Moscow. More discreetly, the new Russian government, getting angrier at the West and collecting a list of grievances, began to pull inward. By the time of Vladimir Putin’s second and apparently endless term as president, the country had embraced a kind of ethnonationalism and was heading for war at home and abroad.
The group is torn apart by the shift in Russia. Some flee; others become sinister agents of the ever more aggressive state. The center cannot hold.
288 pages, Kindle Edition
Published June 3, 2025
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June 8, 2025
This was an interesting read from the inside out about how the wheel turns in Russia. Written by two exiled investigative Russian journalists, the book describes the closeness they had with many friends in the early days of their careers and the camaraderie and debates they would have about life, work, and politics. Their shared experiences in a country that drew from the past, struggled to define itself post-Soviet Union, and now under the complete power of the Kremlin were not enough to sustain those friendships. Instead, it was those same experiences but divergent philosophies and values that drove these friendships apart. This book details the group of friends’ move from idealism to the reality of life in the ever present shadow of Russia’s political system and its machinations, and the choices each have made. I wasn’t wowed by the writing style - it was plodding in parts and not very engaging, although this may have been a function of writing in a different language. Read the book more for a first-hand account into life as it is in current Russia told by the authors who lived there until they moved/escaped to the U.K. in 2020. Many thanks to the authors, publisher, and NetGalley for the opportunity to read and review this book.
July 7, 2025
I’m obsessed with the desire to understand why humans make compromises (or take actions that appear to be in opposition with their stated values or beliefs). Do I misunderstand their beliefs and therefore find myself surprised when I should have seen it differently all along? Are they motivated by a desire for comfort, respect, stability, or ambition? Or are they truly motivated by ideology and belief?
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Bologan unpack those questions in a vulnerable and comprehensive memoir of sorts that follows their friend group of young journalists from 1990s Russia to today. Most of the friends ended up working as propagandists and ideological cheerleaders for the Kremlin, including in prominent roles like the Minister of Culture. One died in a military accident in Crimea. And the authors made the choice to flee to exile in London after the Kremlin strangled their livelihoods and threatened their personal safety. So, they have the life experience to offer us reflections on those questions.
I don’t know whether the authors would agree, but it seems like the roots of their friends’ acquiescence to the brutality and harsh logic of Putin’s Russia lies in a combination of Russian psyche and personal ambition and grievances.
They write in the epilogue that as “students of Russian history by training, all of [their friends]…firmly believed that nothing could be done about about the reason for that storm—the country was doomed to be run by a dictator, in one form or another. The only difference one could make was to choose whether to stay outside the regime—doomed to be a loser, a victim of inevitable repression—or try to stay inside and play a role. And all of them, ever ambitious, chose to stay inside and play.”
In addition, their friends experienced moments where they felt of locked out or excluded. From professional success in their chosen career, from political influence when their patrons fell out of favor with Putin, or from Europe and the West as Russia increasingly isolated itself (and was isolated) following the invasion of Crimea and renewed invasion of 2022. These grievances may have bent their will toward compromise. As they say, “go along to get along.”
These same questions vis a vis Russia are explored in Vasily Grossman’s work (i.e. Life and Fate) or Joshua Yaffa’s Between Two Fires. For readers who aren’t as engaged in Russian affairs, you could still find value for how these questions apply to your own political and social contexts. In my own context as an American and Christian, that question has been particularly relevant as America has parsed out why many evangelical Christians support President Trump.
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Bologan unpack those questions in a vulnerable and comprehensive memoir of sorts that follows their friend group of young journalists from 1990s Russia to today. Most of the friends ended up working as propagandists and ideological cheerleaders for the Kremlin, including in prominent roles like the Minister of Culture. One died in a military accident in Crimea. And the authors made the choice to flee to exile in London after the Kremlin strangled their livelihoods and threatened their personal safety. So, they have the life experience to offer us reflections on those questions.
I don’t know whether the authors would agree, but it seems like the roots of their friends’ acquiescence to the brutality and harsh logic of Putin’s Russia lies in a combination of Russian psyche and personal ambition and grievances.
They write in the epilogue that as “students of Russian history by training, all of [their friends]…firmly believed that nothing could be done about about the reason for that storm—the country was doomed to be run by a dictator, in one form or another. The only difference one could make was to choose whether to stay outside the regime—doomed to be a loser, a victim of inevitable repression—or try to stay inside and play a role. And all of them, ever ambitious, chose to stay inside and play.”
In addition, their friends experienced moments where they felt of locked out or excluded. From professional success in their chosen career, from political influence when their patrons fell out of favor with Putin, or from Europe and the West as Russia increasingly isolated itself (and was isolated) following the invasion of Crimea and renewed invasion of 2022. These grievances may have bent their will toward compromise. As they say, “go along to get along.”
These same questions vis a vis Russia are explored in Vasily Grossman’s work (i.e. Life and Fate) or Joshua Yaffa’s Between Two Fires. For readers who aren’t as engaged in Russian affairs, you could still find value for how these questions apply to your own political and social contexts. In my own context as an American and Christian, that question has been particularly relevant as America has parsed out why many evangelical Christians support President Trump.
August 11, 2025
In "Our Dear Friends in Moscow," investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan tell the story of a generation of Russian reporters who began their careers inspired by the promise of a democratic future in post-Soviet Russia — only to see that dream collapse under Putin’s tightening grip over the course of the last 25 years. The book tells a gripping story where some fought to preserve independent journalism and integrity and others traded integrity for security, influence, and proximity to power.
The metaphor towards the end of the book about sums it up: "He appeared to just accept that zero tolerance of any opposition, coupled with extreme violence, had become commonplace in Putin's Russia. Many generations of Russians had lived as if they were the dwellers of a tiny village clinging to the cliff on the shores of the mighty ocean in the Middle Ages—a victim of storms and hurricanes one could only accept, but never challenge. Now Putin just turned those hurricanes into the perfect storm. ...Just like those villagers, they firmly believed nothing could be done about the reason for that storm—the country was doomed to be run by a dictator, in one form or another. The only difference one could make was to choose whether to stay outside the regime—doomed to be a loser, a victim of inevitable repression or try to stay inside and play a role. And all of then, ever ambitious, chose to stay in and play.”
Reading the book, one thought kept coming up over and over — Soldatov and Borogan’s memoir is both a lament and a warning to us in the West. When those in positions of influence normalize complicity — the damage to facts, freedoms, public trust and democratic norms can be swift and close to irreversible. For American readers, the book offers a chilling reminder that the road from principled disagreement to authoritarian alignment is paved with decisions that feel “necessary” in the moment — and that, once taken, are rarely undone. History doesn’t announce when you’ve crossed the line; it simply records that you did.
The metaphor towards the end of the book about sums it up: "He appeared to just accept that zero tolerance of any opposition, coupled with extreme violence, had become commonplace in Putin's Russia. Many generations of Russians had lived as if they were the dwellers of a tiny village clinging to the cliff on the shores of the mighty ocean in the Middle Ages—a victim of storms and hurricanes one could only accept, but never challenge. Now Putin just turned those hurricanes into the perfect storm. ...Just like those villagers, they firmly believed nothing could be done about the reason for that storm—the country was doomed to be run by a dictator, in one form or another. The only difference one could make was to choose whether to stay outside the regime—doomed to be a loser, a victim of inevitable repression or try to stay inside and play a role. And all of then, ever ambitious, chose to stay in and play.”
Reading the book, one thought kept coming up over and over — Soldatov and Borogan’s memoir is both a lament and a warning to us in the West. When those in positions of influence normalize complicity — the damage to facts, freedoms, public trust and democratic norms can be swift and close to irreversible. For American readers, the book offers a chilling reminder that the road from principled disagreement to authoritarian alignment is paved with decisions that feel “necessary” in the moment — and that, once taken, are rarely undone. History doesn’t announce when you’ve crossed the line; it simply records that you did.
January 29, 2026
By 1991 Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev had resigned, a coup failed to bring conservatives back to power, and Boris Yeltsin would lead the new Russia through a period of corruption and kleptocracy that by the end of the 1990s saw the former Soviet Union at a precipice. Would it continue to try and improve relations with the west, or would it turn inward? However, a watershed moment took place as Russian President Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999, and appointed Vladimir Putin as acting head of the government. According to historians Philip Short, Steven Lee Myres, and Catherine Belton, that behind the scenes Putin, after serving as the Director of Federal Security Service (FSB) and as Secretary of the Security Council, had cut a deal to protect Yeltsin and his family from any criminal charges emanating from his presidency, and that Yeltsin resigned in order to give his protégé a leg up in the coming presidential election to insure that protection.
Once Putin was elected and took firm control Russia engaged in a series of wars, first a massive military invasion and occupation of Chechnya to restore federal control which lasted until 2009. By 2008, Putin had decided that moving closer to western economic interests was not going to be Russia’s future and invaded Georgia in support of separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The five day war resulted in Russian occupation of these territories which are internationally recognized as part of Georgia. According to Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan in their new book OUR DEAR FRIENDS IN MOSCOW: THE INSIDE STORY OF A BROKEN GENERATION by 2011Putin came to an understanding that globalization with its ideas and technologies was the major threat to Russia and him personally. Since 2011 Russia engaged in a series of actions and maneuvers to detach Moscow from the West. In 2014 in response to Euromaidan protests, Russian forces took control of the Crimean peninsula. In addition, Russia initiated a war in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, supporting separatist forces. On February 24, 2022, Putin unleashed a large-scale invasion of Ukraine with the goal of quickly toppling the Zelensky government in Kyiv and installing a regime that was pro-Russian and would not make any moves toward the European Union or NATO. In a few weeks, the war will enter its fourth year and no matter the pipe dreams of Donald Trump it appears Putin has no inclination toward making peace particularly as American support for Ukraine has eroded.
In their new book Soldatov and Borogan explore former friendships with people dating to the spring of 2000 following Putin’s election who met at the Russian daily newspaper, Izvestia. By 2022, some of those friends in Moscow were serving Putin in one way or another. At the same time, the authors were in exile in London separated from family and were wanted by Russian authorities. Why had those friendships which had been so close evolved in the way they had? How did former friends end up on such violently opposed sides? The answer to these questions form the core of a fascinating and heart rendering book as the authors reconnected with a few of their former friends and follow this group from the optimistic years of the early 2000s, a time of brief liberalism under Dmitry Medvedev, the annexation of Crimea and the repressions that followed between 2016-2021, and the current war in Ukraine. It is a journey that describes a soon to be global society with tremendous aspirations to “a dismal walled-in fortress.”
The authors spend the first segment of the book tracing their careers as they move from one newspaper or media outpost to the next. In their discussion they integrate a series of friendships and the belief systems of those who they see as their compatriots. Among the most important individuals that the authors discuss is Evgeny Krutikov who at one time was head of the Political Department at Izvestia and over the years developed extensive contacts in the Russian intelligence community. The authors would work with him at the newspaper. Petya Akopov emerges as another important relationship. Akopov is a scion of Moscow intelligentsia who was the chief correspondent in the Political Department at Izvestia. He and his wife Marina were always critical of the west and were against liberal values and believed Russia was a more spiritual civilization than the west. Zhenya Baranov was an intrepid war correspondent for a Russian television channel who was good friends with Akopov. Olga Lyubimova, a television host with connections to reactionary film maker Nikita Mikhalkov. Lastly, Sveta Babayeva who replaced Krutikov as head of the Political Department, an individual who had been a member of the Kremlin press pool attached to Putin.
Apart from their newspaper work Soldatov and Borogan launched a website, Agentura, “a ring of spies,” that was designed to be a community for journalists to write about security services for different newspapers. At the outset, the FSB did not interfere because it sought to improve its image and hoped to consolidate positive news reports on its actions. At the same time, they launched their website, Vladimir Putin’s presidency was experiencing difficulties. The brutal Chechen civil war which led to repeated terror attacks was ongoing; and the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk while Putin was on vacation in Sochi became a propaganda nightmare.
At this point, the authors should have realized that they were not on the same page as their compatriots who found nothing wrong with Putin undergoing cosmetic surgery at a time when Russian sailors were drowning inside a submarine. Akopov and others blamed the west for interfering in the crisis causing the authors to realize they could no longer work at Izvestia. This would begin a journey of employment at a series of media outlets after resigning from Izvestia after a number of editorial conflicts over articles dealing with Russian security services. The authors would hook on with Versia, a weekly tabloid which had worked with the KGB in the past and they suspected was corrupt, but they needed a job. On October 23, 2002, Putin’s political problems reemerged as terrorists seized the Dubrovka Theater. Special Forces would rush the theater and three days later 130 people, 5 terrorists were killed out of 1000 hostages taken. Putin declared victory over terrorism as he did not want to appear weak despite the fact most were killed when government forces unleashed poison gas which backfired. When Soldatov and Borogan posted an article entitled, “Not True” on their website and Versia picked it up the result was an FSB raid , interrogation at the infamous Lefortovo prison and new employment. The authors would move on to the Moscow News which coincided with the Brelan school massacre in the North Caucusus which consisted of 334 dead hostages of which 186 were children. Their friend Baranov would praise Putin’s response and made a derogatory and false documentary describing the leader of Georgia. By this time, it was clear Baranov and Krutikov were propagandists working for security agencies. Shortly thereafter, the authors were let go by the Moscow News.
Soon the only place they could publish was on their website and a new platform, Ej.ru which was a home for anti-Putin liberals. By this time, the Russian economy was booming due to oil revenues. People began experiencing economic improvement and wealth seemed to touch a large segment of the urban population. Putin saw this as an opportunity to crack down on any opposition resulting in the assassinations of Anna Politkovskaya, an anti-Putin journalist at Novaya Gazeta, and Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer. Anyone who opposed Putin was a target including Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of the largest energy company in Russia who was accused of tax evasion, embezzlement, and assassination and would be imprisoned for over ten years and find his wealth confiscated.
The authors do an excellent job integrating their journalistic journey with events in Russia. By 2008 Putin will invade Georgia expanding on his belief that the breakup of the Soviet Union was the worst thing that ever happened to Russia. It was the first step in a two decade long campaign to restore Moscow to its proper place in the world order. Putin would emerge from the Georgia imbroglio with an 88% popularity in Russian polls. 2008 was also a watershed year for the authors as they learned the murder of Anna Politkovskaya involved an FSB officer leading to their newspaper firing them.
Soldatov and Brogden’s thesis trying to understand how their compatriots had wound up on the other side of the political spectrum from them has a clear answer – the signs were evident from the outset of their friendships as they learned the views and backgrounds of these individuals. Akopov’s belief in the monastic traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church as an alternative to western philosophy should have been a warning sign. Even Baranov spoke of the orthodox faith as he reported on Channel One, the main Russian television station. As Putin decided to make Russian orthodoxy a national ideology, the authors should not have been surprised.
Many believed the term of Dimitri Medvedev symbolized a more liberal Russia. But it was clear Putin was making the decisions in the background and would soon resume the Russian presidency. Once Putin returned and seized Crimea and attacked the Donbas region in Ukraine it was clear what his ideology was and would continue to be. Soldatov and Borogan’s disappointment in their friends would continue as they chose the path of going along with the government as their Izvestia friends showed their true colors. In 2014 Baranov was a presenter for Channel One, the Kremlin propaganda channel, pushing a narrative of Nazis in Ukraine and Nato aggression, while his wife crossed the almost non-existent line between state and press to become Deputy Minister of Culture the following year. Akopov authored a triumphalist essay, published in February 2022: ‘Putin has resolved the Ukrainian question’; it was swiftly removed from the internet when the Ukrainians stopped the Russian army outside Kyiv.
One would ask why these people made the choice of becoming government propagandists. They were well educated, intelligent people, but financial need, family, health issues carry great weight in decision making or perhaps it was nostalgia for the power of the Soviet Union – for each individual it is a personal choice once Putin’s direction was clear. Journalists had little choice if they hoped to make a decent living but to work for state media and get in line with the official ideology. Putin was suffocating the independent media and civil society that emerged in the early 2000s and by 2014 that suffocation was complete.
The depth of the author’s break with past friends is evident as Douglas Smith writes in the August 3, 2025, edition of the Wall Street Journal; “In the eyes of their friends, Mr. Soldatov and Ms. Borogan were either traitors or fools. In 2012 Mr. Akopov called them “scum” and implied they were foreign agents for their investigations into the security services. Ms. Lyubimova, who built a career making patriotic films and eventually climbed the government ranks to become the minister of culture, mocked the notion that Russia could ever be moved from its authoritarian historical foundations. Resistance was futile, submission was the only option. In what became known as the “Lyubimova Manifesto,” she stated that the way to survive was to give in, as she did, like a rape victim: “I lie on my back, spread my legs, breathe deeply, and even try to enjoy it.”
By February 24, 2022, the day Putin unleashed his attack on Ukraine the authors had already moved to London, however there was and is a target on their backs. They have been followed, warned by police that they were in danger, and in June 2022 the Russian Interior Ministry issued an arrest warrant for them. They have had to resort to what they learned about spy craft during their journalistic careers as part of their survival strategy.
Once Putin was elected and took firm control Russia engaged in a series of wars, first a massive military invasion and occupation of Chechnya to restore federal control which lasted until 2009. By 2008, Putin had decided that moving closer to western economic interests was not going to be Russia’s future and invaded Georgia in support of separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The five day war resulted in Russian occupation of these territories which are internationally recognized as part of Georgia. According to Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan in their new book OUR DEAR FRIENDS IN MOSCOW: THE INSIDE STORY OF A BROKEN GENERATION by 2011Putin came to an understanding that globalization with its ideas and technologies was the major threat to Russia and him personally. Since 2011 Russia engaged in a series of actions and maneuvers to detach Moscow from the West. In 2014 in response to Euromaidan protests, Russian forces took control of the Crimean peninsula. In addition, Russia initiated a war in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, supporting separatist forces. On February 24, 2022, Putin unleashed a large-scale invasion of Ukraine with the goal of quickly toppling the Zelensky government in Kyiv and installing a regime that was pro-Russian and would not make any moves toward the European Union or NATO. In a few weeks, the war will enter its fourth year and no matter the pipe dreams of Donald Trump it appears Putin has no inclination toward making peace particularly as American support for Ukraine has eroded.
In their new book Soldatov and Borogan explore former friendships with people dating to the spring of 2000 following Putin’s election who met at the Russian daily newspaper, Izvestia. By 2022, some of those friends in Moscow were serving Putin in one way or another. At the same time, the authors were in exile in London separated from family and were wanted by Russian authorities. Why had those friendships which had been so close evolved in the way they had? How did former friends end up on such violently opposed sides? The answer to these questions form the core of a fascinating and heart rendering book as the authors reconnected with a few of their former friends and follow this group from the optimistic years of the early 2000s, a time of brief liberalism under Dmitry Medvedev, the annexation of Crimea and the repressions that followed between 2016-2021, and the current war in Ukraine. It is a journey that describes a soon to be global society with tremendous aspirations to “a dismal walled-in fortress.”
The authors spend the first segment of the book tracing their careers as they move from one newspaper or media outpost to the next. In their discussion they integrate a series of friendships and the belief systems of those who they see as their compatriots. Among the most important individuals that the authors discuss is Evgeny Krutikov who at one time was head of the Political Department at Izvestia and over the years developed extensive contacts in the Russian intelligence community. The authors would work with him at the newspaper. Petya Akopov emerges as another important relationship. Akopov is a scion of Moscow intelligentsia who was the chief correspondent in the Political Department at Izvestia. He and his wife Marina were always critical of the west and were against liberal values and believed Russia was a more spiritual civilization than the west. Zhenya Baranov was an intrepid war correspondent for a Russian television channel who was good friends with Akopov. Olga Lyubimova, a television host with connections to reactionary film maker Nikita Mikhalkov. Lastly, Sveta Babayeva who replaced Krutikov as head of the Political Department, an individual who had been a member of the Kremlin press pool attached to Putin.
Apart from their newspaper work Soldatov and Borogan launched a website, Agentura, “a ring of spies,” that was designed to be a community for journalists to write about security services for different newspapers. At the outset, the FSB did not interfere because it sought to improve its image and hoped to consolidate positive news reports on its actions. At the same time, they launched their website, Vladimir Putin’s presidency was experiencing difficulties. The brutal Chechen civil war which led to repeated terror attacks was ongoing; and the sinking of the nuclear submarine Kursk while Putin was on vacation in Sochi became a propaganda nightmare.
At this point, the authors should have realized that they were not on the same page as their compatriots who found nothing wrong with Putin undergoing cosmetic surgery at a time when Russian sailors were drowning inside a submarine. Akopov and others blamed the west for interfering in the crisis causing the authors to realize they could no longer work at Izvestia. This would begin a journey of employment at a series of media outlets after resigning from Izvestia after a number of editorial conflicts over articles dealing with Russian security services. The authors would hook on with Versia, a weekly tabloid which had worked with the KGB in the past and they suspected was corrupt, but they needed a job. On October 23, 2002, Putin’s political problems reemerged as terrorists seized the Dubrovka Theater. Special Forces would rush the theater and three days later 130 people, 5 terrorists were killed out of 1000 hostages taken. Putin declared victory over terrorism as he did not want to appear weak despite the fact most were killed when government forces unleashed poison gas which backfired. When Soldatov and Borogan posted an article entitled, “Not True” on their website and Versia picked it up the result was an FSB raid , interrogation at the infamous Lefortovo prison and new employment. The authors would move on to the Moscow News which coincided with the Brelan school massacre in the North Caucusus which consisted of 334 dead hostages of which 186 were children. Their friend Baranov would praise Putin’s response and made a derogatory and false documentary describing the leader of Georgia. By this time, it was clear Baranov and Krutikov were propagandists working for security agencies. Shortly thereafter, the authors were let go by the Moscow News.
Soon the only place they could publish was on their website and a new platform, Ej.ru which was a home for anti-Putin liberals. By this time, the Russian economy was booming due to oil revenues. People began experiencing economic improvement and wealth seemed to touch a large segment of the urban population. Putin saw this as an opportunity to crack down on any opposition resulting in the assassinations of Anna Politkovskaya, an anti-Putin journalist at Novaya Gazeta, and Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB officer. Anyone who opposed Putin was a target including Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the head of the largest energy company in Russia who was accused of tax evasion, embezzlement, and assassination and would be imprisoned for over ten years and find his wealth confiscated.
The authors do an excellent job integrating their journalistic journey with events in Russia. By 2008 Putin will invade Georgia expanding on his belief that the breakup of the Soviet Union was the worst thing that ever happened to Russia. It was the first step in a two decade long campaign to restore Moscow to its proper place in the world order. Putin would emerge from the Georgia imbroglio with an 88% popularity in Russian polls. 2008 was also a watershed year for the authors as they learned the murder of Anna Politkovskaya involved an FSB officer leading to their newspaper firing them.
Soldatov and Brogden’s thesis trying to understand how their compatriots had wound up on the other side of the political spectrum from them has a clear answer – the signs were evident from the outset of their friendships as they learned the views and backgrounds of these individuals. Akopov’s belief in the monastic traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church as an alternative to western philosophy should have been a warning sign. Even Baranov spoke of the orthodox faith as he reported on Channel One, the main Russian television station. As Putin decided to make Russian orthodoxy a national ideology, the authors should not have been surprised.
Many believed the term of Dimitri Medvedev symbolized a more liberal Russia. But it was clear Putin was making the decisions in the background and would soon resume the Russian presidency. Once Putin returned and seized Crimea and attacked the Donbas region in Ukraine it was clear what his ideology was and would continue to be. Soldatov and Borogan’s disappointment in their friends would continue as they chose the path of going along with the government as their Izvestia friends showed their true colors. In 2014 Baranov was a presenter for Channel One, the Kremlin propaganda channel, pushing a narrative of Nazis in Ukraine and Nato aggression, while his wife crossed the almost non-existent line between state and press to become Deputy Minister of Culture the following year. Akopov authored a triumphalist essay, published in February 2022: ‘Putin has resolved the Ukrainian question’; it was swiftly removed from the internet when the Ukrainians stopped the Russian army outside Kyiv.
One would ask why these people made the choice of becoming government propagandists. They were well educated, intelligent people, but financial need, family, health issues carry great weight in decision making or perhaps it was nostalgia for the power of the Soviet Union – for each individual it is a personal choice once Putin’s direction was clear. Journalists had little choice if they hoped to make a decent living but to work for state media and get in line with the official ideology. Putin was suffocating the independent media and civil society that emerged in the early 2000s and by 2014 that suffocation was complete.
The depth of the author’s break with past friends is evident as Douglas Smith writes in the August 3, 2025, edition of the Wall Street Journal; “In the eyes of their friends, Mr. Soldatov and Ms. Borogan were either traitors or fools. In 2012 Mr. Akopov called them “scum” and implied they were foreign agents for their investigations into the security services. Ms. Lyubimova, who built a career making patriotic films and eventually climbed the government ranks to become the minister of culture, mocked the notion that Russia could ever be moved from its authoritarian historical foundations. Resistance was futile, submission was the only option. In what became known as the “Lyubimova Manifesto,” she stated that the way to survive was to give in, as she did, like a rape victim: “I lie on my back, spread my legs, breathe deeply, and even try to enjoy it.”
By February 24, 2022, the day Putin unleashed his attack on Ukraine the authors had already moved to London, however there was and is a target on their backs. They have been followed, warned by police that they were in danger, and in June 2022 the Russian Interior Ministry issued an arrest warrant for them. They have had to resort to what they learned about spy craft during their journalistic careers as part of their survival strategy.
July 8, 2025
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Частично автобиография, частично описание некоторых самых значительных исторических событий современной России времён Путина. Если рассматривать книгу в качестве исторической, то тут ничего нового нет. Главным элементом книги является именно автобиографические очерки этой пары и в частности описание их трудовых будней в качестве российских независимых журналистов. В этом смысле книга интересна тем, что она показывает, хотя не очень детально, внутреннюю жизнь российской журналистики. Мне, конечно, хотелось бы увидеть больше информации о том, как функционировала российская журналистика, особенно как она трансформировалась из относительно независимой в полностью подконтрольную и как журналистское сообщество приняло такие правила игры. Так же мне было бы интересно узнать, насколько действительно объективной была российская журналистика в 90-ые, т.е. когда СМИ принадлежали олигархам. К сожалению, об этом так же как о журналистике ельцинского периода в книге сказано не очень много.
В основном в книге мы встречаем истории которые происходили после того как Путин пришёл к власти. Да, в книге есть история о том, как газета, в которой работали авторы этой книги, на их глазах превратилась из объективной в полностью провластную, т.е. фактически персонал газеты трансформировался из журналистов в некий аналог государственных чиновников. Но опять же, описание этого, хотя и присутствует в книге, но описано не очень интересно, точнее, не очень детально. Так же в книге присутствует тема подобной трансформации друзей авторов, которые из объективных и независимо мыслящих журналистов превратились в государственную обслугу, готовых поддержать любое решение властей, включая расстрел своих собственных граждан. Это интересно, но я так и не понял, по каким причинам такая трансформация произошла и не была ли она следствием принятием иной веры, веры Мамона.
Книгу было частично интересно читать, а частично нет, особенно там, где авторы касались таких тем как Беслан, Норд-Ост и пр. самые известные события современной путинской России. Ничего нового я в этих темах не нашёл, а перечитывать описание событий которые я читал раз пятьдесят, мне не хотелось. Поэтому интерес представляют истории собственной жизни этих двух авторов. К примеру, мне было очень интересно узнать причины, по которым эти два авторы были уволены из самой знаменитой независимой газеты, которую на протяжении многих лет читал и я сам – из «Новой Газеты». Частично мне было известно о таком очень странном поведении главного редактора «Новой Газеты» Дмитрия Муратова. Впрочем, перестал я читать эту газету задолго до этого события, ибо я почувствовал, что критика в отношении властей, которая была раньше у «Новой Газеты», постепенно уменьшилась. Как мне кажется, произошло примерно то же самое что и с когда-то независимой радиостанцией «Эхо Москвы», которое, как и «Новая Газета», то ли договорилась с российской властью о неких компромиссах, то ли добровольно пошла на самоцензуру и компромисс. В общем, вот что пишет автор по поводу той громкой истории:
“We are fired. Novaya Gazeta fired us,” Andrei whispered.
We rushed to the exit, and Andrei explained in more detail: “It was Novaya’s HR chief. She said that we were fired due to staff reduction. She refused to elaborate.” We called the deputy editor, but he refused to talk to us, other than to confirm our firing.
It was a bolt from the blue, and we knew for a fact that Novaya Gazeta was the very last media outlet in Russia that would have us on staff. Who else would dare to hire two reporters whose specialty was investigating the Russian security services?
As soon as we returned to Moscow, we went straight to Novaya Gazeta’s offices on Potapovsky Lane. But there, the editors flatly refused to talk to us.
Two months later, we learned that the FSB lieutenant colonel involved in Politkovskaya’s assassination had been released, and more than that, reinstated in his position.
We thought it was hardly a coincidence. It looked like we had dug deeper in our reporting than we had been expected to do. For the first time, we both began watching our backs.
Я вспоминаю эту историю ещё в контексте появления в качестве главного редактора «Новой Газеты Европа» такого очень неоднозначного человека как Кирилл Мартынов, которого многие обвиняют в тесных отношениях (которые были раньше) с Кремлём. Вообще, после убийства Анны Политковской, «Новая Газета» как будто пошла на какие-то договорные отношение с Кремлём, мол, государство не закрывает газету, а главный редактор не трогает особо болезненные для Кремля темы. Я могу, конечно, ошибаться, но именно такое ощущение у меня сформировалось и сформировалось очень давно. Возможно, такой компромисс и был бы в рамках нормы, если бы не одно событие – вторжение в Украину в феврале 2022 года.
Это событие, к сожалению, помазало очень многих людей кровью, точнее людей, которые решили, что можно пойти на компромисс с путинской властью ради хотя бы небольшой возможности говорить людям правду. Если до распространения интернета такой подход и мог бы быть оправданным, то уже после примерно 2011-12 годов такой компромисс виделся мне саморазрушительным и саморазрушительным именно для российской оппозиции, российских независимых организаций, включая журналистику, НКО и общественных известных деятелей. Каков же выход? Уход в подполье и вещание, находясь за границей. Любой другой вариант подразумевает определённую степень компромисса с нынешней властью, что потом будет использовано в качестве демонстрации, что в России, мол, демократия, точно такая же, как якобы и на Западе. На протяжении многих лет Путин приводил в пример наличие «Новой Газеты» и «Эхо Москвы» в качестве аргумента, что в России существуют независимые от государства СМИ, но как мы видим, они, может, и были независимыми от Кремля, но лишь частично либо имели сильную самоцензуру. В любом случаи, итог мы увидели в феврале 2022 года и это главное во всей этой истории (на всякий случай напомню, что февраль всё ещё длиться, со всеми вытекающими последствиями из этого факта).
В книге так же можно найти зарождение новой идеологии или нового стиля жизни, который стал доступен именно с приходом Путина – деньги, деньги, деньги. Да, это началось при Ельцине, когда население как зачарованные, стремились исключительно к Золотому Тельцу (последствие советского дефицита, которое как будто въелось в души россиян на всю оставшуюся жизнь), однако тогда это было доступно лишь очень богатым россиянам, которых тогда обозначали фразой «новые русские». При Путине, денежный фонтан пролился и на многих городских жителей России.
Liberals in Yeltsin’s government did not try to prevent people from gathering on the streets, but they made a conscious effort to make street protests seem old fashioned, outdated, and even reactionary. Communism had been defeated and there was a new country with a new liberal economy. Everyone was free to make money. Why protest? Protest rallies were for losers—like communists and those nostalgic for the Soviet empire.
Liberal-minded journalists soon coined a term—“red-browns”—to describe the opposition to Yeltsin as a mix of communists and fascists, alluding to their nationalistic revanchism. The media, including the newspaper we worked for at the time, Segodnya, mocked all forms of protest activity as a pastime for old losers who had failed to find a place in the new Russian reality.
The mass gatherings were still permitted, although the places where they were to occur needed to be agreed upon with the local authorities; they just went out of fashion among those who went to work for banks and commercial companies and others who gained access to the perks of the new capitalist economy.
С комфортом и денежным довольством появилась не так давно забытая идея, идея империи. Впрочем, мне кажется, имперские идеи поддерживали скорее либо очень бедные люди, которым просто нечем больше гордиться либо очень богатые. Очень богатые используют идею имперскости чтобы создать иллюзию того, что они поддерживают путинскую власть не ради яхт, особняков, чёрной икры и бутылок шампанского за несколько тысяч долларов, а ради восстановления былого величия России. Всё-таки одно дело, когда ты лжёшь ради бабла, а другой – ради воссоздания империи Александра III. Я думаю это такой самообман, чтобы убедить себя в том, что ты не проститутка, а «государев человек». На самом деле, в глубине души, такие люди понимают, что они обычные проститутки, только продают не тело, а свою, как говорится, бессмертную душу. Так что в этом смысле мне трудно согласится с авторами книги, когда они презентуют своих бывших друзей в качестве людей которые стали такими вот государственниками и якобы патриотами. Нет, не верю я в это и главная причина – расследования того образа жизни который ведут крупные российские чиновники о которых на протяжении многих лет делал видеоролики Алексей Навальный. Нет в путинском окружении идейных людей, их просто там не может быть.
It's part autobiography, part description of some of the most significant historical events of modern Russia during Putin's time. If we consider the book as a historical book, there is nothing new here. The main element of the book is the autobiographical sketches of the couple and, in particular, the description of their working life as Russian independent journalists. In this sense, the book is interesting because it shows, although not in great detail, the inner life of Russian journalism. I certainly would have liked to see more information about how Russian journalism functioned, especially how it transformed from relatively independent to fully controlled, and how the journalistic community accepted such rules of the game. I would also have been interested to know how objective Russian journalism really was in the 1990s, i.e., when the media were owned by the oligarchs. Unfortunately, the book doesn't say much about this, as well as about the journalism of the Yeltsin period.
Most of the stories in the book are about what happened after Putin came to power. Yes, there is a story in the book about how the newspaper, where the authors of this book worked, turned from objective to completely pro-governmental before their eyes, i.e., the staff of the newspaper was transformed from journalists into a kind of analogue of government officials. But again, the description of this, although present in the book, is not very interesting, or rather, not very detailed. Also in the book, there is a theme of similar transformation of the authors' friends, who, from objective and independent thinking journalists, turned into state servants, ready to support any decision of the authorities, including shooting their own citizens. It is interesting, but I never understood the reasons for this transformation and whether it was not the result of adopting a different faith, the faith of Mammon.
The book was partly interesting to read, and partly not, especially where the authors touched on such topics as Beslan, Nord-Ost, etc., the most famous events of Putin's modern Russia. I did not find anything new in these topics, and I did not want to re-read the description of events that I had read fifty times. Therefore, the stories of their own lives of these two authors are of interest. For example, I was very interested to learn the reasons why these two authors were fired from the most famous independent newspaper that I myself had read for many years - Novaya Gazeta. I was partially aware of this very strange behavior on the part of the editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta, Dmitry Muratov. However, I had stopped reading this newspaper long before this event, because I felt that the criticism of the authorities that Novaya Gazeta used to have was gradually diminishing. It seems to me that the same thing happened to the once independent radio station Ekho Moskvy, which, like Novaya Gazeta, either agreed to some compromises with the Russian authorities or voluntarily agreed to self-censorship and compromise. In general, here is what the author writes about that high-profile story:
“We are fired. Novaya Gazeta fired us,” Andrei whispered.
We rushed to the exit, and Andrei explained in more detail: “It was Novaya’s HR chief. She said that we were fired due to staff reduction. She refused to elaborate.” We called the deputy editor, but he refused to talk to us, other than to confirm our firing.
It was a bolt from the blue, and we knew for a fact that Novaya Gazeta was the very last media outlet in Russia that would have us on staff. Who else would dare to hire two reporters whose specialty was investigating the Russian security services?
As soon as we returned to Moscow, we went straight to Novaya Gazeta’s offices on Potapovsky Lane. But there, the editors flatly refused to talk to us.
Two months later, we learned that the FSB lieutenant colonel involved in Politkovskaya’s assassination had been released, and more than that, reinstated in his position.
We thought it was hardly a coincidence. It looked like we had dug deeper in our reporting than we had been expected to do. For the first time, we both began watching our backs.
I recall this story in the context of the emergence as editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta Europe of such a very controversial person as Kirill Martynov, whom many accuse of having close relations (which he used to have) with the Kremlin. In general, after the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, Novaya Gazeta seems to have entered into some kind of contractual relationship with the Kremlin: the state does not close the newspaper, and the editor-in-chief does not touch topics that are particularly sensitive to the Kremlin. I may be wrong, of course, but this is exactly the feeling I had a long time ago. Perhaps such a compromise would be within the norm, if it were not for one event - the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
This event, unfortunately, anointed a lot of people with blood, or rather, people who decided that it was possible to compromise with Putin's power for the sake of at least a small opportunity to tell people the truth. If before the spread of the Internet, such an approach could have been justified, then after about 2011-12, such a compromise seemed to me self-destructive and self-destructive for the Russian opposition, independent organizations, including journalism, NGOs, and public figures. What is the way out? Going underground and broadcasting while abroad. Any other option implies a certain degree of compromise with the current government, which will then be used as a demonstration that Russia is a democracy, just as it supposedly is in the West. For years, Putin has cited the existence of Novaya Gazeta and Ekho Moskvy as an argument that Russia has media independent of the state, but as we can see, they may have been independent of the Kremlin, but only partially or with strong self-censorship. In any case, we saw the outcome in February 2022, and that is the main thing in this whole story (just in case I remind you that February still lasts, with all the consequences that follow from this fact).
In the book, one can also find the birth of a new ideology or a new lifestyle that became available with Putin's arrival - money, money, money. Yes, it started under Yeltsin, when the population, like enchanted people, aspired exclusively to the Golden Taurus (a consequence of the Soviet deficit, which seemed to be ingrained in the souls of Russians for the rest of their lives), but then it was available only to very rich Russians, who were then labeled by the phrase “New Russians”. Under Putin, the money fountain has spilled over to many urban Russians as well.
Liberals in Yeltsin’s government did not try to prevent people from gathering on the streets, but they made a conscious effort to make street protests seem old fashioned, outdated, and even reactionary. Communism had been defeated and there was a new country with a new liberal economy. Everyone was free to make money. Why protest? Protest rallies were for losers—like communists and those nostalgic for the Soviet empire.
Liberal-minded journalists soon coined a term—“red-browns”—to describe the opposition to Yeltsin as a mix of communists and fascists, alluding to their nationalistic revanchism. The media, including the newspaper we worked for at the time, Segodnya, mocked all forms of protest activity as a pastime for old losers who had failed to find a place in the new Russian reality.
The mass gatherings were still permitted, although the places where they were to occur needed to be agreed upon with the local authorities; they just went out of fashion among those who went to work for banks and commercial companies and others who gained access to the perks of the new capitalist economy.
With comfort and monetary contentment came a not-so-long-forgotten idea, the idea of empire. However, it seems to me that imperial ideas are supported either by very poor people who have nothing else to be proud of or by the very rich. The very rich use the idea of imperialism to create the illusion that they support Putin's power not for the sake of yachts, mansions, black caviar, and bottles of champagne for a few thousand dollars, but for the sake of restoring Russia's former greatness. Still, it's one thing to lie for the sake of money, and another to recreate the empire of Alexander III. I think it is such self-deception to convince yourself that you are not a prostitute, but “a man of the sovereign”. In fact, deep down, such people realize that they are ordinary prostitutes, only they do not sell their bodies, but their, as they say, immortal souls. So, in this sense, I find it difficult to agree with the authors of the book when they present their former friends as people who have become such a man of the sovereign and alleged patriots. No, I don't believe this, and the main reason is the investigation of the lifestyle of major Russian officials about whom Alexei Navalny has been making videos for years. There are no ideological people in Putin's entourage; they just can't be there.
Частично автобиография, частично описание некоторых самых значительных исторических событий современной России времён Путина. Если рассматривать книгу в качестве исторической, то тут ничего нового нет. Главным элементом книги является именно автобиографические очерки этой пары и в частности описание их трудовых будней в качестве российских независимых журналистов. В этом смысле книга интересна тем, что она показывает, хотя не очень детально, внутреннюю жизнь российской журналистики. Мне, конечно, хотелось бы увидеть больше информации о том, как функционировала российская журналистика, особенно как она трансформировалась из относительно независимой в полностью подконтрольную и как журналистское сообщество приняло такие правила игры. Так же мне было бы интересно узнать, насколько действительно объективной была российская журналистика в 90-ые, т.е. когда СМИ принадлежали олигархам. К сожалению, об этом так же как о журналистике ельцинского периода в книге сказано не очень много.
В основном в книге мы встречаем истории которые происходили после того как Путин пришёл к власти. Да, в книге есть история о том, как газета, в которой работали авторы этой книги, на их глазах превратилась из объективной в полностью провластную, т.е. фактически персонал газеты трансформировался из журналистов в некий аналог государственных чиновников. Но опять же, описание этого, хотя и присутствует в книге, но описано не очень интересно, точнее, не очень детально. Так же в книге присутствует тема подобной трансформации друзей авторов, которые из объективных и независимо мыслящих журналистов превратились в государственную обслугу, готовых поддержать любое решение властей, включая расстрел своих собственных граждан. Это интересно, но я так и не понял, по каким причинам такая трансформация произошла и не была ли она следствием принятием иной веры, веры Мамона.
Книгу было частично интересно читать, а частично нет, особенно там, где авторы касались таких тем как Беслан, Норд-Ост и пр. самые известные события современной путинской России. Ничего нового я в этих темах не нашёл, а перечитывать описание событий которые я читал раз пятьдесят, мне не хотелось. Поэтому интерес представляют истории собственной жизни этих двух авторов. К примеру, мне было очень интересно узнать причины, по которым эти два авторы были уволены из самой знаменитой независимой газеты, которую на протяжении многих лет читал и я сам – из «Новой Газеты». Частично мне было известно о таком очень странном поведении главного редактора «Новой Газеты» Дмитрия Муратова. Впрочем, перестал я читать эту газету задолго до этого события, ибо я почувствовал, что критика в отношении властей, которая была раньше у «Новой Газеты», постепенно уменьшилась. Как мне кажется, произошло примерно то же самое что и с когда-то независимой радиостанцией «Эхо Москвы», которое, как и «Новая Газета», то ли договорилась с российской властью о неких компромиссах, то ли добровольно пошла на самоцензуру и компромисс. В общем, вот что пишет автор по поводу той громкой истории:
“We are fired. Novaya Gazeta fired us,” Andrei whispered.
We rushed to the exit, and Andrei explained in more detail: “It was Novaya’s HR chief. She said that we were fired due to staff reduction. She refused to elaborate.” We called the deputy editor, but he refused to talk to us, other than to confirm our firing.
It was a bolt from the blue, and we knew for a fact that Novaya Gazeta was the very last media outlet in Russia that would have us on staff. Who else would dare to hire two reporters whose specialty was investigating the Russian security services?
As soon as we returned to Moscow, we went straight to Novaya Gazeta’s offices on Potapovsky Lane. But there, the editors flatly refused to talk to us.
Two months later, we learned that the FSB lieutenant colonel involved in Politkovskaya’s assassination had been released, and more than that, reinstated in his position.
We thought it was hardly a coincidence. It looked like we had dug deeper in our reporting than we had been expected to do. For the first time, we both began watching our backs.
Я вспоминаю эту историю ещё в контексте появления в качестве главного редактора «Новой Газеты Европа» такого очень неоднозначного человека как Кирилл Мартынов, которого многие обвиняют в тесных отношениях (которые были раньше) с Кремлём. Вообще, после убийства Анны Политковской, «Новая Газета» как будто пошла на какие-то договорные отношение с Кремлём, мол, государство не закрывает газету, а главный редактор не трогает особо болезненные для Кремля темы. Я могу, конечно, ошибаться, но именно такое ощущение у меня сформировалось и сформировалось очень давно. Возможно, такой компромисс и был бы в рамках нормы, если бы не одно событие – вторжение в Украину в феврале 2022 года.
Это событие, к сожалению, помазало очень многих людей кровью, точнее людей, которые решили, что можно пойти на компромисс с путинской властью ради хотя бы небольшой возможности говорить людям правду. Если до распространения интернета такой подход и мог бы быть оправданным, то уже после примерно 2011-12 годов такой компромисс виделся мне саморазрушительным и саморазрушительным именно для российской оппозиции, российских независимых организаций, включая журналистику, НКО и общественных известных деятелей. Каков же выход? Уход в подполье и вещание, находясь за границей. Любой другой вариант подразумевает определённую степень компромисса с нынешней властью, что потом будет использовано в качестве демонстрации, что в России, мол, демократия, точно такая же, как якобы и на Западе. На протяжении многих лет Путин приводил в пример наличие «Новой Газеты» и «Эхо Москвы» в качестве аргумента, что в России существуют независимые от государства СМИ, но как мы видим, они, может, и были независимыми от Кремля, но лишь частично либо имели сильную самоцензуру. В любом случаи, итог мы увидели в феврале 2022 года и это главное во всей этой истории (на всякий случай напомню, что февраль всё ещё длиться, со всеми вытекающими последствиями из этого факта).
В книге так же можно найти зарождение новой идеологии или нового стиля жизни, который стал доступен именно с приходом Путина – деньги, деньги, деньги. Да, это началось при Ельцине, когда население как зачарованные, стремились исключительно к Золотому Тельцу (последствие советского дефицита, которое как будто въелось в души россиян на всю оставшуюся жизнь), однако тогда это было доступно лишь очень богатым россиянам, которых тогда обозначали фразой «новые русские». При Путине, денежный фонтан пролился и на многих городских жителей России.
Liberals in Yeltsin’s government did not try to prevent people from gathering on the streets, but they made a conscious effort to make street protests seem old fashioned, outdated, and even reactionary. Communism had been defeated and there was a new country with a new liberal economy. Everyone was free to make money. Why protest? Protest rallies were for losers—like communists and those nostalgic for the Soviet empire.
Liberal-minded journalists soon coined a term—“red-browns”—to describe the opposition to Yeltsin as a mix of communists and fascists, alluding to their nationalistic revanchism. The media, including the newspaper we worked for at the time, Segodnya, mocked all forms of protest activity as a pastime for old losers who had failed to find a place in the new Russian reality.
The mass gatherings were still permitted, although the places where they were to occur needed to be agreed upon with the local authorities; they just went out of fashion among those who went to work for banks and commercial companies and others who gained access to the perks of the new capitalist economy.
С комфортом и денежным довольством появилась не так давно забытая идея, идея империи. Впрочем, мне кажется, имперские идеи поддерживали скорее либо очень бедные люди, которым просто нечем больше гордиться либо очень богатые. Очень богатые используют идею имперскости чтобы создать иллюзию того, что они поддерживают путинскую власть не ради яхт, особняков, чёрной икры и бутылок шампанского за несколько тысяч долларов, а ради восстановления былого величия России. Всё-таки одно дело, когда ты лжёшь ради бабла, а другой – ради воссоздания империи Александра III. Я думаю это такой самообман, чтобы убедить себя в том, что ты не проститутка, а «государев человек». На самом деле, в глубине души, такие люди понимают, что они обычные проститутки, только продают не тело, а свою, как говорится, бессмертную душу. Так что в этом смысле мне трудно согласится с авторами книги, когда они презентуют своих бывших друзей в качестве людей которые стали такими вот государственниками и якобы патриотами. Нет, не верю я в это и главная причина – расследования того образа жизни который ведут крупные российские чиновники о которых на протяжении многих лет делал видеоролики Алексей Навальный. Нет в путинском окружении идейных людей, их просто там не может быть.
It's part autobiography, part description of some of the most significant historical events of modern Russia during Putin's time. If we consider the book as a historical book, there is nothing new here. The main element of the book is the autobiographical sketches of the couple and, in particular, the description of their working life as Russian independent journalists. In this sense, the book is interesting because it shows, although not in great detail, the inner life of Russian journalism. I certainly would have liked to see more information about how Russian journalism functioned, especially how it transformed from relatively independent to fully controlled, and how the journalistic community accepted such rules of the game. I would also have been interested to know how objective Russian journalism really was in the 1990s, i.e., when the media were owned by the oligarchs. Unfortunately, the book doesn't say much about this, as well as about the journalism of the Yeltsin period.
Most of the stories in the book are about what happened after Putin came to power. Yes, there is a story in the book about how the newspaper, where the authors of this book worked, turned from objective to completely pro-governmental before their eyes, i.e., the staff of the newspaper was transformed from journalists into a kind of analogue of government officials. But again, the description of this, although present in the book, is not very interesting, or rather, not very detailed. Also in the book, there is a theme of similar transformation of the authors' friends, who, from objective and independent thinking journalists, turned into state servants, ready to support any decision of the authorities, including shooting their own citizens. It is interesting, but I never understood the reasons for this transformation and whether it was not the result of adopting a different faith, the faith of Mammon.
The book was partly interesting to read, and partly not, especially where the authors touched on such topics as Beslan, Nord-Ost, etc., the most famous events of Putin's modern Russia. I did not find anything new in these topics, and I did not want to re-read the description of events that I had read fifty times. Therefore, the stories of their own lives of these two authors are of interest. For example, I was very interested to learn the reasons why these two authors were fired from the most famous independent newspaper that I myself had read for many years - Novaya Gazeta. I was partially aware of this very strange behavior on the part of the editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta, Dmitry Muratov. However, I had stopped reading this newspaper long before this event, because I felt that the criticism of the authorities that Novaya Gazeta used to have was gradually diminishing. It seems to me that the same thing happened to the once independent radio station Ekho Moskvy, which, like Novaya Gazeta, either agreed to some compromises with the Russian authorities or voluntarily agreed to self-censorship and compromise. In general, here is what the author writes about that high-profile story:
“We are fired. Novaya Gazeta fired us,” Andrei whispered.
We rushed to the exit, and Andrei explained in more detail: “It was Novaya’s HR chief. She said that we were fired due to staff reduction. She refused to elaborate.” We called the deputy editor, but he refused to talk to us, other than to confirm our firing.
It was a bolt from the blue, and we knew for a fact that Novaya Gazeta was the very last media outlet in Russia that would have us on staff. Who else would dare to hire two reporters whose specialty was investigating the Russian security services?
As soon as we returned to Moscow, we went straight to Novaya Gazeta’s offices on Potapovsky Lane. But there, the editors flatly refused to talk to us.
Two months later, we learned that the FSB lieutenant colonel involved in Politkovskaya’s assassination had been released, and more than that, reinstated in his position.
We thought it was hardly a coincidence. It looked like we had dug deeper in our reporting than we had been expected to do. For the first time, we both began watching our backs.
I recall this story in the context of the emergence as editor-in-chief of Novaya Gazeta Europe of such a very controversial person as Kirill Martynov, whom many accuse of having close relations (which he used to have) with the Kremlin. In general, after the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, Novaya Gazeta seems to have entered into some kind of contractual relationship with the Kremlin: the state does not close the newspaper, and the editor-in-chief does not touch topics that are particularly sensitive to the Kremlin. I may be wrong, of course, but this is exactly the feeling I had a long time ago. Perhaps such a compromise would be within the norm, if it were not for one event - the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
This event, unfortunately, anointed a lot of people with blood, or rather, people who decided that it was possible to compromise with Putin's power for the sake of at least a small opportunity to tell people the truth. If before the spread of the Internet, such an approach could have been justified, then after about 2011-12, such a compromise seemed to me self-destructive and self-destructive for the Russian opposition, independent organizations, including journalism, NGOs, and public figures. What is the way out? Going underground and broadcasting while abroad. Any other option implies a certain degree of compromise with the current government, which will then be used as a demonstration that Russia is a democracy, just as it supposedly is in the West. For years, Putin has cited the existence of Novaya Gazeta and Ekho Moskvy as an argument that Russia has media independent of the state, but as we can see, they may have been independent of the Kremlin, but only partially or with strong self-censorship. In any case, we saw the outcome in February 2022, and that is the main thing in this whole story (just in case I remind you that February still lasts, with all the consequences that follow from this fact).
In the book, one can also find the birth of a new ideology or a new lifestyle that became available with Putin's arrival - money, money, money. Yes, it started under Yeltsin, when the population, like enchanted people, aspired exclusively to the Golden Taurus (a consequence of the Soviet deficit, which seemed to be ingrained in the souls of Russians for the rest of their lives), but then it was available only to very rich Russians, who were then labeled by the phrase “New Russians”. Under Putin, the money fountain has spilled over to many urban Russians as well.
Liberals in Yeltsin’s government did not try to prevent people from gathering on the streets, but they made a conscious effort to make street protests seem old fashioned, outdated, and even reactionary. Communism had been defeated and there was a new country with a new liberal economy. Everyone was free to make money. Why protest? Protest rallies were for losers—like communists and those nostalgic for the Soviet empire.
Liberal-minded journalists soon coined a term—“red-browns”—to describe the opposition to Yeltsin as a mix of communists and fascists, alluding to their nationalistic revanchism. The media, including the newspaper we worked for at the time, Segodnya, mocked all forms of protest activity as a pastime for old losers who had failed to find a place in the new Russian reality.
The mass gatherings were still permitted, although the places where they were to occur needed to be agreed upon with the local authorities; they just went out of fashion among those who went to work for banks and commercial companies and others who gained access to the perks of the new capitalist economy.
With comfort and monetary contentment came a not-so-long-forgotten idea, the idea of empire. However, it seems to me that imperial ideas are supported either by very poor people who have nothing else to be proud of or by the very rich. The very rich use the idea of imperialism to create the illusion that they support Putin's power not for the sake of yachts, mansions, black caviar, and bottles of champagne for a few thousand dollars, but for the sake of restoring Russia's former greatness. Still, it's one thing to lie for the sake of money, and another to recreate the empire of Alexander III. I think it is such self-deception to convince yourself that you are not a prostitute, but “a man of the sovereign”. In fact, deep down, such people realize that they are ordinary prostitutes, only they do not sell their bodies, but their, as they say, immortal souls. So, in this sense, I find it difficult to agree with the authors of the book when they present their former friends as people who have become such a man of the sovereign and alleged patriots. No, I don't believe this, and the main reason is the investigation of the lifestyle of major Russian officials about whom Alexei Navalny has been making videos for years. There are no ideological people in Putin's entourage; they just can't be there.
November 17, 2025
Intriguing book, definitely could be hard to follow at parts and all the Russian names made it difficult to keep track of who was who, but a generally interesting description of how Russia became a repressed authoritarian state over the course of a quarter-century after the fall of the Soviet Union.
December 3, 2025
This was interesting and enlightening. But, at times, it also felt like the Olympic Games of mental gymnastics to justify the authors’ friendships with questionable characters. The authors’ friends sounded pretty horrible back in the 2000s as well; their turn in 2022 didn’t come as a shock to me.
And I find it pretty revealing that a society comes to think that “being part of the West” means spending weekends in Paris, while believing that political demonstrations are for losers. It also surprised me that there was no mention to the 2013 gay “propaganda” law in the book; I personally see it as key moment of progress towards authoritarianism.
And I find it pretty revealing that a society comes to think that “being part of the West” means spending weekends in Paris, while believing that political demonstrations are for losers. It also surprised me that there was no mention to the 2013 gay “propaganda” law in the book; I personally see it as key moment of progress towards authoritarianism.
June 29, 2025
Labai žinomi žurnalistai ir rašytojai ieško atsakymo, kas yra blogai su jais, su jų karta, su jų laikmečiu, su jų Tėvyne - Rusija. Grupė žurnalistų, pradėjusių darbuotis Rusijoje jau po sovietmečio, išgyvena, pasakoja, aprašo visus esminius Rusijos įvykius. Tačiau tik daliai jų pavyksta likti padoriais ir sąžiningais. Kiti dėl pačių įvairiausių priežasčių parduoda save, parduoda savo sąžinę, kolaboruoja su kraugerišku režimu. Kita dalis, padorieji, tampa nereikalingi savo gimtoje šalyje. Knyga ir yra ieškojimas tų pagrindinių atsakymų, kodėl jie atsidūrė nereikalingi namuose. Iš esmės knyga nuteikia labai pesimistiškai, nes panašu, kad Rusijoje jau nebeliko nieko gero ir bent jau kalbančių ar rašančių padorių žmonių. Pasiliko tie, kurie to nesupranta, arba suprasdami yra nutarę kolaboruoti, arba kuriems viskas yra tinkama ir priimtina.
September 14, 2025
Very interesting and excellently written story that gives an insight into a mistery: how did a lot of cultivated, intelligent people get to serve the propaganda machine of President Putin? Even more intriguing that it comes from close friends who ended up on the other side of the political spectrum. I see this book as a complement and a follow-up to Pomerantsev wonderful, unparalleled “nothing is true and everything is possible“, in that it gave me a new and updated look into the culture and media industry of an increasingly disfunctional and antidemocratic russian society.
December 29, 2025
I had a chance, before I read "Our Dear Friends in Moscow: The Inside Story of a Broken Generation," to hear and see its authors, Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, interviewed by Kennan Institute Director Michael Kimmage in a Kennan Institute webinar earlier in this month of December 2025.
I remember that Ms. Borogan had replied at one point to a quote about how any reporter not toeing the Kremlin line had been deemed a "loser," and that Ms. Borogan, replying for herself and her partner, Andrei Soldatov, had said, "that would be us."
I beg to differ about that response. These two authors, Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov, are nothing but absolute, courageous heroes for sticking by the truth, as reporters and as human beings, which is made so evident on every page of this memoir, "Our Dear Friends in Moscow."
The book works on so many levels, most importantly for me by giving me insights into the thinking about themselves, as young Russian people, and their country, Russia. It is a personal book. In reading it, I came to know the authors, as my friends, too.
I tell them, "No, you aren't losers, by any stretch of the imagination."
And I want to tell them about myself, that despite being university educated by an eminent and well thought of undergraduate institution in the USA, the University of Notre Dame, as well as having Ivy League credentials as a dual masters' degree holder in International Affairs and an MBA from Columbia University, that I myself have faced adversity, including long stretches of unemployment, not due to being incapable, but rather due to having to live through the same kinds of hardship that forced them to depart from Russia, despite that I am a citizen of the USA, and have been living in New York City for what will be 32 years in 2026.
And I ask these two incredible authors and people and human beings, to keep hope alive! Things are going to get better. The emoji that is appropriate for our times is none other than the smiley face! :) I have time. And by extension, so do they.
I remember that Ms. Borogan had replied at one point to a quote about how any reporter not toeing the Kremlin line had been deemed a "loser," and that Ms. Borogan, replying for herself and her partner, Andrei Soldatov, had said, "that would be us."
I beg to differ about that response. These two authors, Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov, are nothing but absolute, courageous heroes for sticking by the truth, as reporters and as human beings, which is made so evident on every page of this memoir, "Our Dear Friends in Moscow."
The book works on so many levels, most importantly for me by giving me insights into the thinking about themselves, as young Russian people, and their country, Russia. It is a personal book. In reading it, I came to know the authors, as my friends, too.
I tell them, "No, you aren't losers, by any stretch of the imagination."
And I want to tell them about myself, that despite being university educated by an eminent and well thought of undergraduate institution in the USA, the University of Notre Dame, as well as having Ivy League credentials as a dual masters' degree holder in International Affairs and an MBA from Columbia University, that I myself have faced adversity, including long stretches of unemployment, not due to being incapable, but rather due to having to live through the same kinds of hardship that forced them to depart from Russia, despite that I am a citizen of the USA, and have been living in New York City for what will be 32 years in 2026.
And I ask these two incredible authors and people and human beings, to keep hope alive! Things are going to get better. The emoji that is appropriate for our times is none other than the smiley face! :) I have time. And by extension, so do they.
Read
October 11, 2025a shocking story written by two investigators.
June 26, 2025
Όλη η ιστορία της μετάβασης από την ΕΣΣΔ στην παντοκρατορία του Πούτιν μέσα από μια παρέα νεαρών δημοσιογράφων που πήραν διαφορετικούς δρόμους, από εξορία, μέχρι υμνητές του σημερινού καθεστώτος. Αριστοτεχνική αφήγηση προσωπικών στιγμών δεμένων με τα μεγάλα γεγονότα. Συγκλονιστικό βιβλίο. Must read.
November 1, 2025
An interesting piece of work, that offers insights into the way contemporary Russia works and thinks. These two young journalists must have cojones of steel to have chosen to devote their early careers to monitoring and recording the work of the Russian security services; but that is a core theme of this book, presented in the form of a loose diary of the events in the authors’ working lives over 20 years or more.
The style is a little on the breathless side, a blizzard of details and of different people – far too many Russian names for any non-Russian outsider to make sense of them all - as the writers scurry from one event to another, moving from one news publication to the next, one situation to the next. The overall theme is their slowly growing disappointment that their friends – or at least, colleagues – should change their minds and drift towards a pro-Putin view of the world.
A surprising aspect of the narrative, for me, was that they more or less ignore many of the really major events in Russian society, and concentrate instead on their own lesser travails. Navalny does get a mention for a page or two it’s true, and the poisoning of Litvinenko gets a paragraph. Even spy Skripal is referred to (once), but not Putin’s attempt to assassinate him in Salisbury. It’s as if they inhabit their own introspective little world and barely notice the big things taking place outside. The seizing of Crimea gets more or less no mention, and the chapter devoted to the invasion of Ukraine spends more time on their relationships with one or two other journalists than on the pillaging of Ukraine itself. For a pair who clearly see themselves as cutting edge journalists, members of a global community, this is nothing short of bizarre.
Another feature that intrigued me is the authors’ view of Mother Russia. It never intrudes on the narrative and they might very well be surprised that this reader should even comment on it. But there is a consistent drip drip drip of conviction that Russia is a great country misunderstood by the west; a conviction, to use their words, that Russia is "a great civilisation". I’m afraid I found nothing much in this book – or in my wider direct experience of Russia itself, come to that - to suggest Russia was ever a “great civilisation”. A fascinating and multi-layered society, for sure, a great power, certainly; but a great civilisation? When, exactly?
In the closing pages of the book they claim that the real driver for writing was a desire to explore and understand why/how their journalist friends could have drifted away as the Putin years wore on. I would venture that they fail. It is obvious enough that a chasm opened up; but they do not seem able to explore whether it was their friends that changed, in a society that has been repressive for decades and even centuries, or perhaps our two intrepid exiles themselves. It's a bit unkind to say so, but my overall impression is of a couple of small town journalists, let loose on the wider world, who are still not quite able to get to grips with it.
The style is a little on the breathless side, a blizzard of details and of different people – far too many Russian names for any non-Russian outsider to make sense of them all - as the writers scurry from one event to another, moving from one news publication to the next, one situation to the next. The overall theme is their slowly growing disappointment that their friends – or at least, colleagues – should change their minds and drift towards a pro-Putin view of the world.
A surprising aspect of the narrative, for me, was that they more or less ignore many of the really major events in Russian society, and concentrate instead on their own lesser travails. Navalny does get a mention for a page or two it’s true, and the poisoning of Litvinenko gets a paragraph. Even spy Skripal is referred to (once), but not Putin’s attempt to assassinate him in Salisbury. It’s as if they inhabit their own introspective little world and barely notice the big things taking place outside. The seizing of Crimea gets more or less no mention, and the chapter devoted to the invasion of Ukraine spends more time on their relationships with one or two other journalists than on the pillaging of Ukraine itself. For a pair who clearly see themselves as cutting edge journalists, members of a global community, this is nothing short of bizarre.
Another feature that intrigued me is the authors’ view of Mother Russia. It never intrudes on the narrative and they might very well be surprised that this reader should even comment on it. But there is a consistent drip drip drip of conviction that Russia is a great country misunderstood by the west; a conviction, to use their words, that Russia is "a great civilisation". I’m afraid I found nothing much in this book – or in my wider direct experience of Russia itself, come to that - to suggest Russia was ever a “great civilisation”. A fascinating and multi-layered society, for sure, a great power, certainly; but a great civilisation? When, exactly?
In the closing pages of the book they claim that the real driver for writing was a desire to explore and understand why/how their journalist friends could have drifted away as the Putin years wore on. I would venture that they fail. It is obvious enough that a chasm opened up; but they do not seem able to explore whether it was their friends that changed, in a society that has been repressive for decades and even centuries, or perhaps our two intrepid exiles themselves. It's a bit unkind to say so, but my overall impression is of a couple of small town journalists, let loose on the wider world, who are still not quite able to get to grips with it.
November 9, 2025
Andre Soldatov and Irana Borogan began their careers as journalists in the glasnost years. Their work was in print in Moscow based publications and they placed stories in international publications such as “The Guardian”, “The New York Times”, “the Washington Post“ and more.
Their specialty is security issues for which they created a website “Agentura.ru” Somehow they also found time to write books, this appears to be their fourth.
As they started their careers, they had a circle of journalist friends, with whom they enjoyed drinks, meals and just getting together. This is the story of how they fared in turbulent times (roughly 2000 to 2024).
Journalism is competitive and there is a lot of job switching. The papers they work for are typically owned by oligarchs and each has its own history, audience and culture. You follow the duo as they cover crime, protests, corruption, government actions and as they attend professional conferences.
You see how life changes with current events: terror attacks, Putin’s election/inauguration; Navalny and other opposition leaders; installing Medvedev; the Maidan Revolution; poisonings and unusual deaths; and the military move into Crimea and then further into Ukraine.
As time goes on, censorship, both subtle and overtly intimidating, increases. Also, as time goes on, their colleague-friends take jobs that require more bending and eventually, require full compliance with top down instructions. You follow these friends through their careers in TV news, documentaries, embassy work, and general PR.
Eventually, the couple has to leave Russia. Specific reasons are not expressed, but the threat is clear. At this same time, Andrei’s father, who was the force behind joining Russia to the internet, is being harassed and prosecuted (with made up charges).
They write about their life in exile where they contact their friends. Their conversations show, what may be common among 40ish professionals in Russia, their attitudes about the Ukraine war and “The West”. They discuss the results of the sanctions imposed over the Ukraine invasion and how this has limited the mobility of the friends.
If you are interested in journalism, how it can be suppressed and how the people who do it respond, this is a must read book.
For the general reader, a “lighter” but equally descriptive and provocative book is [book:Muppets in Moscow: The Unexpected Crazy True Story of Making Sesame Street in Russia This shows how glasnost inspired an attempt to bring the Sesame Street to Russia and how difficult it was.
Their specialty is security issues for which they created a website “Agentura.ru” Somehow they also found time to write books, this appears to be their fourth.
As they started their careers, they had a circle of journalist friends, with whom they enjoyed drinks, meals and just getting together. This is the story of how they fared in turbulent times (roughly 2000 to 2024).
Journalism is competitive and there is a lot of job switching. The papers they work for are typically owned by oligarchs and each has its own history, audience and culture. You follow the duo as they cover crime, protests, corruption, government actions and as they attend professional conferences.
You see how life changes with current events: terror attacks, Putin’s election/inauguration; Navalny and other opposition leaders; installing Medvedev; the Maidan Revolution; poisonings and unusual deaths; and the military move into Crimea and then further into Ukraine.
As time goes on, censorship, both subtle and overtly intimidating, increases. Also, as time goes on, their colleague-friends take jobs that require more bending and eventually, require full compliance with top down instructions. You follow these friends through their careers in TV news, documentaries, embassy work, and general PR.
Eventually, the couple has to leave Russia. Specific reasons are not expressed, but the threat is clear. At this same time, Andrei’s father, who was the force behind joining Russia to the internet, is being harassed and prosecuted (with made up charges).
They write about their life in exile where they contact their friends. Their conversations show, what may be common among 40ish professionals in Russia, their attitudes about the Ukraine war and “The West”. They discuss the results of the sanctions imposed over the Ukraine invasion and how this has limited the mobility of the friends.
If you are interested in journalism, how it can be suppressed and how the people who do it respond, this is a must read book.
For the general reader, a “lighter” but equally descriptive and provocative book is [book:Muppets in Moscow: The Unexpected Crazy True Story of Making Sesame Street in Russia This shows how glasnost inspired an attempt to bring the Sesame Street to Russia and how difficult it was.
September 19, 2025
Investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan write about their experiences covering the news in Russia. While their reporting begins with Yeltsin, it concerns primarily the Putin dictatorship. “The spring of 2016 shattered our belief that Russian reporters were part of the journalistic community.” This coincided with the release of the “Panama Papers”that documented how Putin and his oligarch buddies used fraud, tax evasion and the evasion of sanctions to amass huge fortunes. Soldatov and Borogan literally risk their lives to bring to light stories about government fraud, Chechnya, Crimea, and eventually the war on Ukraine. Writers who cross Putin have accidents, commit suicide, and are shot and poisoned. The authors had to make a choice - compromise their ethics and integrity or leave the country. Many of their closest friends also left the country. Those that stayed behind, “Our dear friends…” became government mouthpieces. They note that the war against Ukraine led to historic change, it resulted in the isolation of the country. Many of their friends can’t travel to the west and they can’t visit their friends in Russia. The book is interesting, but slow paced and further compounded by the many Russian names.
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September 26, 2025Russian couple relay the story of independent Russian media from late 1990s to today. They were a major part of this group. It isn't a heartening story. This small cohort of journalists moved from job to job eking out a living in the early years. But progressively the Putin state system closed down media outlets or forced them to toe the party line. The same thing happened to individuals. Several of the authors' colleagues ended up with state jobs spouting government propaganda. It was the only way for them to earn a living but the mental gymnastics used to justify this change in thinking is instructive. The authors were forced out of Russia and now live and work in London. Neither are free to return home and of course are in constant fear of what might happen to them in England from Putin assassins.
September 4, 2025
Two Russian journalists talk about their careers in Russia along with the careers of other journalists they knew or worked with. Eventually, the Putin regime makes unbiased journalism a thing of the past and the two authors are forced to exile themselves to England. Interesting how the Soviet system led to a more free country followed by Putin's repressions and dreams of resurrecting the old Soviet Union. Was not too interesting, though, for some reason.
August 2, 2025
Library borrow
December 27, 2025
I wanted this to be better in its focus and directness. The style got in the way of what is an important “ we were there” account of the changes Putin imposes on the fledgling country of Russia after the dismantling of the USSR . Maybe there are concerns of safety and a need to protect some left behind. Maybe it’s writing from a culturally different perspective than an American approach. After reading, I’m still left confused about how and why so many “ dissenters” acquiesced with Putin and who are not dissenting or truth telling about Putin’s “ Imperial Russia” invasion of Ukraine.
February 2, 2026
It got more interesting at the end. 😬
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