Peter Weiss’ play The Investigation details the lesser known “second Auschwitz trial” conducted in Frankfurt, Germany from 1963-1965. Unlike the “first,” famous Nuremberg Trials, the accused Nazi personnel in the Frankfurt court were tried under German federal law, not international law. Most of the accused had successfully re-integrated into German society. Many founded successful businesses on the plunder from the camp.
Weiss, inspired by Brechtian dramatic conventions, strips the trial down to its barest, most essential features. The play is composed of extracted testimony from witnesses and defendants, along with examination and cross-examination by prosecutors and the defense counsel. While the nine witness characters are amalgams of hundreds of individuals brought forth to testify to the atrocities perpetrated at Auschwitz, the 18 defendants are all named and allowed to speak for themselves without fictionalization.
The play is dreadfully efficient in its aim of letting the facts speak for themselves without rhetorical manipulation or theatrical flair. The lines are sparse, delivered without punctuation or literary emphasis. The testimony of the unnamed witnesses achieve a kind of hypnotic dirge, often blending together into a flat, matter-of-fact horror. The numb dread of the witness testimony is only interrupted by the sickening rationalizations, deflections, and denials of the defendants and their defense counsel.
In one of his final works, Theodor Adorno argued that it would have been more moral to summarily execute Nazi war criminals than put them on trial:
“If the men charged with torturing, along with their overseers and with the high and mighty protectors of the overseers, had been shot on the spot, this would have been more moral than putting them on trial. … Once a judicial machinery must be mobilized against them, with codes of procedure, black robes, and understanding defense lawyers, justice--incapable in any case of imposing sanctions that would fit the crimes--is falsified already, compromised by the same principle on which the killers were acting.”
I’ve always found this thought both alluring and troubling. I get the rage behind it, but to call that rage moral always seemed difficult to affirm. Reading The Investigation helped to clarify the point. It hinges on the qualification “more moral.” Shooting them in a ditch would not be moral, but it would be more moral than granting them a trial that they don’t deserve. It would have been more moral than the farce of allowing them to see the inside of a courtroom. What they did could not be adequately represented in any juridical context. In one of the most shocking moments in the trial, it is revealed that a state prosecutor was sent to Auschwitz to investigate what was actually going on there. The prosecutor was tipped off when, after inspecting the amount of gold (composed of melted down fillings) leaving the camp, he realized that each piece had to contain the fillings of thousands of people. After surveying the camp, he charged a few underlings. With larceny. For looting corpses. No other legal recourse was available. When asked why he didn’t tell any German authorities, he said they wouldn’t have believed it. When asked why he didn’t escape and tell the international community, he said he feared they would believe it--and annihilate the German people. I think he would have agreed with Adorno’s judgment.
There is something uniquely horrible about a defense attorney cross-examining a holocaust survivor in an attempt to characterize the victim (and all those who only left the camps in a plume of smoke) as complicit in their own extermination. It quickly becomes clear that, in addition to the well-known “just following orders” defense, another major line of defense rested on constructing a narrative that blamed the 3 million people murdered in Auschwitz for allowing themselves to be murdered. This repugnant line of defense notwithstanding, there’s something simply perverse about the perpetrators of these crimes being allowed to present themselves as sympathetic--even as victims themselves--in the presence of people that they refused to grant the smallest trace of humanity. Perhaps the most subtly obscene line in a play composed entirely of subtle obscenity is--”The Defendants Laugh”. And they do so with some frequency.
So the application of a legal apparatus to a group of men who systematically suspended it in order to murder 12 million people is hard to stomach. It feels unjust to indulge them in their testimony, to give them a platform to deny their crimes. In a particularly telling moment in the trial, Defendant 9 is worked into a position where he must admit to killing some people. The scene unfolds as follow:
“Judge: That means at least 200 dead
Defendant 9: It could have been 250 or 300
I don’t know exactly
It was an order
I couldn’t do anything about it
Witness 8: Sanitary Officer Klehr [Defendant 9]
was involved in the killing
of at least 16,000 prisoners
Defendant 9: That’s too much
everyone has a breaking point
I’m supposed to have killed 16,000 people
There were only 16,000 in the entire camp
No one would have been left
but the military band
The Defendants laugh”
The denial (in 1963) of the scale of the atrocity. The flippant rejection of being accused of killing 16,000 people. The laughter. Lie them stomach down on the ground and shoot them in the neck.