Death has played an alarmingly prominent role in shaping the short, if recently expanded, list of Labour Prime Ministers. Had he lived, John Smith would almost certainly become prime minister in May 1997 and, but for an unfortunate case of lupus, it is likely that Hugh Gaitskell would have follows Alec Douglas-Home into Downing Street. Instead in 1964 the short, rather portly Harold Wilson was ushered through the famous black door.
There has been a tendency to view Harold Wilson as a chancer, a smooth talking media manipulator in an age before media manipulation. No content, but lots of unlit pipes and HP Sauce. Previous biographies, most notably Ben Pimlott's, have held that Wilson sacrificed strategy for tactics; he could win an election, but drifted in government.
Wilson was a winner, he emerged as victor from four general elections, a feat unique in the 20th Century and only matched by Gladstone in the history of the office. Yet in this Biography Nick Thomas-Symonds, who now sits in the cabinet with the improbably long job title of: Paymaster General, Minister for the Cabinet Office and Minister for the Constitution and European Union Relations, provides a timely re-evaluation of Wilson and his premiership which is altogether kinder to Labour’s most electorally successful leader.
Wilson was a child prodigy, becoming an Oxford Don at 21. In the war he served as a civil servant, organising the supply of crucial materials, including coal and lumber. Such was his talent that upon entering parliament in the Labour Landslide of 1945 he was immediately appointed to the front bench, an achievement not repeated until 2024. He rose steadily, if not spectacularly, chiefly in or shadowing economic departments including the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Works and the Treasury. He was competent, well liked and excellent at triangulation. He was of the left, but satisfactory to the right, reassuringly socialist without being scary to conservatives. In the early 1960s he regularly topped the shadow cabinet elections. In 1961 Gaitskell appointed him Shadow Foreign Secretary, a role he was enjoying when, in 1963, Gaitskell died. He contested the next five general elections as leader of the Labour Party. He won four of them. He was a winner.
The achievements of his first government (1964-70) are substantial. During those years homosexuality was decriminalised, the franchise expanded, divorce made easier, abortion legalised, corporal punishment in prisons and the death penalty were abolished, and racial discrimination outlawed across whole swathes of British life. More changes came in his second government (1974-76) with sex discrimination outlawed and further measures on race relations.
The question is to what extent Wilson can take the credit for these changes. It is true he was a fierce anti-racist yet he did not vote at all on the acts which legalised homosexuality and abortion. As Thomas-Symonds notes, Richard Crossman was convinced that Wilson was opposed to the legislation on religious grounds.
It is true that Wilson could have blocked the proposals and did not do so, more than that, he found time in the parliamentary calendar for the legislation to pass and allowed free votes. For this Thomas-Symonds gives him high praise and claims that he is due “a significant amount of the credit”. Yet is is undoubtedly the reforming zeal of men like Roy Jenkins which led to these reforms, all Wilson had to do is get out of the way.
Abroad Wilson’s greatest achievements are mostly in the negative which makes them less memorable, if none the less significant. He prevented British troops from being sent to Vietnam whilst maintaining a strong relationship with both Johnson and Nixon. Less well remembered is his refusal to commit British troops to an invasion of Southern Rhodesia after Ian Smith unlawfully declared independence in 1965. Whilst this avoided Britain starting a potentially very nasty racial war in the heart of Africa, it did allow Smith to run Rhodesia as a racist hetmanate for a decade before handing it over Robert Mugabe, who would do the same for three decades more.
On the other side of the ledger, it was under Wilson that Britain beat a humiliating retreat from East of Suez, and whilst he is rightly remembered for having the good sense to, having called a European referendum, win it, but an application to join the EEC in his first term was veto by De Gaulle, a bi-partisan accolade.
This is no hagiography, for Wilson is no saint and Thomas-Symonds is alive Wilson’s faults. He is paranoid and can be ponderous. Over devaluation he is downright indecisive. His resignation from the Attlee government was opportunistic rather than principled and he was less than honest with George Brown during the 1968 Sterling Crisis. When it comes to “the pound in your pocket” he was less than honest with the British people. Yet Thomas-Symonds is often too ready to look to bad advice or political expediency for Wilson’s shortcomings. For example, He credits the delay in devaluation to bad advice from ministers and officials.
Wilson was a skilled party manager, in 1970 he prevented the party sliding into the fratricidal chaos which followed the defeats of 1951, 1979 and 2010, and returned the party to power after a single term in opposition, a feat no other leader has achieved in post war Britain. He could be consensual in a time of increasing division. During the referendum campaign on EEC membership he suspended cabinet collective responsibility yet it did not descend into the unseemly mudslinging witnessed in 2016. Personally Wilson tempered his pro-remain sympathies in the name of party unity and winning the vote. On the night Britain voted in by 2-1.
With the passage of time we have the advantage of greater access to documents. The Thirty year rule on the opening of government archives has passed on all of Wilson’s years in government and Thomas-Symonds has been able to access previously unavailable material including an unpublished autobiography. He has used these materials to great effect meaning that he has greater knowledge of Wilson’s thinking that his predecessors had. He skillfully uses these sources to embellish and enhance what we know about Wilson, rather than to re-write his legacy.
There is however much we still don’t know. Missing here is a proper account of Marcia Williams. She crops up again and again throughout but without any sense of how she accrued so much power. Popular accounts of her almost always include a healthy dollop of unsubstantiated smut. She was often the subject of wild news speculation, during the Land Deals Affair (a somewhat innocuous scandal concerning William’s involvement in a company which had profited from land speculation and the forging of Wilson’s signature) she found herself besieged in a mews house with her sister. The maxim that is the advisor becomes the story the advisor goes did not apply in this case. By the end of Wilson's premierships she had accrued so much power that Wilson was nodding through lists of honours written by her on Lavender notepaper, enobling people he had never met.
In modern British politics the only two prime ministerial staffers who have wielded anything like as much influence are Alastair Campbell and Dominic Cummings. But Campbell’s influence was confined to the media sphere and he went when he became the story over Iraq. Cummings had if anything a wider scope, Williams, or Lady Falkender, as she later became, hardly ever concerned herself with policy. But she was less malevolent. During the Land Deals Affair she did call Wilson the ‘Kind Rat’ and threatened, in a moment of extreme stress, to “reveal all”, but she was always loyal to him and there is no suggestion she had any agenda but his. It is true that without Marcia Williams we may never have had Prime Minister Harold Wilson, it was under her guidance that he transformed from the dull, if competent and technocratic, minister to pipe smoking, kitchen cabinet, beer and sandwiches in the garden prime minister which comes down to us through history. Yet for all her considerable skills, allowing an advisor so much power, no matter how competent and loyal, is real political malfeasance on Wilson’s part.
Wilson and his governments have a complex legacy. Thomas-Symonds ranks him just below Attlee and equal with Blair in the pantheon of Labour Prime Ministers. It is true that his time in office was less transformatory than Attlee’s. The great social reforms we chiefly associate with Wilson today genuinely made Britain a better place to live. But society had already changed by 1968 when many of the most famous reforms were introduced. The government was following society, not leading it. Here, Thomas-Symonds suggests that it was circumstance and parliamentary arithmetic which prevented Wilson implementing his radical National Plan, maybe so, but Wilson’s economic measures were a series of sticking plasters over the collapse of the post war consensus. It was only a good sense of when to leave the stage which prevented him from being in power during the Winter of Discontent.
The Labour Party is often not overly enamoured with the thought of winning. It seems to relish the factional bloodletting of opposition more than it does the business of government. It is telling that its two most electorally successful prime ministers are frequently dismissed as smooth talking chancers, style over substance merchants. If Wilson had been less resolute on Vietnam he would probably have to endure the war criminal jibes too. This critique isn’t true of Blair and it isn’t true of Wilson either. Wilson’s achievements are significant and his governments even more so. But perhaps his greatest contribution to the Labour movement is that he was a winner. This biography reminds us of that.