In Slog or Swan, Dermot Rooney has written an outstanding piece of military history. He has taken a major battle, which few have heard of and which has been the subject of considerable myth-making, and explored it in painstaking depth, in order to bring out the truth of what actually happened. In doing so, he reveals a number of key lessons about the British Army of 1945.
The book comprises eight substantive chapters, each examining a key phase of the battle, with an introduction and conclusion providing vital structure, setting the context and drawing out critical themes. Each chapter reveals an astonishing depth of knowledge of the sources, which serves both to slay some myths and underline the confusion of many of the engagements within the battle. In addition, there are copious maps, which help the reader follow the course of events.
Rooney’s main argument is that the traditional view that the offensive was bogged down by ‘mud and mines’ is as far from the truth as was the claim in March 1918 that the German offensives were a success due to ‘mist and masses’. Instead, Rooney demonstrates that the design of British forces, which sought to push vast numbers of armoured vehicles into a small area, ignoring the state of the roads and the ability to provide logistical support, turned the battlefield into a vast traffic jam. Coupled with the ‘golf bag’ approach, which switched armoured brigades frequently between the infantry divisions, this led to a paralysis, that forced this armoured behemoth to rely on infantry attacks and heavy artillery barrages, not much advanced from 1917.
Rooney’s humility in his understanding of the difficulty of interpreting the sources, and his insights into the practicality of understanding operations at the tactical level, both make the book a pleasure to read and reinforce the depth of his insights.