Desordem Financeira na Europa e nos EUA

by George Soros

George Soros, multimilionário e investidor com vasta experiência explica, nas páginas desta obra, as raízes da crise económica atual que atinge particularmente a Europa. O autor apresenta uma fundamentação original e diversa dos habituais lugares-comuns, focando três momentos que se sucederam e implicaram: a explosão da bolha imobiliária nos EUA, com a consequente introdução de derivativos «tóxicos» no mercado financeiro internacional que contaminaram outros países, sobretudo na zona euro. O capítulo final desta obra é inteiramente dedicado às questões da crise europeia, no seu contexto específico, sugerindo medidas urgentes a fim de evitar a implosão do euro.

Genres: Economics, Finance, Nonfiction, Politics

152 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2012

About the author

George Soros is a Hungarian-American financier, businessman and notable philanthropist focused on supporting liberal ideals and causes. He became known as "the Man Who Broke the Bank of England" after he made a reported $1 billion during the 1992 Black Wednesday UK currency crises. Soros correctly speculated that the British government would have to devalue the pound sterling.

Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund Management, LLC.
As one of history’s most successful financiers, his views on investing and economic issues are widely followed.

Reviews

[Adrian · Rating 5 out of 5]

For followers of the global economy, George Soros needs no introduction. However, the unconventionally minded may be unsure about purchasing a book that is a collection of essays. This collection of essays is no mere cut and paste job, rather it is a riveting expose of the current financial predicament we are in, and a comprehensive set of solutions for the underpinnings of the global economy.
Published mainly in the Financial Times, the first collection of essays reflects mainly on the initial crash of 2008, and Soros's take on the political response.
The second part of the book is more Eurocentric, examining the danger of the Eurozone, and proposing a comprehensive set of measures for rectifying the situation and correcting the underlying flaws in the design of the Euro.
Central to Soros's work is the notion that a super bubble began in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan and the tenure of Margaret Thatcher. While this reviewer does not share such a critical view of the aforementioned leaders, it is difficult to escape the charges against certain elements of market fundamentalism, which have, many would argue, been at least a contributor to the current financial mess.
However, the flaws regarding the Euro are far more complex than mere market fundamentalism, and Soros abandons such rhetoric in the latter pages of the book.
Far more than a collection of essays, the book reads coherently as a well structured whole, and contains a wealth of insight into the troubled times in which we live, and the necessary solutions for rectifying the situation.

[J · Rating 4 out of 5]

Soros' financial/economic analysis is underrated: why he has not influenced the philosophy of economics / social science more than he has, or why academics do not take him seriously, blows my mind. Disagree with him on some parts (I think he is incentivized to want certain aspects of govt. spending), but refreshing to see someone with a meta-view of the financial system. Easily can see Popper's influence on his thinking. Will be reading more finance books written by Soros b/c of this one.

[Derek Barnes · Rating 3 out of 5]

A reprint of articles written over the last few years for various publications. Soros doesn't take the time to eliminate some of the repetitious ideas. A short read besides, but you've certainly got to give him an ear.

[João Pires · Rating 4 out of 5]

I read the portuguese translation. The book was easy to understand without the need of a greater knowledge of economics. I enjoy reading and see the prespective of the author about the economic situation in Europe and USA.

[Jachin Friday · Rating 3 out of 5]

The 2008 financial crisis brought to light many things that had been developing in years and even decades past. Specifically, it highlighted the absurdity of the efficient market hypothesis, or the idea that market prices reflect all relevant information in a security. More fundamentally, it demonstrably proved that private markets had at least as much excess as public markets, and the dogmas about the free market adopted by economists were insufficient to explain such failures. A more appropriate model for the financial markets is the boom-bust or reflexive model; this model says that there are two aspects to every market transaction, a participatory and a cognitive aspect. Unfortunately, these two things cannot be separated, such that misinterpretations and miscalculations of the future are bound to happen.

As a result, bubbles begin to form around consensus opinions, typically rooted in some ground truth, but which are amplified by market participants inability to see that their actions are affecting the "ground truth". At some point in time in the bubble, however, enough market participants understand that there has been a divergence in the underlying principles and the price of the security, and therefore exit the market in mass very quickly, causing a bust. Through this framework, we can understand the financial crisis, specifically in 4 ways: 1) why the crash happened 2) how regulators should have responded 3) the crisis in emerging markets and 4) the crisis in the Eurozone

First, the crash happened because of the negligence of market participants. Banks offered people credit who should not have gotten it, Those were involved in packaging the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit default swaps (CDSs) did not fundamentally understand the value add of these instruments, and therefore never were rigorous enough in their selection of quality mortgages to include in these instruments. Credit rating agencies did not understand the inherent risks of these instruments, and rated them incredibly high without a real justification as to why. Investment funds, particularly hedge funds, purchased these assets without a strong understanding of the risk involved, and put their limited partners/investors at real risk. This is how an issue, which should have been localized to a single sector of the economy, ended up becoming a massive contagion affecting the entire US population for several years.

Second, the regulators were far too nice to the banks and other financial institutions. What was needed in the crisis was to inject confidence into the system, but political considerations forced politicians to back off of what was really necessary. For example, determining the bonuses and salaries of the employees of a private company might have seemed fascistic, but considering that most of the money was funded by tax payers, this was a necessary step to reign in the excesses. Also, because of these political considerations, the Fed ended up providing most of the liquidity to the market through its quantitative easing programs, when it should have been the Treasury, who could allocate funds where they needed to go instead of having to flood the entire market with cash.

Third, emerging economies were not hurt as much by the crisis, particularly because they had not become as integrated into the global financial system as other players. China is a great example of a country that benefitted from the crisis; it was able to buy up huge amounts of assets at dirt cheap prices while not suffering a downturn in its GDP or government financing. But in so doing, China has become a global leader, and whether it wanted this role or not, now must find ways to support the global financial system going forward. Fourth, the eurozone crisis was fueled by the poor design of the euro; namely, there is monetary but no fiscal policy. As a result, countries must respond to their own financial crisis in ways that will benefit them, but may violate the strict rules of the EU, specifically around deficits and debt. There is a real risk of a two speed Europe where countries like Germany with healthy government financing and low deficits are able to raise government funds at low rates, while countries like Greece are stuck with unstable banking systems that cannot be bailed out because the government cannot sell its bonds (or at least must sell them at unaffordable interest rates), resulting in a weak economy and stagnation. Germany, with its desire to have little inflation, has made it so that printing large amounts of money and prolonged deficit spending are practically impossible, threatening austerity and deflation for Europe for many years, a poor situation for all those involved. Therefore, to avoid this crisis, the rules need to be loosened temporarily to allow countries like Italy, Spain, and Ireland to get back on their financial feet.

[Samuel Clasby · Rating 5 out of 5]

Overall a good book. Some of the essays are better than others and could hold their own.

I would appreciate if the string of essays focused on the Europe side of things had more context. There are not a lot of books that focus on the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse on Europe, so I don’t know the history that well. The book follows Soros’ proposed and evolving solution to a crisis as it unfolds. However due to the lack of context, the situational updates and opposing arguments are not thoroughly explained. Also, there is no summary or conclusion, so I don’t know what the final resolution ended up being.

[Gulliver · Rating 5 out of 5]

We are in an enormous financial and political bubble. It’s burst is nearing, and most likely inevitable. Whatever appears first, financial or political, will inevitably reinforce the second. The book has been published more than a decade ago, but nothing has been done to address the problems and the reality got even worse, even deteriorating the situation, which makes me conclude that the burst is inevitable.

But it’s necessary to acknowledge that the bubbled are inflating not only due to the policy flaws caused by humans, but Covid was a shock to the world economy that forced extreme measures upon nations.

[Lauren · Rating 3 out of 5]

I struggle to rate this as I am clearly not the target audience. This is for someone with far more context (and vocabularly) on financial news. I could grasp sweeping themes, but the minutiae was more than I was capable of or interested in.

Further, this is largely based on financial circumstances from 15+ years ago, and truly this book is time sensitive to make maximum impact, in my opinion. I recommend this book to serious financial experts, I believe anything less there would be a lot missed in the reading of this.

[Dominic Casanova · Rating 2 out of 5]

Whilst this short volume is not as relevant now as it was in the wake of the global financial crisis, it is not entirely outdated.

On many points, I find I disagree vehemently with the leaning of the book, with Soros' predominant agenda and with many of his deeply held beliefs. However, there were several aspects of this book in particular which I found helpful. His explanation, for instance, (which became somewhat repetitive being mentioned at least some 6 or so times throughout the volume) of investment bubbles and busts was enlightening.

Overall, this is a volume worth reading only in limited circumstances; i.e. when one has spare time, or if one is particularly interested in the financial implications behind the greater unification of Europe.

[Hiran Samarasinghe · Rating 2 out of 5]

Its a bit repetitive, given that it’s a collection of articles and not a whole book per se. You could get the the story by reading every other chapter.

[Shee Tsim Nam · Rating 1 out of 5]

X

[Darrick Mowrey · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some of it was an explanation about his activities. The book helped me understand the reality of financial markets.

[Nate · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm not exactly sure what the intent of this book is. The essays are short and easy to read, but the average person is not going to understand the technical details of the euro crisis (or the other topics mentioned) to really have an opinion on what he is talking about. If you do have this type of background, then you've probably heard just about all of the information presented within these essays.

The essays are also quite... redundant. You will experience de ja vu at least a dozen times. You'll think, "wait, didn't I just read that?" In fact you did, the phrasing from essay to essay is almost identical in some scenarios.

Still, it is a nice little collection, but this book just seems unnecessary; it lacks content since so much is repeated. It's almost as if this was printed for his own ego-to have a personal collection of his essays in a nice little book. Even in the introduction he insinuates that this isn't really much a book and he will have another one that will go in depth soon enough. So this collection of essays is the precursor to his next book?

The introduction was the most enjoyable part, although the latter 80% of it should have really been an epilogue. Also, I read this book from cover to cover, but it certainly does not need to be read that way or in any real order. You could even read just one essay from each part and you would get the gist of the whole section.

I would recommend just renting this one from the library and if you fall in love with it or perhaps want more of an intellectual type of coffee table book to then pick it up.

[Undrakh · Rating 2 out of 5]

Essays covering events and reasons of financial crisis in U.S and Europe. All of the essays in this book have been previously published in Financial times (most of them) at the time of crisis of 2008 and further eurozone crisis. So the essays are mostly about the possible solutions for problems European Union, Germany, Greece, European Central Bank, and all the other countries and institutions involving the crisis faced. It would have been useful to read them back then. Anyway, I think I got some snapshots of what has happened around there.

[Brad Rice · Rating 3 out of 5]

Overview of events leading up to and into the financial crisis of 2008. These are collected reprints of articles Soros had written during that time period. Hindsight is 20-20, but it seems as though if someone had taken his advice, we would have come out of the crisis more rapidly and with better consequences for the long term. Interesting read in light of the recent Brexit and the issues with the the European Union.

[Peter · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book contains a number of essays published in the Financial Times and the New York Review of Books, and you can tell as you read them that they have been written to convey crisp perspectives up against the constraints imposed by their respective print deadlines. I would recommend this book as it makes "important" and "insightful" points.

[Jiwa Rasa · Rating 2 out of 5]

Kumpulan esei yang mengulangi isu-isu yang sama. Pandangan dan saranan Soros diulang-ulang.

Satu maklumat yang menarik tentang George Soros. Beliau pernah belajar di bawah Karl Popper yang terkenal dengan idea Open Society. Idea Open Society lah yang diperjuangkan oleh Soros kini,

[Jonathan · Rating 3 out of 5]

The introduction is worth the book on its own. This is good, as the formerly-published articles which follow, well-written as they are, age quickly. Their retained value as foci for thought-experiments and reflective study is high, though, and their bundling is convenient.

[Cagdasy80 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Makes the 2008-12 period very clear and has some wide ranging recommendations about how to solve the big mess.

[Nizam · Rating 5 out of 5]

his next great book... he talks about his philosophy and Euro crisis how it can be solved

[Hqwxyz · Rating 4 out of 5]

由于是报刊文章合集，前后文重复罗嗦的地方不少。然而其反身性理论值得思考，毕竟现代经济学越发重视“理性人”假设的偏离后果。