The dramatic, first-hand account of the historic 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Iceland—the definitive weekend that was the key turning point in the Cold War—by President Reagan’s arms control director, Ken Adelman.
In October 1986, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev met for a forty-eight-hour summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. Planned as a short, inconsequential gathering to outline future talks, the meeting quickly turned to major international issues, including the strategic defense initiative and the possibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons—negotiations that laid the groundwork for the most sweeping arms accord in history the following year.
Scrupulously researched and based on now-declassified information, Reagan at Reykjavik tells the gripping tale of this weekend that changed the world. Filled with illustrative accounts of the private discussions between Reagan and his team, Ken Adelman provides an honest and up-close portrait of President Reagan at one of his finest and most challenging moments.
Reagan at Reykjavik includes 16 pages of black-and-white photos and 11 illustrations.
Who would read a book pertaining to a long weekend in remote Reykjavik, Iceland? It’s not a romance novel set around a glowing fireplace or a murder mystery thriller. But wait, it was a historic event witnessed by the author. I like first hand accounts, but how historic? It’s not about the 1972 World Chess Championship in Iceland between American Bobby Fischer and Russian Boris Spassky. The story is of a more famous meeting between U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev that set the stage to change the world and the lives of individuals around the globe. Author Ken Adelman served as the U.S. arms control director and accompanied President Reagan on the trip. His documentation is priceless for future generations of all societies to comprehend.
The leaders, one a capitalist and one a communist came from vastly different backgrounds but shared a strong desire to halt the Cold War and nuclear escalation of arms during their tenure. Past discussions involved talks and treaties with SALT I&II, ABM, and SDI, but hope was in the air for something special. Gorbachev reached out to Reagan for a bold meeting to take place over the weekend of October 11-12, 1986. The armament details would naturally be too much for any one person to absorb so both world leaders brought their closest councils in tow to Iceland. The showdown would be held behind closed doors in the stark rural Hofdi House complete with rumors of a haunted past.
Adelman notes Reagan’s wandering mind that some journalists preyed upon as a character fault. Was it due to partial deafness or early onset of Alzheimer’s? Throughout his presidency his mind was often focused on his wife Nancy. During this historic encounter common jet lag would also be a factor. At 75 would Reagan be up to the challenge? Offers, counteroffers and concessions were dealt back and forth followed by recess and new rounds to see who might blink. Those who knew Reagan best would never underestimate the qualities within “The Gipper”. Of utmost importance was when the chips were in and America’s best interests were at stake Reagan came through.
Following the talks the press clamored for hard facts. What exactly went down? Reagan avoided details and rather spoke in bold strokes. As the dust settled the months lingered into the Iran-Contra affair, a setback that severely tested Reagan’s ultimate visionary goal. Reagan’s second term was winding down and any significance of the Reykjavik talks were fading fast.
June 12, 1987 would provide Reagan a chance to reach out to Gorbachev and reconnect to the weekend in Reykjavik, Iceland that was full of hope. He would shift his focus from military armament to human rights. While in Germany standing upon a podium at the Berlin Wall and gazing into communist East Germany, President Reagan representing the free world, spoke into the microphone; “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.” Against all odds the wall was dismantled by the end of the decade.
In turn Gorbachev issued another invitation to Reagan, this time to Russia and for this occasion Nancy accompanied him. On communist turf Reagan could not be too critical, but the optimist portrayed the spirit of the American free enterprise through: “Bureaucrats are no substitute for entrepreneurs.”
The Reykjavik meetings paved the way to ending the Cold War and a simple mutual friendship was formed to the benefit of all humanity.
Nice memoir of what happened in Reykjavik from the eyes of a presidential adviser. Gives a sense of what happened in the room, with some commentary for people who either did not have a clear sense of what was going on or who wasn't alive during the entire Reagan Presidency.
First eight chapters were a pretty good detail of the summit. The last two tend to be more of his personal opinion on a host of topics relating to after the summit. Its not a complete piece of revisionist history (Pat Buchanan), but some of the arguments that he makes seem to fall under the lines of "Ronald Reagan is the greatest person ever. Everything he did was right. Anyone who disagrees is a loser who was jealous of him". His defense of SDI makes no sense and Mr. Adelman doesn't even consider for a fact that it was the breakaway of all the smaller republics that broke the Soviet Union. Again, he is entitled to his own opinion and many people have made the same arguments, but that is just my take. Also, the book steers clear of a more over-the-top partisan rewrite of history, which makes this a more enjoyable read.
Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours That Ended The Cold War, is one of the best books I read in 2014. The author, Ken Adelman, is an amazing statesman and scholar. Ken was Director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the time of the Reykjavik Summit, so he observed and participated in the events of which he writes. Also, having served previously as the Deputy Ambassador to the UN during Reagan’s first term in office, Ken brings a unique perspective to his observations of Reagan during the summit: this was a man he had observed up close on many occasions over several years. More than anything, this perspective makes Reagan at Reykjavik an engaging look at a president in action. Reagan at Reykjavik is an important book for all of us to read. The events at the summit and those that unfolded as a result of the summit are a real-world reminder that our perceptions of the monolithic character of other nations and peoples are almost always illusions. When we have the courage to meet and speak and work with the people representing those other nations in settings that allow our mutual humanity to assert itself, we can achieve great things. Ken paints a picture of Reagan as a man whose faith gave him this courage. We see Reagan as one who believed he could reason with Gorbachev. In spite of the limited gains at the summit itself, the humanizing effect of intense work among key leaders on both sides allowed the process to continue and ultimately bear fruit. There are lessons here, I think, for how we approach other seemingly intractable diplomatic issues. My favorite anecdote from the book was Ken’s description of the basement of Hofdi House, the building where the negotiations took place. This space was necessarily shared by both CIA and KGB communications teams. A dispute arose over which team would get the larger of two bathrooms, and the KGB station chief ultimately pointed out the silliness of the dispute and suggested both sides share both facilities. Ken writes, “Thus, while intelligence agencies normally operate on a need-to-know basis, for this weekend in Reykjavik, the world’s two main intelligence agencies operated on a need-to-go basis.” I would encourage everyone to read Reagan a Reykjavik. It is more than a historical description of a key diplomatic event. Indeed, as we prepare to select our next president, this book affords us a personal account of a president ranked in the top tier of all presidents by many recent polls of historians and scholars. In this light, we may find here some insights into the kind of leader we should seek as we approach the 2016 elections.
A great insider view of the key summit between Reagan & Gorbachev and the aftermath. It's an honest and personal look at these leaders and the end of the Cold War.
As Arms Control Director, Ken Adelman was present at the controversial 1986 summit between President Ronald Reagan and Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland. Adelman provides as detailed analysis and narrative of the summit was possible, and places the proceedings of Reykjavik in the context of the Cold War. As an 18 year old college freshman, my only recollection of this summit was the perception that it was a tragic failure and missed opportunity. Adelman provides a corrective to that. On the contrary, he argues that it was an enormous success in the long-term because it brought the leaders of the super powers closer together and paved the way from some historic arms reductions that followed. A critical element of his narrative of the conference is the extent that it was a genuine one-on-one between Reagan and Gorbachev. From the transcripts, Adelman shows that the two leaders did not shy away from frank, and, at times, confrontational, direct communications. Many of their advisors were unaware of what the two leaders were discussing and many of the proposals from both of them had not been vetted by their staffs. This stood in contrast to many previous summits in which here was much scripted discussions and little direct communications. Finally, Reagan and Gorbachev had some misperceptions of each other and what they had promised their own domestic audiences, mostly around the Strategic Defense Initiatives (SDI). Reagan, much to Adelman's surprised kept insisting that he had made a sacred promise to the American people not to abandon SDI. On the other side, Gorbachev and his intelligence experts, believed that the United States was close to implementing a system that had, in fact, not progressed beyond the concept stage.
I had an interesting path to get this book. Decades ago I attended a conference for my firm that was interspersed with "performances" by a group called "Movers and Shakespeares" that used Shakespeare to teach lessons on business using the works of Shakespeare. Those sessions stuck with me for years. I often thought of it. A year or so ago I looked up the organization and found they were still around and on a whim I contacted them to thank them for those shows all those many years ago. So why is that relevant? The group was led by the author, Ken Adelman, a true polymath who is an expert in Shakespeare and arms control.
Mr. Adelman was gracious enough to write back, and send me a copy of his book. It took a while for me to get to it, but I am glad I did. It is not Shakespeare, but it was good. I was never a Reagan fan. In fact some might call me a radical leftist. But this book helped me to see both the faults AND the gifts of Reagan. Adelman talks about some of Reagan's failings but also helped me to see the unique leadership gifts he possessed.
This is a book well worth reading. Is it is good as Movers and Shakespeares? No. You really need to experience that if you get the chance. But it is good.
I thoroughly enjoyed this book which was something of a surprise. I wondered, as you may be wondering, how anybody could write an entire book about a weekend? The secret is: the book wasn't just about the weekend, but about the build-up to and aftermath of the weekend. For example, there was a fairly long chapter about the coming down of the Berlin Wall and the unraveling of the Soviet Union. But what I found really enjoyable about the book were the personal anecdotes related by the author. I suppose there are some that wouldn't want to read about his freezer going out right before he was due in an important meeting, but for me, those are the sorts of things that put a human face on politics.
Gratka dla entuzjastów historii. Dla osób, które chcą rozeznać się w temacie końca zimnej wojny, bez wchodzenia w szczegóły, może wydawać się nudna. Pierwsze 50str to świetne wprowadzenie. Kolejne 150str to opis tylko tych dwóch dni spotkania i nawet dla mnie (lubię historie) było to zbyt obfite w niepotrzebne szczegóły. Natomiast ostatnie 130str, czyli opisanie następstw i konsekwencji szczytu w Reykjaviku było fenomenalne. Zgrabne, wciągające, inteligentne. Generalnie cała książka jest napisana z polotem osoby, która ma za sobą nie jedno wystąpienie publiczne (treściwe i lekkie jednocześnie), ale to jedynie zadziałało na plus. Polecam!
What an uplifting account of what happens when two extraordinary men seek to achieve the impossible. Alderman reminds us that no matter how monumental their accomplishments were, they were simply two human beings seeking to achieve the possible. What a sad state of affairs we are in now, with Reagan’s optimistic Republican Party hijacked by a nasty, despicable man and his neophytes. God help the United States and the Republican Party survive this horrible man for another four years.
I thought it was fascinating, but I lived through this period. It might be a little too detailed for someone who just wants a fast synopsis of the weekend in Reykjavik when the US (President Reagan) and the USSR (Gorbachev) got together and set the framework for nuclear disarmament.
The good thing about ignorance : it is simple. Hence, Adelman can precisely identify the one person and the one moment in time when a complex process has started.
I enjoyed learning more about this summit and hearing about Reagan from someone fairly close to him. However, I found the attempts at humor distracting.
This goes down as one of the most fascinating and highly readable bits of nonfiction I've opened this year. I have heard numerous times the conventional wisdom that the Reykjavik conference was a failure and potentially even a dangerous situation for the U.S. to be in. But this author refutes that in a highly readable style that will keep you turning pages but not skipping the information.
I read this over a Saturday night, and it fascinated me. The author insists that rather than being a failure, the Reykjavik conference was a major piece that brought an end to the cold war ultimately. You get detailed looks at Reagan and Gorbachev here that will leave you with a lot to think about. Drawn on the author's experience as an attendee and on now declassified documents about the conference, the book lets you see how a summit that was slapped together almost last minute carried with it events as turbulent as the Icelandic weather to which conferrees were subjected.
There are personal bits of wonder woven into this account as well. At one point, attendees adjourn into a security bubble that could not be bugged by the KGB. Reagan entered the bubble unannounced, forcing the author to scrunch up on the floor with the presidential knees firmly embedded in his back.
According to the author, one of the bi-products of the Reykjavik conference was an exchange of U.S. and Soviet scientists whose job it was to verify that disarmament was indeed taking place based on agreements reached after Reykjavik. Accordingly, 30 Americans were sent to one of the coldest, most drab, and darkest places in the Soviet Union to watch the dismantling of weaponry as agreed to. Soviet scientists, on the other hand, went to Magna, Utah, known primarily as a mining town and a suburb of Salt Lake city. According to the author, Latter-Day Saints in the region practically competed to see which congregation could be most hospitable to the Soviet scientists. As a result, they were dined if not wined, invited to wedding receptions and Christmas parties and more. Adelman's ability to draw the sharp contrast between the fortunate Soviet scientists and their hapless American counterparts will leave you with a bit to smile about.
So who shouldn't read this? If you are extremely partisan in your thinking, and if you are absolutely convinced that every second of Reagan's two-term presidency was a bumbling idiotic affair presided over by someone who was such a lightweight that he nearly ruined the country, then you probably ought to leave this book alone. This is most emphatically not an anti-Reagan diatribe. If anti-Reagan stuff turns your crank, this isn't your kind of book. But even if you disagreed with much that happened as a result of Reagan's presidency, I believe you would still find much in this book that would both interest you and give you much on which to ponder after you've closed the back cover. I thought Adelman's writing style was snappy and on target. I found the book compelling and one that I'll likely keep on my shelves to revisit. So interested did I become in the arms control arena because of this book that a future project will inevitably be an exhaustive look at the life of Paul Nitze, who was an unparalleled arms control expert for administrations on both sides of the aisle for decades. This isn't exactly a fluffy beach read, but it's a quick read that will keep you reading.
The news coverage I remember of the Reykjavik summit in 1986 was almost uniformly bleak, because no great agreement came from the meeting. But as Ken Adelman, who was on the arms control negotiating team at Reykjavik, points out, most of what would be a 1987 treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) was hammered out in the sessions at the Höfði House.
Adelman's eyewitness account of much of the negotiating sessions is the meat of Reagan at Reykjavik: Forty-Eight Hours that Ended the Cold War. He also describes some of the lead-up to the summit and its context -- news organizations following Raisa Gorbachev around the city because they'd brought immense teams to cover an event that was going on behind closed doors, for example.
According to the way Adelman saw it, one thing that media coverage got both right and wrong was the role of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) space-based missile shield. This plan, usually referred to "Star Wars" because of its near science-fictional operating system of lasers shooting at rockets, was something Ronald Reagan believed in passionately because of his hatred of the threat of nuclear annihilation. Adelman notes that Reagan believed in SDI more than some of its planners, possibly being overly optimistic about the timetable for its effective completion. His commitment to it would not allow him to agree to test it only in the laboratory instead of in the field. Whether Mikhail Gorbachev believed SDI would work or not, he knew that Reagan did and he remained firm.
But faced with increasing economic troubles at home, the USSR eventually had to turn resources from military use to other areas, and the 1987 INF treaty conceded the point. Adelman may overstate his case; whatever major role Reykjavik played in the collapse of Soviet power was not the only factor. Much subsequent writing on the end years of the Cold War downplays Reagan's work and sometimes even Gorbachev's, focusing on economic tides that neither man would have had much success in turning or reinforcing. But it's difficult to imagine stolid party oldtimers like Konstantin Chernenko or Yuri Andropov "smelling the coffee" of economic reality the way Gorbachev did, and Gorbachev himself said that the negotiations and treaties would probably not have happened had he been across the table from anyone but Reagan.
The Cold War ended either way, and whether it happened because stalwart defenders of freedom led three major opponents of Soviet power or because economic inevitability picked that decade to come due or because of a mixture of both views, it's interesting to revisit events I can remember and judge how I see them after a few more years turning calendar pages.
This is essentially a love letter to Reagan. It is nice to read of people celebrating people they admire, but the excellent writing does not make up for the blinders author Adelman wore. Unfortunately, he twists logic (and himself) into a pretzel to credit the following with the end of the Soviet Union: 1) Reagan's consistent belief that Communism is bad and would therefor fall, 2) Reagan's consistent belief that the Strategic Defense Initiative would be successful, and 3) Reagan's unwillingness to bargain SDI away in Reykjavik for eliminating strategic weapons.
Adelman points out that other bad empires hung around, so something had to end the USSR, and it was Reagan. This could not have been a brilliant book, but it could have been a good book, if he had made it somewhat shorter and checked his cheerleading at the door.
I enjoyed this account of the Reykjavik Summit and the subsequent events that spelled the end of Communist totalitarianism in Europe and Russia. Reagan and Gorbachev were both vital in the ending of the cold-war.
The world was a much dangerous place while the super-powers had countless nukes pointed at one another. Nuclear annihilation under the MAD doctrine was a possibility. I still recall doing 'duck and cover' drills in grade school and many folks built bomb-shelters, not just the survival extremists that are on reality television.
Victory in the Cold War was Reagan's greatest achievement. Gorbachev's humanity in allowing the Soviet system to crumble with a whimper instead of a bloody bang was his. Both need to be remembered and lauded.
First hand account of the summit. I remember the news at the time. It was a failure. It was all Reagan's fault. The world was less safe because of Reagan's failure. Adelman argues just the opposite. He asserts that Reykjavik was the most significant cause of the breakup of the eastern bloc and the fall of the Berlin wall. It was Reagan's refusal to budge from work on SDI ("star wars") that caused the summit to end without significant agreements. But a short time later, Gorbachev came back and big cuts were made. Following this, communism began falling apart. I liked this book. But to me his conclusions about the significance of Reykjavik could have used more support. Still well worth reading.
This is an incredible book. Assuming most of it is a reasonably accurate portrayal of what took place, it represented to me an incredibly scary exhibit of what I had expected to be a sane, planned, thoughtful process discussing critical issues between the two major powers of the time. Instead, it seems to me to be a head-shaking process that was more unplanned and serendipitous than anything else. The book is a little long and a little hard to follow at times, but overall a good read, most particularly for the portrayal of a process that likely none of us imagined, either then or now. And in these seemingly crazy days of the Trump presidency, I'd make this a must read for the potential similarities and implications.
Reykjavik from the perspective of someone who was there and witnessed the action and events. For anyone who wonders why a meeting that seemed such a disappointment and a failure at the time could take its place in history as one of the most consequential cusp incidences in the Twentieth Century, Adelman supplies the details, the players, and the terms of discussion. In the end, the most important consequence of this meeting was that Reagan and Gorbachev took full measure of each other, found that they could work together, and did so. This is an awesome and welcome addition to Cold War historiography.
This may seem an odd choice among my readings, but the book was a gift from the author AND nuclear disarmament remains an issue important to me and many others who marched and otherwise advocated in the 80s against new missile systems. Adelman has a charming voice in this book. His argument, that a summit that came about at last moment and that seemed at the time a failure, actually launched resulted in massive arms cuts and launched the decline of the Soviet Empire, is persuasive. President Reagan is a problematic figure for a variety of reasons. 30 years later it's amazing to see him as a champion of arms reduction, a topic not in the news and our advocacy enoughh.
Informative inside look at the Reykjavik summit and analysis of its aftermath. I lived in the UK from 1980-83 and saw the protests about the deployment of US intermediate range nuclear weapons (GLCMs & Pershings) first hand. To go from that to a total ban in just a few years was remarkable, and that was just one result from this Reagan/Gorby meeting. Gorby gets most of the credit but if Walter Mondale had been sitting on the other side I guarantee the outcome would have been worse.
Back to the book - I liked it but it was pretty narrow in scope so reader beware. If you're not a fan of Reagan you probably won't like it.
Interesting insider view of the Reykjavik summit and the impact that it had on the end of the cold war. After the experience of the Iran-Contra scandal and how much Reagan said he wasn't aware of what was happening, I've been a little critical of him and his leadership style.
The book did provide some new perspective -- Reagan was a man with a vision and stuck to that vision despite heavy pressure to change. I do see his commitment to eliminate weapons, and how holding firm on SDI helped hasten the end of the cold war, despite the actual short-term viability of the program.
For those who still think of Ronald Reagan as an "amiable dunce" in the White House, this book is a wake-up call. En route to Iceland on Air Force One, Reagan dismayed his advisers by refusing to read any of the "position papers" his staff had written to prepare him for his confrontation with Mikael Gorbachev. Despite the misgivings of his advisers, Reagan pulled off one of the greatest bluffs in history, while at the same time laying the foundation for a lasting relationship with the new Russian leader.
A great behind the scenes look at the summit that everyone considered a failure at the time. The insider at the meeting gave a good take on the summit and its followup in the history between the two Superpowers. The fall of Communism, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, and the coup attempt in the Soviet Union. Reagan's refusal to cave when it seemed like he should have at the surprise offering at this meeting led to all of those events.
What a fantastic read! Really felt like I was there in the room. Ken Adelman's story reminds us of one of the most pivotal moments that would finally end the Cold War. He talks about the major players, but most importantly the remarkable leaders that made this all possible: Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan. For any student of the Cold War, this is a must-read.