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In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory
This work offers an interpretation of the intermediate field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory.
424 pages, Paperback
First published March 31, 1997
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
May 21, 2013
While I think Naveh is brilliant, this book was disappointing. The book is exhaustively sourced and thorough, but sometimes it seems Naveh is more concerned with his own vocabulary and logic than with clearly articulating his points. At times his assertions were tediously detailed and repetitive, and at others they were obvious and simplistic. This was a struggle to get through, even for someone interested in and familiar with the subject.
The content is decent but poor in presentation. There is some good history and some alternate perspectives on the operational art and its development, but Naveh has also been criticized as being revisionist in his history. He shortchanges the Wehrmacht officers' operational thinking and is overly laudatory of the Russians. He dismisses poor Soviet performance in WWII as the result of the purges, in almost the same way as German failures were dismissed by winter, Russian material superiority and HItler's meddling, a dismissal he is critical of. Further, after discussing the operational renaissance of the Soviets in the 60s and further development in the 70s he completely ignores the Russian failures in Afghanistan, which are an interesting parallel to the US experience in Vietnam. He has also been criticized for his interpretation of the Russian operational art as overly focused on shock rather than destruction, and several citations in the book seem to indicate this as well. I did like his treatment of Clausewitz, and the cult thereof, which I found accurate. His discussion of the reformers like Lind and Boyd was also accurate and relevant.
Overall, worth looking into for the methodology he uses and the different perspectives, but is a slow, dry read with some dubious conclusions.
The content is decent but poor in presentation. There is some good history and some alternate perspectives on the operational art and its development, but Naveh has also been criticized as being revisionist in his history. He shortchanges the Wehrmacht officers' operational thinking and is overly laudatory of the Russians. He dismisses poor Soviet performance in WWII as the result of the purges, in almost the same way as German failures were dismissed by winter, Russian material superiority and HItler's meddling, a dismissal he is critical of. Further, after discussing the operational renaissance of the Soviets in the 60s and further development in the 70s he completely ignores the Russian failures in Afghanistan, which are an interesting parallel to the US experience in Vietnam. He has also been criticized for his interpretation of the Russian operational art as overly focused on shock rather than destruction, and several citations in the book seem to indicate this as well. I did like his treatment of Clausewitz, and the cult thereof, which I found accurate. His discussion of the reformers like Lind and Boyd was also accurate and relevant.
Overall, worth looking into for the methodology he uses and the different perspectives, but is a slow, dry read with some dubious conclusions.
April 7, 2022
One of the biggest intellectual shift in military thinking over the 20th century is the creation of the Operational Level of war. If 'tactics' involve the standard battle, and 'strategy' reflects the politician deciding when and how to fight an adversary, then 'operations' - so the theory goes - connect the various battles to the broad strategic goals of the war.
Beyond simply recognising the need to link the parts to the whole, Operational thinkers as Naveh extensively details, have come to see in this level a new way of fighting. Moving beyond the mere destruction of the adversary (killing as many as possible in each battle) many saw operational activity as a way of targeting our actions to 'shock' the adversary's system, so that they neither want to, nor are able to keep fighting. It's the surgeon's scalpel instead of the butcher's cleaver approach to war.
Tracing these twin logics across the Russian, German and American experience, Naveh provides a history and bold advocacy of the operational level and way of fighting. While the book wears the garb of a scholarly, scientific analysis, this is a book of advocacy. Naveh has his heroes (especially the early 20th century Russian strategists such as Tukhachevskii) and his villans (dismissing much of Blitzkrig and any US Generals who resisted the Operational/Maneuver reformers). Much of the book is also dressed in 'systems' thinking, though it's not always clear how much this is genuinely informing the logic developed throughout.
You'll learn a lot about how operations actually proceed. Naveh's history of Blitzkrig is not the full story, but he correctly punctures many of the myths highlighting the gambles rather than genius inherent within much of its activity. Likewise, he's very good on highlighting how actions such as maneuver, often portrayed as relying on nothing more than pure speed, actually critically depend on some very slow elements - from infantry preceding the tanks, to 'hold' actions which fix an adversary in order to then enable the 'strike'. You have to work through the arguments slowly, but you'll come away realising how much the story of 'get good tech and go fast' we're often told is simply ignorant bullshit.
In 1997 the Operational level was still on the rise, seemingly vindicated by Desert Storm and informing the 'transformational' agenda of the coming Bush Administration in the US. Today however, this book shows its age. First, because Naveh's writing is verbose and overly complex. This may lend an aura of intellectual weight, but it left me suspecting he wasn't as clear in understanding his ideas as he claimed. I'd love to read a similar history by someone who could write clearly and wasn't as fervent in their advocacy.
Second, the luster of the operational level has been slowly punctured. Some times directly (such as B.A Friedman's excellent 'On Operations'), often indirectly, as the actual results of Operational approaches have fallen short of expectations. The US' 'Shock and Awe' campaign against Saddam in 2003 produced neither. 'Effects Based Operations' can't seem to produce the effects they claim. The unintended problems of this level have also become increasingly apparent, diverging military practice from civilian guidance, interfering with both good strategy and appropriate management and oversight of war.
This isn't to say the Operational level of war doesn't have it's place. The 'Operational Art' as Friedman argues, is essential. Indeed though Naveh is quick to throw punches at the dead prussian, Clausewitz' own definition of strategy as 'the use of the engagement for the purposes of the war' is effectively an operational-level effort to link tactical actions to strategic goals. Such coordination is a critical skill. Yet the optimism about what Operational thinking can provide, both in terms of its distinctiveness and decisiveness seem highly questionable these days.
I found this a worthwhile read. It was however a slog, one I put down several times to read other things. Still, you'll learn a lot in the book and its footnotes, and as a work of a moment in time, presenting a particular view as strongly and passionately as its advocates could muster, it retains of value.
Beyond simply recognising the need to link the parts to the whole, Operational thinkers as Naveh extensively details, have come to see in this level a new way of fighting. Moving beyond the mere destruction of the adversary (killing as many as possible in each battle) many saw operational activity as a way of targeting our actions to 'shock' the adversary's system, so that they neither want to, nor are able to keep fighting. It's the surgeon's scalpel instead of the butcher's cleaver approach to war.
Tracing these twin logics across the Russian, German and American experience, Naveh provides a history and bold advocacy of the operational level and way of fighting. While the book wears the garb of a scholarly, scientific analysis, this is a book of advocacy. Naveh has his heroes (especially the early 20th century Russian strategists such as Tukhachevskii) and his villans (dismissing much of Blitzkrig and any US Generals who resisted the Operational/Maneuver reformers). Much of the book is also dressed in 'systems' thinking, though it's not always clear how much this is genuinely informing the logic developed throughout.
You'll learn a lot about how operations actually proceed. Naveh's history of Blitzkrig is not the full story, but he correctly punctures many of the myths highlighting the gambles rather than genius inherent within much of its activity. Likewise, he's very good on highlighting how actions such as maneuver, often portrayed as relying on nothing more than pure speed, actually critically depend on some very slow elements - from infantry preceding the tanks, to 'hold' actions which fix an adversary in order to then enable the 'strike'. You have to work through the arguments slowly, but you'll come away realising how much the story of 'get good tech and go fast' we're often told is simply ignorant bullshit.
In 1997 the Operational level was still on the rise, seemingly vindicated by Desert Storm and informing the 'transformational' agenda of the coming Bush Administration in the US. Today however, this book shows its age. First, because Naveh's writing is verbose and overly complex. This may lend an aura of intellectual weight, but it left me suspecting he wasn't as clear in understanding his ideas as he claimed. I'd love to read a similar history by someone who could write clearly and wasn't as fervent in their advocacy.
Second, the luster of the operational level has been slowly punctured. Some times directly (such as B.A Friedman's excellent 'On Operations'), often indirectly, as the actual results of Operational approaches have fallen short of expectations. The US' 'Shock and Awe' campaign against Saddam in 2003 produced neither. 'Effects Based Operations' can't seem to produce the effects they claim. The unintended problems of this level have also become increasingly apparent, diverging military practice from civilian guidance, interfering with both good strategy and appropriate management and oversight of war.
This isn't to say the Operational level of war doesn't have it's place. The 'Operational Art' as Friedman argues, is essential. Indeed though Naveh is quick to throw punches at the dead prussian, Clausewitz' own definition of strategy as 'the use of the engagement for the purposes of the war' is effectively an operational-level effort to link tactical actions to strategic goals. Such coordination is a critical skill. Yet the optimism about what Operational thinking can provide, both in terms of its distinctiveness and decisiveness seem highly questionable these days.
I found this a worthwhile read. It was however a slog, one I put down several times to read other things. Still, you'll learn a lot in the book and its footnotes, and as a work of a moment in time, presenting a particular view as strongly and passionately as its advocates could muster, it retains of value.
June 18, 2024
Shockingly bad. An empty concept larded with postmodern jargon and turgid prose. Some of the worst howlers:
-He contrasts linear tactics with nonlinear systems. To clarify: "linear" tactics means an army deployed in a line, "nonlinear" systems are characterized by certain mathematical properties - the two have nothing to do with each other. Yet he takes the fact that 20th-century armies were deployed in DEPTH (i.e. not in a line) to mean they're NONLINEAR systems.
-He then makes many references to complexity theory (in which nonlinear systems play a major role), without ever connecting it to military operations in a meaningful way.
-He plagiarizes an entire set of endnotes from Rudolf Steiger’s 'Armour Tactics in the Second World War' (these naturally don't support the text).
This is not to mention the many factual errors throughout, small and large. Naveh is a total fraud.
-He contrasts linear tactics with nonlinear systems. To clarify: "linear" tactics means an army deployed in a line, "nonlinear" systems are characterized by certain mathematical properties - the two have nothing to do with each other. Yet he takes the fact that 20th-century armies were deployed in DEPTH (i.e. not in a line) to mean they're NONLINEAR systems.
-He then makes many references to complexity theory (in which nonlinear systems play a major role), without ever connecting it to military operations in a meaningful way.
-He plagiarizes an entire set of endnotes from Rudolf Steiger’s 'Armour Tactics in the Second World War' (these naturally don't support the text).
This is not to mention the many factual errors throughout, small and large. Naveh is a total fraud.
August 17, 2013
Great overall review of operational evolution. A few intellectual gems. Sometimes naveh over intellectualizes, which leads to a few long moments. I really appreciated the references which led me to buy a few books
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews