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Three Armies in Britain: The Irish Campaign of Richard II and the Usurpation of Henry IV, 1397-1399
This work reexamines the political and military aspects of the Revolution of 1399. It argues that Henry of Lancaster was not the ""all conquering"" hero of 1399 and that Richard II worked with all his faculties to outmaneuver his cousin politically rather than simply accept his fate and deposition with resignation.
- GenresMedieval
300 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
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February 6, 2019
I think the subtitle of this book should have been reversed; events surrounding the usurpation of Richard II got much more attention than the Irish Campaign. Regardless, I found this book to be incredibly helpful. Instead of just reiterating what the chroniclers said, the author went to the trouble of looking at logistics, counting the days, and even consulting the stages of the moon to determine whether there was enough light for an army to march at night. I’ve always been frustrated when historians relate what must be impossible feats, forgetting to take into consideration bad roads, terrible weather, and plain old fatigue. Not only this, Douglas Biggs gives us many considerations relevant to Richard’s disaster. For instance, he reminds us that Richard took his most accomplished military leaders and best trained men-at-arms to Ireland with him—as well as his most loyal adherents. What he left behind were the Lancastrian sympathizers:
“The military situation facing Henry in the early summer of 1399 must have seemed little short of divinely appointed. Richard had recruited an army for Ireland so large that it had to be assembled in stages. The king had drained much of the country of its military resources, and it was well known he would be out of the country for an extended period of time and could not return quickly in force. Although Henry’s late-father’s estates had been divided in keeping among Richard II’s chief supporters, few of Gaunt’s or Henry’s retainers or estate-officials had traveled to Ireland with the king or been removed from their offices and positions by their new lords. Thus, most Lancastrians remained in England, and the lords who had received forfeited Lancastrian estates from Richard in early 1399 had largely left the keeping of these ex-Lancastrian estates in the hands of Gaunt’s men, quite probably for sake of administrative continuity,
who—as events proved—were staunchly loyal to the house of Lancaster.”
When put this way, it’s no surprise that Bolingbroke accrued overwhelming support so quickly. Most of his followers came from Gaunt’s widespread affinity; many of the men in the Lancastrian estates had much to lose once Richard’s supporters gained control, and much to gain if Henry were to retrieve his patrimony. According to the author, many of Henry’s castles and towns were already set up to receive him, even before he landed at Bridlington. There is evidence that much correspondence was traded back and forth across the Channel in the months preceding Henry’s crossing. Once Richard received word of Bolingbroke’s invasion, he had to collect at least a portion of his army, summon ships, and establish an administration to handle things in Ireland before he could consider returning. That was a lot of time wasted. And once he decided to sail to south Wales, events had already progressed way beyond his ability to track them. In essence, much of Richard’s failure can be traced to logistics, poor communications, and bad luck rather than any great political or military brilliance that Henry was supposed to have possessed. This book was decidedly pro-Ricardian, and though the author didn’t hesitate to discuss the King’s errors in judgment, he also defended military decisions that were often derided by many historians. Overall I thought it was a fair and balanced approach.
“The military situation facing Henry in the early summer of 1399 must have seemed little short of divinely appointed. Richard had recruited an army for Ireland so large that it had to be assembled in stages. The king had drained much of the country of its military resources, and it was well known he would be out of the country for an extended period of time and could not return quickly in force. Although Henry’s late-father’s estates had been divided in keeping among Richard II’s chief supporters, few of Gaunt’s or Henry’s retainers or estate-officials had traveled to Ireland with the king or been removed from their offices and positions by their new lords. Thus, most Lancastrians remained in England, and the lords who had received forfeited Lancastrian estates from Richard in early 1399 had largely left the keeping of these ex-Lancastrian estates in the hands of Gaunt’s men, quite probably for sake of administrative continuity,
who—as events proved—were staunchly loyal to the house of Lancaster.”
When put this way, it’s no surprise that Bolingbroke accrued overwhelming support so quickly. Most of his followers came from Gaunt’s widespread affinity; many of the men in the Lancastrian estates had much to lose once Richard’s supporters gained control, and much to gain if Henry were to retrieve his patrimony. According to the author, many of Henry’s castles and towns were already set up to receive him, even before he landed at Bridlington. There is evidence that much correspondence was traded back and forth across the Channel in the months preceding Henry’s crossing. Once Richard received word of Bolingbroke’s invasion, he had to collect at least a portion of his army, summon ships, and establish an administration to handle things in Ireland before he could consider returning. That was a lot of time wasted. And once he decided to sail to south Wales, events had already progressed way beyond his ability to track them. In essence, much of Richard’s failure can be traced to logistics, poor communications, and bad luck rather than any great political or military brilliance that Henry was supposed to have possessed. This book was decidedly pro-Ricardian, and though the author didn’t hesitate to discuss the King’s errors in judgment, he also defended military decisions that were often derided by many historians. Overall I thought it was a fair and balanced approach.
Displaying 1 of 1 review