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A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s
During the 1970s, American foreign policy faced a predicament of clashing imperatives-US decision makers, already struggling to maintain stability and devise strategic frameworks to guide the exercise of American power during the Cold War, found themselves hampered by the emergence of dilemmas that would come to a head in the post-Cold War era. Their choices proved to be of enormous consequence for the development of American foreign policy in the final decades of the twentieth century and beyond.
In A Superpower Transformed , Daniel J. Sargent chronicles how policymakers across three administrations worked to manage complex international changes in a tumultuous era. Drawing on many newly-released archival documents and interviews with key figures, including President Jimmy Carter and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sargent explores the collision of geopolitics and globalization that defined the decade. From the Nixon administration's efforts to stabilize a faltering Pax Americana; to Henry Kissinger's attempts to devise new strategies to manage or mitigate the consequences of economic globalization after the oil crisis of 1973-74; to the Carter administration's embrace of human rights promotion as a central task for foreign policy, Sargent explores the challenges that afflicted US policymakers in the 1970s, offering new insights into the complexities that emerged as the new forces of globalization and human rights transformed the United States as a superpower.
A sweeping reinterpretation of a pivotal era, A Superpower Transformed is a must-read for anyone interested in U.S. foreign relations, American politics, globalization, economic policy, human rights, and contemporary American history.
In A Superpower Transformed , Daniel J. Sargent chronicles how policymakers across three administrations worked to manage complex international changes in a tumultuous era. Drawing on many newly-released archival documents and interviews with key figures, including President Jimmy Carter and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Sargent explores the collision of geopolitics and globalization that defined the decade. From the Nixon administration's efforts to stabilize a faltering Pax Americana; to Henry Kissinger's attempts to devise new strategies to manage or mitigate the consequences of economic globalization after the oil crisis of 1973-74; to the Carter administration's embrace of human rights promotion as a central task for foreign policy, Sargent explores the challenges that afflicted US policymakers in the 1970s, offering new insights into the complexities that emerged as the new forces of globalization and human rights transformed the United States as a superpower.
A sweeping reinterpretation of a pivotal era, A Superpower Transformed is a must-read for anyone interested in U.S. foreign relations, American politics, globalization, economic policy, human rights, and contemporary American history.
452 pages, Hardcover
First published December 1, 2014
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About the author
Daniel J. Sargent
5 books5 followersDaniel Sargent is Associate Professor of History at the University of California Berkeley.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
September 22, 2024
This book is a great read to understand the politics (more than the economics) behind the crisis of the ’70s and the rethinking of imperial USA as its economic dominancy was decaying. The author focuses on two major shifts: Economically, the breakdown of Bretton woods, the advent of global finance, and the turn to monetary discipline in the global capitalist order. Politically, the shifts in geopolitical diplomacy from the Cold War to the acceptance of global interdependence, the rise of human rights-thinking, and eventually… the perseverance of Cold War thinking when a new global order could not be forged.
Economically, the breakdown of the USA’s commitment to Bretton Woods was linked to the decline of USA trade balance, and the dangers it was exposed to in an age when Eurodollar markets in London started flushing capital between nations, exacerbating the vulnerabilities of stable exchange rates. Nixon already said at the end of the ‘60s that “the deficit in our balance of payments is matched by a mounting deficit in our balance of influence.” (p. 37) And “Unless we’re number one economically, we can’t be number one politically” (p. 101) Indeed, the USA was forced to choose, for the first time, between policy goals. It had to descale its military presence in multiple conflicts because it simply could not pay for them anymore. Something had to change, and Nixon forced the hands of his allies (who were unwilling to devalue the dollar) by suspending convertibility. Although he intended to reshuffle Bretton Woods rather than discard it fully, history was made.
On the ruins of Bretton Woods, amidst inflation and global short term capital flows, the European states started integrating faster to create stability for themselves. In this context, the Carter administration was the last administration that tried to reimpose a global capitalist order steered by nations rather than markets. He was the last one that tried to recreate a global Keynesian program in a new setting of the seven leading capitalist economies having an informal chat: the G7, which was thus essentially a new way of cooperating in a world where the USA tried to reimpose its hegemony where it no longer had economic dominance. Together with Labour prime minister Callaghan, Carter tried to push surplus countries Japan and West-Germany to start spending, so that the other countries could flourish and find balance. Especially West-Germany refused to do this. Although it initially seemed like happening after the G7 Bonn meeting in 1978, new speculations against the dollar and the new oil shock after the Iranian Revolution pushed countries into national solutions accepting the global market pressures, who were essentially pushing them into monetary and fiscal discipline. This shift happened within the Carter administration, in his November 1978 plan to rescue the dollar from devaluating too much. He now shifted too discipline in monetary affairs, sacrificing economic expansion (which Nixon thought it would get in flexible exchange rates) for international monetary stability. Reagan would only push this discours of disciplining further, he did not invent it.
And so the world after Bretton Woods became a global capitalist order steered by markets rather than governments. This was best captured by the author on page 276: “Back in 1971, Nixon had subordinated international monetary stability to domestic economic expansion. Eight years later, Carter reversed Nixon’s priorities. Leaving multilateral Keynesianism behind, Carter embraced the politics of adjustment – much as Great Britain had done during the IMF crisis of 1976. External circumstances now defined the parameters of domestic choice, even for the United States.”
You should also read this book to really appreciate what a cynic, evil Machiavellian Kissinger was. A funny quote here from him was: “When you really study it, the nightmare of it is that no one caused World War I.” (p. 146)
Economically, the breakdown of the USA’s commitment to Bretton Woods was linked to the decline of USA trade balance, and the dangers it was exposed to in an age when Eurodollar markets in London started flushing capital between nations, exacerbating the vulnerabilities of stable exchange rates. Nixon already said at the end of the ‘60s that “the deficit in our balance of payments is matched by a mounting deficit in our balance of influence.” (p. 37) And “Unless we’re number one economically, we can’t be number one politically” (p. 101) Indeed, the USA was forced to choose, for the first time, between policy goals. It had to descale its military presence in multiple conflicts because it simply could not pay for them anymore. Something had to change, and Nixon forced the hands of his allies (who were unwilling to devalue the dollar) by suspending convertibility. Although he intended to reshuffle Bretton Woods rather than discard it fully, history was made.
On the ruins of Bretton Woods, amidst inflation and global short term capital flows, the European states started integrating faster to create stability for themselves. In this context, the Carter administration was the last administration that tried to reimpose a global capitalist order steered by nations rather than markets. He was the last one that tried to recreate a global Keynesian program in a new setting of the seven leading capitalist economies having an informal chat: the G7, which was thus essentially a new way of cooperating in a world where the USA tried to reimpose its hegemony where it no longer had economic dominance. Together with Labour prime minister Callaghan, Carter tried to push surplus countries Japan and West-Germany to start spending, so that the other countries could flourish and find balance. Especially West-Germany refused to do this. Although it initially seemed like happening after the G7 Bonn meeting in 1978, new speculations against the dollar and the new oil shock after the Iranian Revolution pushed countries into national solutions accepting the global market pressures, who were essentially pushing them into monetary and fiscal discipline. This shift happened within the Carter administration, in his November 1978 plan to rescue the dollar from devaluating too much. He now shifted too discipline in monetary affairs, sacrificing economic expansion (which Nixon thought it would get in flexible exchange rates) for international monetary stability. Reagan would only push this discours of disciplining further, he did not invent it.
And so the world after Bretton Woods became a global capitalist order steered by markets rather than governments. This was best captured by the author on page 276: “Back in 1971, Nixon had subordinated international monetary stability to domestic economic expansion. Eight years later, Carter reversed Nixon’s priorities. Leaving multilateral Keynesianism behind, Carter embraced the politics of adjustment – much as Great Britain had done during the IMF crisis of 1976. External circumstances now defined the parameters of domestic choice, even for the United States.”
You should also read this book to really appreciate what a cynic, evil Machiavellian Kissinger was. A funny quote here from him was: “When you really study it, the nightmare of it is that no one caused World War I.” (p. 146)
December 16, 2020
I forgot how good this book is.
I read several chapters in undergrad for a U.S. in the World course. Revisited it and it really is an excellent survey. Previous reviewers have knocked it for being boring but I found it to be a really approachable and enjoyable text. (That's probably because of the drivel that I have to slog through).
I read several chapters in undergrad for a U.S. in the World course. Revisited it and it really is an excellent survey. Previous reviewers have knocked it for being boring but I found it to be a really approachable and enjoyable text. (That's probably because of the drivel that I have to slog through).
November 13, 2015
Excellent work, Professor Sargent! A faithful, detailed, and revealing portrayal of an era driven by men who sought to preserve and shape a position of global supremacy for America. Ironically, these architects more often than not found their "stories not of great power and vast agency, inscribed upon history in the realization of bold and purposeful designs, but of frustration, adaptation, and constraint," as patterns of globalization made the ability of officials to shape the fate of their nation subject to even further challenges than those faced by leaders traditionally.
April 21, 2016
Solid history of American foreign policy of the 1970s. The book focuses almost entirely on presidents and their national security advisers, including Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, and their assistants Kissinger (for N & F) and Brzezinski. It wasn't exactly an easy read, particularly the financial chapters, but impressive. The short of it: it's really hard to strategize on foreign policy. So many things come up. :-)
June 19, 2022
One of the best books I have read in a long time.
May 21, 2025
"Reinhold Niebuhr- 'Even the most powerful nations and even the wisest planner of the future, remain themselves creatures as well as creators of the historical process.' So it remained in the 1970s."(310)
Absolutely loved this and the approach Sargent takes, nicely summed up in the Niebuhr quote on the final page of the work. Sargent's central argument is that though Nixon, Kissinger, Carter, and Brzezinski(the central figures of this work) all had grand strategies to remake world order, the world had other ideas. What happened instead was adaptation to the realities of a globalizing world. I appreciate how Sargent points out how this process played out in reverse order in the Nixon/Ford and Carter administrations. Nixon and Kissinger looked to prioritize geopolitics and the Cold War, and had to adapt to the more complex forces of decolonization, financial globalization, and the rise of a transnational human rights agenda. Meanwhile, Carter and Brzezinski looked to transcend the Cold War and instead focus on the complexities of the world. However, the Cold War returned with a vengeance in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Carter ended up emulating containment strategies and rhetoric of the High Cold War.
I also buy Sargent's argument that the 1970s were the hinge decade for the world going forward, and we are still dealing with the transition in monetary paradigms, the rise of human rights today, and the US military pivot obviously even more so than with the now concluded Cold War. Sargent also pulls off an impressive feat here, writing monetary history in a clear and even entertaining fashion. I also appreciate how he balances the structural failures of the Bretton Woods system with the importance of decisions made by individuals, President Nixon, first and foremost. This approach continues into the rise of the floating system that we still operate under today.
Finally, I appreciate Sargent's emphasis on oil, and how important the two oil shocks of the 1970s were to everything- the economic crises throughout the industrialized world, and Brzezinski's emphasis on the Middle East as just as vital a strategic region to the US as Europe or East Asia. The postwar industrialized economic order ran on oil, and the Oil embargo was an absolute shock to that system, helping to end the more regulated monetary order and the Keynesian economic paradigm throughout the West. Also great was Sargent's depiction of the Western alliance as not a static united front, but a tense alliance constantly in flux and in need of tinkering by its leader, the United States. This is a very important lesson to remember for today, with the transatlantic alliance in a moment of even more profound crisis.
If you are interested in US history, foreign policy, monetary history/neoliberalism, and so much more, please read this!
Absolutely loved this and the approach Sargent takes, nicely summed up in the Niebuhr quote on the final page of the work. Sargent's central argument is that though Nixon, Kissinger, Carter, and Brzezinski(the central figures of this work) all had grand strategies to remake world order, the world had other ideas. What happened instead was adaptation to the realities of a globalizing world. I appreciate how Sargent points out how this process played out in reverse order in the Nixon/Ford and Carter administrations. Nixon and Kissinger looked to prioritize geopolitics and the Cold War, and had to adapt to the more complex forces of decolonization, financial globalization, and the rise of a transnational human rights agenda. Meanwhile, Carter and Brzezinski looked to transcend the Cold War and instead focus on the complexities of the world. However, the Cold War returned with a vengeance in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Carter ended up emulating containment strategies and rhetoric of the High Cold War.
I also buy Sargent's argument that the 1970s were the hinge decade for the world going forward, and we are still dealing with the transition in monetary paradigms, the rise of human rights today, and the US military pivot obviously even more so than with the now concluded Cold War. Sargent also pulls off an impressive feat here, writing monetary history in a clear and even entertaining fashion. I also appreciate how he balances the structural failures of the Bretton Woods system with the importance of decisions made by individuals, President Nixon, first and foremost. This approach continues into the rise of the floating system that we still operate under today.
Finally, I appreciate Sargent's emphasis on oil, and how important the two oil shocks of the 1970s were to everything- the economic crises throughout the industrialized world, and Brzezinski's emphasis on the Middle East as just as vital a strategic region to the US as Europe or East Asia. The postwar industrialized economic order ran on oil, and the Oil embargo was an absolute shock to that system, helping to end the more regulated monetary order and the Keynesian economic paradigm throughout the West. Also great was Sargent's depiction of the Western alliance as not a static united front, but a tense alliance constantly in flux and in need of tinkering by its leader, the United States. This is a very important lesson to remember for today, with the transatlantic alliance in a moment of even more profound crisis.
If you are interested in US history, foreign policy, monetary history/neoliberalism, and so much more, please read this!
July 12, 2022
This is a very thorough and economics-focused analysis of the changes that occurred in US foreign policy during the decade of hideous interior décor, evil looking party food, every piece of Jimmy Hoffa's body being buried under a separate Steak & Ale, extremely fantastic horror and sci fi cinema, and the one time the most popular form of pop music was actually good. Like that decade itself, this foreign policy shift, therefore, was a real mixed bag of positive and negative attributes. Frank Frazetta was at his peak in this time and Iron Maiden was getting started though, so even though I am too young to have even existed in this time, I usually give it the benefit of the doubt.
The author is rigorous and engaging and offers a grand narrative from far above. Emphasizing how actual leadership is less bold vision and more struggling (with various levels of success) to meet the moment. He does, however, betray being somewhat captive to the Obama Era this was written in when he sums up Obama's election as a return to a more realist foreign policy. Ha! I wish! As I often tell people-I joined the democratic party in 2008 because of Obama and left in 2013...because of Obama.
Perhaps the most interesting new thing (for me) was the role Scoop Jackson played in constructing the humanitarian turn, serving as a kind of proto-Samantha Power. Gross. My already low opinion of the Carter Administration somehow managed to decline yet further, seeing in it the birth of so much of the sanctimonious nightmare rhetoric my own life has been bedeviled by.
The most interesting part of the book was on Ford. Ford is often overlooked in commentary both positive and negative. This book shows why that should not be the case. And no amount of awkward stumbling and falling on camera can take that away.
Now, if you will excuse me, I am off to Studio 54 to party with Sylvester and the Bee Gees.
The author is rigorous and engaging and offers a grand narrative from far above. Emphasizing how actual leadership is less bold vision and more struggling (with various levels of success) to meet the moment. He does, however, betray being somewhat captive to the Obama Era this was written in when he sums up Obama's election as a return to a more realist foreign policy. Ha! I wish! As I often tell people-I joined the democratic party in 2008 because of Obama and left in 2013...because of Obama.
Perhaps the most interesting new thing (for me) was the role Scoop Jackson played in constructing the humanitarian turn, serving as a kind of proto-Samantha Power. Gross. My already low opinion of the Carter Administration somehow managed to decline yet further, seeing in it the birth of so much of the sanctimonious nightmare rhetoric my own life has been bedeviled by.
The most interesting part of the book was on Ford. Ford is often overlooked in commentary both positive and negative. This book shows why that should not be the case. And no amount of awkward stumbling and falling on camera can take that away.
Now, if you will excuse me, I am off to Studio 54 to party with Sylvester and the Bee Gees.
December 25, 2019
Demonstrates the importance of the 1970s in setting the foundation for the modern world. Removing the U.S. off of the gold standard ended the desires of nation states to actively regulate currencies, relying more on the market. The world became dependent on Arab oil and saw the rise of interdependence, which gave power to OPEC countries, surprisingly over those of the west, demonstrating a clear danger that globalization has to powerful nation states. The U.S.'s choice to rekindle relationships with China was a bid to boost its own position in the world order by leveraging China against the USSR in the geopolitical world order, leading to the recognition of mainland China as a competitor in the global power struggle. Finally another large aspect of the 1970s was the rise of transnational movements, principally that of human rights in the Biafra conflict, transcending the typical borders of nation states and (sometimes) undermining national interest pertaining to the cold war like with détente. Great book.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
November 2, 2025
As a survey on the period and issues, I think this book does very well. It tries to assess each actor who led US foreign policy (which chiefly means Nixon, Kissinger and Carter) on their own terms. Those hoping for an ethics-led takedown of US foreign policy, or a critical rejection of academic frames (such as that waxing strains like 'human rights' discourses or Monetarism developed almost sui generis out of increased globalisation) will find themselves disappointed. The structure is pretty chronological, and many topics receive merely a cursory examination within a larger narrative, but Sargent pays particular attention to high-stakes multilateral conferences and the US' perspective on the G6 and UN in this period. I would have appreciated much more on the burgeoning partnership with Saudi as the US' relationships with Israel, Egypt and Iran changed, and significantly more on the economic exchanges with Japan during the Nixon Shock, but that would disturb the scope of this text.
August 14, 2024
Moving beyond politics and personalities , Sargent illuminates the complexity of Superpower USA steering its way through a changing world in the 1970 s with differences in major factors the post WW II US had not faced The book is superb at unwinding the knots presented to each administration.
February 1, 2025
It's a foreign policy book. If that's your jam, it'll be better than three stars. Cool to learn about the 70s and watch events flow between the three administrators. But there are some very dry parts. As someone that isn't already deeply immersed in the topics discussed, it's not the easiest read.
October 10, 2025
Saggio scritto molto bene che analizza i cambiamenti strutturali del sistema internazionale negli anni '70 dal punto di vista politico finanziario e umanitario con le amministrazioni americane che hanno dovuto cambiare postura rispetto alle loro grandi strategie. Consigliato
February 1, 2015
A tremendous accomplishment.
May 9, 2016
If you believe in the existence of strategy, this book is a must read. If you do not though....
Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews